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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of a critical analysis of John Hick's post-Copernican 
pluralistic hypothesis in the light of the Buddha's attitude towards other 
groups in the Nik5yas. It begins with a Survey of soi-ne of the 
methodological problerns that arise both wheii engaging in a cross- 
cultural comparison and when dealing with primary texts. The first 
chapter introduces and SUI-nmarises the thought of John Hick, focussing 
mainly on his pluralistic hypothesis. The second chapter consists of a 
brief introduction to the historical and cultural background of the 
Buddha's world, and the other groups that lie Would have encountered. 
There is a short SLli-ni-nary of the Buddha's teachings to provide a context 
for the rest of the thesis. The t1iird chapter focLises oil how liberation is 
defined in Buddhist teriiis by coiiiparing the qualities of those who are 
guaranteed liberatioii aiid those who are not. Tills elLiCidates what criteria 
must be ftilfilled in order to gain liberation; these criteria of practice are 
crystallised in the noble eightfold path. The fourth chapter contains a 
(discussion of 
the role of view in tile liberation process, and distinguishes 
between two different forins of right view, the ordinary and transcendent. 
After this eniphasis oil the theoretical elei-neiits of criteria for liberation. ) 
in chapter five there is all exteiisive consideratioii of ]low tile Buddha 
dealt with other gj-oLips aiid teachings ill practice. Tills chapter 
culminates in a SLUM-nary of the Buddha's attitude towards others. In 
chapter six there is a critical aiialysis of Hick"s hypothesis Ill tile light of 
these findings fi-oin tile Buddhist tradition. It is argued that Hick's 
hypothesis is incoherent oil significant Counts and that tile Buddhist 
account presented in this thesis offers a inore coherent way of relating to 
other teachings. 
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One of the subject areas that has dominated religious studies in Western 
universities in recent decades is the issue of inter-religious dialogue and religious 
pluralism. As our society becomes increasingly multicultural and we grow in 
awareness of different global traditions, there is an increasing tendency to compare 
different world-views. The issue of the relationship between various faith traditions 
is of great importance in contemporary religious studies or cross-cultural debates. 
All religious traditions (and not just religious traditions) make claims about the 
nature of reality, each presenting itself as having insight (in very differing forms) 
into the truth of the human condition, and the way to some kind of 'salvation' and 
'liberation'. It is when these claims contradict each other that the problems arise 
- logic demands that not all of them can be completely true when understood at 
face value. It is with this fundamental difficulty that the growing area of inter-faith 
debate is concerned- what is the relationship between all these different claims - 
how can they be verified or falsified as traditions that bring 'salvation' or 
'liberation', and what criteria should be applied to establish this? How does one 
decide which claims are true, and can this be done at all? How can adherents of 
radically different traditions, with their contradictory values, co-exist peacefully" Is 
it one's duty to proselytise if one thinks one has the truth, and how can one relate 
to a missionary from another tradition who is equally certain of the truth, but 
whose version of it bears absolutely no apparent relation to one's own? Is it 
possible to affirm the truth of one's own tradition without denigrating the value of 
other traditions? 
The roots of 'pluralist society', in which different religious traditions 
regularly encounter each other, can be traced back to Hellenic classical culture. In 
Britain and Europe, strongholds of Christianity, the issue of other religions and 
how to approach them received wide public attention in the 1860's and 70's, but 
the antecedents to these inter-religious encounters occurred a long time before 
that. ' In his history of comparative religion, Sharpe explains that Hellenic classical 
culture was relatively indifferent to the existence of other religions until contacts 
with other cultures became more extensive, prompting description of the beliefs 
and practices of the 'barbarians' that were encountered. Ionic philosophers saýý 
I See E. Sharpe. Comparative Rel(gion: A Histoýv (Londoil. Duckworth. 1975). 
4 
5 
religious practices of other cultures more as objects of curiosity than as rival 
systems. However, this Hellenic attitude of 'Intellectual hospitality' contrasted 
sharply with the intolerance and exclusiveness found in the Judeo-Christian 
2 tradition. Sharpe argues that the more intolerant attitude associated with the 
Christian tradition had its roots in the history of Israel, where the worship of 
Yahweh was considered threatened by the worship of other gods. As a result, the 
Jewish tradition was polemical in its response to other religions, and the Christian 
church adopted a similar attitude. There is a long history of Christian encounters 
with other religious traditions: in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
Christian crusades were launched against Islam and Judaism. In the Renaissance, a 
revival of interest in classical cultures, including Greek mythology, led to a greater 
awareness of 'rival' traditions. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
missionary contacts with the Far East, India and China brought an awareness of 
'Eastern' religious traditions, such as Confucianism in addition to the gradual 
discovery of Buddhism. ' This is testified by the existence of seventeenth century 
translations of Chinese texts, and various books about the new-found religions of 
the world. Sharpe identifies the nineteenth century as a time of 'Indo-European 
awakening' in which European cultures became fascinated by the religious 
traditions of India. This century saw the translation of the Upani5ads, for example, 
and in 1814 the creation of the first Chair of Sanskrit in Paris. Philosophers such 
as Schopenhauer had a strong influence in popularising the Upaniýads, for 
example, whilst Buddhist texts began to be translated into European languages. 
In the present century, increases in communication, immigration and travel 
have continued this process of inter-religious encounter that has such ancient roots. 
In Europe there have inevitably been numerous different ways in which religious 
traditions have reacted with each other. In an attempt to sort and categorise these 
various responses, theologians and philosophers of religion have developed a 
theoretical meta-language to facilitate analysis of the inter-religious debate. Since 
Europe has been a predominantly Christian culture, these responses and theories 
tend to be grounded in the Christian tradition. One of the best-known and most 
popularly used analyses in the field of modern Western religious studies is the 
three-fold typology of inclusivism, exclusivism and pluralism. This typology was 
first introduced by John Farquhar in 19134, and revived in terms of the 
2E. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 7. 
3 See I W. de Jong. Hjstoýv of Buchihist Studies in Europe (Varanasi. Bliarat Bliarati. 1976). who 
charts the development oil Western interest in Buddhism from Alexander the Great to the present 
day. 
4John Farquhar. The Crown qfHinduisln (Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1913). 
5 
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contemporary inter-faith debate by Alan Race'. It has been widely adopted as a 
means of categorising and understanding how different religious adherents cope 
with the truth-claims from other traditions, or sub-sets within traditions. The term 
4pluralism' in particular has worked its way into the contemporary theological 
consciousness, having been championed by influential modern ph1losophers of 
religion, most notably John Hick. 6 
The categories of this three-fold typology can be summarlsed as follows: 
Exclusivism holds that only one single religion or revelation is true, and all 
others are false. As D'Costa explains, an important distinguishing characteristic of 
this position is that "truth, revelation and salvation are tightly and explicitly 
connected. "7 Inclusivists, on the other hand, claim that only one tradition or 
revelation is true, but that nevertheless other religions can have a partial or 
incomplete understanding of the truth and therefore salvation, and are thus not to 
be totally dismissed. The yardstick for judging the truth and salvific efficacy of 
other religions or denominations is provided by the one true tradition - other 
religions are considered truthful insofar as they do not contradict the truth found 
within the 'true' tradition, but in some sense, reflect and endorse it. Finally 
pluralism describes the opinion that all the major religious traditions have a partial 
and incomplete understanding of truth and thus salvation, but none is in a position 
to claim the definitive truth, which transcends human understanding. They are all, 
therefore, partially true manifestations of the Transcendent, and as such have equal 
validity. This typology will be returned to in greater depth in chapter one. 
In this thesis I intend to focus upon the 'pluralist' paradigm. This is 
because one of my aims is to compare a 'Western', 'Christian-based' paradigm for 
understanding and approaching other religions with the attitude found in the Pali 
Nik5yas of early Buddhism. Unlike exclusivism and inclusivism, pluralism argues 
that all religions (with some qualifications) are equal, but this equality is enabled by 
the fact that they all offer partial, incomplete versions of the truth. It thus 'speaks 
for' other religions, describing 'on their behalf the actual nature of their truth 
claims. Exclusivism and inclusivism also speak for other religions, however, for an 
exclusivist or inclusivist, it would not matter if representatives of the religion being 
described were to object to such 'spokesmanship' as inaccurate and at odds with 
5AIan Race, Christians and Reljýgious Pluralism (Second Edition, London, SCM, 1993). See in 
particular pp. 10- 105 for an outline of Race's threefold typology, and pp. 152-167 for a discussion 
of developments in the field since Race first put fonvard his thesis in 1983. 
6For example, John Hick'sAn Interpretation of Rehgion: human responses to the tral)scenclent 
(London. Macmillan, 1989). 
7Gavin D'Costa, "The Impossibilit-Y of a PILirahst View of Religions-, Religious Suidies 32. 
1996, pp. 223-232. 
6 
7 
their own self-understanding. It would not matter because one of the underlying 
assumptions of both inclusivsm and exclusivism is that the 'home tradition' from 
which other traditions are being judged is somehow more 'true', and in a better 
position to make accurate judgements, than the traditions which they are judging. 
This is not the case with pluralism, however; it maintains that all the main religious 
traditions come from a position of epistemic equality. All religions are equal, no 
one tradition is nearer to the truth than any other. In not denigrating the claims of 
other traditions, pluralism seeks to be acceptable to them. The implication here, 
then, is that a strong pluralist hypothesis should be as acceptable to a Buddhist as it 
is to a Muslim or a Christian. If this is shown tiol to be the case, then surely the 
pluralist hypothesis will have failed, for if it includes one tradition to the exclusion 
of another it becomes a sort of exclusivism or inclusivism. In other words, it 
denies the truth-claims and self-understandings of the traditions described in favour 
of the theories of the observer, or of another tradition. One of my aims in this 
thesis is to 'test' a pluralist hypothesis - in this case, one from a contemporary 
Christian theologian - by comparing it with the self-understanding of a Buddhist 
tradition. 
There are many different forms of pluralism, for the purposes of clarity and 
focus in this thesis I will focus on just one form, evinced by the popular British 
theologian, John Hick. I have chosen Hick because he is one of the best known 
and most widely respected British pluralist phi Io sopher/theologians. I have also 
chosen his work because he often deals explicitly with Buddhism and thus provides 
specific points of comparison where his claims about what Buddhism is 'actually 
saying' can be compared to attitudes that are found in the Nikdyas. 
It is important to note that these claims arise from a Western academic and 
philosophical tradition. For example, John Hick writes from a Christian 
background, and from within a Western philosophical tradition. For example, as 
we shall seen in chapter one, Hick's thought is strongly influenced by the thought 
of Immanuel Kant (see below, p. 33). Hick himself acknowledges that his work 
comes from a "Western stream of culture"', and is aware that "contemporary 
religious pluralism has arisen within and been supported by a particular historical, 
social and political context. " His theories, however, deal with non-western 
religious traditions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. In this thesis I wish to 
8john Hick, Faith and Knoirle, -ýge (Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1957). p. v The first of his 
written Nvorks. this book provides a cleir denionsm-itIon of Hick's plfflosoplijcýil liemage. In It. lie 
discusses the -problem of the miturc of religious fiiith- (p. Ix). comparing virious theological and 
Western philosophical accounts of faith and knowledge. 
9John Hick. The Rainb(mv of T aiths: critical (lialpgues on religious plitralism (London. SC M. 
1995), p. 3 1. 
/ 
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evaluate Hick's thought from the perspective of the Buddhist tradition, in order to 
understand whether Hick's hypothesis 'works' from this tradition. Hick's 
hypothesis is intended to be acceptable to all the different traditions that it 
encompasses - his aim is to explain how all the varying traditions can co-exist 
peacefully without compromising their own truth-claims or individual 
characteristics, but yet remain equally valid and true. If this aim is shown not to 
have been realised within any one of these traditions, then his hypothesis as it 
stands is problematic. My initial motivation for writing this thesis, then, was to 
consider Hick's pluralistic thesis from a 'Buddhist' perspective. 
In the present context, 'Buddhist' means the attitude found within a 
particular collection of texts, the Pali Nikdyas. The purpose of this exercise is 
twofold - firstly to establish a theory of how the Buddha viewed other religions, 
and thus to get a 'Buddhist' perspective on the inter-faith debate, and secondly to 
evaluate Hick's pluralistic hypothesis from this standpoint. 
Methodological 
There are many methodological problems that arise when undertaking a 
thesis of this type, and these will be briefly considered in this section. There are 
three main areas of difficulty. firstly, this thesis will involve some cross-cultural 
comparison by comparing an Indian culture with a European one. This is 
problematic because it is likely that the different cultural backgrounds will lead to 
different underlying assumptions and attitudes, with the result that the same word 
or concept might have a different meaning for each culture. Secondly, there is not 
only this difference in meaning provided by different cultural contexts, but a 
considerable time-difference between the century in which this thesis is written, and 
the early Buddhist culture on which it predominantly focuses. One must therefore 
be aware that texts from different eras come from fundamentally different contexts, 
and that this leads to complications and ambiguities with the discovery of meaning. 
Thirdly, the Buddhist sources on which this study is based, the Pall Nlkdyas, are 
textual sources, subject to many potential modes of interpretation which are 
influenced by the aforementioned cultural and historical factors. This raises many 
questions - which of these interpretations is 'true'. is it even possible to find a 
'true' interpretation, and what do we mean when we say an interpretation is 'true'9 
There are various contemporary debates about these issues. My intention 
in this section is not to find a definitive answer to the methodological questions 
raised. Indeed, I would sugý_Yest that no such 'definitive answers' are possible, given Zý. 171 zs 
that values and rneaninos chan(-)e according to different cultural or historical Zý - 
8 
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contexts from which they arise. Instead, I intend to demonstrate some of the 
different approaches to these issues, and finally to locate my thesis in a particular 
methodological tradition. 
Cross-cultural comparison 
One of the difficulties of cross-cultural studies is that an observer from one 
culture may bring presuppositions and deeply embedded cultural assumptions to his 
or her study of another culture and thus see meanings that are not really there. 
This is true not only cross-culturally but also across the span of time. Medieval 
European thinking, for example, saw the universe as structured by and subject to a 
divine hierarchy of supernatural forces. "From the supernatural world above 
radiated a sacred organising power which structured all their experience of space 
and time, of the world and society and the individual's life-history. "10. Contrast 
this to the modern scientific European consciousness, in which science has been 
thoroughly secularised, and understood as controlled by discoverable natural forces 
that, for most people, are religiously and morally neutral. Thus the significance 
and meaning of, for example, a thunder storm for a fourteenth century British 
woman would be radically different from its significance for a contemporary British 
woman. These issues are pertinent to the subject matter of this thesis, for 
underlying some of the debates discussed is the presupposition that 'religions' are 
discrete entities which must find a way to interact. In his book, The Alleaning and 
End of Religion", Wilfred Cantwell Smith traces the history of the term and 
concept of 'religion', and argues that it is an unhelpful term which encourages us 
to view religions as contraposed entities. He argues that there are no 'essences' to 
religious traditions. The term 'religion' covers historical, ontological, sociological 
and doctrinal aspects of meaning, rendering it impossible to define exactly what the 
'essence' of a religion is. Smith contends that the hunt for essences is a product of 
the Western philosophical tradition12, and that the notion of religion as an 
intellectual construct is the product of the enlightenmentl3. Before this, 'religion' 
referred to a personal sense of the holy, rather than referring to an objective 
phenomenon. Since the concept of 'religion' is a product of the Western tradition, 
it is not shared by other cultures. Smith points out that very few languages have a 
term for 'religion', and that, with the exception of Islam, there is no such concept 
1013on Cupitt. The Seo of Foith (London. BBC. 1985). 
"Wilfred Cantwel I Sin'th, The, ýIeoningolulEncl of Religion (London. Macm 'I lan. 1978) 
12CantNN, cll Smith. The. ýIeaning an(I End of Religion (p. 47), cites Feuerbach's Nvork. 'The Essence 
qfReligion (New York. 1878. trails. A. Loos) as the starting point for this tendency to look for 
essences. 
DCantwell Sinith, TheMenning al&End ofReligion, p. 38. 
9 
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outside Western culture. Smith argues that it would be better to drop the concept 
altogether, for it leads to misunderstandings- 
4C a Christian can come to an adequate understanding of his faith, or a 
Muslim of his, and indeed, either of them come to an understanding of 
each other's, only if he extricate himself from a concern as to the 
essence or nature of Christianity or Islam, only if he shift his attention 
away from questions such as 'What is true Christianity? % 'What is real 
Islam? ' Both the Indologist and the Hindu are seriously distracted, if 
" 14 not misled, by the notion 'Hinduism'. 
Turning explicitly to Buddhism, Smith argues that Buddhist traditions do 
have concepts of different 'groups' and 'sects' with different beliefs, but these are 
all subsumed within the religious life, and signify the doctrinal position of a 
particular community; such terms were not used in an equivalent sense to the 
modern-day concept 'religion', which suggests a discrete entity of specifically 
delineated beliefs. Speaking of the often-asked question of whether or not 
Buddhism is a religion or a philosophy, Smith argues that ancient Buddhism would 
be incapable of asking such a question, for the philosophy-religion distinction did 
not exist. This point is illustrated by Gethin when he explains that there is a 
tendency amongst Western philosophers to make comparisons between their own 
preoccupations and the Buddhist philosophical claims such as not-self and 
dependent originatiofi. In the Buddhist tradition, such concepts are not pursued 
for their own sake, but are all part of the spiritual path, whereas in Western 
philosophy issues such as causality and selfhood do not have an inherently 
creligious' connection- "The danger is that we rather too hastily translate the 
Nikdyas into terms that are more congenial to us without having first understood 
the original language. " 15 A 'case-study' of how such misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations can take place is provided in the following example by 
Gombrich- 
"In Western languages, the Buddha is presented as having taught the 
doctrine (i)ada) of 'no soul' (analn? a17). What is being denied - what 
is a soul9 Western languages are at home in the Christian cultural 
tradition. Christian theologians have differed vastly over what the soul 
is. For Aristotle, and thus for Aquinas, it is the form of the body, what 
makes a given individual person a whole rather than a mere assemblage 
14Cantwell Sinith. The. k feaning ano' E nd of Religion, p. 12. 
15Rupert Get lim. The Bueldhisf Path to. -N-akening: A Stuýv of the Bodhi-pakkiya dhamma 
(Leiden, Brill. 1992). p. 19. 
10 
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of parts. However, most Christians conceive of the soul, however 
vaguely, in a completely different way, which goes back to Plato- that 
the soul is precisely other than the body, as in the common expression 
'body and soul', and is some kind of disembodied mental, and above 
all, moral agent, which survives the body at death. But none of this has 
anything to do with the Buddha's position. He was opposing the Upani 
ýadic theory of the soul. In the Upaniýads the soul, atman, is opposed 
to both the body and the mind .... 
Once we see what the Buddha was 
arguing against, we realise that it was something very few Westerners 
have ever believed in and most have never even heard of He was 
refusing to accept that a person had an unchanging essence. Moreover, 
since he was interested in how rather than what, he was not so much 
saying that people are made of such and such components, and the soul 
is noý among them, as that people function in such and such ways, and 
to explain their functioning there is no need to posit a soul. The 
approach is pragmatic, not purely theoretical. Of course the Buddha 
claims that his pragmatism will work because it is based on correct 
assumptions, so people are bound sooner or later to discuss these 
assumptions and thus will easily slip back into theorising and 
ontology" 16 
This example warns us against the dangers of presenting the Buddha's 
teaching divorced from its Indian background and thus from the context that made 
it meaningful. 
Another similarly problematic area is the modern use of the term 
'Buddhism'. The term 'Buddhism' or a direct equivalent is not found anywhere in 
the Nik5yas. Indeed, Smith points out that the earliest use of the term is found in 
the West when in 1801 Isaac Schmidt wrote about 'Boudhism' 17. The introduction 
of all religious 'Isms' came in the nineteenth century when religion became reified 
as a concept. However, when one tries to identify exactly what Buddhism is, then 
it is virtually impossible to define an essence, for the term could refer to the many 
different forms of the tradition, to all the lives of people who have lived under the 
name of Buddhism, to the history of the tradition, and to the personal unseen faith 
that prompts an individual's conduct. Similarly, we cannot be guided by 
16Richard Gonibrich. How Bud(lhisln Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the EarIv Teachings 
(London, Althoric Press. 1990). p. 15. 
17Cant%vcll Smith. The. 11teaning al7d End of Religion, p. 6 1. See also Philip Almond. The British 
Discoveýv of Buddhism (Cambridge. Cambridgc University Press. 1988). who charis the effect of 
the discoverý' of Buddhism oil Victorian Britain. and how this plaved a seminal role in "the 
development of a contemporary \Vestern religious pluralism. " (p. lx) 
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Buddhist's own 'self-definition'- "We cannot decide to call Buddhism whatever the 
Buddhists themselves have called that for, as we haý, e seen, they have been 
innocent of such a concept. "18 
A similar point is made by Cabez6n in his discussion of the discipline of 
Buddhist studies: 
"Buddhism is itself an artificial construct whose apparent unity and 
solidity begins to crumble almost immediately upon analysis. Is 
Buddhism text-based doctrine or behaviour-based praxis9 Is it what 
the clergy does or what lay people do? What was done then or what is 
done now? What happens in Tibet or Japan? Of course, it is all of 
these things, but that is tantamount to admitting the multivalent 
character of our subject matter. To say that we all work on Buddhism 
is not to point the finger at similarity but at difference. "19 
What is the relevance of this discussion for the present thesis? Firstly it 
demonstrates the naivety of supposing that one can discover an ancient Buddhist 
attitude towards the modern inter-faith debate as though the framework of the 
debate is universal and ageless, and different faith traditions can be simply 'slotted 
in' to the discussion. "one of the more serious shortcomings of the current 
methodological debate is surely its failure to take on board the full significance of 
the fact that someone brought up in the classical intellectual traditions of, say, India 
would inevitably conceive of and analyse the whole matter in rather different 
terms. 1120 Indeed, the very attempt to study an Indian tradition from the alien 
frameworks of a Western tradition can lead to anachronisms and distortions: 
"It is, perhaps, almost commonplace now to point out that there is no 
precise word for (and hence no concept of) 'religion' in Sanskrit and 
other Indian languages, or that many of the difficulties associated with 
a term such as nh-i, dýia simply disappear when we cease to try to force 
it into one neat Western metaphysical pigeonhole. "21 
In the specific case of Buddhism, examples of such difficulties are provided by 
Gombrich22 in his study of thought and practice of Therav5da Buddhism. He 
explains that as early as 1887, the Pall translator Rhys-Davids noted certain 
18Gethin. The Budc/hist Path to. Airakening. p. 48. 
19Josd Cabcz6n, "Buddlust Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Tlicorý, - in The Journal of the 
InternatiOl7al. -IýV, S-OCi(7tiOI7 of Buck/hist Stitches 18.1995. pp. 231-268. p. 240. 
20Rupert Gethin, The Budc/hist Path to. -firakening. p. 2. 
21fbid. See also EISharpc. Understal7ding Religion (London, Duckworth. 1983). pp. 43-4. 
22Rjcliard Goinbrich. Therav5da Buddhism. -A Social Histoývfirom. Ancient Benares io. Uodern 
Colombo, (London. Roulledge Kegan Paul. 1988). 
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significant differences between Christianity and Buddhism in the way that religion 
is understood: 
"Before comparing the numbers of Christians and Buddhists, it is 
necessary to decide, not only what Christianity is, and what is 
Buddhism., but also, as regards Buddhists, whether a firm belief in one 
religion should or should not, as far as statistics are concerned, be 
nullified by an equally firm belief in another. "" 
Taking up this point in the present, Gombrich explains that for ail Indian Buddhist, 
(religion' means something different to what it might perhaps mean for a British 
Christian. For example, in our Western culture, the concept of God seems 
inextricably linked with our notion of 'religion'. For ail Eastern Buddhist, 
however, gods can have nothing to do with religion, but are just part and parcel of 
a super-human power structure., 
"For Buddhists, religion is purely a matter of understanding, and 
practising the Dharnma, Understandino and practice which constitute n 
progress towards sc-cilvation. They conceive salvation - or liberation to I 
use a more Indian term as the total eradication of greed, hatred or 
delusion. To attain it is open to any human being ... 
"2' 
Buddhists who worship gods are not considered as syncretistic, for they do 
not expect these beings to bring them to nibbana. Gornbrich makes the parallel 
with the Western issues of belief in ghosts, astrology and other such supernatural 
considerations, not all beliefs about supernatural things are 'religious', and many 
Christians hold beliefs that are not derived fi-om Christianity. The only difference 
between the Buddhist and Christian cultures in this respect is where they draw the 
line between what is religious and what is not. Another difference that is 
particularly pertinent to the 'Inter-faith' debate is that Buddhists not only accept 
non-Buddhist, 'supernatural' beliefs, but in some cases accept beliefs from other 
religious traditions in addition to their own. They are said to worship "'Hindu' 
gods in Sri Lanka, while in the Far East, Japanese Buddhists are also Shintoists and 
Chinese Buddhists were also Confucianists or Taoists, or even adherents of all 
three religions. "' 
Gonibrich draws a distinction between soteriology and 'communal 
religion'. He argues that the issue of soteriology - concerned with the question 
23Rhys-Davids. Buddhis"V Being oskelCh ofthe life and wachmgs of Goutolno, the Buddho, 
(London. SPCK. 1887). 
NGonlbricli. Thcravad, l Buddhi-vill. p. 23, 
25Gombrich. 7 v, 71d(I b, 
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'What must I do to be saved" - was the prime concern of the Buddha's teaching. 
Communal religion, however, is primarily concerned with the issue of how to order 
society and solemnises patterns of action. Gombrich argues that the balance 
between these two factors can vary enormously between different religions. In the 
case of Buddhism, the Buddha was so much concerned with the soteriology aspect 
that he focused very little on wordly concerns and societal norms- "for Buddhists 
communal religion necessarily includes any attempt to better one's lot in this life by 
recourse to magic or the intervention of gods. 1126 Only those who join the Sangha 
of monks are expected to renounce the wider societal norms. Thus to be a 
Buddhist 'layman' might involve belief in various different rituals and spirits, for 
exa mple, that have nothing to do with 'Buddhism'. This contrasts dramatically 
with the Western idea of what it means to be a Christian layman; for example, a 
Christian layman would have a Christian wedding, whereas a Buddhist layman 
could have a Hindu wedding without inconsistency or incongruity. This is partly 
because Therav5da Buddhism has a much narrower view of what constitutes 
religion than the Christian, "so it is even more obvious in their case that they need 
systems of thought and action to cope with life in the world. "27 This state of 
affairs led to a much 'freer' attitude towards other religions in traditional Buddhist 
countries: 
"The classical Indian concept -a norm of communal religion - was 
that it was the duty of a layman to respect and even materially support 
all holy men, of whatever 'path', who presented themselves ... 
A holy 
man, such as a Buddhist monk, could claim disciples as followers of his 
'way', but that could not in practice preclude multiple allegiance, and 
the boundary between Buddhist and non-Buddhist laity must have been 
a hard one to trace. "28 
All these factors combine to mean that the Western understanding of 
religions as distinct and mutually exclusive entities does not sit easily with the 
ancient Buddhist traditions. The tendency of scholars educated in the Western 
academic and philosophical tradition to import and impose categories of 
understanding onto 'Eastern' cultures is the subject of continuing debate. One 
protagonist in this arena is Edward Said, who in his book, Oi-ielilali. 517i, argues that 
the study of Eastern cultures is much more influenced by Western philosophical 
sources than by the actual Eastern sources that they claim to represent, "Orientalist 
discourse is a system of representations which is primarily embedded in European 
26Goinbrich. Therav5da Buddhism. p. 26. 
27Goinbricli. Therav5da Buddhist". p. 24. 
28Gonibricli. Therav5da Buddhism. p. 29. 
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culture. "" This point is taken up by Philip Almond, who argues that 'Western' 
studies of Buddhism tend to tell us as much about the culture from which they are 
written as they do about the cultures which they investigate- 
.... Victorian interpretations of Buddhism, whether of its founder, its 
doctrines, its ethics, its social practices, or its truth and value, in 
constructing Buddhism, reveal the world in which such constructing 
took place ... 
Discourse about Buddhism provides a mirror in which is 
reflected an image not only of the Orient, but of the Victorian world 
also. 1130 
An example of the influence of contemporary European academic fashions 
on the way Buddhism is studied and presented Is found In the work of Rhys 
Davids. Rhys Davids dedicated much of his life's work to translating Pali texts and 
rendering Buddhist texts accessible to English speaking readers. His translations 
are still used in the field of Buddhist studies. His methodology was a historicist 
approach, typical of nineteenth century European and American scholarship- "This 
historicism aimed to rescue texts from conditions of misunderstanding and reveal 
their objective meaning for the first time by applying the critical methods of 
'scientific history' which could disclose the intentions of their author. "31 For 
example, in his biography of the Buddha, Rhys Davids tended to focus on the 
original texts of the three Pali Pitakas, and ignore later translations, commentaries 
or versions of the Buddha's biography within the Buddhist tradition. Hallisey 
describes the reasoning behind this understanding and demonstrates how it 
contributed to the current tendency in Buddhist studies to see the Pali Canon as 
more authoritative than later texts* 
"In this view, commentaries and translations were not the record of the 
growing understanding of a text, of the accumulation of evolving 
interpretation over the centuries; instead they were si nposts for those 19 
in the present to recover accurately the meaning that had already been 
promulgated in the past. They were instrumentally valuable, but were 
without interest in their own right.... the self-presentation of these 
commentaries and translations, in which attention is drawn away from 
the present to the past, encourages their users to approach them as 
29Edward Said. Orientolism (London. Roulledge and Kegan Paul. 1978), p. 21-2. 
30pililip C. Almond. The British Discoverv of Bud(lhism (Cambridge, Cambridge Universit-N, 
Press, 1988). pp. 5-6. 
31Charles Halliscy: -Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Therav5da Buddhism" in 
Donald S. Jr. Lopez (ed. ). Curolors of the Bu&lha, The Stucýv of Bud(lhisln under Coloniolism 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 1995). pp. 31-6 1ýp. 32. 
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provisional entrees to the 'more authoritative' texts of the Pali canon. 
... The effects of this elective affinity fell quickly into place, as can be 
seen in almost every program of Buddhist Studies in European and 
North American universities. The study of the Therav5da became 
equated with the study of the Pali canon, and it is still common for a 
student to finish a graduate program in Buddhist Studies without ever 
having read a Theravddin commentarial text. 1132 
Hallisey makes the further interesting point that Rhys Davids portrayed 
Buddhism as largely free from ritual, and suggests that this is because non- 
European cultures provided Europeans with the chance to "cultivate and enlarge 
an imagined vision of human life" as an alternative to what was currently in 
Europe: "The idea of early Buddhism was used in just this way- its definition as an 
agnostic, rationalist, ethical movement inspired those Europeans anxious to find 
alternatives to religion as a foundation for morality in everyday life"33 This is a 
point taken up by Gombrich who explains that, in his presentation of Buddhism, 
Rhys Davids "naturally stressed the rationalist elements of Buddhism, because they 
formed the most striking contrast both to Christian, and to other Indian 
traditions. 1134 
Some scholars have objected to the apparent monopoly of Western scholars 
on the study of religion, and argue that more opportunity should be given to 
'Eastern' scholars to describe their own traditions. Frank Whaling is one such 
example. Whaling cites with approval Edward Said who argues for the importance 
of recognising different traditions within their own native contexts before engaging 
in comparative exercises- "firstly we should recognise, conceptuallse and genuinely 
realise the self-awareness of different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, races 
and religions, but ... secondly we should situate them within one 
human reality. "" 
Whaling illustrates his point by citing some scholars from an Indian/non-Western 
background who have expressed dissatisfaction with the Western approaches to 
their native religious traditions. One such example is Coomaraswamy, who in his 
book Hinduism and Buddhism (1943) argued that Buddhism was poorly 
understood and translated by Western scholarship. Coomaraswamy wrote of the 
32Hallisev, "Roads Taken and Not Taken". pp. 43-4. 
33Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken". p. 45. See also Robert H. SliarE -The Zen of Japanese 
Nationalism- in Curators (ýf the Bu(Oho. pp. 107-16 1. p. 123. 
34Pjcliard Gonibrich, Buddhist Precept and Practice: Tra(litional Buddhism in the Highland5 of 
Ceylon (Oxford. Clarendon Press. 197 1), p. 6 1. 
35Frank Whaling. Contemporaýv. -Ipproaches to the Slu(ýI, of Religion: l'olume One, - The 




intuition behind Indian experience of the unity of all life, and thus saw Indian 
philosophy as "part of a perennial philosophy embodying universal truths exclusive 
to no one tradition or period. 1136 This providesjust one example of an area where 
Indian cultural presuppositions differ from the Western conception of different 
religions as forwarding competing and mutually exclusive truth claims. It is a 
sentiment that is echoed by another Eastern scholar, D. T. Suzuki- "Buddhism and 
Christianity and all other religious beliefs are not more than variations of one single 
faith, deeply embedded in the humanSOU1.1137 
Whaling analyses the thought of various non-western scholars and identifies some 
common responses to Western approaches. Firstly, commenting on Western 
approaches to their own traditions, the non-western scholars identified a need for 
Westerners to supplement their understanding of other traditions by learning from 
those within the traditions- "While generally not disapproving of the work of 
Western scholars, their suggestion is that this work needs to be supplemented by 
that of scholars belonging to the traditions themselves ... Western cultural 
presuppositions make it less easy for Westerners to understand the language and 
world-view of -the people concerned. "38 Secondly, Whaling identified a certain 
unease amongst non-western scholars about the epistemological presuppositions 
that underpin the methodological approach of Western scholars of religion: 
"Their feeling is ... that the Western tendency to stress empirical and 
rational categories derived from a science-based model makes it less 
easy for Western scholars to understand what Veddiita means to a 
Hindu, STifism to a Muslim, Zen to a Buddhist, or ancestor worship to 
an African. "39 
However, this issue is made more complicated by the fact that some of the 
Eastern scholars that Whaling cites have themselves been strongly influenced by 
'Western' methodologies. For example, we have seen how Whaling cites D. T. 
Suzuki as an example of an 'Eastern' scholar who challenges the Western 
academic conception of Buddhism. Indeed, Suzuki was largely responsible for 
introducing Zen Buddhism to the West. However, in his paper on D. T. Suzuki, 
Robert Sharf explains that, ironically, Suzuki and others who presented Zen to the 
West were in fact products of a Western academic tradition- 
36Cooniaraswainy. Hincluislit antl BlOc/hism (197 1), p. 49. cited from Frank Whaling. 
ContemporarvApproaches to the Slacli, of Religion. p. 3 99. 
37D. T. Suzuki. 1921 vol 1 156. cited from Whaling, ContemporaývApproaches to theSaidt- of 
Religion, p. 4 10. 




"The men most responsible for laying the intellectual foundation for, 
Zen in the West did not emerge from traditional Zen monastic settings. 
Rather, they were educated proponents of post-Meiji New Buddhism, 
concerned with rendering Buddhism and Zen culturally and 
intellectually respectable. Moreover, many of the Japanese 
proponents of Zen in the West were university graduates who 
successfully pursued academic careers in their own country. The 
universities in which they were trained and later taught were modelled 
on systems largely imported from the West. As students they were 
introduced to Western secular thought in general and European 
philosophy in particular, and as teachers they actively sought to 
formulate a Japanese response to the challenge posed by Western 
culture, science and technology. " 40 
He explains that these figures in fact had marginal status within the Zen 
establishment, and failed to recognise the influence of Western traditions on their 
work: "Asian apologists, convinced that Zen was making significant inroads in the 
West, failed to recognise the degree to which Zen was "theraputized" by European 
and American enthusiasts, rendering Zen, from a Buddhist point of view, part of 
the problem rather than the solution. "41 
This process of 'Insidious' Western influence was not merely confined to 
Buddhism. At the turn of the century in the many 'dialogues' that took place 
between Western (mainly Christian) scholars and 'representatives' of Asian 
traditions, 'these Asian 'representatives' were "invariably the products of European 
style educations, [who] formulated their understandings of their respective 
traditions in a European intellectual context. 1142 Sharf cites 'Hindu' thinkers such 
as Rammohan Roy and Vivekananda, as well as the Therav5da Buddhist 
Dhammapala (who represented Buddhism at the world parliament of religions in 
1893) as examples of such individuals- 
.... These Western-educated Asian intellectuals were all too ready to 
present their own spiritual heritages as paragons of enlightened, 
scientific, rational, humanistic, and universal religious creeds grounded 
in the direct experience of divine truth. The modern notion of religion 
as an appropriate cross-cultural object of scholarly investigation 
emerged directly out of this complex dialogue, in which Western 
40Robert H. Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism- in Curators of the Buddha: The Stuýv of 
Buddhism tinder Colonialism. ed. Lopez (Chicago. UnIvasily of ChIcago Press. 1995). P. 136. 
41Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nallonalism", p. 140. 
42S]iarf, "TlicZcnofJ, ipailcscN, itioii; ilisiii", p. 142. 
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investigators were ever encouraged to find their own romanticised 
notion of true or essential religion mirrored back to them by their Asian 
prot6g6s. This raises serious questions as to the very foundation of the 
secular study of comparative religion in the West ... 
"43 
In Buddhism this process of the 'Westernisation' of Buddhism has 
sometimes been called 'Protestant Buddhism'. This phrase was coined by 
Obeysekere, who defined 'Protestant Buddhism' in two ways: "(a) many of its 
norms and organisational forms are historical derivatives from Protestant 
Christianity. (b) More importantly, from the contemporary point of view, it is a 
protest against Christianity and its associated Western political dominance prior to 
independence"44R. S. Copleston, the Anglican bishop of Colombo in 1892 wrote 
of how he saw two Buddhisms in Sri Lanka; one was the 'old Buddhism of the 
past centuries' and the other, a "new revival, very self-conscious and artificial" 
which "aims indeed only at reviving what Buddhism always professed to be, but 
which has been influenced, in its estimate of that profession, very largely by 
Europeans. 1145 
Gombrich explains how this movement was not confined to Sri Lanka and 
was caused by the influence of missionaries from the West and the rise of the 
46 
middle classes in Sri Lanka. As Sharf indicated, one of the characteristics of this 
movement was the presentation of Buddhism as rational and scientific. One 
eminent example of this sort of approach is Professor Jayatilleke (whose work is 
quoted later in this thesis). Gombrich explains how in the 1960's Jayatilleke was 
seen by middle-class Sinhalese Buddhists as the leading Buddhist intellectual of the 
time- "He applied his considerable learning, intelligence and expository powers to 
proving that every major intellectual development in the modern world was 
anticipated by the Buddha. "47 
43Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Natiorialisin". p. 143. 
44 G. Obeysekerc, "Religious Symbolism and political Change in Ceylon" in ed. Ganananath 
Obyesckcre. Frank Rcynolds. Bardwcll L. Smith. The Two Wheels of Dhalmna: Essq. vs on the 
Theravida Tradition in India and Ce 
, 
vlon (Pennsylvania. Cliambersborg. 1972). pp. 58-78, p. 
62. 
See also Richard Goinbrich and Gananalli ObN, csckcrc. Buddhism Transformed: 
Religious 
Change in Sri Lanka (New Jersev. Princeton Universitv Press. 1988), pp. 202-240. 
45R. S. Copleston. Budc/hism Prilniove and Present in lqgadha and Ce. vIon (London. Longmans. 
Green& co., 1892). p. 46 1. 
46Goinbricli, TheravJda Buddhism. pp. 182 ff. Gombrich provides some ven interesting 
examples of how, under the influence of Western missionaries. Buddhists 
began to change their 
attitudes towards debating with other religions, going from a position of great tolerance to a 
tendency to argue back with a inirror-iiiiagc vigour. 
47Gornbricli, Theravida Buddhism, p. 183. 
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What is the relevance of the above discussion for this thesis9 Firstly, it 
suggests that it may be naive to suppose that simply by looking at the Pali Nik5yas 
one can find a 'Buddhist attitude towards other religions'. It would perhaps be 
more correct to say that this thesis is a Western academic interpretation of what 
Buddha (itself a concept strongly influenced by Western interpretations) might 
have thought. For as we have seen in the discussion above, the focus on the Pali 
Nikdyas, and even the notions of Buddhism and inter-faith dialogue, are the 
product of a certain history, a particular branch of the Western intellectual 
tradition. 
Texts and Meanings. 
We have examined some examples of how the agenda of this thesis and the 
subject matter it deals with is influenced by particular academic traditions. This 
raises further questions. Is it ever possible to have some idea of how the Buddha 
actually viewed other traditions, or is this a hopeless enterprise, the Buddha's 
original intentions being forever buried under year upon year, level upon level, of 
reinterpretation and recontextualisation? This relates to a broader issue when 
reading any text- can any text have an 'original meaning', and if so, how is it 
accessed? How much meaning Is in the text, and how much comes from the 
reader's background or expectations? 
In his paper oil the discipline of Buddhist Studies, Cabez6n presents the 
extremes to both sides of this debate. On the one side, there is what he describes as 
the 'positivist' view. On this view, it is possible to find the original meaning of a 
text: "it maintains that the purpose of scholarly textual investigation ... is to 
reconstruct the original text (there is otily otie best reconstruction)- to restore it 
and to contextualize it historically to the point where the author's original intention 
can be gleaned. To reconstitute the text in this way is to make it available in a 
neutral, untampered-with and pristine fashion . 
"48 The other extreme Cabez6n 
describes as 'interpretivism'. Oil this view, every element of scholarship contains 
an element of interpretation, 
"There is, for the interpretivist, no escape from subjective 
contamination, no preinterpretive moment. Interpretivists eschew the 
notion that there is a single achievable text that represents the author's 
original intention. A scholar's signature must appear not only on the 
48Cabez6n. "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Tlicorý--. JoIll-1701 (ý, f the 




title page, but throughout the entire work through the manifest 
exposition of his or her subjectivity. "49 
A current example of an interpretivist approach is provided by Andrew 
Tuck. In his book Conil)al-allve 1)hllosophy ajid the PhIlo. volAJ, of Scholal-shl'P, he 
considers the philosophical presuppositions behind comparative scholarship. He 
warns of the danger of imposing one's own cultural preoccupations on ancient 
texts and supposing that these texts are in fact addressing the same issues- 
"When one says (with a tone of discovery, rather than construction) 
that two philosophers from separate traditions are "saying the same 
thing", "have the same position", or are attempting to "solve the same 
problern", one edges close to the belief that philosophical problems are 
universal, perennial puzzles with which all men, regardless of historical 
period or culture, are engaged, and that these eternal problems can be 
expressed in any language and at any tirne. "O 
This is the view, then, that despite cultural and linguistic differences 
between thinkers from different times and from different backgrounds, the issues 
that they are confronted with are basically the same. Oil tills view, cultural or 
linguistic differences are 'cosmetic', and thus comparative projects are wholly 
appropriate. Tills kind of view is forwarded by Griffiths, who argues that 
"Philosophy is a trans-cuitural human activity, which in all essentials operates 
within the same conventions and by the same norms ill all cultures. These are, 
broadly speaking, the conventions and norms which dernarcate what in the West 
has sometimes been called rationality. '151 From our brief survey of the history of the 
terms 'religion' and 'Buddhism' it is clear that the inter-faith debate as we now 
know it is clearly not a universal or perennial puzzle, so there is some validity in 
Tuck's warning for the present project. Although, as we shall presently see, the 
Buddha did pass judgement oil the salvific effectiveness of other groups that he 
was confronted with, even this situation was quite ditTerent from the contemporary 
inter-faith debate. This debate is strongly influenced by concepts such as the notion 
of 'religious' as discrete entities, somehow in competition with each other, 
concepts which were not current in the Buddha's day. However, it is also the case 
that some of the problems that the Buddha addresses are problerns that we are 
491bid., pp. 247-8. See also Jerome Mc Gaim. 7he 7extual Colulmon (Princeton. Princeton 
University Press. 1991). 
50Andrew Tuck. Comparailiv 11hilosopliv anct the Philo. \opl-ýv ol'. ýcholarship: on the Western 
interpretaliO17 OfN'(-1"(-1 'ima (Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1990). P. 11. ,1 .7 51 Paul J. Griffit I is. On Beilig, . 
ýIimlles. v- Bmhlhisi me(Iii(mon amlihe lmml-bwývprohlejn. 
(Illinois, Open Court. 1986). p. xviii, 
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faced with today. In particular, the existence of suffering and how to make it cease 
is a conundrum that connects us to all other times and cultures, although how 
suffering manifests itself and what counts as suffering may vary according to 
cultural and historical contexts. One could argue then, that this provides a universal 
framework that gives the Buddha's teaching meaning for a twentieth century 
audience. 
Tuck argues that it is more helpful to recognise that one is interpreting an 
ancient text from a Western perspective, rather than getting answers to universal 
questions: "the kind of comparison that makes minimal claims for itself allows 
greater intelligibility of interpretation. it gives us all we can have, and that is no 
small thing. 1152 Tuck eschews the idea that one can find an 'objective' 
interpretation of a text, undistorted by the reader's cultural presuppositions. He 
argues that this quest for objectivity is common in comparative religion, and is 
often accompanied by the notion that one must immerse oneself in the culture from 
which a particular text arises in order truly to understand it. Tuck cites the 
following quote as an example of such philosophy- 
"Why is It so important to be able to see Hinduism through Hindu eyes, Zn 
to see the tradition from the inside? For one thing, doing so is a 
prophylactic against superimposing alien and inappropriate 
conceptual i sati ons. But more profoundly, the empathetic identification 
is prerequisite to seeing meaning in the objects of study. 1153 
Tuck finds the idea just outlined "inherently problematic" for it falsely 
assumes that one can shed ones cultural presuppositions at will- 
"There are no non-culture- specific languages in which to write, or 
unconditioned perspectives from which to view, another age or culture 
... 
While trying to counter the subjectivist excesses of comparative 
scholarship, textual objectivists become guilty of a different kind of 
methodological excess. 1154 
Tuck cites thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Sellars and 
Kuhn to question the notion that it is possible to find an objective meaning or truth 
in a text, and to question the coherence of philosophical essentialism. He goes on 
to cite the arguments of textuallsts such as Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Gadamer 
521bid. 
53Rjcliard H. Robinson. "'Coillincrits oil 'Noil-Wcstcrii Studies- The Religious Approach' bý 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith", A Repoi-t on an invitational Conference on the Stwýv of Religion in the 
State Universitv. New Hiven: the Sociely for Religion in Higher Education. I'd. (Conference held 
Oct 23-25 1964). p. 64. 
54Tuck. Comparative Philosophýv. p. 12. 
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and Rorty that "the notions of literal meaning and truth as representation" are 
It remnants of antique theoretical premises. "55 It is not the place here to embark in 
detail upon such a debate. However, Tuck's point that any reader brings his or her 
own cultural presuppositions to his or her interpretation of a text is a sound one. It 
is surely impossible to shed one's cultural skin in order to gain an 'objective' 
interpretation of a text: 
"That scholars in an interpretive field like Indian philosophical studies 
have attempted to deny their own creative input and to claim that their 
efforts are totally 'objective' reveals a curious combination of excessive 
modesty, hubris, and ignorance (or less insultingly, innocence. )" 56 
A methodology that takes this into account will acknowledge the inevitable 
creative process of interpretation that accompanies any reading of a text: 
"If we are to reject the idea that meaning lies hidden beneath the 
surface of a text, then we have to see the act of reading as an enterprise 
that involves the context of the reader as much as that of the text. 
Readers of Sanskrit texts, like readers of European novels, must 
employ their personal and cultural perspectives if they are to find what 
they read intelligible. This act of productive understanding - isogesis 
is an integral part of the interpretive process, and the putative 
objectivism of many scholars in Indian studies is only a vain attempt to 
deny the phenomenon. 1157 
The discussion earlier in this chapter about Western approaches to the 
study of Buddhism to some extent supports Tuck's point insofar as it is clear that 
what is 'found' in Buddhist sources is to some degree determined by the hopes or 
expectations of the observer. However, the very fact that the history of Western 
influence can be traced and seen as a somewhat unfaithful representation of 
Buddhist sources, suggests that it may be possible to at least get closer to, for 
example, the Buddha's intentions in his teachings. There may not be a final 
objective meaning of a text but it does not follow that some readings are less 
distorted by the preconceptions of the reader than others. For example, earlier in 
this chapter, there was a quotation from Gombrich which contrasted Western 
connotations of the world 'soul' with the Upani, ýadic understanding of the term 
'atman' which the Buddha denied. The reader who understands that the Buddha 
was arguing against this Upani. ýadic understanding is surely closer to the original 
55Tuck. Comparative Philosoplýv. p. 11. 
56Tuck. Comparative Philosoplýv. p. 15. 
57Tuck, Comparalivc Philosoplýv. p. 16. 
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teaching of the Buddha than a reader who fails to put his teaching in its Indian 
context and thinks the Buddha is denying the notion of Soul, as it is presented in 
the Christian cultural tradition. 
Elsewhere, Gombrich provides another argument in support of legitimacy 
of the pursuit of original contextual meanings. He describes how, in 1837 James 
Prinsep translated one of Asoka's edicts as condoning the death penalty. 
However, in 1975 K. R. Norman identified a mistake in this translation, and 
showed that the edict referred not to the death penalty (which had been abolished), 
but to flogging. 58Gombrich argues that this demonstrates that there is a final, true 
meaning to the text in question- 
"The criminals being punished by Asoka's officials can have been in no 
doubt that the text of his edict had an objective meaning. for those 
accused the emperor's meaning was absolute. Joking apart, however, 
it is not enough to say that Norman provided a new interpretation of 
the text - he di. ycovei-ed its meaning. "59 
This example, according to Gombrich, demonstrates the legitimacy of the search 
for original meanings: 
"An important part of the history of a religion is of course how it 
interprets its own tradition, including its textual tradition. But that 
does not alter the fact that texts had specific meanings to their original 
authors, and moreover, since we can assume that those authors were 
competent communicators, to their original audiences. To uncover 
those original meanings is not only a legitimate task for the historian, it 
is of the greatest historical interest. 1160 
In maintaining that the quest for the original meaning of the Buddha's 
teachings requires knowledge of "what cultural knowledge and presuppositions he 
shared with his audience"61 , 
Gombrich is making just the sort of methodological 
claim that, as we have seen, Tuck objects to. For Tuck believes that such an 
approach involves the 'problematic' notion that one can shed one's own cultural 
skin in order to temporarily wear somebody else's. 
58K. R. Norman, -A. ýoka and Capital PLIIIISIIIIICllt-. notes oil a portion of Asoka's fourth pillar 
edict. with -in appendix oil the accusative absolute construction. --Journal of the Rqval. -Isiatic 
Sociqv, 1.197 5. pp. 16-24. 
"Gombrich. "The Buddlia's Book of Genesis'. "', Indo-Iranian Journal 35.1992. pp. 159-178. 
p. 159. 
60Goinbricli. "The Buddlia's Book of Genesis"". p. 160. 
61Goinbricli. "The Buddlia's Book of Genesis? ". pp. 16 1 
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As Cabez6n points out, such arguments could be endless and there will not 
necessarily ever be scholarly consensus on the issues of, for example, scholafly 
intention. However, such debates are nevertheless useful- "the point of critical 
dialogue on questions of method is not of course to reach final an universal 
consensus. Rather, it is to converse, and in so doing to clarify our own and others' 
positions on important issues, for ourselves and others. "62 
Indeed, such a debate may help to clarify the methodological position taken 
in this thesis. Both Gombrich (representing a positivist) and Tuck (representing an 
interpretivist) make some compelling points. In this thesis, however, my 
methodological approach follows Gombrich's line rather than Tuck's. Whilst I 
agree that it is not possible to read a text without some subjective, interpretive 
input and thus to discover an 'objective' meaning, I think Gombrich is right in 
suggesting that one is able to get closer to an original, or rather, 'intended' 
meaning by attempting to reconstruct the original context of a text as far as is 
possible. 
This thesis is located firmly within the sort of European/North American 
academic tradition of Buddhist Studies that Hallisey describes above. It focuses 
on the Pali Canon as Its 'original' source, and very little upon later commentaries, 
except where they elucidate issues within the Nik5yas themselves. Similarly, my 
approach is philosophical and rationalist, focusing very little on practice or ritual 
within Buddhism, and favouring philosophy over phenomenology. There may be 
various pitfalls and shortcomings to this approach, and these are all ongoing 
problematic concerns which I recognise. Instead, I hope it will suffice to have 
explained my method of approach in this thesis and to acknowledge my awareness 
that the comparative project is prone to various methodological pitfalls. Since it is 
inevitable that any reader of a text brings a certain level of sympathy and bias to 
their reading, it is perhaps relevant to acknowledge that this thesis is written by a 
practising 'Buddhist' from a standpoint that is sympathetic to the Buddhist 
tradition. 
I have deliberately chosen the pluralistic hypothesis of John Hick in order 
to provide one approach to ancient Buddhist texts. It may well be the case that in 
the Buddha's time there was no concept of 'religions' as discrete and mutually 
exclusive entities, and thus the factors that motivated Hick's hypothesis did not 
exist in the same form. However, the problem undoubtedly exists now that there 
62Cabez6n, "Buddlust Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Tlicorý ". p. 26 1. 
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are many rival accounts of how one can attain liberation (and, of course, rival 
accounts of what liberation is). Whilst this issue is not seen in the same terms in 
the Nik5ya texts considered in this thesis, nevertheless the Buddha is occupied 
with the question of what one must do to be liberated. Part of his teaching 
involves his encounters with those individuals or groups who follow different 
courses of action and conduct. His response to such groups can show us both 
how he understood his own path to liberation, and how he saw other teachings as 
relating to it. So whilst the modern-day context of inter-faith debate is thoroughly 
different from that of the Nik5yas, nevertheless, there does seem to be a certain 
connection in the question of how liberation is attained. The Buddha was faced 
with rival teachings, rival claims about how liberation is attained, and this is the 
same basic problem that Hick attempts to deal with, even though he may be 
approaching the question from a different standpoint and from a different 
motivation. It seems legitimate to look at the Buddha's teaching for a perspective 
on the inter-faith debate because, after all, it is with the modern day that we are 
concerned. A modern practitioner of the Buddha's teachings is faced with a 
plethora of other religious teachings that may contradict his own, and is thus 
forced to take some position on the issue, even if it is to reject the terms of the 
debate. 
We have already considered the difficulties with using the terms 
'Buddhism' and 'Buddhist' when these were not used by the Buddha himself but 
are relatively recent Western philosophical concepts, part of the process of the 
reification of religions that Cantwell Smith so laments. For this reason I have 
chosen to focus entirely on the Pali Nikdyas as the 'Buddhist' source for this 
thesis. Rather than claiming to find a "Buddhist attitude to other religions", it is 
more accurate for me to describe my project as an attempt to discover how the 
Buddha viewed other groups that he encountered as recorded in the Nik5yas. To 
clarify the Buddha's position, it will also be necessary to consider the philosophy 
that underpins his teachings. 
The analysis of Hick's hypothesis provides both' the justification for this 
project and a method of approach. As I will show in chapter one, Hick sees his 
hypothesis as a preferable alternative between two positions. The first, he 
characterises as the belief that all religious experience is "M loto delusory", and the 
second as "the dogmatic view that it is all delusory except that of one's oýýn 
tradition. "63 The third alternative that he offers is the view that the different ýýorld 
faiths "constitute different ýý,, ays of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation 
63Hick. An Interpretation ofReligion. p. 2335. 
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to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of it. -6-1 Hick 
sees this hypothesis as a "best explanation ... 
from a religious point of view, of the 
facts of the history of religions. "65, because it preserves the in-principled truth of 
religious claims, whilst allowing the co-existence of different truth claims. As we 
will see (below, p. 71), Hick admits that his hypothesis requires a deviation from 
the self-understanding of the different religious traditions, but argues that this does 
not detract from the coherence of his hypothesis. 
This is one of the claims that will be evaluated in this thesis. After an 
exposition of certain of the Buddha's teachings, it will be argued that Hick denies 
Buddhist self-understanding to such an extent as to completely undermine the 
Buddha's teachinO D. He therefore in effect 
'excludes' the Buddha's teaching from 
inclusion in his hypothesis, by altering it to such an extent that it is no longer 
recognisable. Using the Buddha's teachings and responses to other groups in the 
Nikdyas, I will then attempt to consider Hick's hypothesis from a 'Buddhist' 
perspective. Finally I will argue that the Buddha's way of approaching different 
'soteriological traditions' is more coherent than Hick's. 
Hick's hypothesis helps to structure my approach to this issue in various 
ways. For example, Hick is ultirnately concerned with the question of 
salvation/liberation - it is therefore necessary to consider how the Buddha 
appeared to view liberation. Similarly, Hick is concerned with the relationship 
between religious views and doctrines and salvation/liberation, so part of this thesis 
will be devoted to the Buddha's attitude towards views and how they relate to the 
path to liberation. 
The Structure of the Thesis. 
The thesis will be structured as follows- chapter one will provide an 
exposition of Hick's thought, culminating in a presentation of his Post-Copernican 
pluralistic hypothesis. This will 'set the scene' for the rest of the thesis by showing 
how Hick sees Buddhism as fitting into his hypothesis. Chapters two to five will 
deal exclusively with material based upon the Nik5yas. 
In chapter two I endeavour to provide a vei), brief overvleýý of the 
Buddha's teaching, and try to answer the question of 'what does it mean to be 
641bid. 
65HIck, The Rainbow qfFoiths, P. 51 
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liberated according to the BuddhaT by considering the descriptions of the goal of 
nibbdna and the path to its attainment. 
In chapter three, the qualities of the 'four types of person' (ah'yusavuka) 
who are destined to attain liberation will be contrasted with the ordinary person, 
theputhujjaiia. This will thus show us the criteria for liberation as defined by the 
Buddha, which will provide a point of comparison with Hick's thesis. 
In chapter four the relationship between views and liberation will be 
considered in some length. This will involve an exploration of the concept of 
belief and its relationship to practice according to the Nik5ya tradition in an 
attempt to understand whether one has to consciously accept Buddhist truth-claims 
to gain liberation. 
Chapter five will focus on the occasions in the Nik5yas where the Buddha's 
meetings with other groups or individuals are reported. The first section of 
Chapter Five will focus on the Buddha's more generalised comments about other 
views, or about views in general, whereas the second will look at specific named 
'others' that the Buddha encounters. 
Finally, in chapter six, there will be a critical analysis of Hick's Post- 
Copernican Pluralistic hypothesis. It will be criticised firstly on tile grounds of its 
internal coherence, and secondly from an 'external', 'Buddhist' perspective. Finally 
it will be argued that, from this 'Buddhist' perspective, there is no 'need' for Hick's 
hypothesis, for the Buddha already espouses a coherent account of other 'religions' 
in the Nikdyas. 
This thesis may provide an original contribution to the contemporary inter- 
faith debate on two main grounds. Firstly, Hick's hypothesis and a Buddhist 
approach to the question of other religions have not previously been considered 
together in such depth. A Buddhist critique of religious pluralism has been 
provided by Masao Abe, but he writes from the perspective of the Zen tradition 
and does not explicitly engage with Hick's hypothesiS, 66 In the same volume, John 
Cobb Jr. and Padmasiri De Silva (writing from a Therav5din standpoint) provide 
67 criticisms of religious pluralism from a Buddhist perspective . 
Unlike the present 
thesis, neither root their criticism in the Pali Nik5yas or respond directly to Hick's 
hypothesis. In this respect, then, it is hoped that this thesis covers original ground. 
66Masao Abe. "A Dynamic U111(vin Religious Pluralism- A Proposal from the Buddhist Point of 
View. ", in Hick and Askari. ed. The Lrperience ofReligio"S Diversity (Aldershot. 
Gower. 1985). 
Another of Abe's Zen critiques is found in Paul J. GrIffitlis (ed. ). Christianity Through 
Yon- 
Christian, ýves (New York. Orbis. 1990). pp. 171-180. 
67john Cobb Jr.. "Cliristian Witness in a Plural World". pp. 144-162. Padinasirl de Silva. 
"Religious Pluralism- A Buddhist Perspective". pp. I") 1- 143. 
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Secondly this thesis may make an original contribution in its consideration 
of the Pali Nik5yas in relation to the question of inter-faith relations. Both 
Richard Hayes and K. N. Jayatilleke have presented works which consider the 
Buddha's attitude towards other groups as it is presented in the NlkdyaS68_ 
However, both are relatively short papers; the present thesis represents a more 
detailed treatment of this theme, and is original in combining this theme with a 
critique of Hick's hypothesis. 
68Richard P. Haves. -Gotaina Buddlia and Religious Pluralisin". In Journal q Religious 
Pluralism, 1.1991, pp. 65-96. K. N. Javatilleke. "The Buddhist Attitude to 
Other Religions". The 
117heel Publication 216 (Kandy. Buddhist Publication Society. 199 1). Extracts of this paper are 
also found in Paul J. Griffiths ed., Christionitv Through Yon-Christian 
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CHAPTER ONE: John Hick's Post-Copernican Pluralistic HVpothesis. 
Professor John Hick has recently retired from a long career as a theologian 
and philosopher of religion. He is perhaps best known for his work on religious 
pluralism, having developed the thesis that all the great world 'religions' are 
equally capable of bringing salvation/liberation. This position is best exemplified in 
his work, An Inlerpi-elation of Religion, where his thesis is summarised in the 
following extract: 
I want to explore the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world faiths 
embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly 
different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of 
being human; and that within each of them the transformation of human 
existence from self-centredness to Real 1 ty-centred ne , ss is 
taking place. 
These traditions are accordingly to be regarded as soteriological 
'spaces' within whicli, or 'ways' along which, men and women can find 
salvation/liberation/ultimate fulfilment. '169 
Context: The Threefold Typology. 
Before embarking on an exposition of Hick's thesis, it is perhaps helpful to 
look at the context of the debate to which he contributes. In Christian theology, 
the inter-faith debate has been dominated by the threefold typology of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism. Whilst recognising that many different varieties of 
position can exist within each of these categories, Hick defines exclusivism as the 
belief that "salvation is confined to Christians, or even more narrowly, in the 
traditional Catholic dogma, that exii-a ecclesiam indla salus, outside the church 
there is no salvation. 1170 Hick finds exclusivism unacceptable on the grounds that it 
provides a picture of a tyrannical God who lacks in compassion insofar as he will 
condemn to eternal damnation anybody who, through no fault of their own, may 
not have heard the 'salvific' teachings. Similarly, it condemns those who do not 
believe in the 'salvific' tradition as the result of their cultural or religious 
background, which is largely dependent on their place of birth. Secondly, Hick 
believes that it is self-evident that salvific change occurs in other traditions, a fact 
69Hick,. 
-In Interpretation of 
Religion. p. 240. 
70Hick, The Rainbow (? f haiths. p. 19. 
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which exclusivism fails to take account of : "if we mean by salvation an actual 
salvific change in women and men, then it is ... an observable 
fact that this is not 
restricted either to any section of Christianity or Christianity as a whole. 1171 
Turning to the category of inclusivism, Hick identifies two forms. Firstly there is 
the view, accepted by Vatican 11 and 'the majority' of Catholic and Protestant 
theologians, that salvation does take place within each of the great faith traditions, 
but where it does occur it is always 'the work of Christ'. This means that 
individuals from other faiths can be saved by Christ, but they will not necessary 
know or acknowledge the faCt72. The second form of inclusivism is the view that 
the salvific work of all the major figures in other religious traditions is ultimately 
due to Christ - not the historical Jesus, but the "non-historical, or supra- 
historical, Christ figure or Logos ... who secretly inspired the 
Buddha, and the 
writers of the Upanishads ... 
Muhammad, Guru Nanak, Ramakrislina and many 
others since. ". 73 Hick finds the first form of inclusivism implausible and illustrates 
his criticism with an analogy fi-om medieval astrology Before Copernicus, the 
Ptolemaic understanding of the universe saw the earth at the centre of the cosmos, 
with the sun and other planets revolving around it. Apparent movements of the 
planets which did not fit with this understanding were explained as 'epicycles', 
small 'sub-orbits' that the planets followed as they circled the earth. As more and 
more of these epicycles were observed, the plausibility of the hypothesis became 
eroded. Hick believes that the inclusivist position is one such epicycle of a dying 
theological dogi-na that needs to be updated. 
With regard to the second type of inclusivism, Hick argues that once the 
idea of a salvific figure is no longer identified with the historical figure of Christ, 
then it becomes a "name for a world-wide and history-long presence and impact 
upon human life of the Divine, the Transcendent, the Ultimate, the Real. " . 
74 Hick 
states that, in fact, this is close to the pluralist position that lie advocates, because 
it is referring to the ultimate source of salvation and not pinnin2 it to an exclusive 1: ý 0 
historical manifestation within one particular poSlt, 011.75 
Hick defines pluralism as the belief that all traditions are different but 
equally valid and effective paths to salvation. He argues that the three-fold 
typology does not apply only to salvation, but also to truth clairris - different 
71 rbid. 
72Karl Raliner introduced ilic NNell-known plimse ýIjjoiivnious Christians' to expkill, hONN 11011- 
Christians (Ralmer focussed on zillicists) are to be understood. See K. Raliner. I'heolovical 
Investigations vol. 6 (London. Darton Lonunian and Todd. 1969). pp. ')90-8. 
73Hick, The Rambow (? I'Foah. ý. p. 2-). 
74Hick, Pic Rainhoir ql'Failh-N. p. '13. 
I'9. 75Hick. iln 
Interl)rcialion ofl? eli, ý, Ioli. p. 
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religious traditions do not only claim that one has to fulfil certain criteria to be 
saved, but that also that they have a true understanding of reality which, in many 
cases, conflicts with the narratives presented by others. Hick's critique of the 
different approaches and his argurnent for pluralism is applied to both these areas 
of truth-claims and salvation-claims. 
In this chapter, the progress of Hick's thought from conservative Christian 
theology to the very liberal position of pluralism will be briefly charted, in order to 
provide a context for his later thought. Hick writes of himself that he has "a habit 
of noticing flaws in arguments and inconsistencies in accepted belief systems and 
. 76 thus to understand his position it is helpful to ... an obsessive respect 
for facts", 
look at the 'flaws and inconsistencies' that led hirn to put forward alternative 
theses. Having established this, Hick's pluralist hypothesis will be analysed in 
some detail, focusing primarily on Ali Intely)i-ei(alon (#'Rellgioli and 7he RaMhOW 
of Faiihs. I have focused on A17 1111el7)1V1a11OJl (? f Religion because Hick presents 
it as a comprehensive statement of his position, describing it as an'. 1. ) 
"attempt to construct a comprehensive hypothesis which takes full 
account the data and theories of the hurnan sciences but which uses 
them to show how it is that the response to a transcendent reality has 
taken the bewildering plurality of forms that history records. "77 
I have also focused on Me Rolnboii, (? fI-cu'1h. Y because Hick wrote it as a response 
to criticisms of the thesis presented in Aii MIe17)1-eIcwoii (? f Religion. 11 
Finally, there will be an exposition of Hick's treatment of Buddhism in these 
works, and how lie fits Buddhist teachings into his pluralistic hypothesis. Hick 
cites with approval certain key Buddhist doctrines, particularly attitudes towards 
viewS79, which will be considered closely. This consideration of Hick's 
understand ing of Buddhism and its compatibility with his pluralistic hypothesis will 
lead in to the main body of this thesis, considering, the Buddha's attitude to other 
teachings and views as demonstrated in the Pali Nik5yas. After this exposition, it 
will be possible to critically analyse the coherence of Hick's Post Copernican 
pluralistic hypothesis. 
76Hick. Pi-ohlems q 'Re/ (, /oux Pluralism (London. MaCiIIII1,111.1W). P. I 
77 Hick,. -In Inlerprelolioll ()1*I? Ch, IQ'I()1?, P. 2 
78Hick, The Rainbow (London, SC%1.1995). 
79C. g.. the idea of the 'unanswered questions'. and the 'pariible of the raft'. \\ hich Will be discussed 
later, p. 146 ff. 
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The Development of Hick's Thought 
Hick began his career as a Christian theological conservative, working first 
as a Presbyterian minister in Northern England and then teaching philosophy of 
religion at universities and seminaries in America. At this stage, he believed that 
salvation came through God's incarnation in Christ, and through his work in 
theodicy presented an 'Irenaen' thesis that suffering exists to enable individuals to 
grow and develop80. Hick's academic career began in Cambridge University- 
when Hick moved to take up a professorship in Birmingham University in 1967, 
various factors presented themselves as 'flaws and inconsistencies' to the 
arguments of the conservative Christianity he had hitherto espoused. Firstly, 
Birmingham was - and is -a mulitcultural city, with a very large immigrant 
community amongst which all the great world religions are represented. Living in 
this environment led Hick to rethink his work on theodicy- "I had concluded that 
any viable Christian theodicy must affirm the ultimate salvation of all God's 
creatures. How then to reconcile the notion of there being one, and only one, true 
religion with a belief in God's universal saving activity? "81 
Hick found the doctrine of the incarnation particularly difficult to combine 
with the notion that all God's creatures would be saved, for if it is only through 
God's incarnation in Christ that one is saved, then individuals from other religions 
that do not profess Christ as saviour are precluded from salvation. As we shall see 
presently, this, coupled with various other factors listed below, led Hick to 
question the uniqueness of God's revelation in Christ, and to develop a pluralistic 
hypothesis. 
In The Rainbou, qf T-aith. v, Hick identifies three factors which make the 
problem of how to understand and co-exist with other religious traditions 
particularly pressing for Christians. Firstly, to a greater extent than ever before, 
people are better informed about other traditions - there has been "an explosion 
of information in the West about the religions of the world. 1182 Secondly, the 
increasing ease of global travel means that many more Westerners have first-hand 
I is experiences of other cultures than was the case in the past, and that even in thi 
country, many people are experimenting with 'Eastern' religious techniques such 
as meditation. Thirdly, this process of increasing global awareness was boosted as 
a result of post-war immigration: "we are now familiar, in many major cities of the 
80 Exemplified in John Hick. Evil and the God of Love (Loildoil. Collins. 1979). 
81 Hick. God I-Ias. 1 lan 
* 
v, Vames: Britain's new religious plurolism (London. Macmillan. 1990) 
82Hick, The Rainbow of Foiihs. p. 12. 
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Western world ... not only with churches and synagogues but also with mosques, 
gurudwaras, meditation centres, and temples of many kinds, and may have 
worshippers in these places as neighbours. "83 
These physical factors have made the necessity for a theology of other 
religions more pressing. However, even more significant for Hick was the 
realisation that he could find no apparent criteria on which to judge Christianity as 
4superior' to any other of these world traditions. Judging from his own experience 
and that of those with whom he had come into contact, Hick concluded. "We find 
that both the virtues and the vices are, so far as we can tell, more or less equally 
spread among the population, of whatever major faith. "84 Similarly, the traditions 
themselves each share a mixture of good and evil to the extent that it is impossible 
to say one tradition has less or more good or evil in it than any other, leading to the 
"negative conclusion that it is not possible to establish the unique moral superiority 
of any one of the great world faiths. "85 
All these factors combined to make Hick challenge the idea of the 
uniqueness of Christian salvation, and his first overtly pluralist work, God and the 
Univel-se (? f Fa/i/7.06 was published in 197-33. In it, Hick argues that talk of the 
incarnation was not literal but mythological. This is a crucial part of Hick's 
pluralistic thesis, and is a theme that he developed more fully (along with five other 
theologians) in Me Allylh (? f* Gocl lncal-naleV. Here we see the beginning of the 
thinking that culminates in the pluralistic hypothesis of An Inlei-pi-elation of 
Religion. Hick argues that once religious language and doctrines are understood 
as metaphorical and not literal, the way is opened for greater tolerance between 
religions insofar as they are not hinging their beliefs oil literal, fact-asserting claims 17ý 
that contradict each other- 
"the realisation that religious language expresses our apprehension of 
the divine in mythic pictures, and that these pictures are human and 
culturally conditioned, has opened up for some the possibility that the 
different mythologies of the great religious traditions may constitute 
alternative, or perhaps even complementary, rather than rival ways of 
picturing the divine reality. ", "' 
83Hick. The Rainhow qfl, aiih., ý. p. 13. 
841bid. 
85Hick, The Rainbow of Faiih. ý, p. 15. 
86Hick, God and the Universe of I, njihs: essays in the philosophýv of religion (London. 
Macmillan, 1973) 
87Hick. ed., The. A loh of God Incarnate (London. SCM, 1977). 
88Hick, The. ýIvlh ofGodh7carnwe. pp. ]')-14. 
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Rather than placing Christ as the central salvific figure, making Christianity 
the unique means to salvation, Hick suggested that instead the emphasis should be 
placed upon God, and that all religions - not just Christianity - are responses to 
God. He proposes a paradigm shift "from the dogma that Christianity is at the 
centre to the realisation that it is God who is at the centre and that all religions, 
including our own, serve and revolve around him. "89 To illustrate the significance 
of this paradigm shift, Hick again uses the analogy of Ptolemaic epicycles (see 
above, p. 29), in which the plausibility of Ptolemy's hypothesis was eroded by the 
constant need for the postulation of epicycles. Copernicus's theory that the sun, 
not the earth, was at the centre of the cosmos and that all the planets revolved 
around it made much more sense of the data. So in the universe of faiths the 
increasing data about other religions attained through greater awareness and 
understanding makes the theology which places Christ at the centre increasingly 
implausible. Instead the hypothesis that God is at centre of the universe of faiths 
makes much more sense of the data, for it allows an acknowledgement of the 
evident salvific power in other religious traditions, explaining it in relation to a 
common God. The analogy of a 'Copernican revolution' is also used with 
reference to Immanuel Kant's philosophy, and indeed, Hick is strongly influenced 
by this thinking. " 
Kant9l brought about this revolution in philosophy by arguing that 
perception is influenced and ordered by the subject - as Hick puts it, "we are 
always aware of reality beyond ourselves in terms of the sets of concepts which 
structure our own cognitive consciousness. 1192This represents a revolution because 
previously it was thought that one could perceive an object 'as it is', without 
mediating it through ones perceptive and cognitive apparatus; it is 'Copernican I 
because it turns the focus away from the object, to the perceiving subject. This 
philosophy contributes to the coherence of Hick's Copernican theology. Since the 
subject influences how reality is perceived, it makes sense that different 'subjects', 
namely believers from different religious . traditions, perceive the Divine Reality in 
different ways according to their cultural and religious backgrounds Hick 
developed this thesis in God Ha. v Maiiy NameS93 in which, as the title suggests, he 
89Hick. God and Me L"Ifiverse of Iaiihs, p. 13) 1. 
901n The Rail7boiv oj'FaiIhs. Hick explains that lie regards Kant as: "On tile whole. the Most 
penetrating and illuminating. as well as the most Influential. of modern Western plillosopliers. 
" 
(p. 4 7). 
911manuel Kant. Critique qf1lure Reoson (London. Macmillan, 1939). 
92Hick. Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 92. 
93Hick. God llas, klany. Vomes (London. Macmillan, 1980) 
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developed this thesis in God Has Allaiiy, Names9l in which, as the title suggests, he 
suggests that the different forms of religion have different vocabularies, but are 
actually worshipping and responding to the same God. 
At this stage, Hick was still using the term 'God'94 to describe the reality at 
the centre of the universe of faiths. As his thought developed, and in response to 
criticisms9l he recognised that this terminology apparently excluded non-theistic 
religions from his pluralistic hypothesis, because in suggesting that a personal being 
was at the centre it seemed to question the veracity of non-theistic religious claims. 
Hick accordingly changed his terminology, and it is this latter stage of his work, 
written during the eighties and most comprehensively expressed in An 
InteipivIation of Religion, that will now be focused oii In some detail. 
The Post-Copernican Pluralistic Hypothesis 
Ati llaeq)l-elcaloli (? f' Religioii provides a clear and comprehensive 
exposition of Hick's 'theology' of world religions. It expresses a further paradigm 
shift - the 'Post-Copernican Revolution'. Whereas previously Hick understood 
Christ, and later God, at the centre of the universe of faiths, now he sees the Real 
at the centre, a "putative transcendent reality which is affirmed when the different 
traditions speak of God or Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or of the Holy Trinity, or 
Allah, or Vishnu, or Eirahman, or the Dharmakaya/Nirvana/Sunyata and so on. "96 
How Hick supports this hypothesis, and how fie understands different faith 
traditions in the liglit of it will now be examined by charting the argument of Ati 
Mlei-pi-eiailoii qfReligioli. Hick begins by arguing for the soteriological character 
of religion. He maintains that all post-axial faiths, including so called 'secular 
faiths' such as Marxism, are "soteriologically oriented"91 - they all recognise that 
present human existence is in some sense 'defective' or 'lacking', characterlsed by 
suffering, and they all contrast this with a future reality or attainable state which is 
infinitely better- "Thus Christianity speaks of death and eternal life, Judaism of the 
coming kingdom of God-, Islarn of judgement and paradise, Hinduism of mokýu, 
Buddhism of enlightenment and nii-%-uýiu. "98 According to Hick's hypothesis, the 
93Hick, Go(l llos. ý lony. Vomes (London. Macmillan. 19,80) 
94AIthough in tlic American \Crsioil of Got///os. ý IM, , 
I-Nomes (Philadelphia. Westminster Press. 
1982), Hick replaced the terin 'God' with Ilic Real'. 
95For example. Gavin D'Costa., John Ilicks Theo/ovv o oas a craical evoluotion 
(Lanhain. Universit\ Press of Aineric: i. 1987). p. 154. Jullus Lipner. "Does Copernicus Help') 
Reflections for a Christian Theologý of Religions-. RchumitsSimlies, 13.1977. p. 253 
96 Hick, An 1wei-Inviotion q Wehuion. p. 10. V1 
97 Hick-4n llueqw-cionon ofRelioion. p. 3-) 
"Hick... 1/7 Intei-pl-eialion ()fReligion. p. 33. 
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Real that lies behind all the different religious forms, and has the same 
characteristic effects on followers- 
"In all these forms the ultimate, the divine, the Real, is that which 
makes possible a transformation of our present existence, whether by 
being drawn into fellowship with the transcendent Thou, or by realising 
our deeper self as one with the Real, or by unlearning our habitual ego- 
centredness and becoming a conscious and accepting part of the 
endlessly interacting flow of life which is both suipsui-a and nii-viiia. "99 
Hick defines salvation or liberation (he uses both terms together to accommodate 
both Eastern and Western religious traditions) as the "transformation of human 
existence from self-cent redness to Real ity-centred ness", and goes on to 
demonstrate how each faith tradition has as its ideal a selfless, loving and 
compassionate attitude towards others. In all the main faith traditions, then, the 
same process of transformative liberation/salvation is taking place, and indeed the 
central message of all post-axial faiths is the good news of salvation/liberation. 
Having argued for the soteriological character of religion, in the second 
section, Hick discusses the religious ambiguity of the universe. He points out that, 
in the Christian tradition, so-called 'proofs' of the existence of God, such as the 
ontological, cosmological and design arguments, have failed to produce conclusive 
results'00 and theism is not unambiguously demonstrated. He then turns to 
arguments from morality and religious experience - these, too, are inconclusive, 
as any religious experience could, in principle, have a naturalistic explanation. 
However, naturalistic understandings of the universe are also inconclusive. Hick 
thus concludes that there is no way of knowing whether the universe is 'religious' 
or not* 
"It seems ... that the universe maintains 
its inscrutable ambiguity. In 
some aspects it invites whilst in others it repels a religious response. It 
permits both a religious and a naturalistic faith, but haunted in each 
case by a contrary possibility that can never be exorcised. Any realistic 
analysis of religious belief and experience, and any realistic defence of 
the rationality of religious conviction, must therefore start from this 
situation of systematic ambiguity. "101 
991bid. 
looHick,. -Iii Inferprelatioii of Relývioll- pp. 73 
ff. 
o Religion, p. 124. lo'Hick.. 4n Inferpretafion f 
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Hick makes this point to demonstrate that it is not clear that any one 
religious interpretation of reality is obviously more true than any other, and that 
reality is capable of being construed in many different ways. 
Having established this religious ambiguity, Hick moves on to a section 
devoted to epistemology. He begins by making the Kantian point that our 
experience is mediated through our perception, and that as humans we are 
'programmed' to perceive the world in a certain way that is determined by our 
survival needs. Since humans live in different environments to each other, there are 
varying cconceptual creations', 'inner skeletons' or 'ways of being human' 
constituting different cultures* "At this level, at which experience is pervaded, 
moulded and coloured by human meanings ... 
I wish to maintain that all experience 
embodies concept-laden forms of interpretation. "102 This being the case, it is 
impossible in the realm of religious experience to distinguish between Impressions 
from an outside reality, or expressions that are a result of the concept-laden 
process of perceiving. In themselves, as reports about reality, religious experiences 
are ambiguous - they could arise from psychosis, for example, rather than the 
influence of the transcendent. Similarly there are varying different sorts of religious 
experience, not all of which seern compatible with each other. Nevertheless, Hick 
argues that religious experiences can be genuine interactions with the Real - their 
variety is accounted for by the different 'inner skeletons' and conceptual creations 
that exist between cultures. This presents the problem of how one tells which 
experiences are 'genuine' and which are false. Hick argues that what an object - 
in this case, the Real - meali. y is demonstrated by the dispositional response- "For 
the meaning of an object or situation is its perceived (or misperceived) character 
such that to perceive it as having that character is to be in a distinctive dispositional 
state in relation toit. " 103 Thus one can tell the authenticity of an experience by the 
effect that it has on the subject - if it helps them in their transformation from self 
to others-centredness, then this suggests a genuine response to the Real- 
"Those mystics, in all traditions, who have been accepted and revered 
have been immensely impressive hurnan beings, 'whose words have 
illuminated, challenged and encouraged others and whose lives have 
revealed the Real by embodying an appropriate human response to one 1=) 
102Hick,. 
-In Interpretation ofReligi017. p. 142. For in Interesting article on the epistemological 
foundations of Hick's hypothesis see Philip Barnes. -Continuity and Development in John Hick's 
Theology-, Stuthes in Religion, 21.1992, pp. 395-402. 
103Hick, 
.4n 
Interpretation of Religion. p. 12. 
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of the personae or inipei-sonaeI04 in which it has been manifested 
within the human experience. " 105 
Hick argues that all the main religious traditions have such 'sensitives', 
thus supporting his thesis that despite the different phenomenal forms of the 
experience and tradition within which it is perceived, they are all a response to a 
common Real. 
Continuing the epistemological theme, Hick counters the anti-realist 
critique'06 that sees religious discourse as totally mythological and not fact- 
asserting, by arguing that the cosmic optimism, the faith in a future liberated state 
that is common to all the traditions, implies "the basically cognitive and fact- 
asserting status of standard religious discourse, both western and eastern". 1070ne 
of the consequences of the anti-realist view is that if all religious language is 
mythological, not fact-asserting, there is no conflict between the conflicting claims 
of different religious eschatologies"11. However, maintaining the cognitive status 
of religious discourse presents a great difficulty- "have we not, in showing the fact- 
asserting character of the plurality of religious options thereby established their 
radical incompatibility"" 109 This is one of the main problems that Hick is 
attempting to address in his pluralistic hypothesis, how is one to admit the 
cognitivity of religious language, and at the same time maintain that all these 
conflicting accounts are in one sense true, insofar as they provide 'soteriological 
spaces" 10 in which individuals are transformed from self to Real 1 ty-cent redness. 
Having thus set the background for Hick's argument, let us now consider 
the post-Copernican pluralistic hypothesis that he presents. Hick sees the need for 
this hypothesis as arising out of the fact that there is a whole range of theistic 
religions, many with a different 'intentional object'; and many religious forms and 
traditions which point to an ultimate that is non-personal. Herein lies the problem 
- given that religious belief is reasonable and that believers are making 
fact- 
asserting claims about reality, the traditions seem incompatible with one anotherý 
"Surely these reported ultirnates, personal and non-personal, are mutually 
exclusive9"Ill Hick suggests three possible responses to this state of affairs - 
104The nicaning of these terms Nvill be explained presently. 
105Hick, An Interpretation of Religion. p. 168. 
106Led by thinkers such as Don Cuplit and D. Z. Phillips. 
107Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 188. 
108 For a non-reallst perspective on inter-faith relations see David Hart's. 
Von-Reahsln and the 
C'niverse of Faiths (London. Mowbrays. 1996). pp. 44-6. 
109Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 188. 
1 'OHick,. 
-In linerl)rciation of Rehgion. p. 240. 
11 lHick-An Interpretation qfReligion. p. 234. 
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firstly, the naturalistic response is that none of the belief systems are true, but are 
"archetypal daydreams of the human mind. "' 12 This response is rejected because 
religious belief is reasonable- "it is entirely reasonable for the religious person, 
experiencing life in relation to the transcendent ... to 
believe in the reality of that 
which is apparently experienced. "' 13 
The second type of response is to claim that only one's own tradition is 
true, and that all the others are false - indeed, this is what most religions have 
done in the past. To do this, however, is to break the "intellectual Golden Rule" of 
disallowing a premise to others that one relies upon oneself The only justification 
for. claiming the superiority of one tradition in this approach is the fact that it is 
one's own; since religious adherents from all the different traditions can make this 
claim, one reaches a complete impasse. 
Having rejected both these options, then, Hick advocates a third- "that the 
great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and 
living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied 
visionsof it. " 114 Thus the visions of all the different traditions would be partially 
true but incomplete descriptions of the Real. 
Religious or 'Mystical' Experiences. 
Many adherents of the world's different religious traditions point to 
mystical experiences as evidence of the truth of their beliefs. Hick defines mystical 
experiences as 
Lc 
experiences in which the 'information' being presented to 
consciousness has been received by some kind of extra-sensory awareness of our 
ultimate environment. "' 15 There is a long history of academic discussion about the 
status of such experiences, and how they relate to the different religious traditions, 
and it would be helpful to locate Hick in this debate. 
The key attitudes towards mysticism are helpfully summarised by Robert 
Forman in a book he edited, IN 1-11-oblem (? f Pul-e Cot iscloil. v le. ý. V 1 16. Forman 
describes one school of thought as 'perennialism', in which it is argued that 
mystical experience represents a direct contact with a transcendent reality. 
Cultural concepts do not enter into this direct experiencing, and as a result 
44 mysticism is by and large culturally homogenous, having a small number of 'core 
1121bid. 
113ffick,. 
-In Interprelotion OfReligioný p. 
235. 
114Hick,. 
-Iii Interpretotion ofReligion. p. 
236. 
115Hick,, 4n Interpretolion ofReligion. p. 165. 
116R. C. Fornian (cd. ). The Problem ofPure Consciousness: jýlvsticisln onclPhilosoplýv 
(O.. \-ford. 
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characteristics' that could, indeed, should be analysed Independently of any 
specific, culturally bound mystical philosophies. "' 17 Forman cites such thinkers as 
Walter Stace, William James, Mircea Eliade and Evelyn Underhill as examples of 
perennialist philosophers"'. 
The perennialist position is challenged by what Forman describes as the 
cconstructivist position'. In contrast to the perennialist belief that it is possible to 
experience the transcendent directly, constructivism holds that one cannot 
transcend ones own cultural and linguistic backgrounds, which accordingly 
determine the kind of experience attained. Forman cites Stephen Katz as providing 
the most well-known account of constructivism' 19: 
"Thei-e ai-e NO pul-e (i. e. unniedialed) expel-lences. Neither mystical 
experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, 
or any grounds for believing, that they are unmediated ... 
The 
experience itself as well as the form in which it is reported is shaped by 
concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his 
experience. " 120 
Hick locates himself within the constructivist camp - he cites Katz with 
approval on three occasions in An Inleq)i-elall . on (? f Religion, admitting that he 
"sides with Katz" in the debate with perennialists such as Stace. 121 Let us now 
briefly examine how Hick presents the constructivist position in An Inte17)i-elatioll 
of Religioti. We have already seen the influence of Kant's philosophy on Hick in 
relation to the Copernican revolution. This influence is further apparent in Hick's 
views on epistemology, particularly in respect of mystical experiences. Hick 
advocates the Kantian hypothesis that all our experience is ordered in our 
consciousness in accordance with certain 'categories'122. For Hick, our 
perceptions are ordered by- "concepts corresponding to our ordinary sortal words, 
such as 'grass', 'chair' ... etc., and also certain more general organising 
concepts, 
11717orman, The Problem of Pure Consciousness, pp. 3-4. 
118Walter Stace-A h-sticism ancl Philosoplýv (Londoil. Macmillan. 1960). 
119Forman also cites amongst others R. C. Zaeliner. Hindu an(Ohtslim Iývslibsm (NcNN York. 
Schoken Books, 196 1) and John Hick. "Mystical Expcriciicc as Cognition" in C. Woods. 
Understali(lil7, ýy. klt.,., viicisiii (Garden Citv, New York: Doubleday. Image Books. 1980). pp, 
415-21. 
as providing examples of the constructivist position. 
120Steplien Katz. "Language. Epistemology and Mysticism- lil, A ývsticbmi aml Philosophical 
AnaýVSis. pp. 22-74. p. 26.. [Italics originall. 
12' Hick, An Intcrpretalion of Religion. p 170. note 17. 
1221n his essay, "Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest oil a Mistakc? "In 
Forman. The Prohlem 
ofPure Consciousness. pp 237-253. Antliony N. Perovich Jr. argues that Kant's philosophy 
does 
not. in fact. support the constructivist critique of mysticism. for it rests oil the 
'imstakc'of 
C. assuming that mystical cNpcrience is narrowly 'liuman' experience and. so. is subject to the same 
treatment as isliumail'expcricnec generally. - p. 250. 
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which Kant called the categories. " 123 The act of perception thus involves an 
element of interpretation and this interpretation is determined by our needs in 
relating to the physical environment. Hick describes the "outcome" of this 
consciousness as "'experiencing as' - developed from Wittgenstein's concept of 
seeing-as'. 11 124 Hick maintains that all experience is a form of 'experiencing-as', 
demonstrating his agreement with Katz that there are no unmediated experiences. 
Different cultures, however, may use different concepts to sort their experience, 
thus there are many different 'conceptual creations' through which reality is 
perceived and understood: 
"These conceptual creations are the inner skeletons structuring the 
various forms of life, or ways of being human, that constitute the 
different cultures of the earth. And it is at this level, at which 
experience is pervaded, moulded and coloured by human meanings, 
that I wish to maintain that all experience embodies concept-laden 
forms of interpretation. " 125 
This is the case not only for ordinary, sensory experiences, but also for 
mystical experiences. In his pluralistic hypothesis, Hick argues that "humanity has 
always been conscious of the Real in terms of a range of concepts and modes of 
experience"126, and that these modes of experience often differ widely He 
maintains that, in such experiences, the Real does impact upon the mind of the 
mystic, but that it is transformed by sorting concepts into a mode that "tile mystic's 
community can assimilate". - 
"In the transformation of information into a meaningful human 
experience the mystic's mind employs the same constructive capacities 
that operate in the creation of dreams. But whereas dreams are 
(normally) means whereby the complex many-levelled psyche 
communicates internally with itself, mystical experiences - on a 
religious interpretation of them - embody information 
deriving from 
the transcendent source which I am referring to as the Real. 11127 
123Hick,. An Interpretolion of Religion, p. 133, 
124 Hick,. -In Interprelotion of 
Religion. p. 140. 
125Hick,. 
-In Inlerprelation ofReligion. p. 
142. 




The Personae and Impersonae of the Real. 
In his post-Copernican hypothesis, Hick borrows and adapts another Idea 
from Kant, that of the noumenon and the phenomenon. Kant argued that, because 
of the subjectivity of our experience, we cannot know reality as it truly is in itself 
- it is always mediated by our perceptual apparatus. 128 There is, however, a 
reality that informs these perceptions, inaccessible to us in its pure state, which he 
describes as the noumenon. Reality as we perceive it, the conceptual world of our 
human experience, he describes as the phenomenon - although it is informed by 
the noumenon, its shape is determined partly by the faculties we use to interpret it. 
Hick explains that: "the noumenal world exists independently of our perception of 
it and the phenomena] world is that same world as it appears to our human 
consciousness. " 129 Hick adapts this model to create his pluralistic hypothesis by 
understanding the Real an sich (in itself) as the noumenon, and tile different 
religious conceptions of it, as the phenomenon. By postulating this hypothesis, 
Hick preserves the realist character of religious discourse. 
"the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by different human 
mentalities, forming iand formed by different religious traditions, as the 
range of gods and absolutes which the phenomenology of religion 
reports. And these divine per. vonae and metaphysical 11771)el-Sonae, as I 
shall call thern, are not illusory but are empirically, that is experientially, 
real as authentic manifestations of the Real. 11130 
Hick here introduces the notion of pel-sonae and hnpei-. ýoliae to explain the 
different modes of knowing and experiencing the Real represented by the theistic 
and non-theistic traditions respectively. For Hick, these provide the conceptual 
categories through which mystical experiences are assimilated and understood, the 
different ways of 'experiencing as'. He explains the relationship between these two 
different modes of perception by using the analogy of light - it cannot be directly 
observed in itself, but depending on the mode of observation, it registers either as 
waves or as particles. Although the descriptions seem mutually exclusive, in fact 
the reality of light is such that it can be described in either or these ways, ways 
which are determined by the methods of the observer. So it is with the Real - it 
cannot be known aii sich, but for those who, because of the tradition that they are 
in, relate to it in terms of "I-Thou encounter", the Real is personal, for those who 
LL relate to the Real in the mode of non-personal aýý, -areness" it is impersonal. 
Whether one perceives the Real as personal or impersonal is dependent on "the 
128Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. 
129Hick, An Interpremoon of Religion, p. 241 
130Hick-An Interpretalion qfReligion. p. 242. 
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range of human cultures, actualising different though overlapping aspects of -our 
immensely complex human potentiality for awareness of the transcendent. "131 All 
religious language is cognitive, insofar as it refers to the Real, but the accounts are 
different because of the different modes of perception: "When we speak of a 
personal God, with moral attributes and purposes, or when we speak of the non- 
personal Absolute, Brahman, or of the Dharmakaya, we are speaking of the Real as 
humanly experienced; that is, phenomenon. " 132 
To sum up, then, Hick argues that the noumenal Real is beyond human 
conceptual i sation. The phenomena of the Real are perceived in either personal or 
impersonal terms. These represent the deities or the 'realities' of the world 
religious traditions. 
The impossibility of unmediated experience of the Real. 
Some religious traditions, particularly Hindu and Buddhist traditions, claim 
that mystical experiences can consist of an unmediated experience of the Real ati 
sich. Hick cites D. T. Suzuki from the Zen Buddhist tradition who claims that 
unitive awareness (pi-qjfia) of the Real (ý1-wyulc-i) is to see reality as it truly is, 
without distortion or interpretation. 133 He then points out that the advaita Vedanta 
tradition also claims the possibility of direct experience of Reality. However, these 
two example accounts offer different versions of what this Reality is like. For 
example, in the Zen tradition, nirvana and samsara are one; in advaita Vedanta, 
"they are distinguished respectively as reality and illusion. "134 The difficulty that 
this presents to the concept of unmediated experience of the Real is that we are 
presented with "two very different reports, which, taken as accounts of direct, 
unmediated awareness of the Real as it is in itself, offer incompatible 
alternatives. " 135 Indeed, there are various other accounts of the Real, including the 
(6 personal, loving God' which is claimed to be experienced by Jewish, Muslim and 
Christian mystics. 
All these claims of unitive mysticism conflict with the constructivist theory. 
Hick argues that such claims are incoherent. He argues that if there was a single 
account of unitive mysticism across all religious traditions, then the claim would 
make sense. However, the fact that there are many different accounts of the 
BlHick, An Interpretation ofReligion. p. 245. 
132Hick, An Interpretation ofROgion, p. 246. 
133ffick.. An Interpretaiion of Relýgion, p. 293. citing Suzuki . 
Essq. vs in Zen Buddlu-s-111, Third 
Series (London and New York, Rider, 1953), pp. 250,284. 




cunmediated Real' seems to suggest that these accounts, too, are dependent upon 
the cultural backgrounds and thought-idioms of the subject: 
The kind of constructivist argument that Hick puts forward here is 
powerfully challenged by Forman and others136, but it is not fitting to enter into 
this debate at this stage. Let it suffice to say that Hick argues for the impossibility 
of pure, unmediated experience of the Real ati sich. Let us now turn to a closer 
analysis of Hick's concept of 'the Real', and the role it plays in his hypothesis. 
The Real. 
Hick argues that because it is noumenal, beyond the realm of experience, 
nothing substantive can be said about the Real. The Real is a formal postulate to 
make sense of the data of differing religious experiences and traditions, but one 
cannot even say that it is a 'thing', because that would be to characterise what is 
not capable of being characterised because it is inaccessible to us an mch, in its 
4 pure', uninterpreted form. The Real thus does not have any of the qualities 
attributed to its manifestations, even though it is the ground of these. Hick 
explains in The Rahiboiv (? f Faiihs that the Real is "that which there must be if 
human religious experience is not purely human projection but, whilst involving 
projection, is at the same time a response to a transcendent Reality. " 137 There 
being this reality and there not being this reality is the difference between religious 
and naturalistic interpretations of religion. Since Hick wishes to keep a 'religious 
interpretation' of religion, and since there are so many different accounts of the 
ultimate, postulating this hypothesis is the only way the two factors can be held 
coherently together. 
"Because there are several world religions which seem to be 11") 
soteriologically more or less on a par, a religious interpretation of 
religion cannot identify the Real with the intentional object of any one 
of them to the exclusion of the others, and so has to resort to the 
distinction between the Real as it is in itself and the Real as variously 
thought of and experienced within the different major traditions. " 138 
136Foriiian, The PjWosoplýv of Pure Consciousness. 




Since one cannot speak about the Real as it is in itself, all language used to 
describe it by the different religions is in fact mythological. For example, the 
concept of Christ's incarnation is mythologically, but not literally true. This 
presents the problem that the mythology of any group, even one that acts violently 
or unethically, might be true. Hick avoids this difficulty by explaining that a myth 
is true or false according to the dispositional attitude it evokes in the subject, this is 
the criteria for determining if it is an 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' response to 
the Real: "The truth of a myth is its practical truthfulness- a true myth is one which 
rightly relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological 
terms. "119 In responding appropriately to a myth - for example, following the 
example of Christ's self-giving love, or emulating the Buddha's compassion - one 
is responding appropriately to the Real - "to the extent that a per. 5ona or impersolla 
is in soteriological alignment with the Real, an appropriate response to that deity or 
absolute is an appropriate response to the Real. "110 There is not just one 
appropriate response to the Real - there are various different ways of acting in 
accordance with it, ways that are expressed through the variety of religious 
teachings expressed through the world's different traditions. 
To sum up the pluralistic hypothesis so far, then, it serves many different 
purposes. It allows each religious tradition to maintain the cognitivity (in 
principle) of their beliefs without excluding other faiths which make conflicting 
claims. It thus avoids the two unfavourable options of seeing all religions as 
naturalistic, or only one as true: 
"Without this postulate we should be left with a plurality of pei-soiiae 
and impei-sonae each of which is claimed to be ultimate, but no one of 
which can be. We should have either to regard all the reported 
experiences as illusory or else return to the confessional position in 
which we affirm the authenticity of our own stream of religious 
experience whilst dismissing as i. 1lusory those occurring within other 
traditions. But for those to whom neither of these options seems 
realistic the pluralistic affirmation becomes inevitable, and with it the 
postulation of the Real an sich, which is variously experienced and 
thought as the range of divine phenomena described by the history of 
religion. "141 
139Hick,. 4n Inlerpretalion of Religion, p. 248, 
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Hick stresses that each of the different persotiae and impersoiiae, expressed in the 
different theistic and non-theistic religions, is equally valid - there is no grounds 
for saying that one is superior to all the others, although for various reasons one 
might be more suitable and helpful to one individual than another. To illustrate the 
fact that all the different religious mythologies are true but not precise descriptions 
of the Real, Hick provides an analogy in The Rainboiv of Faiths where he likens 
the different religious traditions to maps. Maps represent a three-dimensional 
landscape on a two-dimensional plane - they can be highly accurate, but in 
another sense they are inevitably a distortion. Similarly, different sorts of map are 
useful in different circumstances, in the same way that different religions suit 
different people- "it could be that the conceptual maps drawn by the great 
traditions, although finite picturings of the Infinite, are all more or less equally 
reliable within their different projections, and more or less equally useful for 
guiding us on ourjourney through life. ""' 
Here, then, Hick provides a qiialýfied affirmation of other religions on their 
own terms, in that he argues that they provide partial and incomplete pictures of the 
Real. Despite the claims of any tradition to the contrary, Hick maintains 
unmediated experience of the Real an sich is impossible. 
The Soteriological Authenticity of Religious Traditions. 
When it comes to metaphysics, Hick concedes that not all religious 
traditions ask the same metaphysical questions. For example, a Buddhist might ask 
how to ce ase suffering whilst a Jew might ask 'how can I keep life holyT. 
However, although the specific questions are different, they are the same 
generically: "They all presuppose a profound present lack, and the possibility of a 
radically better future, and they are all answers to the question, how to get from 
one to the other. In traditional Christian language, they are all ways of asking, 
What must I do to be saved9"143 All these metaphysical attempts to explain the 
mysteries of human life must be mythological, or else they would contradict each 
other. Instead, the truthfulness of each one "consists of its aptness ... to 
forward 
the soteriological process. 11144, and it is this soteriological process, common to all 
the different traditions, that suggests that they are all responses to the noumenal 
Real. Any myth that helps to effect the change from self-centredness to 
Reality- 
centredness is true insofar as it has soteriological value. Seeing 
different 
142Hick. The Rainbow of Foiihs. p. 27. 
143HIck. The Rainhow off-oills. p. 4 1. 
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metaphysical systems and mythologies in this way renders apparently conflicting 
truth claims compatible: "the great world traditions constitute different conceptions 
and perceptions of, and different responses to, the Real from within the different 
cultural ways of being human. " 145 
We can see here, then, that Hick applies certain ethical criteria to judge the 
soteriological authenticity of the Real. In the final section of An Inierpi-etation of 
Rehgioi7, Hick expands upon this aspect of his hypothesis by describing the criteria 
that are shared by all the main faith traditions, which suggest that they are all 
authentic responses to the Real. He argues that all post-axial religions have the 
function of providing the context for an individual to transform from self- 
centredness to Real ity-cent redness. 
"For the function of post-axial religion is to create contexts within 
which the transformation of human existence from self-centred ness to 
Realit y-centredness can take place. Accordingly the basic criterion 
must be soteriological. Religious traditions and their various 
components - beliefs, modes of experience, scriptures, rituals, 
disciplines, ethics and lifestyles, social rules and organisations - have 
greater or less value according as they promote or hinder the salvific 
transformation. "146 
Thus Hick's definition of a 'genuine' religion is one in which the transformation 
from self-centred ness to real ity-cent redness is taking place. There must be some 
criteria, then, for judging whether or not such a transformation has occurred- "on 
the hypothesis that the major world religions constitute varying human responses 
to the transcendent Reality, and are thus at least to some extent in alignment with 
that Reality, the available criteria will be those that have developed within 
them. " 147 
What, then, are these criteria? Hick argues that salvation/liberation shows 
itself in spiritual and moral fruits. A 'spiritual' person, argues Hick, is an individual 
in whom "signs of salvation are strikingly visible, and who are accordingly known 
as bodhisattvas, gurus, mahatmas, masters, saints. "I-18 The production of these 
C saintly' figures is one of the criteria for judging whether or not a religious tradition 
is an authentic response to the Real. Hick defines a saint as- "one in whom the 
transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Real ItY-centredness is 
14 5ffick--In Inierprelation qfReligion. p. 376. 
146Hick. An Interpreiaiion of Religion, p. 300. 
147 Hick,, An Interpretolion ofReligion. pp. 300-1 
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so much more advanced than in the generality of us that it is readily noticed and 
acknowledged. " 149 
This transformation usually occurs within the context of a particular 
religious tradition, but is characterised by certain common features. The main one 
Hick identifies as: "the transcendence of the ego point of view and its replacement 
by devotion to or centered concentration upon some manifestation of the Real, 
response to which produces compassion/love towards other human beings or 
towards all life. "150 Hick cites with approval William James, who provides certain 
definitions of "universal saintliness, the same in all traditions" 151 This is worth 
quoting, for it summarises Hick's definition of those qualities that characterise one 
who has undergone the transformation frorn self centredness to Real -cent red ness: 
"I. A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish 
little interests-, and a conviction, not merely intellectual, but as it were 
sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power 
2. A sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own 
life, and a willing self-surrender to its control. ' 
3. An immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining 
selfhood melt down. 
4. A shifting of the ernotional center towards loving and harmonious 
affections, towards 'yes, yes', and away from 'no', where claims of the 
non-ego are concerned. " 152 
James lists the 'practical fruits' of this saintliness as purity, asceticism and 
charity. Hick adds to this list a quality that in its passive state is "Inner peace and 
serenity", and in its active state is "a positive and radiant joy"' 51 
Hick is keen to point out that this process of transformation is not limited 
to religious traditions - lie argues that the modern age has 
brought "political 
saints" who fight for the deliverance from suffering through effecting structural 
change, and that this motivation is "basically the same as for acts of individual 
charity in the days of pre-sociological consciousness. " 154 Hick sums up his 
position by arguing that "the production of saints, both contemplative and 
1491bid. 
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practical, individualistic and political, is thus one valid criterion by which to 
identify a religious tradition as a salvific human response to the Real. "155 
So far, then, we have established that the existence of 'saints' who have 
undergone a transformation from self- cent redness to others-cent redness is a 
criterion by which one can judge a tradition as an authentic 'soteriological space', a 
genuine manifestation of the Real. 
Using these criteria, Hick maintains that all the main traditions contain 
evidence of having successfully provided this context- "The salvation/lIberation 
which it is the function of religion to facilitate is a human transformation which 
we see most conspicuously in the saints of all traditions. "156 He adds that, if one 
uses these criteria, no one religious tradition is any more 'saintly', any closer a 
representation of the Real, than any other- 
"But if we now attempt comparative judgements, asking whether 
tradition A has produced more, or better, saints per million of 
population than tradition B, we quickly discover that we do not have 
sufficient information for an answer. All that I myself feel able to 
venture at present is the impressionistic judgement that no one tradition 
stands out as more productive of sainthood than another. I suggest 
that so far as we can tell they constitute to about the same extent 
contexts within which the transformation of hurnan existence from self- 
centredness tQ Real ity-cent redness is taking place. The criterion of 
saintliness, then, enables us to recognise the great traditions as areas of 
salvation/liberation, but does not enable us to go on to grade them 
comparatively. " 157 
Thus Hick sees the existence of ethical 'fruits' as a sign that a religious 
tradition is responding to the Real, He argues that it appears that no particular 
religious tradition dernonstrates more 'fruits' than any others. This suggests that 
they are all equally genuine responses to the Real. Let us now consider Hick's 
ethical criteria in more detail. 
The Ethical Criterion - the 'Golden Rule'. 
The basic criterion for evaluating religious traditions is thus soteriologcal, 
and epitornised in the lives of saints of all the main traditions. The saintliness 
Ctsterns in each case from a basic ethical requirement, and it is this that provides the 
'"Hick-In Interpreialion of Religion. p. )07. 
156Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 309. 
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criterion for the moral assessment of religious phenomena. "158 Hick notes that this 
moral requirement can be separated from some of the concrete ways in which it has 
been displayed in the past, for various other factors could contribute to the way the 
moral requirement is manifested. For example, Hick describes how human reason 
could be used to twist moral principles in favour of self-interest, or that cultural 
beliefs could lead to practices such as the torture and execution of heretics, 
practices that are currently seen as 'immoral' but which were carried out in the 
name of a religious tradition. Hick argues that one can make a distinction between 
these manifestations, and the moral values and motivations that underlie them- 
"we can distinguish [these beliefs] from the fundamental moral 
principle of promoting the good of others - both the good of the 
heretics who were supposedly being saved from hell, and the good of 
the church as a whole which was supposedly being saved from the 
dangerous germs of spiritual taint. " 159 
This 'fundamental moral principle' by which we. recognise saints, is, 
according to Hick, a fundamental part of human nature- 
"From a religious point of view we must assume the rooting of moral 
norms in the structure of our human nature and the rooting of that 
nature in our relationship to the Real. ... 
The ethical insights of the great 
teachers are visions of human life lived in earthly alignment with the 
Real. Implicit within these we can discern the utterly basic principle 
that it is evil to cause suffering to others and good to benefit others and 
to alleviate their sufferings. " 160 
This 'basic principle', argues Hick, is too basic to be proved- it is the 
principle upon which all moral discourse is based. Hick describes this basic 
principle "to treat others as having the same value as myself'161 and that it Is 
good to benefit others and evil to harm them. " 162 as a description of 
"the 'Golden Rule' found in the Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist, 
Zoroastrian, Jain and Christian scriptures and in the Jewish K7117nid and 
the Muslim Hadiih and is likewise a translation of Kant's concepts of a 
rational person as an end and of right action as action which our 
158Hick. An hilerprelalion of Rela, "iOn. P. 309- 
159Hick,. 
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rationality, acknowledging a universal impartiality and transcending 
individual desires and aversions, can see to be required. 11163. 
The fact that all traditions are relating in parallel ways to the Real is 
evidenced by the fact that each one has some variation of this ethical 'Golden 
7. Rule . 
"In each case it begins on the common ground of fair dealing and 
respect for others' lives and property and leads on towards the higher 
ground of positive generosity, forgiveness, kindness, love, compassion, 
where we find the ethical evidence to the transformation of human 
existence form self-centred ne ss to Real ity-centred ness. " 164 
This fundamental, inbuilt moral criterion that forms the basis of our moral 
discourse is what enables us to judge religious or spiritual authenticity. The 
sensitivity to love, compassion and a self-sacrificing concern for others is part of 
human nature which is "reinforced, refined and elevated to new levels within the 
religious traditions. "165 Indeed, this criterion has always been in operation in the 
identification of great religious leaders - if such teachers taught acts of cruelty 
and hatred they would not have received their elevated status- 
"Thus the ideal of love, compassion, generosity, mercy has always been 
a basic factor in the recognition of someone as an authentic mediator of 
the Real. ... 
It is this basic norm enshrined in the great traditions that 
provides the broad criterion by which we can make moral judgements 
in the sphere of religion. " 166 
When it comes to applying these criteria to religious phenomena, Hick 
argues that it is relatively easy to recognise good and evil acts within any particular 
traditions. He gives examples of bride-burning in Hindu society, amputating hands 
under Islamic law, and the involvernent the Christian church in racial oppression in 
South Africa as examples of evil acts. He argues that each religious tradition 
contains a mixture of good and bad - the difficulty comes when the ethical 
criterion is used to try to 'grade' religions as totalities- 1: ý 
"'But when we seek to go beyond the identification of particular 
phenomena as good or evil to make ethical judgements concerning the 
religious traditions as totalities, we encounter large complicating 
163Hick.. An Inierpretotion ofReligi017. P. 149. 
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factors which must give pause to any project for the moral grading of 
the great world faiths. " 167 
Hick identifies the rise of modern science as one of the main 'complicatin(-' 
factors'. The rise of science has led to different rates of development in the East 
and West, with Christianity becoming associated with economic affluence and 
education in the West. Science has also brought a "humanisation of values", 
which in turn has brought ideals such as individual freedom, and compassion in 
social and political structures* "Thus it seems to many that Christianity is both the 
source and the inspiration of a contemporary ethical outlook which matches more 
nearly than any other the common ideal of the great traditions. " 161 Hick argues 
that this belief does not stand up to analysis, for the relationship between 
Christianity and modern science is contingent. Although the modern liberal 
outlook does accord with the basic values of kindness and compassion taught by 
the great world religions, it "does not represent simply a flowering of Christian 
teaching. "169 Indeed, the "application, or misapplication" of Christian principles in 
the past has led to strongly hierarchical systems where power is narrowly 
concentrated and where the poor have been oppressed. Giving detailed examples 
from the Christian and Muslim traditions, Hick demonstrates how the application 
of certain ethical ideals take different forms in relation to the moral and historical 
climate that is current at the time, some of which are now seen as morally 
repugnant. 170 Although all the world religions share "essentially the same ideal of 
love, compassion, forgiveness", the way these have been applied to "tile concrete 
circumstances of life in different t, MeS"171, has varied enormously. Given these 
complicating factors, Hick concludes that no one of the main religious traditions 
appears to be more 'authentic' than any other when judged by the ethical criterion: 
"Taking the great world traditions as totalities, then, we can only say 
that each is an unique mixture of good and evil. Each has been and is 
responsible for or associated with immense contributions to human 
welfare, each has also been and is responsible for or implicated in vast 
evils afflicting some part of the human race. It may be the case that, 
from the point of view of ornniscience, one tradition stands out as 
morally superior to all others. But if so this is not evident from our 
partial judgement with which all rational persons could be expected to 
167Hick,. 
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agree, to assert the overall moral superiority of any one of the great 
religious traditions of the world. This is the rather modest conclusion 
to which our discussion points. " 172 
To sum up, Hick contends that the soteriology of religious traditions is 
testified by their ability to effect a transformation from self-centredness to others- 
centredness, and that this criterion, as one of the basic elements of human nature, 
is universal. The criterion cannot be applied to the Real an sich, because, as we 
have seen, this is unknowable. Instead it should be applied to the response that 
different personae and impersonae elicit from individuals. Using this method of 
judgement, Hick concludes that no tradition stands out as better or worse than any 
other, and that all are productive of individuals who have been transformed from 
self-centredness to others-centredness. This suggests that each Is an authentic 
response to the Real. 
The Pluralist Hypothesis and Buddhism 
Having presented Hick's post-Copernican pluralistic hypothesis, let us now 
consider the specific case of Buddhism to see how Hick understands it In relation to 
his thesis. Throughout the various presentations of his hypothesis, Hick refers to 
many different forms of Buddhism within the broad distinction of the Mahdydna 
and Theravdda traditions. In Ali 11ilei-I)i-elation (? f Religimi, Hick explains why he 
thinks the Buddhist tradition qualifies for inclusion in the pluralistic hypothesis. He 
addresses this in the light of the difficulty presented by the fact that the manifold 
religious forms are so varied that there appears to be no essence which connects 
them. For example, the non-theistic Therav5da Buddhism appears to have so little 
resemblance in its specific forms and beliefs to Islam, that it is hard to see what 
connects them in the same category of 'religions'. Hick maintains that it is 
impossible to find an 'essence' of all the different religions, but that they al-e 
connected by a series of different 'family resemblances'. He explains this with an 
analogy- the term 'game' is applied to a whole series of different practices, some of 
which appear to have very little in common with each other, but they are connected 
in that "each is similar in important respects to some others in the family, though 
173 11 not in all respects to any or in any respect to all. (Hick recognises that there are 
so many different forms of Buddhism that it is -impossible to locate Buddhism at 
172Hick, An Interpretation ofReligion. p. 337. 
173Hick,. 4n Interpretalion ofRelýgion. p. 4. 
any one point within the network of family resemblances"174, and argues that 
instead of trying to locate a single 'authentic' Buddhism' one can only speak of the 
multi-faceted Buddhist tradition. ) 
Thus in the realm of religious traditions, although different theistic traditions 
can be said to be connected by the concept of a 'higher unseen power', this qualit), 
is absent in Theravdda Buddhism, although there are similarities between 
Therav5da Buddhism and many theistic traditions in that they offer "a 
comprehensive interpretation of life". 175 Hick favours Tillich's concept of "ultimate 
concern" as a "general agreed notion" that unites all the different religious 
traditions - they all have a sense of being concerned with something of "ultimate 
importance" 176. He singles out one feature in particular that is common to all the 
traditions, namely belief in the transcendent. Although this cannot be described as 
the "essence of religion", it is nevertheless a feature that unites them all: 
"most forms of religion have affirmed a salvific reality that transcends 
(whilst also usually being thought of as immanent within) human beings 
and the world, this reality being variously conceived as a personal God 
or non-personal Absolute, or as the cosmic structure or process or 
ground of the universe. " 177 
In terms of Theravdda Buddhist language, this 'transcendent reality' is understood 
as the goal of Buddhist practice, nibb5na. Just as other post-axial religious 
traditions see the present reality as unsatisfactory, but redeemed by the ultimate 
hope of salvation/] iberation made possible through the transcendent reality, so 
Therav5da Buddhism sees the present life as characterised by suffering (dukkha), 
and points to the transcendent state of nibbdna as liberation from this suffering. 
Like all other post-axial traditions, then, the significance of nibb5na in Therav5da 
Buddhism is "soteriological, and the liberation which it makes possible presupposes 
a structure of reality, knowledge of which constitutes good news for all human 
beings" 178 
Similarly, we have seen that Hick claims each religious tradition uses 
language in a cognitive way, because each makes eschatological claims. In terms of 
Therav5da Buddhism, this too is expressed by the concept of nibb5na: 
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"Moksh"irvana, then is for the Indian religions the blessed eschaton 
for which believers hope and toward which they strive, and they hope 
and strive for this as ardently as within the Semitic traditions believers 
hope and strive for the promised eternal life of heaven, paradise, and 
the Kingdom. "179 
Hick argues that in both theistic and non-theistic traditions, there is also the concept 
that such a limitlessly better existence can be realised in this life - this is another 
factor which unites them. Therefore, despite the fact that different traditions view 
the Real either in personal or impersonal terms, they share a similar underlying 
structure; both sorts recognise the unsatisfactory nature of the present existence, 
and strive towards a limitlessly better existence through response to a transcendent 
Reality. Hick sees these similarities as a sign that, despite the differences in 
concepts of the Real, both theistic and non-theistic religions are essentially doing 
the same thing, namely responding to the Real in its various manifestations. Let us 
now consider Hick's presentation of the Buddhist goal of nibb5na as a manifestation 
of the Real. 
Nibbdna as a manifestation of the real. 
Nibbdna, according to Hick, is the manifestation of the Real within the 
tradition of Therav5da Buddhism - it is one of its h7ij)er. Yoiiae. The fact that the 
Real takes the impersonal form here is a result of the particular character and 
framework of the Buddhist tradition, 
"the modes of experience which both the Theravdda and the Mall5ydila 
make possible are ways in which tile Real becomes manifest to a human 
consciousness sensitised by the meditational practices and shaped by 
the conceptual frameworks of these ancient and profound 
traditions. " 180 
This quotation clearly demonstrates Hick's belief that experience is thoroughly 
influenced by human perception - the experiences are not merely 'received' 
but 
are 'made possible' by the thought-world from which they are observed. 
Hick then briefly elaborates the 'Buddhist' view of the world, mentioning 
the unsatisfactoriness of dukkha and the "ceaseless kaleidoscope of ever changing 
insubstantialities"181 which constitute dependent origination and san7sara. 
He 
- -dilkkha s created by the explains the role of the self-view in producing suffering. I 
ego-centred point of view and mode of apperceivinzo. "182, and then characterises 
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nibbdna as the escape from this ego-centredness, and the consequent liberation from 
suffering. According to Hick, then, nibbdna is liberation from our self-centred 
consciousness- "the cessation of ego-centredness which generates self-regarding 
emotion and awareness, thereby turning the world into a threatening environment in 
which we live in continuous conscious or unconscious anxiety. " 183 He cites various 
sections of the Pali Canon where nibbdna is defined, for example, as the cessation of 
greed, hatred and delusion184, or the freedom from the conceit 'I am' 185. However, 
Hick stresses that nibb5na is not understood in the tradition as merek, a 
"psychological state of unselfcentredness" 186, but "a fundamental and eternal reality 
that can only be realised through this state of unselfcent redness. " 181 He cites 
positive descriptions of nibbdna where it is described as "a not-born, a not-become, 
not-made, not-compounded" 188, or as "the unborn ... the unageing ... undecaying ... 
undying ... unsorrowing ... stainless. 
" 189. He does this to demonstrate that the 
psychological state of nibbdna is grounded in an ultimate reality. Thus, rather than 
being merely a state of mind, the mental experience of n1bb5na "constitutes the 
immanence of the Ultimate within human life. "1911 
Hick points out that the concept of nibb5na as ultimate reality 
(paratndnha-salyu) runs throughout most forms of the Buddhist tradition'91. He 
thus feels justified in claiming that nibbdna is a manifestation of the Real - 
"From the point of view of our pluralistic hypothesis Nirvana is the 
Real experienced in an ineffable ego-lessness, unlimited and eternal, 
which can be entered by the moral and spiritual path taught by the 
Buddha. From a religious point of view the authenticity of this 
Buddhist experience is shown by the life-transforming response to the 
Real which it makes possible. "191 
We have seen that Hick believes that one of the signs of an authentic 
response to the Real is tile transformation from self to others-centredness, and the 
existence of the ethical Golden Rule. He sees the Buddhist teaching of no-self 
(analta) as a teaching that effects the liberating transformation by bringing about 
183fbid. 
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the death of the ego. 193 Similarly, although he concedes that the Buddhist 
scriptures do not have a 'precise formulation of the Golden Rule' (i. e. that it is evil 
to cause suffering to others and good to promote their well-being) Hick cites 
various passages that portray a similar message. For example, he cites the 
Dhamniapada claim that "Life is dear to all. Comparing others to oneself one 
should neither strike nor cause to strike. " 194, and the Sutta-Nipata teaching that one 
should care for all living beings as a mother cares for her son. 195 The Noble 
Eightfold Path, too, contains elements that are "directly ethical", and Hick cites 
with approval the four cardinal virtues found in the Pall Canon of "friendliness" 
196 (mend), compassion (karuýld), sympathetic joy (niuditd) and serenity (saniatha) . 
These values, he argues, particularly compassion, are shared by other religious 
traditions. For example, having cited the four cardinal virtues, Hick claims that 
"essentially the same ideal of universal compassion or love (agape) is central to 
Christianity. " 197 Indeed it is enshrined in all the great traditions and "provides the 
broad criterion by which we can make moral judgements in the sphere of 
religion. "191 The presence of these ethical factors in Buddhism qualifies it for the 
status of a genuine response to the Real. 
Having seen how nibb5na is understood as a genuine response to the Real, 
let me now demonstrate how Hick uses some of the Buddha's own teachings and 
concepts to elucidate his pluralistic hypothesis. This is important for demonstrating 
Hick's understanding of doctrines in his hypothesis. It is also important because it 
is an area in which Hick's hypothesis diverges from Buddhist self-understanding. 
This is a point that is extensively argued in the final chapter (pp. 214-224). 
The Unanswered Questions: Hick's understanding of views and doctrines. 
So far we have seen how Hick views Buddhism as an authentic response to 
one of the inij)ei-smiae of the Real. We will now consider how Hick explains the 
different, often conflicting, beliefs and doctrines belonging to different religious 
systems, for he borrows one of the teachings of the Buddha in order to explain his 
understanding of these differences. This will also enable us to understand the status 
that Hick gives to the Buddha's teachings themselves. 
193ffick.. 
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Hick writes in An Imerpi-elatioti of Religion that how one views the 
relationship between the different religious doctrines of the world depends upon the 
epistemological status attributed to them. His basic thesis is that, owing to the 
ineffability of the Real, all religious doctrines are incomplete, and should be 
understood mythologically, not literally. Thus he advocates a doctrine not only of 
"religious knowledge" but also of "religious ignorance" and he uses the Buddha's 
teaching of the Unanswered Questions to illustrate this. 199 In the case of the 
Unanswered Questions, the Buddha is approached by a follower who insists that 
the Buddha answer ten metaphysical questions about the universe and the self 
These are: is the world eternal; is it not eternal; is the world infinite, is it not 
infinite; is the soul the same as the body; is it not the same as the body; does the 
Tatlidgata exist after death, does he not exist after death, does he both exist and not 
exist after death; does he neither exist nor not exist after deatP2110 The Buddha 
refuses to answer these questions because they are not conducive to reallsing the 
eightfold path and gaining liberation. He illustrates this with tile example of a man 
who is shot with a poisoned arrow, and instead of being treated insists that first he 
must know who shot the arrow, and what it is made of He consequently dies 
before he gets the answer to these questions. In the same way, if disciples 
preoccupy themselves with metaphysical questions that have no relevance to 
liberation, then they will die still prone to suffering and rebirth. Such questions are 
rejected by the Buddha because they do not lead to the attainment of nibb5na- "It is 
accompanied by anguish, distress, misery, fever; it does not conduce to turning 
away from, not to dispassion, stopping, calming, super-k now] edge, awakening, not 
to nibbdna. 1201 Hick adds that such an attitude to metaphysical questions is not 
unique to Buddhism, in the Christian tradition, Julian of Norwich claims that some 
truth, belonging to 'our Lord's privy counsel' is hidden fromUS202, and in Judaism 
"the stress has always been upon right practice, both ritual and ethical, rather than 
right theory. 11203 
In the case of tile ten unanswered questions, Hick makes a distinction 
between two different sorts of question. The first six, he argues, "are in themselves 
legitimate and admit of true answerS11204 - It is possible that the Buddha actually 
knows the answers to these questions, but also knows that knowledge of the 
ions are not legitimate answers is not conducive to salvation. The final four questi 
199ffick, An 1171erpretation of Religion. p. 343. See also Hick. DisputetlQuestions. pp. 
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because they pose the question through concepts that do not apply - it is not 
possible to express nibbdna in terms of this life, for it is beyond such 
characterisations, thus it is impossible to understand what happens to the Tathd 
gatha in that state. Hick understands this to mean that these four questions refer to 
realities "that are beyond human comprehension and expression. "105 
Hick uses the unanswered questions to support his thesis in two ways. 
Firstly, in relation to the first set of questions that the Buddha refuses to answer 
because of their irrelevance to salvation, he infers the argument that "for people 
holding different views to treat agreement about them as essential for salvation is a 
dangerous because soteriologically counter-productive error. "206 Hick 
recommends this approach as useful when applied to inter-faith dialogue in general, 
since all the great traditions appear to be salvific, there is nothing to be gained from 
dogmatically affirming the truth of one particular tradition or to oppose the views 
of others, as they are ultimately secondary, and not uniquely vital for salvation. 
Thus the key point for Hick is that the myths and beliefs of different religious 
traditions have a positive soterioloulcal effect on the believer (demonstrated in the 
presence of ethical Truits'). For Hick, this is the most important thing, for it is a 
sign of genuine engagement with the Real; the content of myths and doctrines is 
thus secondary to their effects. 
Secondly, he uses the Buddha's point about the unansivel-able nature of the 
other four questions as support for his thesis that the Real aii sich is unknowable, 
and cannot be understood in terms of our present human consciousness- "our 
language can have no purchase on a postulated noumenal reality which is not even 
partly formed by human concepts. This lies outside the scope of our cognitive 
capacities. 11207 Indeed, Hick sees eschatological speculations or scenarios as myths 
which fill a human need "for something to which our minds can cling as we 
contemplate our own finitude"208. The only sense in which they can be said to be 
true is if they promote an attitude that conduces to the transformation from self to 
reality-centredness- "If we have been right in seeing this goal as the transformation 
of human existence from self-centredness to Real ity-centredness, eschatological 
myths are valid to the extent that they promote that transformation. "209UItimately, 
Hick agrees with the Buddha that if one is close enough to liberation one recognises 
the irrelevance of eschatological speculations, but for those who are less developed, 
then myths can serve a useful function. 
205ffick,. In Interpretation QfReligion. p. 347- 
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In his book Disputed Questions in Theology and ihe Philosophj, of 
Religion, Hick devotes an entire chapter to the Unanswered Questions, and 
expands the themes that he introduced in An Inteipretation of Religion. This 
detailed exposition is worth considering in some length, for it demonstrates Hick's 
understanding of the Buddhist tradition, and sheds some light on his views about 
the cognitive and salvific status of Buddhist claims. In Disputed Questions, Hick 
continues to use the unanswered questions in two ways - firstly, to advocate a 
pragmatic, non-dogmatic treatment of religious doctrines and metaphysics, and 
secondly, he uses the unansivei-able nature of some questions to support his thesis 
of the unknowability of the noumenal Real an sich. 
Throughout his presentation of the unanswered questions, Hick is keen to 
maintain that the concepts should not be confined to the Buddhist tradition, but 
instead should be applied to all religious traditions. He argues that the 'theory of 
religious ignorance' presented by the unanswered questions is universally applicable 
to religious systems: 
"It could be that the universe, like a modern spy operation, is 
conducted on a 'need to know' basis and that what, religiously, we 
need to know is soteriological rather than metaphysical. If so, the 
metaphysical differences between the different religious traditions, 
responding in their distinctly different ways to the various unanswered 
and unanswerable questions, will not affect the all-important matter of 
salvation/liberation. "110 
Let us now consider how Hick applies the doctrine of the unanswered 
questions to inter-faith dialogue in general. The main difficulty when trying to 
reconcile different religious systems is the existence of conflicting truth claims. 
Hick identifies three levels of conflict - firstly, there can be conflict over historical 
issues; secondly, over 'trans-historical' issues (for example, questions that are not 
answerable by looking at historical facts, such as whether or not there is life after 
death); and thirdly and most importantly, there can be conflicting truth claims about 
the conception of the ultimate reality to which (according to Hick) religions are 
different responses. 
Regarding historical issues, Hick maintains that there is relatively little 
conflict between different religious traditions on these matters, because there are 
only a few cases where historical claims of different traditions overlap, and most 
historical questions are able to be settled with reference to 
historical e%, idence 
21OHick, Disputed Oitestions in Theologi, and Me Philosoplýv of'Reliivon (London. 
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However, in so far as the evidence regarding ancient events is often no longer 
available, there is a way in which many claims in this field are unanswerable in the 
first sense, of being answerable in theory, but unanswered in practice. The 
Buddha's teaching, then, is an appropriate response to such issues - since such 
questions are either answered or no longer answerable, there is nothing to be 
achieved by repeatedly attempting to answer them, and it would certainly be 
counter-productive to over-emphasise differences in these claims between the 
different religious traditions. 
However, Hick acknowledges that, related to these historical questions, 
there is a further claim or dimension that it is necessary to salvation that certain 
historical events occurred. These claims make the issue much more complicated. 
For example, with reference to Christ's crucifixion, there is little historical evidence 
to contradict the fact that he was crucified; however, to insist that this historical 
fact must bg believed because "it is an integral part of a system of belief the 
acceptance of which is essential to salvation" creates, according to Hick, 
"difficulties of the most profound and disturbing kind. -211 Hick's objection to such 
a position is that he finds it morally repugnant that salvation could be limited to 
those with a certain specialised historical knowledge- I find the idea that God has 
ordained a scheme under which the large majority of the human race are, through 
no fault of their own, condemned to perdition, so morally repulsive that it would 
undermine the Godness, or worship-worthiness, of any being who was said to be 
God. 11212 The doctrine of religious ignorance provided by the unanswered 
questions provides an alternative to this position which therefore avoids the idea 
that salvation is exclusive to only those with certain historical knowledge - since 
certain knowledge is not attainable, then it seems contradictory to maintain that 
salvation depends upon it. 
The second form of conflict of belief, the questions of trans-historical fact, 
concern those issues "which are not settleable, even in principle, by historical or 
other empirical evidence . 
11213 Some of these questions, such as the origins of the 
universe, are unanswered but in principle answerable. Others - such as the fate of 
a human being after death - are in principle unanswerable 
in this life. Hick cites 
the Buddha's example of the question about what happens to the Tatli5gata after 
death - the Buddha maintains that such a question cannot 
be answered because 
the concepts we use both to frame the question and to understand any answer are 





not applicable. Hick accepts and adopts the Buddha's teaching that such questions 
are not necessary for salvationAiberation- 
"no scientific knowledge can in itself be religiously significant except in 
so far as the religions unwisely adopt dogmatic views, as they have 
some times done, on questions in astronomy, geology, biology, 
astrophysics, or any other of the special sciences. 11214 
In the case of Christianity, Hick argues that there has always been much 
concern with trans-historical fact, but that more recently there has been a move 
towards disentangling the Christian life from commitment to particular dogmatic 
answers. He hopes that ultimately this development will continue until a "new 
consensus" is found215. Hick anticipates that such a consensus* "may well prove to 
be not another monolithic consensus at all but rather a pluralistic range of differing 
theoretical frameworks for the same soteriological process. "216 
At this point, Hick departs from the Buddha's teaching, in so far as he 
maintains that the teaching of dependent origination, the Buddha's description of 
reality, is of the same status as other trans-historical truth claims - it goes beyond 
experience and cannot be proved, in the same way that the truth claims of other 
religious traditions cannot be. Hick's treatment of the Buddhist position will be 
examined in more detail below. For now, let it suffice to say that, rather than 
seeing all other religious traditions as offering varying interpretations of the ultimate 
reality of dependent origination, Hick suggests that even this Buddhist theory is an 
attempt to go beyond the realm of our experience, and thus to answer an 
unanswerable question. He therefore suggests that all the trans-historical claims of 
the different religious traditions are claims made about matters which cannot be 
settled. They are all "different, but for all we know, equally valid modes" of 
experiencing the Ultimate- "So what I am suggesting in relation to questions of 
trans-historical fact is that it would be a mark of wisdom and maturity frankly to 
acknowledge our ignorance. 11217 In the context of the Christian tradition, this 
would mean "that we should sit very lightly to our inherited Christian dogmas 
concerning creation, fall, eschatology and method of salvation. "218 
Here, Hick separates the 'method' of salvation from the fact of 
salvation/liberation itself, and this is the dichotomy which enables him to understand 
different religions as all ultimately attaining the sarne goal. He argues that the "fact 
of salvation/liberation" - namely, the transformation 
from self- to Reality- 
214Hick, Disputed Questions, p. I 11. 
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centredness is an "observable fact - observable indirectly in its fruits in human 
life. 11219 However, the Christian dogma that this state is only attainable as a result 
of the death of Christ is a "distinctively Christian theory, and it is to this and to all 
such theories that we should sit lightly. 11220 He maintains that "the reality of 
salvation/liberation is limitlessly more important than particular theories about 
it 11 
1 
221 and that to insist that all human beings adhere to one particular theory about 
it would be - and, Hick maintains, has been - soteriologically counter- 
productive. In inter-faith dialogue he proposes that "doctrinal differences ... should 
be matters of keen speculative interest rather than matters of ultimate concern in 
which our religious existence is held to be at stake. 11222 
Finally, Hick uses the notion of unanswerable questions with reference to 
the third kind of truth-claim conflict, the different religious conceptions of the 
ultimate. He argues that "the nature of the Real in itself, independently of human 
awareness of it, is the ultimate unanswerable question. ", 223 because human concepts 
do not apply to the Real in itself He draws a distinction between literal application 
of concepts such as love, justice, personality and power to different niatiifesiallollN 
of the Real, and mythological statements about the Real in itself For example, the 
claim 'the Real is love' is literally true of God or Krishna, the claim 'the Real is 
impersonal' is literally true of dependent origination, but all these descriptions are 
only my1hologically true of the Real an sich. Hick defines 'mythologically true' as 
"tending to evoke in the human hearer an appropriate dispositional response. "224 
Any personae or impersonae of the Real that promotes this response is 
cmythologically true' and in 'soteriological alignment' with the Real. Hick 
concludes that "we have ... no adequate reason to think that any of the great world 
traditions is soteriologically more effective than any other"225, thus there are a 
plurality of right responses to the Real. 
To sum up, Hick uses the Buddha's teaching of the unanswered questions to 
deprioritise conflicting religious doctrines and myths over the 'fruits' that they 
encourage. Since the Real is unknowable an sich, metaphysical differences are in 
principle not settleable, instead, their authenticity as responses to the Real can be 
judged by the conduct that they encourage. 
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Skilful Means 
In the case of the Unanswered Questions, we see Hick using a Buddhist 
teaching to support his view of religious ignorance. This religious ignorance must 
exist when there is an epistemic gap between the Real an sich and its 
manifestations. According to Hick, no religious tradition knows what the Real in 
itself is like, and the teaching of the unanswered questions is a way of 
acknowledging and accepting that ignorance in a soteriologically helpful way. One 
of the results of this understanding of religious doctrines as mythological is that 
they are seen in a pragmatic way, as means to soteriological ends, rather than as 
ultimately true in themselves. 
Hick takes up this point in Di. vpuled Quesllon. ý and expands it in detail 
through the adaptation and development of another Buddhist teaching, the doctrine 
of skilful means (11p5ya)226. Although the doctrine of skilful means is found in the 
Pali Canon, it is a teaching that is more comprehensively expounded in Malidy5na 
textS227. However, Hick makes reference to the teaching -as it is found in both I 
strands of the Buddhist tradition. He identifies two meanings of upaya -a 
narrower and a broader meaning. He identifies the narrower meaning as the 
presupposition that "a teacher knows some truth which is to be communicated to 
others so that they may come to see it for themselves. "228. Understood in this way, 
there is an extent to which all teachers use skilful means in that they adapt their 
teachings to suit the level of their hearers. 
Hick is more interested in the broader, more comprehensive understanding 
of skilful means, which he illustrates with the Buddha's parable of the raft from the 
Pali Canon. In the parable a man who is in danger builds a raft to carry him across 
a river to the safety of the other shore. Once he gets there, he is tempted to carry 
the raft around with him on his back because it has been so useful to him. Of 
course, if he does this, the raft will in fact be a hindrance - it no longer serves its 
purpose, and should be left behind. In the same way, the Buddha describes his 
Dhamma as "for carrying over, not for retaining. "229 Hick takes this to mean that 
the Buddha's teachings are to be understood pragmatically and non-dogmatically as 
a means to an end, rather than as something to be attached to for its own sake. He 
226Hick, Disputed Questions. pp. 119- 13 )6. 
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draws a parallel between this and Wittgenstein's statement that his propositions are 
like ladders - once one has used the ladder, one must thro%ý it awav230. 
Hick cites with approval Michael Pye's claim"' that the attitude promoted 
by the teaching of skilful means is what enables so many different forms of 
Buddhism to proliferate in different cultures, for the teachings are adapted to suit 
different cultural contexts. However, Hick argues that there must be a limit to how 
far the doctrine of skilful means can be taken. Can it, for example, be applied to the 
fundamental teachings of the Four Noble Truths, with the concepts of dukkha and 
nibbdiia, or even to the doctrine of skilful means itself.? Hick argues that if skilful 
means were applied to this extent, then "we are left with nothing but means which 
are not means to anything, and the whole system collapses into incoherence. "232 To 
avoid this collapse, Hick argues that a distinction must be made between different 
levels of 'upayity'- "we must say that the doctrine of the end to which Buddhism is 
a means is not itself another skilful means but is intended ... non-upay1cally. 
"233 
There is, he argues, a continuum of upayity, not only within Buddhism, but within 
other religious teachings - for example, he cites the distinction in modern 
Christian critical thinking "on the one hand, religious experience, 
and on the other the philosophical arid theological theories to which it has given 
h rt nI rise. 11234 Using this idea of 'degrees of upayity', Hick argues t at ce ai e ements 
of Buddhism, such as the existence of suffering and the Four Noble Truths, are 
universally acceptable facts that no "honest and reflective person" could deny. 
"Dukkha is not a metaphysical theory but refers to an experienced reality. "235 
However, Hick's Kantiari epistemology becomes clear at this point, for he 
argues that all our experience is subject to the interpretive activity of our minds, 
and that ultimately all our experience is 'theory-ladeil' "Our conceptual system is 
embodied in language, and the world as described is therefore always partially 
formed by the human experlencer and lariguage-user. "236 The implications of this 
are that any attempt to communicate any objective reality always involves a level of 
interpretation- "all human awareness necessarily exhibits distinctively human forms, 
and ... an 
intuition of the universe as it is in itself, rather than as it appears within 
human consciousness, could not be expressed in any language but would require 
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silence. 11237 This, then, applies to the Buddha's teaching - Hick argues that as 
soon as the Buddha taught the Dhaninia he was necessarily employing skilful means 
"in the sense that he was conveying in language something that cannot in principle 
be conveyed in language. "238 Some of the teachings of the Buddha are more 
cupayic' than others - whereas the Four Noble Truths have a low level of 
tupayity', others, such as the Theravdda teaching of not-self (anunu), or the 
Yogacdra teaching of 'store consciousness' (d1qyuvijA5na) are "products of special 
theories, occurring within particular optional ways of seeing and understanding the 
world. 11239, and thus have a high level of 'upayity'. Hick also argues that the 
teaching of dependent origination (puýiccasanwppdda) has a relatively high level of 
upayity for it involves "a considerable use of optional concepts and 
assumptions. "240 He maintains that the 'basic observation' that "dukkha is a 
product of the point of view of the self-enclosed ego" could be expressed in various 
other ways, "using different systems of psychological and physiological concepts 
and distinctions. 11241 It is, as he puts it, "a cake that can be cut in different ways. "242 
Hick goes on to list various Malidydna ways of referring to ultimate reality, 
comparing the Theravdda notion of nibb5na with the notions of the Trikuyu and 
Atnyald. He uses these different accounts to support his point that all experience is 
subject to interpretation and is understood in different ways. The following passage 
provides a useful surnmary of how Hick enlists ul)ayci in support of his Kantian 
epistemology- 
"The notion of upaya is, then, the notion that the cosmic significance 
of the nirvanic experience can be conceptualised in a variety of ways, 
all of which communicate the importance and availability of the 
experience, but none of which constitutes the one and only correct way 
of conceptualising it. These schemes of thought are provisional and 
instrumental, and are to be discarded like the raft in the Buddha's 
parable once they have fulfilled their function. "241 
Skilffil Means in Relation to Other Traditions. 
Having thus considered the notion of ul)aya and adapted it In relation to 
Buddhism, Hick applies it to other religious traditions, For example, if ipaya were 
applied to Christianity it would mean looking at the 'core experiences' that certain 
"371bid. 
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doctrines display, rather than focusing too much on the content of the doctrines 
themselves. When this is done, fundamental similarities between apparently 
conflicting traditions come to light. For example, the "experience of a new life" is 
believed by Christians "to rest upon the ultimate nature of reality, "244 in the same 
way that Buddhists believe that the attainment of nibbdna brings about a radically 
new experience in which suffering is absent. In this respect, Christianity and 
Buddhism have certain fundamental similarities- "The basic formal inner structure 
of Christianity parallels that of Buddhism. 11245 Hick considers various Christian 
doctrines that have existed throughout the ages. some, such as the idea that Christ 
died as a form of ransom for the devil, are implausible now, but have been 
mythologically true (effective in producing an response in 'soteriological alignment' 
with the Real) in the past. Similarly, other elements of Christian doctrine, such as 
the Trinity, heaven and hell, the idea of the Church as the Body of Christ, are 
"likewise upayic"- "They are not absolute and eternal truths but optional 
conceptualities which have proved useful to those whose formation they have 
influenced, but not generally to others. 11246 
Since all religions use doctrines upayically, then ultimately doctrines have 
the same status; they are essentially doing the same thing, namely interpreting the 
Real in native cultural terms in a way that encourages believers to act in 
46soteriological alignment" with the Real. Hick reiterates his claim about the 
connection between Buddhism and Christianity, which are "both skilful means to a 
radically new or transformed state of being -a state which is intrinsically desirable 
"247 
and which is believed both to depend upon and to manifest the ultimately real. 
Even these core experience that different religious traditions share are upayic (in so 
far as all experience is theory-laden), but the more specific doctrines and ideas that 
create differences between the traditions are have much higher levels of upayity. 
Despite these phenomenological differences, religious traditions share a core 
ity-centredness, and are affected experience of the transformation from self- to Real' 
by cosmic reality in the sarne way. Hick concludes by stating that all the different 
religious traditions: 
(care different forms of upaya, skilful means to draw men and women 
from a consuming natural self-concern, with all its attendant sins and 
woes, to a radically different orientation in which they have become 
'transparent' to the universal presence of the Ultimate. "248 
2441-lick, Dispiaed Questions. p. 130. 
245flick, Dispitte(l Questions. p. I ") I- 
246 Ibid. 
247Hick, Dispule(l Questions. p. F)"). 
248Hick, Disputed Ottestions. p. 135. 
69 
70 
Hick understands the unanswered questions and the doctrine of skilful 
means to mean that religious doctrines are of a provisional and pragmatic, but not 
an ultimate or absolute value: 
"Religious teachings are not absolute and eternal truths but are human 
ideas that can help people to move at particular stages of their spiritual 
growth towards the goal of enlightenment, liberation, awakening or, in 
Christian terms, salvation. "249 
This idea is vital for Hick's pluralistic hypothesis-, if all religious doctrines are 
pragmatic means to attain soteriological ends, but are not true in an absolute sense, 
then they can co-exist without contradicting each other, for they are all serving the 
same purpose in different ways. Hick explains that different doctrines suit different 
people, or that an individual may find different beliefs appropriate at different stages 
in his or her life. If every world religion could come to see religious beliefs and 
doctrines in this way, "they would allow people to grow within their own different 
faith traditions, and would be able to share spiritual resources across traditional 
borders. 11250 
Hick does not explicitly claim that the Buddha applied the concept of skilful 
means to the doctrines of other religions, however - he simply borrows the 
approach from the Buddha, and develops it to support his own thesis. Indeed, in 
Problems c? f Religious Plill-cilism lie recognises that Buddhist self-understanding is 
that the Dhamma is more efficacious in bringing about liberation than any other 
teaching- 
"In the Buddhist tradition it is held that the true appreciation of our 
human situation occurs most clearly and effectively in the teachings of 
Gautama Buddha; and that any doctrine which denies the ceaselessly 
changing and insubstantial character of human life, or the possibility of 
attaining to the 'further shore' of nirvjýia, is not conducive to liberation 
from the pervasive unsatisfactoriness of ordinary human existence. 11251 
In The Rainboir of Faiih. v, Hick supports this point with an extract from the 
Dhanimaj)ada, where it is clairned that the Dharnrna is '. 'the only Way. There is 
none other for the purity Of VISIOn. "252 
This leads us to a common criticisn, 253 of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, 
namely that it does not accommodate any particular tradition's self-understanding 
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252The Dhammapa(la, 20.2. trans. Narada Manithera. (Colombo. Vaji-araina. 1972). p. 22 I: cited 
Hick, The Rainbow of Paiihs, p. 113. 
253 See for example. Paul GrIffillisand Delinas Lc\% Is. -On Grading 
Religloils. SeckIng Truth and 
Being Nice to People -A Reply to Professor Hick". 




as superior or unique in bringing salvation/liberation. Hick concedes that Buddhism 
is not alone in having elements in which it regards itself as uniquely superior, and 
has aspects 'a religious pluralist has to question. 1254 Hick addresses this point 
directly in The Rainbow of Faiths where he concedes that an inevitable 
consequence of his pluralistic hypothesis is that it will diverge from the self- 
understandings within any specific tradition: 
"You have to face up to the fact that no hypothesis about the relation 
between the different world religions - unless it simply affirms the 
truth of one and the falsity of the rest - is going to be congruent with 
the belief system of one of them to the exclusion of the others. "255 
Hick does not claim to have a privileged vantage point from which to see the 
coherence of the pluralist position, but lqfers the hypothesis from the available data, 
and sees it as more coherent than claiming only one tradition is true, for this would 
be to ignore the clear soteriological 'fruits' of all the other religions. He thus sees 
the individual as having to make a choice "between a one-tradition absolutism and a 
genuinely pluralistic interpretation of the global religious situation. "256 
According to Hick, then, the only way to make sense of the apparently 
conflicting claims to salvific effectiveness is to see religious truth claims and 
doctrines as provisional, pragmatic and not absolute truths, in just the same way 
that the Buddha viewed his own teachings. This means that any religion that tends 
towards absolutist claims will inevitably have to adjust its values somewhat if the 
pluralistic hypothesis is accepted. "none of the world religions can move beyond 
that point [i. e. inclusivism] without reconstructing at least some of its belief 
system. " Hick attributes the assumption of each religion that it is superior to 
others, to psychological factors. For example, it might be attributed to a sort of 
corporate pride or self-respect, "a natural form of pride in and ingrained preference 
for one's own group and its ways. 11257 This pride is natural, but becomes harmful 
when it is promoted to the status of absolute truth, for it gets in tile way of mutual 
respect and tolerance. In fact, Hick argues, if one were to truly follow any of the 
great religious traditions, then one would reach a point of compassion and 
acceptance of fellow human beings, rather than competition and rivalry. For 
example, he sees a 'basic Buddhist conviction' as "the universal unity of 
humanity. "258 He thus sees pluralism as conducive to the 'spirit' of religious 
D'Costa, 'Whose Objectivity? Which neutrality? The Doomed Quest for a Neutral Vantage Point 
from which to Judge Religions'. Reli. gious Stitches. 29. lqqý) (pp, 79-95). p. 
94. 
254Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, p. I 13. 
255Hick, The Roinbow Qf Faiths, p. 48. 
256Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, p. 43. 
257Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 50. 
258Hick, Problems of Reliýizious Pluralism, p. 8' ). 
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teachings. His vision is that the diversity of the different religious forms should be 
respected, but each faith can "winnow out the aspect which entails its own unique 
superiority and increasingly influence one another in inter-faith dialogue with some 
degree of mutual transformation in which each enriches and is enriched by 
others. 11259 
So far, we have looked at how Hick uses the notions of the Unanswered 
Questions and Skilful Means to suit his pluralistic hypothesis. In his presentation of 
these doctrines, Hick at times departs from the understanding of these doctrines as 
they are presented in the Buddhist texts, and argues for an alternative reading. We 
will now consider how he departs from the Buddhist understanding, and his 
implicit criticisms of the Buddhist tradition. 
Hick is drawn to the Unanswered Questions teaching because of its 
emphasis on basing theories only on experience, on what is known now, and not 
engaging in the futile enterprise of theorising about the unknowable. Hick applies 
these doctrines to the "developments in Buddhist thought" after tile time of the 
Buddha. 260 He turns his attention to the idea of dependent origination. Whilst he 
accepts that the, claim that "everything is mutually co-constituted by everything 
else" is based upon experience, he argues that any claims beyond this are not 
legitimate- "to affirm that this continuum of pi-alitya s7annllpada is uncreated and 
not structured towards any end or fulfilment is to go beyond the witness of 
experience. "261 Similarly, he uses the same argument to reject the denial of a 
creator* 
I suggest that dogmatic insistence upon the non-existence of a 
creator, and again a dogmatic insistence that the universe does not have 
a teleological structure moving towards what we can refer to, in 
Buddhist language, as universal nii-vana, would be to go beyond what 
is known in Buddhist experience. 11262 
Not only would such a move be illegitimate, but to insist that knowledge of these 
'truths, is a prerequisite fo r finding liberation is 'soteriologically 
counterproductive'. Here, it Is unclear exactly which Buddhist schools or thinkers 
that Hick is opposing, as lie does not provide examples of any te\ts that propound 
the beliefs that he rejects. The role of this argument in his overall thesis, however, 
is clear. One of the areas in which Buddhism appears to conflict with theistic 
religions is in its silence as to the existence of a creator, and in its picture of the 
universe as being governed by an impersonal law of causality. Hick is 
keen to 
259Hick. The Rainbow oj'l--oilhs, P. 123). 
260Hick, The Rainbow of Failh-ý. P. II 
261 Ibid. 
262Hick, The Rainbow of Failhs. p. 114. 
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stress that any dogmatic claims about the nature of the universe, claims that would 
emphasise the differences between the religious traditions, are not grounded in 
experience, and should not be considered as soteriologically significant. 
He makes a similar criticism of the idea of rebirth or reincarnation, a 
concept that appears to have been accepted by the Buddha. Hick notes that, even 
though this doctrine is a trans-historical question, the Buddha himself did not 
classify it in this way. Throughout the Pali Canon, the Buddha operated in the 
thought-idiom of his time in apparently accepting that "human life is part of a vast 
karmic process involving repeated rebirths in this and other worlds. "263 However, 
since this fact is not 'universally obvious', and indeed contradicts many Western 
religious and naturalistic beliefs, it too is to be categorised as "one of the avyakala 
or undetermined issues". "If we accept the Buddha's basic soteriological insight, 
we shall conclude that it is neither necessary for salvation/liberation to know 
whether reincarnation occurs nor conducive to salvation/liberation to devote one's 
energies to establishing such knowledge. "264 . 
There is a tension here, between this claim that rebirth is an unanswered 
question, and an argument Hick makes in his chapter on Skilful Means in which he 
addresses a modern, non-realist, 'psychological' understanding of BuddhiSM. 265 On 
this view, Buddhism is "a psychological technique with no metaphysical 
implications. 11266 Hick rejects this interpretation as elitist- "not so much a gospel for 
the world as a special option for the fortunate few"261 This is because it is not held 
that the structure of the universe makes liberation a possibility for everybody: 
instead, Buddhism consists of a specialised psychological technique, only available 
to a fortun ate few. The Buddha himself said that nll-icuia is not a realistic goal for 
most people in this present life268 Hick ernphasises that it is the Buddha's insistence 
on rebirth, and the chance to attain nwiýalia over a succession of lifetimes that 
prevents the Buddha's teaching frorn being elitist, enabling it to be a source of good 
news for human kind. It is at this point that the apparent contradiction arises 
between this claim, and his earlier insistence that the question of rebirth is one of 
the unanswered questions which is not 'soteriologically relevant'. For Hick 
criticises the non-realist view of Buddhism, complete with its denial of rebirth and 
the objective structure of reality, as at odds with Buddhist texts: "the sceptical 
view does not seem to me to fit well either with the teachings of Gotama as 
263Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths. p. 112. 
2641bid. 
265Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths (p. 126) cites Don Cupitt is a proponent of this approach. 
See 
Takiiýg Leave of God (London. SCM. 1980). and The lf'()rld to Come (London. 
SCNI. 1982). 
266Hick. The Rainbow of Faiths. p. 126. 
2671bid. 
268D ii 36. Rhys Davids. p. 34: froin Hick, Disputed Questions, p. 126. 
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reflected - admittedly, at some remove of time - in the Pall scriptures, or in most 
of the later developments of Buddhist teaching. "269 However, he also seems to 
claim that one must be agnostic about the question of rebirth. How is this apparent 
contradiction resolved? 
The answer seems to be that, whilst Hick insists that it makes sense to be 
agnostic about the 'specifics' of the Buddhist understanding of ultimate reality, (for 
these are claims that go beyond experience), nevertheless, Buddhist language must 
be seen as operating in a critical realist way if it is to accord with the self- 
understanding of the tradition as seen in the texts. By critical realist, Hick means 
"referring to realities beyond ourselves, but realities that are always apprehended in 
terms of human concepts. 11270 Without the idea of an objective reality that informs 
Buddhist language, or any religious language, Hick believes that the fundamental 
message of liberation would be undermined- "The universe has a certain objective 
character which grounds the possibility of nil-vana for all conscious beings, It is this 
that makes the Dhamma good news and that motivated the Buddha to preach it to 
needy humanity. "271 However, in the interpretation of the 'objective character' of 
the universe it is the emphasis on human concepts that is vital - all experience of 
the ultimate is interpreted and Iii-nited by human conceptual activity, and is therefore 
incomplete. Thus the idea of rebirth is merely one picture, one interpretation of 
ultimate reality, but as a human concept, it is ultimately provisional. It is one 
possible way of looking at reality, but one of many. The same is true of dependent 
origination - we have already seen Hick's insistence that the reality it describes "is 
a cake that can be cut in different ways. " It is at this point that Hick makes use of 
the Buddhist idea of skilful means- 
"all these different modes in which the ultimate Reality is manifested to 
Buddhist understanding are modes of ul)aya ... 
The notion of ill)aya is 
... the notion that the cosmic significance of 
the nirvanic experience can 
be conceptuallsed in a variety of different ways, all of which 
communicate the importance and availability of the experience, but 
none of which constitutes the one and only correct way of 
conceptuallsing it. 11272 
Let us conclude by surnmarising what Hick's pluralist hypothesis means in 
the context of Therav5da Buddhism. Firstly, it means that the Buddha's teachinos 
about the way reality is, iiicludin(, y doctrines such as not-self (unuuu) and 
dependent 
I 
269Hick, Disputed OuestiO17S, P. 127. 
2701bid. 
271 Hick, Disputed Ouestions. p. 124. 
272Hick, Disputed Questions. p. 128. 
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origination, are not to be taken at face value as cognitively true statements about 
reality. These doctrines are 'salvifically true' in the sense that they can effect the 
transformation from self- cent redness to Real i ty-cent redness, but they are best 
understood pragmatically or mythologically, as tools to achieve certain effects, 
rather than as absolute truths. Hick does concede that the Buddha offers the no- 
self doctrine as a 'theoretical truth', but sees this as much less important than the 
fact that it functions as "a practical prescription for liberation. "271 Hick adapts the 
Buddha's own teachings about the Unanswered Questions and the Parable of the 
Raft to support these ideas. 
The concept of nibb5na is also to be viewed mythologically, and not to be 
taken literally, for by its very nature the Real (of which, according to Hick, nibbdna 
is a manifestation) cannot be understood or characterised in any human terms. 
Rather than being a true description of Reality, the concept of nibb5na is a useful 
tool or image to help individuals orient themselves towards tile Real. 
Buddhist symbols, traditions and images al-e genuine manifestations of the 
Real, for they can bring about liberation demonstrated by the transformation from 
self to reality-cent redness. However, they are no more effective than doing so than 
those of any other religious traditions. In terms of salvific effectiveness, Buddhism 
is on a par with all the other world religious traditions. In the sense that all these 
traditions provide an incomplete picture, a human perception of the Real, they are 
all 'inaccurate', but in the sense that they can all, in their different ways, promote a 
positive response to the Real they are equally valid. In terms of the religious 
tradition contemporary to the Buddha's lifetime, this means that 'Brahmanism' and 
Jainism, for example, were and are equally effective paths to liberation as 
Buddhism. 
Summary 
Hick claims that his pluralistic hypothesis is an inductive proposal based on 
the data that he is presented with. He claims that his hypothesis is the most 
coherent way of making sense of the data. As we have seen, one of Hick's 
arguments is that it does not matter if his pluralistic hypothesis contradicts a 
religion's self-understanding, as this is inevitable, and preferable to the alternatives 
of propounding either a one-tradition absolutism or naturalism. 
The next four chapters of this thesis will look at the Buddha's attitude 
towards other views and practices as demonstrated in the Nikdyas. As a result of 
this investigation, a series of arguments will be made against Hick's 
hypothesis. 
273Hick. An Interpretation ofReligion. p. 42. 
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Firstly it will be shown that Hick misuses the metaphor of skilful means and the 
unanswered questions, it will be argued that these teachings do not make sense 
without a grounding in objective knowledge. Secondly, it will be argued that Hick 
contradicts Buddhist self-understanding to such an extent as to effectively 'exclude' 
it from his hypothesis. It will be argued that the Buddha's teaching fundamentally 
rests on the possibility of experiencing reality unmediaied, a possibility that Hick 
denies. Hick's agnostic criteria, then, effectively makes him an exclusivist, for his 
implication is that only traditions that accept his fundamental agnosticism are true. 
Hick therefore implicitly espouses just the kind of exclusivist view that he wishes to 
counter. Thirdly, is will be argued that the 'Buddhist' view offers a real critique of 
Hick's hypothesis. Fourthly it will be suggested that the Pali Nikdyas provide a 
much more interesting and coherent account of dealing seriously with other 
religions, accepting them in terms of their own self-description and criticising them 
accordingly. 
The exposition of the 'Buddhist' position will be divided into four chapters. 
The first will provide a brief introduction to the thought-world and historical 
background of the Buddha. The second will be devoted to the definitions of 
liberated and non-liberated individuals in the Nik5yas, in an attempt to elucidate 
what liberation consists of and how it is attained. The third chapter deals with the 
relationship of views and doctrines to liberation, as this has an important bearing on 
the Buddha's attitude towards other groups and teachings. The fourth chapter 
(chapter five) of this section will contain an exposition and analysis of a selection of 
the many passages in the Nik5yas where the Buddha encounters and passes 
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CHAPTER TWO: A Brief Introduction to the Buddha's Thought 
My intention in this section is to form and present an understanding of how the 
Buddha treated teachers and disciples who followed teachings other than his own. 
This will eventually be used to present a 'Buddhist' perspective on the modern inter- 
faith debate, and in particular a critique of Hick's post-Copernican pluralist hypothesis. 
In order to understand the Buddha's attitude to other groups I am focusing on the texts 
of the Pali Nik5yas as the earliest written account of the Buddha's life and teachings. 
in this project there are various questions I am seeking to answer. What does it mean 
to be a follower of the Buddha in the context of the Nikdyas9 What is the goal of the 
Buddha's teaching and what does one have to do in order to attain V Can this goal be 
attained without consciously following the Buddha's teachings, namely from the 
context of a different 'religious' tradition? 
All study - all perception even - is done from a certain standpoint and 
context. This study is being undertaken from the context of a British university 
religious studies department. Certain current preoccupations within this field of study 
have led me to undertake this thesis. Perhaps the strongest of these is the 
contemporary debate about how religions can co-exist with their apparently 
contradictory truth claims, which (if any) account of salvation or liberation is true and 
is there one exclusive way to its attainment or many" One of my intentions in this 
thesis is to provide an early Buddhist 'angle' on this debate. There are many possible 
ways of engaging a Buddhist critique with the contemporary inter-faith debate. In this 
thesis I have chosen to focus on the work of John Hick as a protagonist of the 
contemporary debate. By responding to Hick's thesis from the standpoint of the 
Nikdyas, I hope to have found an intelligible context within which to apply some of the 
teachings and insights of the Nik5iyas to the contemporary inter-faith debate. In the 
final chapter there will be an analysis of Hicks thesis in the light of my findings 
from 
the Nikdyas. In doing this I hope both to elucidate the Buddha's attitude to 
soteriological issues and provide a critique of Hick's thesis. 
We have already briefly surnmarised and considered Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis. In this section, the focus will be almost entirely oil the 
Nikqvas in order to 
fulfil the primary purpose of this thesis. In this chapter I will begin 
by describing the 
iv ea Buddhist primary source that is t`6cused on, the Pali Nikavas After this 
I ýýill LY 
very brief survey of the Buddha's teaching. This \\ill include a 
definition. of ýýhat 
liberation is according to the Buddha. The next question, and one to ýýhich most 
of 
this section is implicitly devoted, is- what does one have to 
do in order to attain 
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liberation? When this question is answered, then one can perhaps understand who is 
included and who excluded from liberation. One of the ways of answering the 
question is to look at the Nikdya accounts of those whom the Buddha describes as 
being guaranteed liberation; what qualities do they have to possess and how are these 
qualities attained? How do such individuals differ from the ordinary, non-liberated 
person? This is the question that will be considered in chapter three, where I will 
compare the definitions of those who are guaranteed liberation (at-iyusuvaku -- noble 
disciple) with the ordinary person (puthi&na) who is still ensnared in the cycle of 
suffering. 
In chapter four I will consider this question with particular reference to the 
issues of views and doctrines. This aspect is worthy of particular attention because it 
is often over the issues of doctrinal views and beliefs that different religious traditions 
differ. For example, if a Christian holds that one can only attain salvation by accepting 
that Jesus Christ was God incarnate, then the Buddhist who does not hold this belief is 
excluded from liberation. I want to discover if a comparable situation occurs in 
13uddhism - for example, can an individual only attain liberation if he or she 'believes 
in' key teachings of the Buddha such as not-self and dependent origination? This is 
significant, for if it were the case, then followers of other teachings would be excluded 
from liberation. Various issues arise when considering this question - what does it 
mean to 'believe' something? How does this differ from 'knowledcye'9 Is it possible to 
believe without an object of belieP What role do doctrines have in the Buddha's 
teaching and in the path to liberation? How do belief and practice inter-relate in Nik5ya 
Buddhism? 
In chapter five I will consider those occasions in the Nik5yas where the Buddha 
encounters or passes judgement on other groups or views. Taking this data and the 
Buddha's definition of liberation and the way to attain it, I will attempt to formulate 
the Buddha's attitude towards other teachings. In the third section, this will be 
compared and contrasted to the presentation of Buddhism that is given by Hick. The 
purpose of this comparison will be twofold-, firstly to provide a critique of Hick's 
thesis and secondly to offer the Buddha's teachings as a rival account of how to 
approach the question of inter-faith dialogue. 
This chapter will be structured as follows. Firstly I will briefly trace the historx 
of the Pali Canon, as this is the primary source from which most of the information 
about the Buddhist tradition is taken. I will then consider the question of Nvho the 
Buddha was, which will include a survey of the context ývithin which 
he taught. 
Secondly I very briefly consider N\,, hat the Buddha taught, using his descriptions of the 




individual's progress from the everyday lay-life, characterised by suffering, to a state of 
liberation. Having given a brief summary of the Buddha's teaching, this will allow me 
to then embark upon a more detailed analysis of some of his teachings which are most 
relevant to the project of this thesis. 
The Pali Canon. 
The Pali Canon is a vast collection of Buddhist scriptures usually described as 
'belonging to' or created by the Therav5da school of Buddhism. It is also described as 
the Pali Tipitika, ("three baskets"), for it is divided up into three sections (pi. iukas or 
'baskets'): the Vinaya-piluka, (the basket of discipline), which contains scriptures 
relating to monastic discipline, the Sialu-pquku, (the basket of discourses), which 
contains teachings of the Buddha, and the Ahidliumnia-pi! uka, (the basket of higher 
Dhamma), which contains later commentaries on the teachings in the Siata-pilaka. 
In this thesis, the focus of attention will be on the Sulla-piluka, which contains 
accounts of the Buddha's teachings in specific times and places in his life. There are 
four 'collections' -(nikuyus) in tile Siaiu-pi. iuku, the D[ghu Nikuya (the 'long 
discourses'), the Mqljhil7ia Niku)., a (the 'middle length discourses), the 
Sa, 7ijnma Nikiya (the 'grouped together' discourses, and the Aýigrialuru Nikuyu (the 
'gradual discourses'). As their names suggest, the suttas in the first two NikAyas are 
classified according to their length. The suttas in the ýuqiyullu Nikuycj are 'grouped 
together' according to subject. For example, a large proportion of the second part of 
the Saqij4tttaNi1(jya, the Khandliuvagga, is devoted to the subject of not-self 
(anand). Suttas in the Mguuaru Nikiýyu are sorted in numerical progression, 
containing many lists. The Mgialuru Nikuyu contains a book of ones, twos, threes, 
fours and so on. The book of fives, for example, contains the Buddha's description of 
the five hindrances, the five precepts and so on. Cousins suggests that this form of 
classification was to aid the memories of those who were reciting, with the 
classification in terms of length helping monks chose teachings suitable for different 
occasions. Similarly the preponderance of lists suggests that they were designed to act 
as mnemonic aid S. 274 
Each Nik5ya is divided into volumes - there are three books of the 
Digha Nikiya, three of the Majjhima Nikuyu, five of tile Sumy7wu AIjkj_i, a, and 
four of 
the Afigutlaiw Nik5yu. 
274 Gethin, The Buddhist Paih io. -Iwakening. p. 13. Gethin argues that III's use Of 
lists Is 11111"10111C 
aids makes it difficult to decide the chronology of the discourses for the preponderance of 
lists does 
not necessarily point to flic lateness of a text. 
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How does the Pali Canon relate to other Buddhist texts? To the Western 
reader, the word 'canon' carries connotations of exclusivity and uniqueneSS275. Whilst 
the Pali Canon is the only complete surviving Tipi! uka in an Indian language, remnants 
of the scriptures of other Buddhist 'schools' show that it holds much in common with 
these other accounts, rather than being completely exclusive and separate. Lack of 
knowledge about when exactly the Buddha lived, died, and gained enlightenment276 
means that it is very difficult to date exactly when Buddhist scriptures first began to 
appear. However, it is thought that upon the death of the Buddha, a Buddhist council 
was formed at Rdjagaha where the Buddha's followers were informed of his death. '77 
The Vinaya and Dhamma were then recited by the monks, forming the basis of what 
was later to be written down to form the scriptures. A hundred years later, another 
Council was called at Vesall to discuss divisions amongst the Sangha over ten points of 
discipline, and after discussion and rejection of these ten amendments, tile Sangha was 
re-united. 
Some time between tile second and third council a split occurred in the sangha 
between the Sthaviras (tile elders) and the Mah5s5ijighikas, who disagreed with the 
elders over five points involving discipline and the qualities of an Arhat. Subsequent to 
this division, the Sthaviras themselves split Into three groups - the Pudgaluvadills, 
(personalists), the Vihhujjýui'Udins (analysts), and the Sa/-v. YUs/1`vC-1di*ns (those who claim 
that 'all exists'). The Therav5da tradition is linked to tile Viblia. j*y5diiis, and the third 
Buddhist council at Pataliputra during the reign of Asoka is only recognised in D0 
Theravdda sources, suggesting that by that time, different schools had become quite 
distinct. After this council, Asoka's son, Mahinda, travelled from India to Sri-Lanka 
with the Vibhajyav5din version of the scriptures, which were still transmitted in oral 
form. Following a monastic dispute tile scriptures were written down for the first time 
between 29-17 BCE, and it is this version that has outlived all the others. 
Quite how the formation of what we now describe as the Pall Canon was 
influenced by these divisions and disputes is unclear, and a matter of dispute. 278 
275This understanding of the Pali Callol, as an 'c. xclusiN, c' and 'closed' set of texts is strongly 
challenged by Stevcn - Collins in his article --On the Vcn- Idea of the 
Pali Canon. ". Journal of the Pali 
Text Societv, XV, 89-196. p. 90. Collinsargucs 111,1t tile pall CIIIoII is not icgitlinatcly understood as 
being an exclusivc. closed test and traces sonic historical CNPIIllltI*OIIS aS 
to NVIIN' It Often 1111S C0111C to 
be So understood. 
276According to the 'long clironolgý'. t lie Buddha's pa ri iilbb5i na \\ as I 11 4,, () BCE. 2 18 ý eirs 
before t lie 
reign of the Emporcr Asoka (269-232 BCE). The 'sliort cliroiiolgý' lias it that the Buddlia rc. ichcd 
nibb5na In 386 BCE. one limidi-cd years before A. ýoka's i-C191, 
277There is Some doubt I inow, st acadciii ics over \\ lict her th is counci I \\ ýIS all il,: Wal 
histom:. 1 I C\ clit 
See C. S. Prebish. "A Re\ lc\\- of Scholarship of the Buddhist Councils- ill Journol ()/. Ism/1 
sludies. 
33,1974, pp. 2-339-54. 
278See Prebish's article. listed above, and 
Prebish and Natticr. -Mfli5sarrighika Oriuinsý Tile 
Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism-. History (? f1? e1igio17-\. 16.19-(). pp. 237-72. 
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Similarly uncertain is the chronology of the Abhidhamma writings in relation to these 
events. One factor that makes judgement on such issues difficult is the fact that the 
scriptures were apparently transmitted orally from the time of the Buddha's 
enlightenment to the writing down of one version in the first century. Amongst the 
remaining versions of the Sutta-pitakas of different schools, there is fundamental 
agreement about the content of the Nikdyas (collections), with only minor details 
altering between the different accounts over descriptions such as the setting of certain 
discourses. This, argues Cousins, is consonant with oral recitations- "It is quite 
evident that if we compare the Pali recension of the Nikdyas with other surviving 
versions, the differences we find are exactly those we might expect to discover 
between different performances of oral works. " 279 
Apart from these minor differences, the Vinayas and Sutta-pitakas of different 
scriptures have very much in common, including their mode of classif ng the four Y1 _, 
main nikdyas in terms of length (mqjjhhna, 'middle-length', and dl-gha, 'long'), subject 
(san t1a) and numerical progression (w)gnillum). According to Gethin, such J IYU Z) 
similarities suggest that the PH scriptures are just one more recension of this teaching 
common to all schools. "As far as the contents of these four priniary collections of 
sufras are concerned, all the indications are that there was a remarkable consensus and 
"280 degree of correspondence among the various recensions. 
Thus similarities between the surviving Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas of other 
Buddhist traditions and those of the Pali Canon suggest that the contents of both these 
pitakas were decided relatively early, before substantial divisions occurred in the 
sangha. This, then, undermines the notion of the Pali Canon being in some sense 
Lexclusive' or more 'faithful' to early Buddhism than other recensions - instead it 
apparently draws on a heritage common to all the schools. 
The Abhidhannnas of different schools, however, display more substantial 
differences, suggesting that they were written later, and were influenced by the 
philosophies that distinguished schools frorn each other. The Abhidhaninla or 'higher 
teaching' represents an attempt to systernatise and elaborate the teachings in the suttas. 
Despite the variations between different Abludliammas, Gethin rejects the 
\bhldharma are said common notion of a clear "cut-off point" where texts before the , 
to be early and representing a common heritage, whilst Abhidhamrna texts thernsel, ý'es 
are peculiar to particular traditions. One argument lie cites is that although different 
i indicates a common Abhidhammas do have new material, some unique, much of it 
279L. S. Cousins. -Pali Oral Literature-in Buddhist Siuclies: Ancient al7c0l0(ler17, cd 
P. Dcimood and 
A. Piatigorsky (London: Curzon Press. 1981). pp. 1-11. p. 2. 
28OGethin, The Buddhist Path to A wakening, p. 10. 
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heritage with other schools. He points to the fact that some ideas and expressions, (for 
example, the 'thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya dhaninia'), are not mentioned in the Pali 
Canon, but nevertheless are common to all Buddhist schools, This suggests that the 
fact that an idea comes later does not preclude it from belonging to a common 
heritage: while it is apparent that there were divisions in the Sangha, it seems that 
the various distinct traditions must have remained in communion with each other, and 
that geographical dispersal as much as doctrinal divergence tended towards the 
formation of particular traditions. " 281 
Thus, despite many uncertainties about the formation of the Pali canon, it 
appears-that it evolved gradually before being set in writing in the first century BCE, 
and that it shares enough common heritage with other traditions to shed doubt on the 
legitimacy of regarding it as an exclusive document. 
What, then, of the propensity of modern scholars to see the Pali Canon as 1he 
authority on early Buddhism? Gethin argues that there are two "simple but 
inconclusive reasonS11282 why this is so. Firstly, the Pali Canon offers the fullest 
recension of early material that is available to scholars, and is thus more convenient for 
studying as it provides a more complete or coherent picture. Secondly, the fact that 
the Pali Canon remains in a Middle Indo-Aryan language and resisted the process of 
sanskritisation "may be indicative of a more general conservatism", since we know that 
the vernacular of the earliest Buddhism was also a Middle Indo-Aryan language. 
These factors, however, do not give the Pali Canon the sanction of ultimate authority, 
"the Pali canon cannot simply be taken as the last authority on questions of early 
Buddhism; quite clearly the traditions found in other sources may be of a similar or 
even earlier date. 11283 
Similarly, Gethin questions the assumption that the earlier the tradition, the 
purer' or more authoritative it is. Just as legitimate as the early sources are the later 
commentaries which have developed from the same tradition. For this reason it would 
be unwise to isolate earliest texts as the most legitimate "because we do not know 
whether the Buddhist tradition ever regarded precisely these texts as embodying a 
proper or meaningful expression of 'Buddh ISM1.11284 I 
Indeed, even within the Thera\, 5da tradition itself, it is not the case that the 
Canon alone functions as 'scripture' to the detriment of all other te\ts and practices 
28 'Gethin, The Buddhist Path to. -I wokening, pp. 14-15. 
282 Gethin, The Buddhist Path to. 4 wakening. p. 10. 
283 Gethin, The Buddhist Path toA wakening. p. 11. 
284 Gethin, The Buddhist Path to. 4irakening. p. 15. 
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"throughout Theravdda history, up to and including the modern world, maný, other 
texts, both written and in oral-ritual form, have been used. "285 
We have seen how the Pali Canon shares a common heritage with other texts, 
both within and outside the Therav5da tradition, which makes it virtually impossible to 
impose a clear cut-off point between exclusively 'Theravddin' or canonical texts and 
other scriptures. This thesis focuses very much on the Nikdyas of the Pali Canon, it is 
not intended to be an exposition of a specifically Theravddin point of view. 
The Buddha. 
The Buddha's World 
The precise dates of the Buddha's lifetime are not known. Different strands of 
Buddhist tradition place the dates of the Buddha's life at varying timeS286. The 'long 
chronology' dates the Buddha's life from 564-486 BCE. This is based upon tile texts 
of Pali 'Southern Buddhism' which states that the king Asoka acceded tile throne 218 
years after the Buddha's death in the year 268 BCE. The short chronology of 
'Northern Buddhism', however, places Asoka's accession 100 years after the death of 
the Buddha, and there is evidence to suggest that the accession in fact occurred 
anywhere between 280 and 267 BCE287. The dates of the 'corrected long chronology' 
are favoured because the dates given seemed to accord with available archaeological 
288. evidence, but even this is now under question 
"From the point of view of reasonable probability the evidence seems to 
favour some kind of median chronology and we should no doubt speak of a 
date for the Buddha's Mahaparinibbana of c. 400 B-C -I choose the 
round number deliberately to indicate that the margins are rather loose"289. 
285 Steven Collins, "On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon" p. 103- 
286For example, the Northern tradition believed the Buddha died in 881 BCE-. the Eastern that lie died 
in 878 BCE. and the Southern. Pah tradition that lie died in 543) BCE. See Lance Cousins. "The 
Dating of the Historical Buddha: A Review Article" inJournal of the Royol Asiolk-Sociely. 6.1996. 
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Thus the situation might be summarised by explaining that scholarly consensus nolv 
places the Buddha's enlightenment at around 400 B. C. 290 
The Brahmanical Tradition 
The two main sorts of religious tradition that would have existed in India at the 
time of the Buddha were the Brahmanical tradition and the 'renouncer' tradition. The 
Brahmanical tradition is believed to be very ancient, though its precise origins are 
unknown. The tradition arose out of the Aryan culture, which is generally thought to 
have been present in India from around 1500 BCE, although there are conflicting 
theories about how this culture originated. 291 The oldest text associated with this 
tradition, the Rg Veda, is believed to be extremely ancient, havino, been composed 
around 1200 BCE (although, once again, there is uncertainty over when the earliest 
portions were composed)292. As Flood explains, i)eda "is synonyrn for revelation-291 
and the scriptures texts which constitute the Vedas are claimed to be revealed to sages. 
Later traditions of Veda texts were the l3rdlimapas, the Arapyakas and the Upani, ýads, 
these texts are all known as the Vedas. The gg Veda consists of a series of hymns to 
various deities who are to be appeased with various rituals. Indeed, sacrifice was a key 
element of Vedic culture. Flood explains that sacrifice and sharing a sacrificial meal 
was the "central religious practice of the vedic AryanS"294, and that through this 
process of sacrifice, gods were thought to be appeased or encouraged to give blessings 
and gifts. The gg Veda assumed the existence of various gods (del'as), the most 
significant being Agni, the fire god, and Soma. Agni could be appeased with 
sacrificeS295 involving fire, and, like Soma, "the pillar of the sky and the bringer of 
ecstasy and understanding of the divine realMS"296, was thought able to intercede 
290 See Gethin, The Foundations of Bu(IcIhi. vn (Oxford. Oxford Uiiiversitý, Press. 1998). pp. 13-14 for a 
summary of this debate. 
291The generally accepted theor), is that the Aryans migrated into lildla froin central Asia and 
subjugated the existing. Dravidian culture of the Indus Valle),. However. this view lias receiiflý- been 
challenged by such thinkers as Colin Renfrew (Archaeologi, an(I Languqge [London. Penguin. 19891), 
who argue that there is little archaeological evidence for this N, IcN%- and suggest insicad that the 
Ar)-aii 
culture gradually evolved froin its Dravidian roots. For a useful overview of this discussion see 
Gavill 
Flood,. An Introduction to Hincluism (Cambridge, Cambridge Univcrsitý- Press. 1996). pp. 30-35. 
292See Flood, An Introduction to ffintluism, p. 37. 
293Flood, An Introduction to Hintluism, p. 36. Gonibrich. lioN\-c\-cr (Theravdda Buddlisim, p. 
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between people and gods. The texts of the gg Veda were transmitted orally, hence 
there was a strong tradition of oral recitation surrounding the Veda. Basham explains 
how a magical entity known as bl-ahnian became identified with the role of the priest- 
"Often in the Rg Veda we read of a mysterious entity called bi-ohnian, in 
many contexts brahman is the magical power in the sacred utterance 
(mantra), but sometimes it has a wider connotation, and implies a sort of 
supernatural electricity, known to students of primitive religion as malla. 
The possessor of brahman, by a common process of secondary word 
formation in Sanskrit, became known as &5mhaýiu, the tribal priest and 
magician. 11297 
The idea of sacrifice was intertwined with cosmology at this time, for it was believed 
that the world was created as a result of the sacrifice of one of the gods. This account 
is found in one of the later hymns of the Rg Veda298, the PUI*Uýa SUta. The hymn 
gives an account of a sacrifice of a cosmic giant, a prinieval male. This giant figure is 
dismembered by the gods, and parts of his body used to create the universe: "From his 
navel the middle realm of space arose, from his head the'sky evolved. From his two 
feet came the earth, and the quarters of the sky frorn his ear. "299 It was subsequently 
believed that each time a priest performed a sacrifice, the world was born anew. This 
state of affairs led to the immense power of the priests, or bi-ahmiii. ý, in society. 
"Without regular sacrifices all cosrriic processes would cease, and chaos 
would come again. Thus the order of nature was an ultimate analysis not 
dependent on the gods at all, but on the bj-uhnjul. is who by the rnagic of the 
sacrifice maintained and compelled them. The bmhmuýi was more powerful 
than any earthly king, or god, by his accurate performance lie maintained all 
things, and was therefore the supreme social servant, by the slightest variation 
of ritual he could turn the sacrifice against his patrons and destroy them and 
was therefore the most dangerous of enernies 
Connected with this, one of the chief characteristics of Brahmanical society was its 
hierarchical structure. Society was ordered into two classes, the Aryas and the non- 
Aryas. In the Arya category there were three hereditary groups. At the top the purest 
and most powerful were the h1whinumis who taught and maintained the Vedas, the 
second class was made up of k.. s, u/n), ýis or rulers who were responsible 
for maintaining 
order in society, and thirdly there were the who were farmers and trades 
297 Basham. The lVolicler thol 11'al; 117cliO, p. -14 1. 298RV 10.9(). PL, rtl,,, l SUkta. In The Rig I *, It/a. trans. \\'cild\ O'Fhhcr(\ (Harniondworth. 
Penguln. 
1981), pp. 29-3 
299 Ibid.. 
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people whose duty it was to generate wealth. The non-Aryan category consisted of 
servants, or Aidras who had to serve the other sections of society. The Puruýa Sfikta 
hymn of the Rg Veda gives an account of the origins of this division in relation to the 
sacrifice of the primeval man- "His mouth became the Brahmin-, his arms were made 
into the Warrior, his thighs the People, and from his feet the Servants were born. "301 
Gombrich explains that it is significant that the Brahmins were made from the mouth as 
this represents their role as "the mouthpiece of reality. 11302. Similarly the fact that the 
warrior, 4atriya class comes from the arms signifies the power of this class. The 
mythology of the gg Veda thus demonstrates the hierarchical structure of Vedic 
society. 
Whereas in the gg Veda, an individual was thought to live and die only once, 
by the time of the Upani. ýads the doctrine of reincarnation and the transmigration of 
souls had appeared. Basham explains that this was a relatively new idea and that even 
at the time of the Buddha, transmigration may not have been a widely accepted belief, 
although it did gain much ground in the sixth and seventh centuries BCE. 101 With the 
notion of transmigration came the idea of kai-ma, of conduct affecting one's rebirth. It 
is important to note, though, that in the context of the vedas, karma (Pall. kal77171a) has 
a narrow meaning, referring only to religious acts, in particular, rituals. Gombrich 
argues that, although the term kal-Ina evolved to mean ethical and not just ritual acts, 
the idea of karnia as a purely ethical concept was an innovation of the Buddha's. "It 
was the Buddha who first completely ethicized the concept- in Hinduism ritual and 
moral obligations remain lumped together. 11304 Even gods were thought to be subject 
to death and rebirth. Thus even if one were reborn in a heaven one would still be 
subject to suffering: "The growth of the doctrine of transmigration coincided with the 
development of pessimistic ideas. Rebirth in heaven was not enough -a way had to 
be found to escape the cycle of birth and death altogether. "305 Flood describes the 
notion of karma and rebirth as "two ideas of great significance" that emerged between 
the ninth and sixth centuries BCE. 306 
In the Arapyakas and Upanisads, a stronger emphasis was placed upon 
experiential practice and mysticism than was the case in the earlier Vedas. Flood 
30 IRV 10,90, from O'Flalicrty. p. 3 1. 
302Gombricli, Thei-avada I kiddhi sn', P. 38fT. 
303Basharn, The Wondei- that Was 117dia. p. 244. 
-avJda Buddhism. p. 46. p. 66. Elsewhere. Gombrich states that thc 304GOinbrich, Thei 
innovation' of the Buddlia "was to say that the moral quality of an act 
lics 11, the intention behind it". 
P. 67. See also Flood, An Introcluclion to Hinch"S171, pp. 85-6. 
305Basharn, The Wonder that Was bulia. p. 245. 
306flood, An Introductimi to Hinthiism, p. 75. See also Steven Collills. 
Seffless Persons (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. -1982). p. 29 ff. for the survey of the CN*Olutloll 
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explains that spiritual knowledge became prioritised over the performance of ritual 
action: "the Araiýyakas and Upaniýads ... completely re-evaluate the nature of ritual, 
seeing its internalisation within the individual as its highest meaning, and subordinating 
ritual action to knowledge. 11307 This knowledge was attained through various world- 
renouncing practices (yoga). The Buddha was not a Brahmin, but some of these ideas 
were presupposed in his teaching; for example, the notions of kamma and rebirth and 
the idea of a cycle of birth and death that could ultimately be transcended. 
The Renouncer Tradition 
A hymn from the later gg Veda describes a class of holy men different to the br 
dhmaiýas. 308 These were the munis, the silent ones who indulged in meditative and 
ascetic lifestyles. There are also references in the Aihut-iv Veda Sai * nhila 
to Vi-5tyas, 
who were non-vedic priests who did not follow the vedas. The existence of such 
individuals suggests a gradual weakening of the power of the brahinins. By the time of 
the Upaniýads, asceticism was very widespread. The attainment of mystical 
knowledge through meditation and asceticism was thought to be a way of breaking 
through the cycle of birth and death, sui. nsJi-a. This was opposed to brahmanism 
which claimed that the magical powers of the brahmin came through lineage of birth 
and training; the ascetic tradition maintained that there were other ways of attaining 
these powers. Flood explains that common to all the renouncer traditions was the idea 
that life is characterised by sufferin(y309, and that to be freed from suffering meant 
renouncing actions (originally ritual actions) and their consequences.. "This 
renunciation could be achieved through asceticism (lapas) and meditation, which 
means techniques of altering consciousness from the world of the senses in order to 
experience total world transcendence. 1'3 10 Such individuals were known as bwnlaýlas, 
ones who strive' (Pali, samaýia), and the Buddha is described in the Pali Canon as a 
saniaýza. He was thus part of a tradition, known as the 'renouncer' (suqnlyusill) 
tradition in which individuals renounced their role in society to devote themselves to 
religious or spiritual pursuits. This usually involved leaving behind one's family and 
ones wealth, and becoming a wandering mendicant, depending on alms for one's 
livelihood. Gethin explains that there were many different kinds of practice 
undertaken by these ascetics, testified by the different terms used to describe them-. "in 
307Flood, An Introduction to Hincluism, p. 75. 
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addition to 'one who strives' and 'renouncer' we find 'wanderer' 
(parivrdjakalparibbdjaka), 'one who begs his share (of alms)' (bhikp11bhikkh11), naked 
"3 11 ascetic (acelaka), 'matted hair ascetic' (ja! ila), as well as a number of other terms. 
Gethin goes on to identify three types of practice that such wanderers all seemed to be 
concerned with: firstly, they would practise austerities; secondly, cultivate meditation 
in the hope of attaining mystical knowledge; and thirdly they would develop 
philosophical views to provide intellectual justification for their practices and the 
knowledge they attained. Some groups focused on only one or two of these elements, 
not all of them were concerned with all three. Flood also provides a summary of three 
elements common to all ascetic traditions- the idea that "action leads to rebirth and 
suffering"; that "detachment from action, or even non-action, leads to spiritual 
emancipation", and finally the belief that "spiritual emancipation" can be attained by 
"3 1 ascetic practices and "methods of making consciousness focused and concentrated. 
That such varied groups of wanderers existed at the time of the Buddha is 
testified in the Nik5yas, as we shall see in chapter five, the Buddha regularly 
encountered other ascetiCS313. One of the clearest accounts of such a meeting is in the 
Sdniahhaphala Sulfa, where the Buddha responds to 'six teachers of other Schools. 1314 
As we shall see, the brahmins are not included in these lists, but are dealt with 
separately on other occasions. Some of the religious traditions that arose out of this 
tradition of asceticism are still in existence today. Buddhism is one obvious example, 
and Jainism was founded by a naked ascetic, Mahdvilra who was a contemporary of the 
Buddha315. The Jains believed that all suffering was a result of past actions, and that 
suffering could be 'worked ofr by engaging in ascetic practices, and that it was best 
refrain from actions to prevent creating more kai-ma- "in their desire to escape rebirth 
Jains hold that all kal-mati, since it entails consequences, is undesirable; thus they arrive 
at the radical conclusion that the best course is to do nothing. 11316. 
A group that does not exist today was the Ajivikas, members of which are included in 
the Buddha's list of six rival philosopherS31 . 
7. The Aj-ivikas were materialists who 
denied the operation of kamrna and the notion of rebirth. Instead they believed that 
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everything was controlled by fate, niyali, which rendered volitional effort or moral 
activity futile. Flood suggests that these different groups clearly influenced each other- 
"these early renouncer traditions cannot be understood in isolation from each other as 
there is mutual cross-fertilisation of terminologies and ideas- Buddhism influences the 
Brahmanical renouncer religion and brahmanical religion influences BuddhiSM. "318 
Although, as we have seen, there were some fundamental differences in teachings and 
practices between the three main ascetic groups of Jainism, Ajivikisin and Buddhism, 
they were united by certain common factors in their rejection of Brahmanism. 
"All three offered an alternative, or complement, to the popular 
polytheistic and sacred-place cults of a kind which opposed the Brahmanic 
magico-mystical ritualism of the sacrifice, whether this was 'inside' society 
as ritual priests or 'outside' it as ascetics who had 'Internallsed' the 
sacrifice as a permanent way of life or imagination. "319 
Scepticism and materialism also became common. However, as Basharn points out, 
most sceptics did accept some 'supernatural' categories, such as transmigration or the 
. xistence of supernatural beings. Indeed, as we shall see in due course, the Buddha 
was no exception to this, and in fact renounced the views of materialists (for example, 
Ajita Kesakambali) who held that all morality and religious observances were futile. 
The relationship between brahmanism and wandering ascetics is not entirely 
clear. Collins explains that there is an "ambiguous historical situation of mutual 
ignorance" between Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical Indian traditionS320. The 
following quotation from Basharn demonstrates a certain ambivalence- 
"It has been suggested that the development of ascetic and mystical 
doctrines, especially in the heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism, 
represents a reaction of the warrior class to the pretentiousness of the 
brdlunaijas and to the sterility of the sacrificial cult. This, however, is 
certainly not the whole truth. Buddha and MaMvira, the founder of 
Jainism, were ksatriyas, they proclaimed the futility of sacrifice and more 
than one passage in the Buddhist scriptures may be interpreted in ail 
anti-brdliniai. iic sense. But many of the teachers of the new doctrines were 
themselves bi-51imans. The Upani, ýads, which represent the thought of the 
more orthodox mystics, in no way oppose sacrifice, but maintain its 
318FIood-4n Introduction to Hin(hiisin. p. 76. 
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qualified validity: and passages speaking respectfully of brahmans are quite 
as frequent in the Buddhist scriptures as those which disparage them. "32 1 
On the one hand, then, wandering ascetics who did not recognise the authoritV 
of brahmins in society were a threat to the brahmanical tradition. On the other hand, 
brahmanical ideas must have had some influence on the thought of the ascetics, and 
indeed, the ideas and practices of ascetics must have been refiected somewhat in 
brahmanism-111 
In his discussion of how early Buddhism arose from this background, Collins 
suggests that there are two aspects of influence, the "ethical" and the "conceptual" 
and that in both areas, the Buddhist tradition characterises the Buddha's teaching as 
the 'Middle Way' between two extrernes of asceticism on the one hand, and indulgence 
in sense-pleasures on the other. In ethical terms, the Buddha's taking of the 'middle 
way' is testified by his life-story - as we shall see presently, the Buddha tried and 
eventually renounced the harsh ascetic practices of other groups. However, lie did 
undergo a process of renunciation in which lie went forth from the ordinary, 
householders' life and the material possessions and sense-grat ifi cation that 
accompanies it. In the conceptual aspect, Collins argues that there are two significant 
areas in which the Buddha is portrayed as taking the 'middle way'. Firstly, the Buddha 
is contrasted with the argumentative, disputing style of other ascetic groups: 
"The picture the Buddhist texts draw, of a large variety of small sects, 
each with their own ideas, all arguing with each other and sticking to their 
own particular 'views', provides the perfect foil for the image of the 
Buddha and Buddhist saints as peaceful, unargumentative sages, whose 
'silent wisdom' transcends philosophical bickering. "323 
Secondly, the Buddha is portrayed as taking a stand between two extremes of thought 
that charcterised the teachings of other groups- 
"On the one hand there are those systems which postulate, and orient all 
their thinking and behaviour towards, an eternal and divine self or soul - 
including iwei- alia, the Brahmanical tradition - and which Buddhism calls 
'Eternalism', on the other hand there is 'Annihilationism' which Includes 
both straightforward, 'materialistic' conceptions of a self, soul, or person 
.f 
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which exists but which is destroyed at death, and also by assimilation of 
any kind of though which rejects the other-worldly/moral account of action 
11324 that is, in terms of rewards... 
To sum up, then, there were clearly many different strands of religious thought and 
practice in India at the time of the Buddha, some of which were complementary 
and others at odds with each other. Two main traditions can be identified, the 
brahmanical tradition and the renouncer tradition. The Buddha was a renouncer, 
but as we shall see, the influence of both traditions can be seen in his thought. 
The Buddha 
The Buddha fits into this context as a renouncer or wandering ascetic. The 
earliest Pali sources say the Buddha was born into the relatively wealthy and powerful 
kyatriya class. He was called Siddhatta Gotama and had a comfortable and privileged 
upbringing325. He eventually became disillusioned with this privileged life having seen 
death, disease and suffering around him and reallsing that sooner or later these things 
would affect him or his loved ones. This made his comfortable life seem hollow and lie 
thus left home to become a wandering ascetic (sulnuýiu) in order to seek liberation 
from suffering through religious and ascetic practices. He tried various forms of 
extremely austere ascetic practices under different teachers but failed to attain his goal 
of the cessation of suffering. Eventually lie abandoned his teachers and, by himself, sat 
under an as'vaihu tree by the banks of a river and meditated until he had an experience 
which convinced him that he had attained the cessation of suffering. The Buddhist 
tradition describes this experience as 'enlightenment' or 'awakening' (bodhi) in which 
the Buddha understood the nature of suffering, its cause, its cessation and the path to 
its cessation. These four insights constitute the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism. 
After his enlightenment, the Buddha spent the rest of his life as a wandering teacher, 
teaching his followers the path to the cessation of suffering. By the time of this death 
at around the age of eighty he had established a considerable following of both lay and 
religious mendicant groups. 
It is not clear how much of the story of the Buddha is 'history' and how much 
is 'myth'. It is perhaps anachronistic to ask such a question of texts written in a time 
when the concepts of 'myth' and 'history' as separate entities might not even have 
existed. This is a point that Gethin elaborates on- 
324COll ins, Seýfless Persons, P. 3)5- 
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"Of course, as the Buddhist tradition tells it, the story of the life of the 
Buddha is not history nor meant to be. The whole story takes on a mythic 
and legendary character. A wealth of detail is brought in capable of being 
read metaphorically, allegorically, typologically and symbolically. Much of 
this detail is to modern sensibilities of a decidedly 'miraculous' and 
tsupernatural' kind. The story of the Buddha's life becomes not an account 
of the particular and individual circumstances of a man who, some 2,500 
years ago, left home to become a wandering ascetic, but something 
universal, an archetype ... 
If we persist in distinguishing and holding apart 
myth and history, we are in danger of missing the story's own sense of 
truth. 11326 
A legend containing the narrative of the Buddha's life is common to all forms 
of Buddhism. It is found, for example, in the Sanskrit text Muhuvustil from the first 
century CE; in Mvaghoýa's poern, the Buddhacat-11a from the second century, and in 
the Pali introduction (the Niddnakalhiý) to the collection of stories about the Buddha's 
previous lives known as the J, 5tuka, which dates from the fifth century CE. It is also 
found in the Tibetan tradition. 327 
In all the various descriptions of hirn, the Buddha is not referred to as a 
4creator' or 'saviour' of the universe, but more as a guide or teacher. The fOllOwing 
extract is a stock description found in the S51nufifiuphu1u S1111U and repeated on 
numerous occasions throughout the Nik5yas: 
"a Tatlidgata arises in the world, an Arahant, a fully-enlightened Buddha, 
endowed with wisdom and conduct, Well-Farer, Knower of the worlds, 
incomparable Trainer of men to be tamed, Teacher of gods and humans, 
enlightened and blessed. He, having reallsed it by his own super-knowledge, 
proclaims this world with its devas, m5ras and Brahrn5s, its princes and 
people. He preaches the Dhamrna, which is lovely in its beginning, lovely in 
its middle, lovely in its ending, in the spirit and the letter, and displays the 
fully-perfected and purified holy life. '1328 
This passage demonstrates the role of the Buddha as an example to other people, 
he is 
a testament to the human ability to attain the cessation of suffering and acts as a guide 
to enable them to achieve this. The term 'Tathagata' in the above passage mealls, 
literally, 'thus gone' and is suggestive of the Buddha's liberation 
from tile cycle of 
1. - 
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suffering, satysira. Sadhatissa is keen to stress that the Buddha should always be 
understood as fully human- "the Buddha at no time claimed to be anything other than a 
human being. 11329, a point that is also stressed by Rahula- "the Buddha was not only a 
human being; he claimed no inspiration from any god or external power either. "330 
This is something of a problematic account, for on occasions in the Pall Canon, the 
Buddha is described as a god in one of his previous realms. In the Muhdpaddna SlItta 
and the Acchariya-abbhftla Sittia, for example, we are told that before being born as a 
human, this Buddha and previous Buddhas had existed in the god-realm of Tusita 
heaven. 331 This clearly suggests that, in some incarnations at least, the Buddha was a 
god. However, the point is that in his final incarnation, the Buddha was fully human 
and that any human being has the potential to follow the path that he set out and 
become liberated. The significance of this is that it renders the Buddha's teaching and 
example accessible to all human beings: "Every man has within himself the potentiality 
of becoming a Buddha, if he so wills it and endeavours. We call the Buddha a man I)al- 
excelletice. He was so perfect in his 'hurnan-ness' that he came to be regarded later in 
popular religion almost as 'super-hurnan. "'332 Indeed, any human has that potential to 
be reborn in a Tusita realm, and therefore exist as a god. When the suttas describe the 
Tatlidgata as 'arising' in the world it does not mean that lie magically appears, like a 
deity, but becomes a Buddha as a consequence of his fulfili-nent of the spiritual path. 
As we shall see in chapter four, the Buddha is said to see reality as it truly is 
(yathdbhFt1haqi). His perception is free from the distorting factors of greed, hatred and 
delusion, when one sees things as one truly is then one ceases to suffer. The definition 
of the Buddha above strongly emphasises his direct knowledge and insight - he sees 
the world for what it is, and knows the appropriate way to 'train' others. Thus rather 
than being portrayed as a 'saviour', the image of a 'teacher' is used with reference to 
the Buddha: 
"If one is not familiar with the Indian cultural context it is easy to 
underestimate the potency of the image here. For a Buddhist no being can 
match the Buddha's abilities to teach and instruct in order to gently push 
beings towards the final truth of things. A Buddha may not be able to save 
us - that is, he cannot simply turn us into awakened 
beings - yet, if 
awakening is what we are intent on, the presence of the Buddha is still our 
best hope. "333 
329H. Saddliatissa, The Bu(klha's lVoy (London. George Allenand Unwill. 1985). p. 19. 
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Let us now turn to the Buddha's teaching, the Thammal). 
IN 
Mamma: The Four Noble Truths 
The four noble truths are perhaps one of the most concise ways of summarising 
the Buddha's teaching. He described them as follows in the Suipj4mu Nikaya. - 
"This is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, ageing is suffering, 
sickness is suffering, dying is suffering, sorrow, grief, pain, unhappiness 
and unease are suffering; being united with what is not liked is suffering, 
separation of what is liked is suffering; not to get what one wants is 
suffering; in short, the five a gregates of clinging are suffering. 19 
This is the noble truth of the origin of suffering- the thirst for 
repeated existence which, associated with delight and greed, delights in this 
and that, namely the thirst for the objects of sense desire, the thirst for 
existence and the thirst for non-existence. 
This is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering- the complete fading 
away and cessation of this very thirst - its abandoning, relinquishing, 
releasing, letting go. 
This is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering: the 
noble eightfold path, namely right view, right intention, right speech, right 
action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness "334 
The First Noble Truth 
The Buddha taught that there are three kinds of suffering. - suffering as pain, 
suffering as a result of change , and suffering as 
"inherent in formations. "33. The first 
form describes mental and physical pains and unpleasant feelings. The suffering as a 
result of change points to the phenomena whereby pleasant. states are transient, and 
total and permanent happiness constantly elusive, as a result of impermanence. 
Even 
when one is in a pleasant state, it can be tarnished by the awareness that this state is 
likely to change, and this, too, is a cause of suffering. The "suffering as 
inherent in 
formations" refers to the fact that, according to the Buddha's teaching, all things in 
samsara are conditioned and come into existence in dependence on a cause. 
For this 
reason, nothing exists inherently in its own right, but only in 
dependence on other 
334S v 421-22 (Gethin's translat 1011. '117e /"(111111 1311 (1(1/11 - 'all 'P59 
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things; as a result everything is transient and subject to change and decay: "As such, 
they are likely to cause suffering (that is, the feeling of suffering) whenever there is 
inflexible craving and clinging to them through ignorance. "336 
This analysis of suffering is the Buddha's description of the way things are. In 
the sense that suffering is experienced by all beings, it is not a 'creed', for the existence 
of suffering is a self-evident fact of experience for any unenlightened being. The 
Buddha does not attempt to explain on a metaphysical level ivhy suffering exiStS337 but 
treats it as a fact of existence that we are all faced with. His teaching is designed to 
help beings free themselves from this suffering. Understanding suffering in the way 
taught by the Buddha does require training, but the raw materials that provide the 
starting point for the Buddha's path - namely the existence of a suffering being - are 
already given. 
The Second Noble Truth 
The second noble truth consists of the Buddha's 'diagnosis' of the causes of 
suffering - once the ailment is understood, then one can begin to treat it. The 
Buddha describes the cause of suffering as 'thirst' or 'craving' (iuýihU) for repeated 
existence, for the objects of sense desire, or for non-existence. There are many 
different manifestations of craving. Craving for the objects of sense desire is perhaps 
self-explanatory. It is a cause of suffering because the objects of sense desire are 
ultimately unsatisfactory - they are subject to change and decay and are thus 
unreliable. Even if one's craving for sense desire is momentarily satisfied, this 
satisfaction does not last, either the desired object itself changes or is taken away, 
causing suffering, or one becomes dissatisfied with it and seeks a new object of desire. 
Craving for existence describes the desire to obtain certain states, to be a certain way 
or to have a certain existence. Like the craving for sense objects, this craving is rarely 
satisfied and the objects of craving are still subject to change and decay. The desire for 
non-existence, epitomised in suicidal impulses, is another form of craving, a desire for 
things to be otherwise. Even beliefs about whether or not one exists after death are 
manifestations of craving or desire, reflecting a wish either to be or not to be- 
"From the perspective of Buddhist thought all these feelings, desires and 
beliefs are the products of ... the workings of craving 
for existence and 
I, in a non-existence. Yet in a world where everything is alý\ays changlino, i 
336p A. PaN-utto, Depenclent Origination: The BucWhist Lair of Causality (Bangkok. Buddliadhainnia 
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world of shifting and unstable conditions, craving of whatever kind ", III 
never be able to hold on to the things it craves. This is the origin of 
suffering. 11338 
Craving leads to clinging after things, and this clinging also contributes to 
suffering. In the Sainniddillhi Sima the Buddha lists four types of clinging - clinging 
to sensual pleasures, to views, to rules and observances and clinging to a doctrine of 
self This clinging is the result of craving 339. It is important to note that not all 
clinging is 'equal'; some forms of clinging are much more conducive to suffering than 
others. For example, an individual who is attached to deeply unethical habits of 
conduct (a serial killer, for example), will suffer more and cause more suffering than 
someone who is attached to a strong morality. Nevertheless, both these forms of 
attachment are a manifestation of 'clinging' and ultimately productive of suffering. 
Even the Buddha's Dhamma can be tile object of attachment and clinging"(1. When 
one is freed from ignorance and craving, then one's natural conduct is skilful, ethical 
and pure; the aim of the Buddha's teaching then, is not to replace clinging for 
unhealthy objects with clinging for healthier ones, as this would still be a cause and 
manifestation of suffering. Instead the idea is to rid oneself of all clinging and craving 
in order to get to the natural state of purity and goodness that is manifested by all 
unenlightened being. 
It is through not seeing the way things really are that one is ensnared in tile 
round of suffering. One craves for objects that are subject to chan-ge and decay and 
unable to bring lasting happiness or satisfaction: "in craving we fail to see flow things 
truly are, and in failing to see how things truly are, we crave. in other words craving 
goes hand in hand with a fundamental ignorance and misapprehension of the nature of 
the world. 11341 
When craving and clinging are not satisfied, they can lead to states of hatred, 
aversion, depression, frustration and anger which in thernselves represent further forms 
of suffering. Thus ignorance, craving and hatred or anger are inextricably linked with 
each other. According to the Buddhist tradition, the three fundamental defilernents of 
mind are greed, aversion and delusion. The enlightened being has rooted out these 
defilements and behaves with wisdom and purity, freed from suffering 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, there is a ver\, strong emphasis on 
causality in the Buddha's teaching. Much of the knoýý, 'Iedgye of the enlightened 
being 
338Getliin. The Foundafion-ý ()f 1311(ldhi-vill. p. 70. 
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constitutes an understanding of the workings of a natural causal law that operates in 
the world and results in suffering. When this causal law is fully understood, then it is 
possible to 'break the cycle' that leads to suffering and instead use the causal ty to lead 
to the cessation of suffering. This causal law is summed up in the key Buddhist 
teaching of dependent origination. It explains in a sequence of twelve links how 
ignorance ultimately leads to suffering. 
Rather than being a teaching of his 'invention', the Buddha explained that 
dependent origination would be true whether a Buddha was there to teach it or not ý 
"Whether there is arising of Tatlidgathas or whether there is no such 
arising, this nature of things ... stands, this causal status, this causal 
orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. 11342 
So important is the understanding of Dependent Origination in the quest for the 
cessation of suffering that the Buddha described understanding it as synonymous with 
understanding his teachings, the Dhannna- "One who sees dependent origination sees 
the Dhamma; one who sees the Dharni-na sees dependent origmation. "343 It is through 
not understanding dependent origination that people are ensnared in the round of 
suffering: 
"It is through not understanding, not penetrating this doctrine that this 
generation has become like a tan led ball of strin(Y, covered as with a 9 11: ) 
blight, tangled like coarse grass, unable to pass beyond states of woe, the ill 
destiny, ruin in the round of birth-and-death. "344 
Dependent origination is a complex and difficult teaching which, for our I 
present purposes, need not be examined in any more depth. Let it suffice to say that it 
is a detailed and in depth account of the causes of suffering which constitutes the 
second noble truth345. 
The Third Noble Truth: Nibbdna, the Cessation of Suffering. 
Beyond the conditioned world of saipsura lies the transcendent, supramundane 
(lokimara) state of nibb5na. Nibb5na is described as the absence of those conditions 
which cause sorrow and suffering and perpetuate the cycle of dependent origination 
and satysdra. In the Mujjhimu Nike7yu, nibb5na is described as "unborn ... unageing, 
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deathless ... sorrowless ... undefiled, the supreme security from bondage. "346 Here, 
then, nibbdna is described in terms of the absence of the conditions that are the end 
result of the process of dependent origination , suggesting that nibb5na is the state of 
freedom from those conditions that inevitably result in some form of ditkkha. This is 
reinforced in the same sutta where nibbdna is described as "the tranquillising of all the 
activities, the renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, 
stopping, nibbdiia. 11347 Escape from the cycle of dependent origination means that 
there is a stopping of the factors that lead to rebirth, and the result is cessationý "The 
subduing of pride in self, the restraint of thirst, the removal of clinging, the cutting off 
of the base of rebirth, the destruction of craving, freedom from passion, ending, 
11348 nibbdna. 
Gethin points out that Pali texts describe nibb5na as something of a process, 
rather than a state which is attained. The process is one of extinguishin the negative 
factors ('fires') of greed, hatred and delusion: 
"At the moment the Buddha understood suffering, its arising, its cessation, 
and the path leading to its cessation, these fires were extinguished. This 
process is the same for all who reach awakening, and the early texts term it 
either as nirv5pa or parinirv5pa, the complete 'blowing out' or 
'extinguishing' of the 'fires' of greed, aversion and delusion. This is not a 
'thing' but an event or experience. "349 
After a being has 'nirvana-ed' he or she continues to live and function in the 
world; what makes them fundamentally different to other people is that none of their 
actions are motivated by greed, aversion or delusion, but are instead grounded in the 
opposite characteristics of generosity, friendliness and wisdom. When they die, they 
are not reborn into another existence- "instead of being reborn, the person 'pari-nirvdij 
gregates of physical and mental phenomena a-s', meaning in this context that the five ag 
that constitute a being cease to occur. 
)1350 
It is for the attainment of this freedom from suffering, from the realms of 
dependent origination and rebirth, that the Buddha's teaching is set forth. The path 
that is to be followed in accordance to this teaching is described In various waysý it is 
variously referred to as the Holy life (bi-uhniucui-i); ul. ý, ), 3 SI the life of a recluse 
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(samafifiam), 352 'the highest life', or'the Brahma-life' (brahinafifiat 
* ?, 
), 353 the noble v,, av 
that goes to the utter destruction of dukkha (ariyo maggo sunimadukkhayagann). 354 
The goal of this way of conduct is the attainment of the freedom which constitutes 
nibbdna: 
"this holy life, bhikkhus, does not have gain, honour and renown for its 
benefit, or the attainment of virtue for its benefit, or the attainment of 
concentration for its benefit. But it is this unshakeable freedom of mind 
that is the goal of this holy life, its heart-wood, and its end. ""' 
Earlier in the Majjhinia Nik, 5ya it is explained that "It is for the sake of the final 
Nibbdna without clinging that the Holy Life is lived under the Blessed One. "356 
So far, then, it seems apparent that the problern of suffering is what fuels and 
informs the Buddha's teachings, the holy life is a prescription for the cessation of this 
suffering, nibb5na. This is concisely expressed in the A-ghu-Nika))a where the Buddha 
addresses wanderers of other views, simply explaining to them the purpose of his 
teachings- 
"There are unwholesome things that have not been abandoned, tainted, 
conducive to rebirth, fearful, productive of painful results in the future, 
associated with birth, decay and death. It is for the abandonment of these 
things that I teach Dharnma. If you practise accordingly, these tainted 
things will be abandoned, and the things that make for purification will 
develop and grow, and you will attain to and dwell, in this very life, by 
your own insight and realisation, in the fullness of perfected wisdom. "3 57 
In a similar exchange with wanderers from a different group, the Buddha explains that 
his reason for teaching the four noble truths is that- "this is conducive to welfare, to 
Dhamma, to the higher holy life, to perfect disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, 
to tranquillity, to realisation, to enlightenment, to nibbdria. That is why the Lord has 
revealed It. "358 
It is apparent from these extracts that there is a strong pragmatic element to the 
Buddha's teaching, insofar as the content is determined by reference to a specific goal. I 
It is important to remember the Buddha's claim in the context of dependent origination 
that the causal law governing tile existence of suffering, exists whether or not anyone is 
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there to teach it - it is not a belief of the Buddha's invention, but a description of the 
way things are. The same is true of the path to the cessation of suffering - it operates 
on a causal basis, and the Buddha is merely showing the way it operates. 
The Fourth Noble Truth: The Way to the Cessation of Suffering 
There are different ways of describing the way to the cessation of suffering that 
the Buddha taught. In his definition the four noble truths that we saw at the beginning 
of the chapter, the Buddha described the path to cessation as 'the noble eightfold path' 
of right view, intention, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and 
concentration. There are different levels of attainment of the eightfold path and 
different ways of understanding it which makes the issue of describing it rattler 
complex. Thus I will postpone elaboration of the eightfold path to a later chapter 
(chapter four), and for now concentrate on a stock description of the gradual path to 
enlightenment that appears regularly throughout the Nik5yas. The example I will use 
here is from the S5mufifiuphalu Sulla351. This particular version features an individual 
becoming a monk, however, there are some accounts of lay-people becoming 
enlightened360, but these are unusual cases, and presupposed that the individuals 
concerned had renounced the attachments of the world- "When forced to debate this 
question, the Therav5dins held that it would be possible for a layrnan to attain 
arahantship only if the layperson actually had renounced all those fetters that 
"361 The account begins with the description of the characterised the ordinary lay life. 1-D 
arising of a Buddha that was quoted earlier. A 'householder' then hears the Buddha's 
Dhamma and gains faith (saddlid) in him. He decides to undertake the life of a 
wandering ascetic- "'The household life is close and dusty, the homeless life is free as 
air. 111362He thus leaves his horne and family, shaves his ]lead and puts on robes, and 
adopts the homeless life. 
Moral Discij)lhie 
The Sutta then explains in great detail how the disciple becomes "perfected in 
moral'ty"363. Ic I One of the first elements of morality that lie develops Includes the basi 
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ethical code that the Buddha taught, known as the five precepts. These are-. abstaining 
from taking life; abstaining from taking the not-given, abstaining from sexual 
misconduct; abstaining from false speech (such as lying or being abusive) and 
abstaining from the taking of intoxicants which cloud the mind. The account in the 
Samahhaphala Stitta then lists in great detail the many rules that constitute the 
Pdlimokkha, the rules for the monastic life. It is not necessary here to list these rules 
- the point is that the first stage of the path is the development (and eventual 
perfection of) moral discipline. The sutta explains this goal with a simile, 
"Just as a duly-anointed Khattiya king, having conquered his enemies, by 
that very fact sees no danger from any side, so the monk, on account of his 
morality, sees no danger anywhere. He experiences in himself the 
-364 blameless bliss that comes from maintaining this Ariyan morality. 
Restraint of the Senses 
Moral discipline, then, has the effect of creating peace . of mind and a solid 
foundation for the next stage of development, which is described as " uarding the gI, 
sense-doors. 11365 We saw earlier in the description of the second noble truth tile role of 
craving and clinging in creation of suffering. The practice of restraint of the senses is 
an attempt to limit and ultimately stop this clinging: 
"Here a monk, on seeing a visible object with tile eye, does not grasp at its 
major signs or secondary characteristics. Because greed and sorrow, evil 
unskilled states, would overwhelm him if lie dwelt leaving tile eye-faculty 
unguarded, so he practises guarding it, lie protects the eye-faculty, 
develops restraint of the eye-faculty. "366 
The same formula is used for the four other senses. The Buddhist tradition 
understands the mind as the sixth sense. Whenever the sense faculties are listed, the 
mind is included as one of them, and in this context, the mind faculty is guarded in 
order to avoid 'unwholesome states' such as covetousness and grief 
Mindfulness 
The next stage that is listed consists of mindful awareness and clear 
comprehension of ones actions- 
364D i 69-70. Walshe 100. 




"Here a monk acts with clear awareness in going forth and back, in 
looking ahead or behind him, in bending and stretching, in wearing his 
outer and inner robe and carrying his bowl, in eating, drinking, chewing and 
swallowing, in evacuating and urinating, in walking, standing, sitting, lying 
down, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silent he acts with clear 
awareness. In this way, a monk is accomplished in mindfulness and clear 
awareness. 11367 
Like the previous practice of the restraint of the sense faculties, the point of 
mindfulness is to control the mind, to be aware of its workings and thus to be able to 
limit craving and clinging at the point where it hits. 
Contentment 
Contentment, too, is aimed to counter the force of clingino. It describes the 
process of being satisfied with the rriliurnum of need-requirements, in this case, robes 
and almsfood- "Just as a bird with wings flies hither and thither, burdened by nothing 
but its wings, so he is satisfied with a robe to protect his body, with alms to satisfy his 
stomach, and having accepted sufficient, he goes on his way. "368 
Having perfected all these qualities, the disciple is now ready to begin 
meditation; when he finishes his alms-round he "finds a solitary lodging" such as a 
forest, a cave, or a mountain and "he sits down, cross-legged, holding his body erect, 
and concentrates on keeping mindfulness established before hiM. "369 
The Abatidoifitig of 1he Hhidl-alices 
According to the Buddha's teaching, there are five hindrances that obstruct 
meditative attainment. These are covetousness or sense desire, ill-will and hatred, 
dullness and drowsiness, restlessness and wQrry, and doubt. In his meditation the 
disciple purifies his mind from covetousness; he abandons ill-will and his mind is full of 
cc compassionate love for the welfare of all living beings". He abandons dullness and 
drowsiness and he perceives "fight, mindful and clearly aware. " Having abandoned 
restlessness and worry, he is "Inwardly calmed", and Mien lie has abandoned doubt, he 
is "without uncertainty as to what things are wholesome. " 370 1. 
367D 70-71-, Walshe 100. 





The abandoning of the hindrances is described as a process of release, a feeling 
of being "Freed from debt, from sickness, from bonds, from slavery, from the perils of 
the desert. " It triggers a positive causal process that provides the foundations for deep 
mental concentration* 
"When he knows that these five hindrances have left him, gladness arises 
in him, from gladness comes delight, from the delight in his mind his body 
is tranquillised, with a tranquil body lie feels joy, and with joy his mind is 
concentrated. 11371 
The Four Adnas 
In Pali, the word 'jh5na' means, literally, 'meditation', the Buddha describes 
four stages to meditation, known as the four J115nas. They are characterised by 
increasing focus and concentration. The first jh5na is the initial stage of focused 
meditation that occurs when the hindrances have subsided. It is a state of 
concentration that is accompanied by "thinking and pondering, born of detachment"172 
Indeed, it is a thoroughly pleasant experience in that every part of the disciple's body is 
said to be "suffused" by this sense of rapture. 
If the disciple continues with his meditation, then applied and sustained thought 
subsides and is replaced by the second flidna, "which is without thinking and 
pondering, born of concentration, filled with delight and j oy. "373 This stage thus takes 
the mind beyond thought to purer and more profound levels of consciousness; like the 
first flidna, it brings with it *oy and rapture. ni 
In the third flidna, the meditator moves beyond joy and rapture to a state of 
equanimity and mindfulness, Such is his equanimity that feelings of joy and grief pass 
away. In the fourth jh5na, lie "gives up pleasure and pain" and moves to a state of 
complete mindfulness and equanimity- 
"The monk ... with the 
disappearance of former gladness and sadness, 
enters and remains in the fourth flidna which is beyond pleasure and pain, 
and purified by equanimity and mindfulness. And he sits suffusing Ills body 
with that mental purity and clarification so that no part of his body is 
untouched by I t. "374 
371D 1 7-3, Walslic 1022- 
, 17. 'lbid. 
373D i 74. Walslie 10 1. 
-174D i 75, Walslie 10') - 
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Knowledge and Vision 
Having attained the four flidnas, the disciple is now in a state of extremely 
heightened consciousness and calm. At this stage he attains certain insights into 
reality, 'the way things really are' (yuIhdbhFitaqi), and is able to see for himself that 
which the Buddha has already pointed out. There are various different knowledges 
that the disciple attains at this stage375, some of which might be labelled 'supernatural' 
by the contemporary Western consciousness. For example, he is said to be able to 
exercise certain 'supernormal' powers, enabling him to walk through walls, walk on 
water or levitate. He is able to understand the minds of others- 
"he knows the mind with passion to be with passion; he knows the mind 
without passion to be without passion. He knows the mind with hate to be 
with hate; he knows the mind without hate to be without hate, He knows 
the deluded mind ... the undeluded mind ... He 
knows the liberated mind to 
be liberated; he knows the unliberated mind to be unfiberated. -III, 
He is also able to recall his own past lives, and one of the final stages of Insight, the 
'knowledge of the divine eye', enables him to see passing away and re-appearance of 
other beings in accordance with their karnma. He sees that beings who behaved with 
"misconduct of body, speech or thought" are "reborn in a lower world, a bad 
destination, a state of suffering, hell. "377 Similarly, he sees that those with good 
conduct have pleasant rebirths - lie is able to see for himself the truth of what the 
Buddha taught. 
The final, liberating knowledge that he attains is "the knowledge of the 
destruction of the taints". The taints, or Jsavus, are a form of ignorance and craving 
that causes suffering. There are four taints- the taint of sense desire (kunlusuvu), the 
taint of craving for states of becoming (bhuvisul, u), the taint of attachment to beliefs 
and views (diiihi-savu)- and the taint of ignorance of the way things are (ui-ijjUsuvu)- 
The disciple sees and understands for himself the four noble truths, and he sees the 
taints, their origin, their cessation and the path to their cessation. With this knowledge 
he destroys the taints and has attained his (Yoal- the cessation of sufFering, 
"And through his knowing and seeing his mind is delivered from the taint 
of sense-desire, from the taint of becoming, from the taint of ignorance, 
and the knowledge arises in him- 'This is deliverance!, and he knows 
375Namely insight knowledge, knowledge of the man-made body. knowledge of (lie niodes of 
SUpernorinal power. knowledge of (lie divine car. knowledge of enco"INSS1119 (Ile "'Inds of others. 
knowledge of recollecti ng past lives. knowledge of the divine eye and knoNN 
ledge of the destruction of 
the corruptions. 
376D i 79-80, Walslic 105-6. 
377D 182, Walshe 107. 
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'Birth is finished, the holy life has been led, done is what had to be done, 
there is nothing further here. 111378 
This point marks the climax of the Sdinafifiuphala Sunu , the sutta is dedicated 
to answering the questions of King AjdsattLI, who wished to know the fruits of 
following the holy life under the Buddha. Liberation from suffering is the ultimate 
'fruit', and at the end of the sutta, the King declares himself a lay-follower. 
There are some significant points to make about this 'gradual path, which will 
be made more of in later chapters. One is the causal nature of the path; certain 
conditions have to be fulfilled before the disciple moves from one stage to the next. 
Gethin describes the basic logic behind this- 
"In order to see the four truths, the mind must be clear and still, in order to 
be still, the mind must be content, in order to be content, the mind must be 
free from remorse and guilt, ill order to be free fi-orn guilt one needs a clear 
conscience; the bases of a clear conscience are generosity and good 
conduct. "379 
This presupposes a certain understanding of the nund - narnely, that it responds in 
certain predictable ways to particular conditions. It seerns that the whole of the 
Buddha's teaching is prernised upon this understanding of ]low the mind works, for his 
analysis of suffering and his description of the path to its cessation is focused on the 
workings of the mind. 
Another related point is that liberation is attained by getting rid of certain 
'defilements' of the mind, such as greed, hatred and delusion. The idea is that once 
these defilements are removed, then the mind is liberated, it is not a question of 
attaining. 'extra' qualities but rather of letting unskilful ones go so that the skilful, pure 
ones can shine through. 
Summary 
To sum up, in this chapter there has been a brief account of the historical and 
cultural background from which the Buddha's teaching arose. This has been followed 
by a very basic outline of his teaching, focusing on the concept of the four noble truths. 
The fourth noble truth, the path to the cessation of suffering, has been Illustrated ýwlth a 
standard formula of the path to liberation that is found in the Aghu Xiku_iu. 
This 
description of the gradual paths portrays the message that the attainment of 
liberation 
378D i 84, Walshc 107-8. 
379Getliin, The Foundalions of Buddhislil, p. 83. 
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requires the operation of a certain causal process in which the mind Is gradually freed 
from taints and defilements until the disciple is able to see things as they truly are, and 
ceases to suffer. 
In the next chapter, I will look at this process of liberation in more detail, bv 
focusing on the definitions in the Nikdyas of those who are liberated aiid those who are 
not. The purpose of this is to elucidate the criteria for liberation according to the 
Buddha's teaching in the Nikdyas. This will help to build up a picture of Buddhist 
1soteriology' that can be compared and contrasted with other accounts in the 
contemporary inter-faith debate. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Liberated and Non-Liberated Individuals 
The Noble Disci pl e/Ordi nary Person Distinction. 
According to the Buddhist tradition, every being has the potential to attain 
nibb5na eventually. It may not be possible to attain it in one's present lifetime, but 
since all states of existence in the conditioned realm of sailisdra are impermanent, each 
being w, ill eventually be in an existence where the attainment of nibbdila is a possibility. 
The human realm is one such level of being where it is possible to attain liberation. 
Having thus established that every human has the potential to attain n1bb5na in this 
lifetime, I wish to consider a fundamental spiritual division that exists throughout the 
Nikdyas. This is the distinction between those who are irrevocably on the course to 
the attainment of nibb5na and those who are not. The individual who, in common with 
most other people, has the potential to be liberated but has not yet begun to reallse that 
.y 
person' Q)iahill cilia). The individual who i potential is called the 'ordinar .J 
is 
irrevocably bound towards nibb5na is called a 'noble disciple' (Un*j; (lsU-vUkU). As we 
shall explore presently, there are four types of noble disciple, distinguished by their 
relative positions on the path to liberation. The noble disciple is bound ultimately to 
fulfil the fourth noble truth, the path to the cessation of suffering, and will eventually 
attain nibbdna. He is contrasted to the 'ordinary person', who, through not fulfilling or 
understanding the bi-ahniaccii-i); u set forth by the Buddha and epitomised in the 
eightfold path, is destined to continue being reborn in saijis5ra, and thus continue to be 
subject to dukkha- The distinction between the noble disciple and the ordinary person 
is the fundamental spiritual division within the Nik5yas, for it describes tile difference 
between those who are definitely on course for the attainment of liberation, and those 
who are not. For this reason it is very important to surnmarise how these two 
categories of person are defined, for in doing so it is possible to answer the question of 
what characteristics one must have in order to gain liberation according to the 
Nikdyas. It is important to note that any 'ordinary person' can potentially become a 
'noble disciple'; in order to do so they must practise the path set forth by the Buddha to 
a certain degree, until they reach a 'point of no return' towards liberation. At this point 
they become noble disciples. The term used to describe the first kind of noble 
disciple, 
the 'streamwinner', provides a useful irnage of this point of no return, once one enters a 
fast flowing stream, one cannot go backwards, but is cast irrevocably in the 
direction 
of the stream. So the noble disciple has reached a point from which he or she can onk, 
go forwards towards liberation, and is irrevocably bound to attain the ultimate goal. 
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The ordinary person, however, always has the potential to become a noble 
disciple and attain liberation, but is not irrevocably bound on that course. Let us now 
consider the characteristics of the 'ordinary person' in more detail. 
The'Ordinary Person', (Puthujjana) 
Many of the descriptions of the ordinary person focus on his ignorance, his 
failure to see the way things really are, which in turn results in the craving or clinging 
that is at the root of suffering. 380 
We will see presently that one of the main requirements for the noble disciple Is 
faith or confidence in the Buddha and the Dhamrna. In contrast, the ordinary person 
either does not follow or respect those who are well-trained in the Dharnma at all, or 
does not do so to the same extent. Indeed, the noble disciple is at times defined 
precisely in terms of the ordinary person's characteristics that lie is freed from. For 
example, it is explained that the noble disciple- ".. has no such disloyalty to the 
Buddha, Dhamma and Sanglia or immorality as that possessed by tile uneducated 
marlyfolk [ordinary person]. "381 This disregard for the Dhanlma is demonstrated in 
their ignorance - we are told that the ordinary person-. 
"does not understand what things are fit for attention and what things are 
unfit for attention. Since that is so, he attends to those things unfit for 
attention and he does not attend to those things fit for attention. " "I 
"Attending to things that are unfit for attention" is characterlsed as various futile 
speculations about the past, tile future, and the present, and various wrong views381 
about the self The problem with such speculations is that they lead to further craving 
and ignorance, which further propagates the cycle of suffering, n 1: ý * 
"When he attends to them, the unarisen taint of sensual desire arises in hirn 
and the arisen taint of sensual desire increases, the unarisen taint of being 
arises in him and the arisen taint of being increases, the unarisen taint of 
ignorance arises in him and the arisen taint of ignorance increases" 384 
Whereas the noble disciple gradually weakens and destroys the 'taints', 
(usuva. s,, a 
form of ignorance) through his knowledge and conduct, the ordinarA- person, throu(yh 
his failure to "attend to things that are fit for attention" and his engagement in wrong,, Zý 
ignorance ai IIII 
'k-va thotight. 380The inter-dependencc of id craving is of fuildwile, 11,11 'niportance n ,, i a. 
and Will be discussed at greater length in relation to the question of N, icN\ in chapter 
two. 
381S x- 363-, Woodward 117. 
382M i 7, Bliikkliu Bodhi 92. 
5. 383 Wrong view will be discussed in gre. iter depth later. pp. 130- 
1. ) 
384M i 7. Bliikkliu Bodlii 92. 
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views creates the conditions for further arising and increasing of the taintS. 385 Just as, 
in dependent origination, the Buddha describes a causal process that explains the 
existence and propagation of suffering, so the negative factors that lead from sense 
desires to bad conduct are also described as a causal process, grounded in the 
ignorance of the ordinary person. The Buddha describes how sense desires lead to 
sensuous perception, which in turn can lead to unskilful conduct. "Pursuing a sensuous 
quest, the untaught worldling practises wrong conduct in three ways: in deed, Nvord 
and thought. Pursuing a malevolent, a cruel quest, the untaught wordling practises 
wrong conduct in these three ways (i. e. sense-questing, ill-will and cruelty). "386 
In contrast, the noble disciple does comprehend what should be wisely attended 
to, and acts upon this, leading to the destruction of the taints- 
"He, thinking, 'This is anguish' wisely attends ... 'This is the origin of 
anguish', wisely attends ... Because lie wisely attends thus, the three fetters 
decline - wrong view as to own body, doubt, adherence to (wronoful) 
rites and ceremonies. These are called the taints to be got rid of by vision 
11387 
Through control of the sense-organs, the noble disciple gets rid of the taints of sense- 
pleasures, and by endurance, avoidance and mental development he ultimately destroys 
all of the taints, and arrives at nibb5na. 
Most other descriptions of the ordinary person revolve around Ills ignorance, 
often characterised by this attachment to wrong views which are both a product and a 
determinant of further craving and suffering. The ordinary person regards the five 
aggregates (khaiidhas) as the self, and engages in speculations about the status and 
destiny of the self 388, and as a result suffers the concomitant distress when the five 
aggregates are disturbed by change. 389 When, for example, a pleasurable feeling arises 
the ordinary person becornes addicted to it, and when it stops a painful feeling arises 
and he mourns and larnentS. 3911 He laments when inevitable states of ageing, sickness, 
death, destruction and ending occur, indeed, this is one of the hall-marks of the 
ordinary person- "This man is called an unlearned average man [ordinary person], 
pierced by the poisoned dart of sorrow, he just torments himself ". 391 In failing to 
recognise the inherent misery in pursuing sense-pleasures, which are ultimately 
385 Ibid. 
386S 11 15 1. Rhys Davids 106. 
3 871bid. 
388M i 135. Blukkhu Bodlu 229. M ni 228-, Blilkkhu Bodlu 1077. S 1111 19, \Vood\\ard 36. 
Woodward 140. 
399M iii 227, Blilkkliu Bodhi 1077, 
390M i 239, Bliikkliu Bodlil 334. 
39 'A iii 54-, Hare 46. 
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impermanent and unsatisfactory, the ordinary person is likened to a cow that has got 
loose in a corn field: " the ignorant manyfolk [ordinary people], being uncontrolled in 
the sixfold sense sphere, eats its fill with ravenous delight among the five sensual 
11392 
pleasures. The 'worldly conditions' of gain, loss, fame, obscurity, blame, praise, 
contentment come to both the noble disciple and the ordinary person, but, unlike the 
noble disciple, the ordinary person does not see these factors as they really are, namely 
that they are impermanent, and therefore constantly strives for the positive aspects, 
resulting in dukkha when this striving is inevitably thwarted. Similarly, both the 
ordinary person and the noble disciple experience feelings, but the ordinary person 
chases after them, whilst the noble disciple does not cling to theM. 393 The same is true 
for thought and the mind - the ordinary person suffers because he identifies tile mind 
with the self. "This that we call thought, that we call mind, that we call consciousness, 
by this the untaught manyfolk [ordinary people] are not able to feel repelled, to cease 
"394 fancying it, to be freed from it. Why? Because it is what they cleave to as 'mine'. 
Anybody who thus regards the five aggregates as the self and fails to appreciate tile 
impermanence of sense pleasures and so on is defined as a ordinary person: 
"Such an one'is called one of the untaught rnanyfolk [ordinary people], one 
fettered by the bonds of body, one bound to the inner and the outer, one 
who has not si lited the further shore, one who has not siolited the beyond, 9 I=> 
one who is born bound, who dies bound, one who from this world goes to 
the world beyond. "19' 
It is clear from these definitions that what defines a ordinary person is his 
ignorance, and that this ignorance fundamentally infornis his conduct, which further 
propagates the cycle of suffering. This relationship of mutual interdependence between 
ignorance and conduct is reinforced by the claim that it is only by developing both 
skilful knowledge and . conduct that the ordinary person could ever become an noble 
disciple, and gain liberation from suffering- 
4c If there were an end-maker by any other way than by knowledge-and- 
conduct, then the ordinary man would be ail erid-maker. Noýý, the 
ordinary man, living apart fi-oni knowledge-and-conduct, bein(-, urIversed in 
conduct, knows not, sees not things as they really are. But If 
lie be 
practised in conduct, lie knows, lie sees things as they really are. 
So 
knowing, so seeing, lie is an end-rnaker. " 396 
392s iv 195, Woodward 128. 
393S iv 206, Woodwird 138. 
394S ii 94. PJiys Davids 66. 
395S iii 163, Woodward 140. 
396A n 163, Wood\\, ird 170. 
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To sum up, then, the 'ordinary person' is governed by ignorance. He or she is unskilled 
in the practices taught by the Buddha. As a result of his or her ignorance, the ordinary 
person does not see the inherent suffering to be found in identifying with the self, and 
therefore clings to this idea, and to various hopes and expectations about the selfs 
destiny. Thus a negative causal cycle is set in motion by the ordinary person's 
ignorance. In contrast, the noble disciple has broken out of this negative causal cycle 
through his or her knowledge, and has set in motion a positive causal process. Let us 
now consider the noble disciple's characteristics. 
Ariyasdvaka, 'the Noble Disciple'. 
The noble disciple is freed frorn the ignorance that characterises the ordinary 
person. In the following formula that is repeated on numerous occasions in the 
Mafflzinia Nikiya, there is once again an emphasis on the causal process leading to 
wisdom and freedom frorn suffering, a process that begins with having trust in the 
teaching of the Dhamma: 
"And how is there non-agitation due to rion-clinging? Here a well-taught 
disciple [noble disciple] who has regard for the noble ones and is skilled 
and disciplined in their Mamma, who has reLyard for true men and is skilled 
and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard material form as self, or 
self as possessed of material form, or material form in self, or self as in 
material form. That material form of his changes and becornes otherwise. 
With the change and becoming otherwise of material form, his 
consciousness is not preoccupied with the change of material form. 
Agitated mental states born of preoccupation with the change of material 
form do not arise together and remain obsessing his mind. Because his 
mind is not obsessed, he is not anxious, distressed, and concerned, and due 
to non-clinging lie does not become agitated. " 191 
Unlike the ordinary person then, the noble disciple is endowed with faith or 
confidence in the Buddha, Dhamrna and Sangha, and has gained the liberating 
knowledge of things as they really are. In the Suip)vila Nikuyu, there is another set 
formula that is used to describe the noble disciple, which once again places emphasis 
on knowledge and insight: 
"He is said to be an ariyan [noble] disciple who possesses vie%ý and insight, 
who has attained true dhaninia, who sees the true 
dharnma, Mio is 
endowed with the knowledge of the learner (ýckhtt), who is endowed %ýith 




the wisdom of the learner, who has the dhamma-ear and noble penetrating 
wisdom and stands knocking at the door of the deathless. "398 
This formula is preceded by different criteria, all relating to insight. These criteria 
include "knowledge in doctrine and retrospective knowledge"399[l e. he knows now 
and in the past decay and death, its uprising, ceasing and the way to Its ceasing - in 
other words, the four noble truths], knowledge of each of the links of dependent 
origination and their arising, ceasing, and the way to their ceasing41111, and knowledge of 
"as it really is the coming to pass and the passing away of the world. "4111 
In contrast to the ordinary person, the noble disciple is unseduced by sense 
pleasures. He "sees as it really is with proper wisdOM"402 that the sense-fields are 
impermanent, and as a result knows how "sensual pleasures provide little gratification, 
much suffering, and much despair, and how great is the danger in thern. "403 
It is the noble disciple's knowledge of the way things really are, then, that 
ultimately distinguishes him or her froin the ordinary person. He or she can see the 
truth of dependent origination and the four truths. As a result of this knowledge, the 
ordinary person does not identify with a view of self and therefore does not cling to 
sensual pleasures or suffer when any of the aggregates of his being alter for the worse. 
There are four different cate(gories of noble disciple, the 'streamwinner', the I 
'once-retuner, the 'never-returner', and the 'arahat'. Arahatship is the higliest level of 
noble discipleship. Each stage represents a progressive freedom from the sources and 
causes of suffering. These four types will now be considered. 
The Four Types of Noble Disciple. 
The four stages in the process of attaining liberation are each characterised by 
increased weakening of the bonds that cause suffering. In the SuiýgTlj , S111lu 
404 1t is 
explained that there are ten fetters which bind the individual to the realm of sulnsulv. 
These are listed as follows- 
The rive lower fetters: 
1. Personality belief 
2. Doubt 
398 
e. g. S ii 58, adaptcd from Rlivs Davids 42. 
399 Ibid. 
400 ii 43-4. Rhys Davids 34. S ii 80. Rhys Davids 56-7. Si 
401S ii 79-, Rhys Davids ý5- 
402M ni 272, Bhikkliti Bodlu 112 1. 
403M 1 91 -, Blukkhu Bodlu 184). 
404D iii 234-27 1, Willshe 479-5 10. 
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3. Attachment to rites and rituals 
4. Sensual desire 
5. III-will 
The rive higher fetters: 
6. Craving for form 
7. Craving for the formless 
8. Conceit 
9. Restlessness 
I. O. Ignorance 
The four types of noble disciple, corresponding to four stages of 'breakthrough' are 
described in terms of the successive breaking of these fetters. I will noýý, look at each 
of the four types of person. Most attention will be given to the stream-winner as this 
stage represents the 'minimum requirement' for a noble disciple, the three further stages 
will be mentioned only briefly, for they only differ from the streamwinner stage in one 
or two respects. 
The Streamwinner. 
In the last chapter there was a description of the gradual path towards 
liberation, consisting of the cumulative practice of moral discipline, meditation and 
insight. The four types of person epitomise tile 'fruits' or the final stages of tile 
culmination of this path. The first stage is the stage of the strearn-winner. In the case 
of the stream-winner, we are told that he or she has destroyed the three fetters of the 
personality belief or self-view, doubt, and attachment to rites and rituals, and this is 
sufficient for him or her to be reborn in one of the higher realms after death. 405 In 
other words, the strearnwinner has perfected moral conduct and meditation (in the 
manner described in the gradual path) to such an extent that lie or she has attained a 
level of insight into reality 'as it really is' "having had a glimpse of reality and 
perceived the falsity of the self-belief, one is iinshakeable and no more dependent on 
external aids. "406Having attained this 'glimpse of reality', the streamwinner knows 
for 
him or herself that what the Buddha has taught is true. He or she is thus 
freed from 
doubt about the purpose of following the path set forth by the Buddha. 
Haý'ing seen 
reality as it really is, he or she knows that clinging to the belief in the self is a 
perceptual mistake, the idea of an essential self is an illusion 
The third fetter is 
attachment to rites and rituals. Thus tile streamwinner no 
longer acts out of 
I observance' for rules, but 'naturally' acts in the right way. In other %ýords, 
lie or she 
405D i 156, Walshe 145. D 111 132. Walslic 435. 
406 Maurince Walslic. Thus Have I Ilear(I. - The Long Discourscs (? f ihe 
Buchiho (Wisdoin Publientions. 
London, 1987), p. 27. 
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has got rid of the ignorance that prompted unskilful behaviour and therefore does not 
need to adhere to rules in order to prevent misconduct. This serves to emphasise the 
idea that liberation in the Buddhist tradition represents a returning to a natural state of 
wisdom and compassion. When unskilful factors such as ignorance and cra',, ing are 
removed, then the'liberated state' is'uncovered'. 
In the Kiiidl-ed Sayings oii Sli-eam-Winning (Soj5pulli-sul 
, nyimu) in the 
SaipyvitaWdya, the qualities of a stream-winner are listed in detail. Common to 
virtually all the descriptions is the possession of four elements - three 'unwavering 
loyalties' or 'confidences' and moral practice. These appear to be pre-requisites for 
attaining the fruit of streamwinning. These four elements are given various different 
names in the Nik5yas: they are known as the "four 11mbs of strearn-winning" 407 the 
"four floods of merit, floods of good things that bring happiness"4"-, "mirror of the 
Dhamma"; the "four deva paths to the Devas, for the purification of impure beings, for 
the cleansing of foul beings" , the 
"four desirable points of vantage"I". These four 
conditions, "if cultivated and made much of, conduce to the reallsing of the fruits of 
streamwinning' '4 10, and subsequently of the next stages of once-retu rill ng, of never- 
returning, and of arahatship. They also bring other more immediate benefits- "Blessed 
with these four things the Ariyan disciple [noble disciple] is also blessed with long life, 
both heavenly and human, blessed with beauty, blessed with happiness, blessed with 
good name, and blessed with sovereignty, both heavenly and human. "411 
The first of the four elements that one must possess in order to be a stream- 
winner is 4k unwavering confidence in the Buddha. " This is characterised as the 
conviction regarding the Buddha that-. "He is the Exalted One, an arahat, a perfectly 
enlightened universal Buddha, endowed with (perfect) knowledge and conduct, happy, 
a knower of the world, an unsurpassed guide of men who have to be restrained, a 
' 412 teacher of gods and men, a Buddha, an Exalted One'. 
Confidence in the Buddha must exist to some degree if one is to follow his 
teachings - one must have some faith in one's teacher if one is to take notice of what 
he says, particularly when those teachings are intended to loosen the grip of the 
deep- 
I Ity. seated forces of ignorance and craving which dominate one's perception of reali 
Similarly, confidence in the Buddha as 'perfect in knowledge and conduct' is 
emphasised because, as an enlightened being, he represents the embodiment of the 
407 -a rd ) )87. WoodN% 33 3 4. e. g. S N, 404, Woodward 345. ). 
408 '91. Woodward 3-36. e. g. S N, 399, Woodward 342. 
409S N, 357, adapted from Woodward 3) 12. 
410S N, 4 10. Wood Nva rd 351. 
411S N, 391, WoodNurd 136. 




practice of his teachings, and is thus a testimony to both the efficacy of the teachings 
he propounds and the possibility of achieving nibb5na. The opposite to confidence is 
doubt (vicikicchd), which hinders development towards liberation. Not only is doubt 
one of the five lower fetters, but it is also one of the 'five hindrances' that can obstruct 
the development of mindfulness in meditation. 413 The strearnwinner has abandoned 
doubt, and has full confidence in the Buddha's teachings. 
The second, related confidence, is in the Buddha's teachings, the Dharnma. It 
is characterised by the faith that- "The dhamma is well-taught by the Exalted One, of 
advantage to this life, timeless, open to all, leading onwards (to nibb5na), understood 
for themselves by the wise". 414 
The third confidence is in the community of monks and nuns and other fellow- 
practitioners, the sangha. This constitutes the belief that: 
"Walking. righteously is the Exalted One's Order of Disciples, walking 
uprightly, walking in the right way, walking dutifully is the Exalted One's 
Order of Disciples; namely, the four pairs of men, the eight sorts of men' I ý. 
That is the Exalted One's Order of Disciples. Worthy of honour are they, 
worthy of reverence, worthy of offerings, worthy of salutations with 
clasped hands, -a field of merit and unsurpassed for the world. "416 
This third confidence is related to the first two - the order of disciples gets Is 
whole raisoii d'ell-e from the Buddha and the dhamma that he taught. Without 
confidence in the Buddha and dharnma, it would be impossible to have trust in a 
community that based their lives on these factors. 
The fourth and final factor required before one can become a stream-winner 
follows the pragmatic tenor of much that we have seen so far, for it places emphasis on 
the moral practice expounded by the Buddha. Rather than entailing faith or 
confidence, this element requires that one is accomplished in moral conductý "He Is 
possessed of the moral practice loved by the ailyaii. ý [noble ones], conduct unbroken, 
consistent, spotless, unblemished, giving freedom, propounded by the wise, 
uncorrupted, conducive to concentrat, 0 11. " 417Moral conduct is both a pre-requisite and 
a result of progressi As we shall see shortly, owing to the inter- on along the path. n 
relatedness of different elements of the path to liberation, ethical conduct provides a 
413For a list of the five hindrances, see for cminiple M1 60. Blukkhu Bodlu 
15 1. The Fivc hindrimccs 
are sensual desire. ill-will. slot li-a ild-torpor. restlessness and remorse. and 
doubt. 
414 Ibid. 
415- incr c1c. ) and those c. \pcr*ciic'ilg the 
Fruit of that C'lleglorv Of i. e. the four kinds of men (strcam-NN ii 
conduct. 




basis for positive development of other path-elements, such as mindfulness and 
concentration. Once one has got to a certain level of attainment, then the factors that 
lead to unskilful moral conduct have been abandoned, and moral conduct occurs 
'automatically'. We have already seen that the stream-winner has transcended the need 
for rules and rituals; he or she is in a natural state of ethical 'goodness'. It is tills that 
constitutes the fourth 'limb' of stream-winning. 
The strearnwinner, then, has broken through the first three fetters, he or she 
also possesses the four 'loyalties', or 'limbs' of strearnwinning. As his or her practice 
continues, the next stage of attainment is reached, the stage of the once-returner. 
The Once-Returner. 
The next stage towards liberation is the level of the once-returner, so called 
because one has only to have one more human rebirth before attaillilig ilibb'511a 
(compared with a maxii-nurn of seven for the streamwimier"). The Once-Returner has 
greatly weakened the fourth and fifth fetters in addition to havirig destroyed the first 
three. Thus he or she has all but discarded the fetters of sensual desire and ill-will- "A 
monk who has abandoned the three fetters and has reduced his greed, hatred and 
delusion, becomes Once-Returner who, having returned to this world once more, will 
make an end of suffering. "419 
The Never-Returnet- 
As the name suggests, the never-returner will no longer be reborn in the human 
realm. He or she has completely discarded the five lower fetters, and is no longer 
attached in any way to this world. When the never-returner dies he or she will be 
reborn in a higher abode and will attain liberation from there- "A monk who has 
abandoned the five lower fetters takes a spontaneous rebirth [in a higher sphere] and, 
without returning frorn that world, gains enlighýenrnent . 
11420 
The Arahat 
In the Muh, 51i Sulla, the arahat is defined thusý "a monk through tile extinction 
of the taints reaches in tills very life the uncorrupted deliverance of mind, tile 
deliverance through wisdorn, which lie has realised by 11's 0%ý,, 
The stage 
418SCe for cxaiiiplc t lie Janava-vabho D 11 200-219. NNlicrc a sti-ca ill -winiler ill 
his Sc\Clit hII fc 
expresses the dcsirc to bcconic a once-returner, 
4 19D 1 156, Walshe 145. 
420fbid. 
42 1 Ibid. 
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of becoming an arahal, then, is the culmination of the path set forth by the Buddha. It 
is characterised by complete freedom of all the fetters, and the destruction of all taints. 
Significant factors to note from the above description of the arahai Is that It is through 
insight, through seeing the way things really are, that ignorance and the concomitant 
craving, clinging and suffering falls away. The individual who sees realitý' correctk' 
does not suffer, for suffering arises out of ignorance. It is also significant that the 
'deliverance' attained is not 'endowed' on the arahat by someone else, but is 'reallsed 
by his own insight. 1422When an individual has reached the state of arahantship he has 
completed his task and knows: "'Birth is finished, the holy life has been led, done is 
what had to be done, there is nothing further here. `423 In the Mahdll* Siala, the 
Buddha is asked by Malidli what the method is for the realisation of the four different 
stages of liberation, and the Buddha replies that it is the Eightfold Path that is "the 
path, the way to the reallsation of these t I, I 11gS. "424 We will shortly consider the 
eightfold path in the light of the distinction between the ordinary person and tile 11oble 
disciple. Before doing so, however, I wish to briefly consider another category of 
liberated being, the paccekabuddha. The paccekabuddlm is an individual who has 
attained enlightenment by himself, without being taught. The figure of the 
paccekabuddha is interesting because it illustrates that one does not have to have 
heard the teaching of the Buddha in order to attain liberation. 
The Paceekabuddha. 
English translations of the term paccekabuddha emphasise tile concept of a 
solitary' Buddha, one who has becorne enlightened by himself There is also an 
emphasis on the fact that such an individual does not teach the dhamma after his 
enlightenment. 425 Thepaccekabilddl7a is mentioned much less frequently in the NIk5 
yas than the four types of noble disciple, A comprehensive list of various references to 
paccekabuddlia. v and a study of tile concept is found in Kloppenborg's work, 717c 
Paccekabuddh&26. For the purposes of this study it is necessary only to sunimarise 
422 In the Sampas5danTya Sulta (D 111 99-116, Walslic 417-426), seven diffcrciit types ofaraliant are 
described: (lie Both-Ways-Liberated. the Wisdom-Libmited. the Body-Witness. the Vision-Attaincr. 
the Faitli-Liberatcd, the Dliamina-Devotec. and the Faitli-Dcvotcc- (D 111 106). Tlicsc differcilt types 
emphasize the ways in which different character types come to the state of liberation - sonic. 
like the 
Dlianinia and Faith Devotee. have a devotional attitude towards their pracilce. N\ licreas others 
lim cI 
stronger emphasis on Nvisdoni and insight. or indeed oil visions. This demonstrates th. a. whilst 
I -iding to liberation are sharccl b\ all araliants. Ilicre arc 
d ffercilt 
Ultimately the practices and insighis le. III 
approaches or emphases to the path of practice. 
423 Di 85, Walslic 108. 
424 Di 157. Walslic 146. 
425See Rja Kloppenborg. The Paccekahwhlha. -A BiOcIl7ba Ascetic (1-ciden. 
Brill. 1974). p. 1-2 for a 




these findings and point out that the paccekabuddha is an individual who has attained 
arahalship without ever having heard the teachings of a Buddha. I wish to emphasize 
two respects in which the concept of the paccekahuddha is signIficant. FIrstlY, It 
suggests that the three 'loyalties' in the Buddha, sangha and dhamma possessed by the 
four types of noble disciple are not absolutely necessary as a prerequisite for liberation. 
if there is no Buddha, then there can be no 'Buddhist' teachings (dhamma), and no 
followers of these teachings (sangha). Secondly, the concept of the paccekabliddha 
suggests that the universe has a certain objective causal structure that exists whether or 
not there is a Buddha to teach it. This lends support to the Buddha's claim that he is 
simply 'describing' the way to liberation and the way reality truly is, rather than the path 
being something of his 'invention'. The implication of this is that liberation is not 
something that is restricted only to 'Buddhists' or 'followers of tile Buddha', because it 
can be attained when no Buddhas or Buddhist teachings exist. 
These twp points are important when applied to the context of the 'Inter-faith 
debate', for they suggest that one does not have to be a follower of the Buddha in 
order to become liberated, in so far as it is possible to beconi-e liberated w'hen no 
Buddha exists. However, although one may not be a 'follower' of tile Buddha in the 
sense of responding to his specific teachings, there is another sense in which a 
paccekabuddha could be described as a 'follower' of the Buddha. The story of the 
Buddha's enlightenment describes how he followed a certain causal path of conduct 
that culminated in his awakening. I wish to suggest that any being who becomes 
enlightened has followed the same path of cause and effect, and is thus a 'follower' of 
the Buddha in the sense of unconsciously 'following in his footsteps', or treading the 
. 
427 11 1-71 same path The 
four types of noble disciple have an advantage over the would-be 
paccekabuddha in that they have a guide along this path in the shape of a Buddha, a 
Imap' or 'instructions' in the form of the dhami-na, and the support of tile sal. igha. The 
paccekabuddha, however, has none of these supports, but finds his own way along this 
path. Whichever method with which a disciple progresses along this path, I wish to Z: > -0 
suggest that the path is the same. I will now consider this notion of the path in greater 
detail before going on to consider the objective causal process that it describes and 
represents. 
427 The analogy of Tollowing in dic Buddha's footstcps' is uscd by the Buddha 
himself 'n thc 
Cý. Iahatthipadopama Stata, M1 182 ff-. BlukkIm Bodlil -175 ff. 
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The Eightfold Path as the Distillation of Spiritual Practice. 
So far we have examined many of the references throughout the Nikayas to the 
different forms of noble disciple and how they differ from the descriptions of the 
ordinary person. The definitions have had many different emphases, and indeed 
throughout the Nikdyas, various different practices are identified as the way to the 
cessation of suffering. In the following section, these apparently disparate references 
will be tied together using the notion of the eightfold path, following the argument put 
forward by Gethin that the eightfold path represents the 'complete distillation' of tile 
spiritual life. This will be followed by an examination of the two levels of achievement 
in the eightfold path, the noble and the ordinary which correspond to the attainments 
of the noble disciple and the ordinary person respectively. This will help to elucidate 
this fundamental spiritual distinction within the Nik5ya world. Similarly the eightfold 
path will be used to illustrate further the differences between the 'four types' of 
ordinary person. 
What is the Eightfold Path? 
The Noble Eightfold Path is defined on a number of occasions in the Nik5yas as 
the Fourth Noble Truth. One such analysis and description of the eightfold path lies in 
the Saccavibhai)gasu11a428 (The Analysis on the Truths), where the path is described in 
detail. In this sutta, the first noble truth is described as "suffering" and the second 
noble truth is described as follows- 
"It is craving, which brings renewal of being, is accompanied by delight 
and lust, and delights in this and that, that is, craving for sensual pleasures, 
craving for being, and craving for non-being. This is called the noble truth -D - 
"429 
of the origin of suffering, 
The third truth is characterised as- 
"It is the rernainderless fading away and ceasing, the givint.; up, 
430 
relinquishing, letting go, and rejecting of that same era-vill ,, 
The fourth truth, the eightfold path, is identified as tile way that this stoppill(I 
of anguish is achieved. There follows all analysis Of all eight 
factors of the path. Right 
view is defined in this context as knowledge of the four noble truths. 
428M iii 251-252. Bliikkliu Bodlu 1100-1101. An analysis is I ISO found at S N. S, 10'. 
Woodward 7-9, 
and D ii 311-2. Walshe 348. 
429M iii 250-1, Bliikkliu Bodhi 1099. 
430M iii 25 1. Bhikkhu Bodlu 1099. 
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Right intention or thought is defined as the aspiration for renunciation, "non-ill 
will", and "intention of non-cruelty"431. In his analysis of right intention, Gethin argues 
that both right and wrong thought exist on a continuum - it is not an absolute or 
binary state* "wrong thought ranges from thoughts and desires that only subtly tend to 
desire, hatred or cruelty, to thoughts and ideas that are absorbed in and obsessed with 
these; fight thought ranges from thoughts and ideas that only subtly tend to 
desirelessness, non-hatred or non-cruelty, to thoughts and ideas absorbed in and fully 
given to these. 11432 
Right Speech is "abstaining from false speech, abstaining from malicious 
speech, 'abstaining from harsh speech, abstaining from idle chatter. "433 
Right Action is "abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from taking 0 In In 
what is not given, and abstaining from misconduct in sensual pleasures. " In the 
Vibhahga of the Saippatu-Magga, the third element of right action is defined as 
"refraining from non-celibacy", thus giving a more specific definition of "sensual 
misconduct". 
Right Livelihood is defined as "abandoning wrong livelihood, and earning a 
living through right livelihood. " 
Right Effort or Endeavour, refers to a state of affairs in which- 
"a bhikkhu awakens zeal for the non-arising of unarisen evil unwholesome 
states, and he makes effort, arouses energy, exerts Iiis mind, and strives. 
He awakens zeal for the abandoning of arisen evil unwholesome states .. 
for the arising of unarisen wholesome states ... 
for the continuance, non- 
disappearance, strengthening, increase, and fulfilment by development of 
11434 arisen wholesome states ... 
Right mindfulness is exhibited when: 
"a bhikkhu abides contemplating the body as a body, ... 
feelings as 
feelings, 
... mind as mind, ... mind-objects 
as mind-objects, ardent, fully 
aware, and mindful, having put away covetousness and grief 
for the 
world. 11435 
Finally, right concentration is exemplified when a monk.. 
43 1 Ibid. 
432 Gethin, The BlOclhist Path io. -I wakening. p. 194. 
433M in 25 1, Bhlkkhu Bodhl 1099. 
434M iii 252, Blukkliu Bodhl I 100. 
435 Ibid. 
"Quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from umýholesome 
states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhdna, which is 
accompanied by applied and sustained thought, with rapture and pleasure 
born of seclusion. With the stilling of applied and sustained thouv_ht, he 
enters upon and abides in the second jhdna, which has self-confidence and 
singleness of mind ... with rapture and pleasure born of concentration. 
With the fading away as well of rapture ... he enters upon and abides in the 
third meditation ... he enters upon and abides in the fourth meditation. -436 
The Eightfold Path and Other Descriptions of the Way to Liberation. 
As we have seen, there are many different practi III ices listed in the N*UYas that 
purport to lead to the status of stream-winner and, ultimately, arahat. For example, we 
have already seen in the Sotapulli-Sul. npwa, ' there is a strong emphasis on the four 
loyalties or 'faiths' as a means as attaining liberation, whereas the paccekabuddha can 
attain liberation without faith in the Buddha, dhami-na and sangha. Elsewhere it is the 
four foundations of mindfulness that are described as the means for liberation: 
"This is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting 
of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the 
attainment of the true way, for the reallsation of nibb5ina - namely, the 
four foundations of mindfulness. "437 
In the Andpana-Suiyj4alam, the "Ariyan way, the best of ways, the Tath5gata's way of 
life" is identified simply with mindfulness of breathing. In the Pusudl, ka SuffU411, the 
'holy life' is constituted by the so-called seven sets- the four foundations of 
mindfulness, the four right efforts, the four roads to power or bases of success, the 
five spiritual faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of awakenina439 and finally 
the eightfold path. 
In addition to all these practices that lead to nibbana, the eightfold path is 
frequently and consistently described as the way to liberation- in the A11UggU-suY. n_i7111a, 
the aim of the Holy life is described as "dispassion", the destruction of the 
fetters "the 
uprooting of tendency", the "way out", the destruction of the taints, release 
by 
"' M iii 252, Blilkkliu Bodlil I 10 1. 
437M 155-6. Bliikkliu Bodlu 145. Also S N' 167. Wood\\-, ird 167. D 11 290. 
\\%ilslic Sec 
The Buddhist Path to. -hrakening, pp, 59-68 
for discussion of the swii riciii,: c of ilic terin ck, -iiana. 
43 8D iii 117-41- Walslic 427-489. ilso in the 
StW7(J"(71J7aSui1a. \16 243-5 1.34oo. ýiiicl the 
Afahdpai-inibbina Sulta. D 11 119-20. Walslic 252-3). 
439Namely mindfulness. investigation-of-staics. ciicrgy. raptUrc. inniquility. coilmitnition. 
equanimity See for example NI iii 276. Blukkliu Bodlil 1124. 
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knowledge, knowing and seeing and "final emancipation without clingirip"441 
-- 
The 
vehicle - the "way and practice" for achieving all these things is the eightfold path. 
it is referred to as the 'highest life', the 'holy life'441, the life of the recluse 442 , and 
has 
as its aim the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion. 443. In the same sutta, the four 
fruits of the path are identified as the four types of person, (stream- winner etc. ). and 
once again the path is completely identified with the way to achieve the cessation of 
suffering: 
"By whomsoever the Ariyan [noble] eightfold way is neglected, by them is 
neglected the Ariyan eightfold way that leads to the utter destruction of III 
[suffering]. By whomsoever the Ariyan eightfold way is undertaken, by 
them is undertaken the Ariyan eightfold way that leads to the utter 
destruction of Ill. 11444 
Earlier in the Mugga-Sal 
* njialu, 
the path is described as tile 'best of chariots', 
'dhamma-chariot', "unsurpassed for its conquest in the fight"445. This idea of the 
eightfold path as a vehicle is, as Gethin points out, reinforced when the simile of a raft 
is applied to the eightfold path. Early in the Muggu-Su1P), '1a1u, tile eight factors of the 
path are said to conduce to going to the further shore when they are "cultivated and 
made muchof 1446 , and in the 
Su. lujýaianiku Suly)ntnu, the eightfold path is likened to a 
raft which a man uses to get from the lower shore, fraught with dangers (representing 
the world of samsara), to the safety of the further shore, nibb5na. 447 In the 
Sotdpalti-Sai 
, njmtlu, as we 
have already seen, the eightfold path itself is referred to as 
the 'stream' that has been won, this tirne characterised by the connotation of being the 
stream or current that will carry one inexorably to nibb5na. 
These passages portray an unequivocal message that the fulfilment of the 
eightfold path is the way to tile cessation of dukkha. What, though, of the references 
to other practices that lead to cessation? With reference to the seven set S448, for 
example, the eightfold path is but one of the sets, and the fact that the other six factors 
are mentioned as separate sets presumably means that they represent practices that are 
t other' to, and thus additional to, the eightfold path, which, when all cultivated 
440S v 23 ff., Woodward 24 ff. 
441S v 23-5. Woodward translates 'b1v17jjj(j(-a1-j*y(jjj7' Is 'the best practice- I, lilts conlext (Kilicired 




445S v 2: adapted from WoodN% a rd 4-6. 
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together, constitute the brahmacariya that will take one to nibbdila. However, as we 
have seen, the eightfold path is clearly considered to be enough, when cultivated on its 
own, to take the practitioner to nibbdna. Conversely, we have also seen how individual 
sections of the path - for example, mindfulness - are also said to lead to nibbana, 
without reference to any other limb of the path, whilst in the Sot5pam'Sutta, there are 
many references in which the description of the practices of those who are guaranteed 
liberation makes no mention of the eightfold path, but only refers to other qualities and 
practices such as the four loyalites. What, then, is the status of the eightfold path, and 
how are these apparent inconsistencies to be accounted for? 
Gethin argues that the eightfold path has a privileged status as the distillation of 
the complete spiritual life, under which all other practices can be subsumed. He argues 
for this in various ways. Firstly, he maintains that whilst at times tile other six of the 
seven sets are spoken of as paths to the cessation of suffering, "it is surely true that in 
the case of the at-iyo allhai)giko Inuggo [noble eightfold path] this kind of treatment is 
rather more thoroughgoing. "449 , and argues that in 
fact "it is in part precisely by 
association with the ai-iyo allhai)giko maggo that the other sets are treated in a parallel 
fashion 
. 
11410 He explains that whilst the eightfold path is mentioned explicitly as tile 
fourth noble truth on six occasions in the Nikdya.,; 4 5 1, there are very many passages 
where, although the four noble truths are not explicitly mentioned, the format of 
suffering, arising, ceasing and the way going to the ceasing is used, and the eightfold 
path features in these sections. In the Maggu-Suip), unu, when the Buddha is 
questioned by wanderers of other schools, lie describes the eightfold path as tile way to 
achieve full understanding of suffering, which is the purpose of living the holy life 
452 ghtforward solution, complete in under him. It is thus presented as the "strai-,, 
itself'453 to dukkha, the problem that the Buddha is dealing with. Gethin goes on to 
argue that as the "essence of the spiritual life", the eightfold path also operates as a 
yardstick by which the teachings of other schools can be evaluated. He cites a passage 
in the Digha Nik5yu where the Buddha describes the presence of the eightfold path as 
the determinant of whether there are any stream-winners, once-returners, never- 
returners or ascetics- 
"In whatever Dharni-na and discipline the Noble Eightfold Path is not 
found, 
no ascetic is found of the first, the second, the third or fourth grade. 
But 
such ascetics can be found ... in a 
Dharnma and discipline where the 
449Gethin, The Buck1hist Path to. -I wakening, p. 202. 
4 501bid. 
451 Ibid., p. 201 -D 11 311: BlukkIm Bodh 1 348. NIII: 
BilikkIm Bodlu 1100 S\ 421-2. 
Woodward 358. Sv 424: Woodx\-, ird 362. 
452 e. g., Sv2, Woodwird 6. 
453 Gethin, The Buch/hist Pall, io. -hrakening. p. 203' 
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Eightfold Path is found. Those other schools are devoid of [true] ascetics- 
but if in this one the monks were to live the life to perfection, the world 
would not lack for Arahants. 11454 
How does the paccekabuddha fit into this idea that only traditions in which 
the eightfold path features are liberative? As we have seen, the pacc-ekahuddli(I 
has no access to the Buddha's teachings, including his teaching of the eightfold 
path. If he has no access to the teachings about the eightfold path, how can he 
become liberated? The existence of paccekabuddhca suggests that the eightfold 
path is not just an explicit teaching, but a description of a certain causal process. 
Thepaccekabuddha is able to become liberated without hearim, the teaching of the 
Buddha because he has fulfilled the factors of the path by himself He has found 
the path without the guidance of the Buddha. This serves to reinforce the idea that 
the eightfold path is the Buddha's description of an objectively existing process, it 
is not just a teaching of his 'Invention'. When the Buddha taught that there can 
only be liberated beings in a tradition where the eightfold path is found, he 
presumably means that people are only liberated when the eightfold path is 
followed and fulfilled. The existence of paccekahudclhas suggests that there does 
not necessarily have to be explicit iecichitig of the eightfold path in order for a 
tradition to produce noble disciples. 
The Spiritual Division of 'Transcenclent' and 'Ordinary' in the Eightfold 
Path. 
Let us summarise what we have examined so far. In the fourth noble truth, the 
Buddha describes the way to the cessation of suffering as the Noble Eightfold Path. 
All the various practices and insights that are connected with the path to 111bbana can 
be subsumed under one or other of the limbs of the eightfold path, as factors that 
contribute to the eventual fulfilment of morality, wisdom and concentration. 
Throughout the Nik5yas there is a constant dichotomy between those ývho have 
perfected the eightfold path sufficiently to have got rid of wrong views and practices 
and be guaranteed eventual attainment of the freedom of nibbdna, and those ývho have 
not yet attained this degree of development. Those in the former cate(; ory are referred 
to as 'noble' or 'noble disciples', and include stream-\vinners, once-returners, never- 
returners and arahats. Those in the category of 'ordinary person' Ila% e not perfected 
the factors of the eightfold path to a sufficient de(. Yree to be (guaranteed 
liberation. The 
knowledge attained by the noble disciple is said to be -transcendent', in contrast to the 
454 D ii 151. Walslic 268. 
I -) ý 
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knowledge of the ordinary person who is still bound to sailis5ra, and possesses 
knowledge that is 'ordinary' or 'worldly'. This same dichotomy exists in terms of the 
elements of the eightfold path - when each part of the path is perfected so that it is 
clearly seen, practised and understood it is termed 'noble'. As Gethin explains, the 
eightfold path refers to both the process of spiritual development, and its fulfflmeriv 
"In the first place, the ariyo a! 1huhgiko maggo [noble eightfold path] 
subsumes all other spiritual practice, it is, as it were, the whole of the 
spiritual life. Secondly, as complete and perfect spiritual practice, it is the 
ultimate form of spiritual practice; it is what the bhikkhu aspires to, It is the 
goal, the end, the culmination of the spiritual quest. The 
ariyo a!! hai)giko inaggo is the transformation of view, thought, speech, 
action, livelihood, striving, mindfulness and concentration into right view, 
right thought etc. Thus the ai-ijýo allhul)giko inuggo is at once where one 
wishes to arrive at, and the way one must go to get there. For the 
destination is not exactly something different frorn the journey, where one 
arrives is only the culmination of the way one has conie. "'ýý 
The clearest exposition of this noble/ordinary distinction lies in the 
MahdcatOrisaka Sulla of the A4ujjhil)ia Nik5yu456. This sutta gives a very useful 
exposition on the path and the relatedness of the ei(ylit different factors, so it will be 
helpful to undertake a detailed analysis of it. The sutta begins with the Buddha 
teaching his disciples about "ariyan right concentration", with its supports and 
equipment. These 'supports and equipment' are the other seven factors of the path, 
namely ariyan right view, thought, speech, action, livelihood, endeavour, mindfulness. 
This suggests that ariyan right concentration exists not on its own, but in connection 
with, supported and nourished by, the other factors of the path. 
Throughout the Muhacailul-isaku Siala there is a strong emphasis on right 
view. In relation to the "supports and equipment" of noble right concentration, the 
Buddha emphasises that right view is the fore-runner of the other elements. In this 
respect, right view is defined as recognising wrong view as wrong view, and right view 
as right view. Wrong view is defined as the opinion that-. 
"'There is nothing, given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed, no fruit or 1. - 
result of good and bad actions, no this world, no other ýýorld, no mother, 
no father- no beings who are reborn spontaneous]\,, no good and virtuous 
recluses and brahmins in the world who have reallsed for themselves by 
45 5Getliin, The Buddhist Poth to. -hrokening. p. 207 
456M iii 71-8-, Bliikkiiu Bodlu 9,4-40. 
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direct knowledge and declare this world and tile other world. ' This is 
wrongVieW. 11457 
Right view in the sense of distinguishing right from wrong comes first in the context of 
each factor of the path. For instance, it is right view that recognises wrong action (i. e. 
taking life, taking the not-given and sexual misconduct) as wrong action, and right 
action as right action. 458 
In each case, there is a distinction made between two types of right view, that 
which "is affected by taints, partaking of merit, ripening on the side of attachment. """, 
and right view that is "noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of tile path. 1146() With 
each section of the path, the same distinction is made between the factor with taints, 
and the noble factor, the component of the way. As an example of this format, which 
is the same for all eight factors, let us look at right speech. Right view conles first 
insofar as it distinguishes wrong speech from right speech. Right speech is twofold - 
in the first place it is abstaining from wrong speech, (i. e. lying, slanderous speech, 
harsh speech, and gossiping), and this comes under the category of right speech with 
taints, on the side of merit, leading to rebirth. The second f6F111 is right speech that is 
"noble, taintless, suprarnundane, a factor of the path" and is characterised as "the 
desisting from tile four kinds of verbal misconduct, the abstaining, refraining, 
abstinence from them in one whose rnind is noble, whose mind is taintless, who 
possesses the noble path and is developing the noble path. "461 After this exposition of 
the two different sorts of right speech, it is explained how the path elements of right 
endeavour and mindfulness are involved in the cultivation of right speech in addition to 
right view- 
"One makes an effort to abandon wrong speech and to enter upon right 
speech: this is one's right effort. Mindfully one abandons wrong speech, 
mindfully one enters upon and abides in right speech- this is one's right 
mindfulness. Thus these three states run and circle around right speech, 
that is, right view, right effort, and right mindfulness. "462 
The same formula is followed for each of the eight limbs of the path. Gethill 
discusses the inter-connectedness of the different elements of the path- 
"While right view has precedence because of its function of knowino and 
ise, right view must be seeing what is wrong and causing what is right to ar 
457M I ii 71-2, Bliikkliu Bodlu 9334. 
458M iii 74-, Blilkkliu Bodlu 934. 
459M iii 72, Blilkkhu Bodlu 915. 
4601bid. 
461M in 74, Blukkhti Bodlii 936. 
462M iii 74, Bliikkliu Bodlii 937. 
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supported by right striving and right mindfulness. Thus ... right view must 
in some sense lead the way because it is what 'sees', but three dhanlMa. ý 
['things'], namely right view, right striving and right mindfulness, 
continually interact with the other factors in order to promote them in their 
cright' aspect. "463 
The distinction between the ordinary understanding of the path with taints and 
the endowment with noble factors is very important, for they are treated as two stages 
in the attainment of the eightfold path. Gethin summarises this distinction as followsý 
"First there is the turning away from wrong view etc., and the turning 
towards right view etc. that are of the ordinary skilful variety. Secondly 
there is the attainment of right view, etc., as noble, without 5NU I 'UN [taints], 
lokuttara [transcendent], a factor of the path. It is precisely this stage that 
must be understood as ai-iyo saiiiiýi5-, s, aiiic-idlii'su-itpuiiiso. s, u-pui-ikkhu-i-o 
[noble right concentration with supports and equipi-nent]"464 
In contrast to the approach in which the elements of the path are seell as 
working together, the stages of the path are explained in terms of a consecutive pattern 
as the Mahdcanuri-suku Situa progresses- 
"In one of right view, right Intention cornes into being, in one of right 
intention, right speech comes into being, in one of right speech, right action 
comes into being- in one of right action, right livelihood comes into being, 
in one of right livelihood, right effort comes into being, in one of right 
effort, right mindfulness comes into being-, in one of right mindfulness, right 
concentration comes into being, in one of right concentration, right 
knowledge comes into being, in once of right knowledge, right deliverance 
comes into being. Thus, bhIkkhus, the path of the disciple higher 
'46- training possesses eight factors, the arahant possesses ten factors. ' ` 
How is this contrast between the 'con. secutive' approach and tile 'simultaneous' 
approach to be explained? In the case of the consecutive approach, it is important to 
notice that, at the end of the section, a distinction is made between path for a "disciple 
in higher training", and the arahant's path. A 5ekhci or 'learner' is one who is in 
possession of the noble or transcendent (ari. van) eightfold path, but still has more to 
do, more to perfect. He is contrasted with the 'perfected one' ýýho is all al-ahal, and 
who has not only perfected all eight factors of the path, but has also 
developed two 
further ones, right knowledge and right freedom. Thus the learner/perfected one 
(or 
463 Gethin, The Buddhist Poth io. -hrokening, p. 219. 
464Getliin, The Buddhist Path lo. -hrokening. p. 218. 
465M iii 76, Blilkkliu Bodhi 9-38- 
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adept) distinction is not between those who are developing ordinary factors of the path 
and those who are possessed of the noble path, but is a hierarchy within the group of 
those who have developed the noble factors. It is a distinction between tile stream- 
winner, the once-returner, and the never-returner on the one hand, and the al-ahal on 
the other. The sekha is described as one who is "imperfectly possessed of right vieýC 
and all the other factors of the path. 466 Gethin argues that this particular section of the 
MaMcattdrisaka Sulla, where all the factors of the path are described sequentially, as 
a description of how one who is already endowed with the eight stages in their noble 
form, is to bring right knowledge and freedom into existence and therefore become an 
arahat: "' ... once again right view 
is said to lead the way in the final and absolute 
wasting away of the ten items in their wrong aspects, and their coming to full 
development in their right aspects. "467 
To sum up, then, the noble eightfold path can be seen as the distillation of the 
spiritual life, not only because it encompasses the many different areas of spiritual 
practice that must be attained in order to attain liberation, but also because it 
represents both the culmination of spiritual practice (in its perfected, transcendent 
state), and the course by which this attainment is achieved. As tile culmination of the 
spiritual life it thus represents a yardstick against which spiritual aspirants can be 
judged. The al-ahat, as a perfected being, has not only attained perfection of all the 
eight stages of the path, but also has cultivated the two additional limbs of right 
knowledge and freedom. The noble disciple has attained the eight stages in their noble 
form - he has each element that is "ariyan [noble], taintless, superillundane, a 
component of. the Way", but lie yet has more to perfect. This understanding of the 
noble eightfold path suggests that there are, in fact, degrees of noble, transcendent 
right vieW468, speech and so oil, but nevertheless the 'crucial spiritual breakthrough' 
has been made insofar as the practitioner has perfected the elements to such a degree 
as to be bound irrevocably to the eventual attainment of nibb5iia- 
The Causality of Libei-ation 
So far, there has been a discussion of the spiritual division of ordinary and 
transcendent in the Nik5yas, and how this relates to the eightfold path, ýýhich can 
be 
viewed as the 'distillation' of the Buddha's teaching I ýýIsh to close this chapter 
b%, 
emphasising the idea that the eightfold path and the rest of the Buddha's teachimys are 
466S ý, 14, Woodward 13. For fullier definitions ofsekha see- Sv 175, \\'ood\\-, ird 
15-)-4. S\ 229M. 
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468This A-vic Ret-clalmli in is an argument that -is vehemently opposed by Masefield 
his book. 1) 
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not just subjects of his invention, but a description of the nature of reality. What is 
being described, or rather presupposed, in the Buddha's teaching, is a causal process, a 
certain structure of reality. There is plenty of evidence for the "causality of 
liberation" throughout the Nikdyas. In the following passage from the 
Afiguttara Nikiya, concentration is seen as the causal factor that allows liberating 
knowledge and insight to arise. "... in the absence of right mental concentration and 
in the case of one not endowed with right mental concentration, the cause is absent for 
(the production of) the knowledge and insight of things as they really are. " -169 It is a 
law of the world, a fact of life, that insight follows on from concentration, "It is in the 
nature of things (dhaminutd) that a person in a state of concentration knows and sees 
what reallyiS. 11470 The fact that non-attachment follows automatically from 'seeing the 
way things really are' also demonstrates this 'salvific causation' "A person who knows 
and sees things as they really are need not make an effort of the will, (saying), 'I shall 
become disintere5ted'-, it is of the nature of things that a person who knows and sees 
becomes disinterested. "471 
The Daniubhi-um Sitila provides some helpful analogies t-o illustrate the causal 
law that operates to bring the factors of the path to their positive fruition. Tile Sutta 
begins with Prince Jayasena asking one of the Buddha's disciples, Aggivessana, to 
teach him the Dhamma. Aggivessana declines, because he knows that the Prince will 
not be able to understand it, and when fie is eventually persuaded to teach it, his fears 
are realised and the Prince fails to understand. When Aggivessana tells this to the 
Buddha, the Buddha is not surprised. 
"Aggivessana, how is it possible that Prince Jayasena, livinu in the midst of 
sensual pleasures, enjoying sensual pleasures, being devoured by thoughts 
of sensual pleasures, being consumed by the fever of sensual pleasures, 
bent on the search for sensual pleasures, could know, see or reallse that 
which must be known through renunciation, seen through renunciation, 
atta* That is ined through renunciation, realised through renunciation. 
impossible. "472 
He illustrates this story with an analogy of two fi-lends who go to a mountain - one 
climbs to the summit and the other stays at the bottom. When the man on the surnmit 
describes the beautiful view that lie can see, his friend at the bottom does not believe 
him, and claims that it is impossible that such a view can be seen. in response, the man 
on the summit leads his sceptical friend up the mountain, and there he sees the %, iek%* 
from himself, and explains that "'because I was obstructed b%, this high mountain 
469 ... 
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did not see what was there to be seen. "'. So it is, explains the Buddha, with ai-1, 'Vall 
fight view - "Prince Jayasena is obstructed, hindered, blocked, and enveloped by a still 
greater mass than this - the mass of ignorance. 111473 
This simile is important on two levels - firstly it demonstrates that althouah 
ariyan right view is simply seeing what is really the case, secondly it illustrates ho-w 
this insight is gained from a particular point of vantage that is the culmination of a 
certain path of practice. Certain conditions must be fulfilled in order to have this 
insight. Thus although it is all around him, the ordinary person cannot see the wav 
things really are because his insight is obscured by 'the mass of ignorance', an 
ignorance that is a causal result of his immersion in the world of sense pleasures. One 
cannot simply gain right view at will, for it is the culmination of a course of training. In 
a further simile, the Buddha likens each stage of the ('j1radual development formula to 
different stages in the process of taming a wild elephant - the elephant tamer has to 
work gradually and patiently before the creature is "rid of all faults and defects, purged 
of all flaws. 11474 
This idea of the existence of a certain 'causality of liberation' is supported by 
Gethin who suggests that both the eightfold path and dependent orioination are 
descriptions of a certain 'law of nature'. Gethin notes that, towards tile end of the 
Mahdcauji-Tsaka Sulia, the presentation of the factors of the path bears a significant 
resemblance to that of dependent origination. The sutta takes its name ('Tile Great 
Forty') from the classification of the ten stages of the path (tile eight limbs of the 
eightfold path, plus Right Freedom and Right Knowledge which are perfected by the 
arahal) into forty sections, twenty concerning 'wrong' (inicchu) elements and twenty 
concerning 'right' (sainmu) ones. Each element is described as the element itself, and 
the states that arise as a consequence of its existence. For example, wrong view is one 
item on the list, and "those various evil unskilled states that arise conditioned by wrong 
view. "475 is another. Each wrong element is described as being 'worn away' by the 
corresponding right element, which lead to various skilful results Thus altogether 
there are forty items. Significantly, the lists-of both right and wrono elements begin 
with view, which set in motion the respective cycles of skilful and unskliful conduct. 
Gethin points out that this treatment of right and wrong view and its relation to the 
other factors in the Maha(-cmul-i-suku Sullu is echoed in the opening sutta of the 
Magga Saqiwilla. 
"Ignorance comes first ... in the attaining 
of Lin-skilful cilwInnuts, afier 
[come] lack of self-respect and disregard for consequence, 
For one given 
473M Iii 13 11 Blilkkhu Bodlil. 991. 
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to ignorance, for one who is ignorant.... wrong view appears, for one of 
wrong view, wrong thought ... wrong speech ... wrong action wrong 
livelihood ... wrong striving .. wrong mindfulness . ýý rong 
concentration appears. Knowled e comes first ... in the attaining of skilful 911 17 dhanimas; after [come] self-respect and regard for consequence. For one 
given to knowledge, for one who has knowledge . right view appears 
. right concentration appears. 
11476 
Gethin argues that this treatment of the cycles of good and bad conduct 
resembles the positive and negative cycles of dependent origination477 insofar as right 
view is positioned at the beginning of the positive cycle, and wrong view at the 
negative, in the same way as ignorance comes first in the sequence of dependent 
origination, conditioning the whole cycle of dukkho, and the cessation of ignorance 
enables this cycle of suffering to cease'. 
"The significance of this is, I think, that we might speak of the laýv 
of palicca-sulnitppc7du [dependent origination] In the Nikc-qus, and also of 
the law of the eight-factored path. These are in a sense two aspects of 
essentially the same thing, namely dZialmna. According to early Buddhist 
literature, the law of pa, iccu-sunnippada is not something that cail be 
avoided, it is not something that there is any choice aboutl it is the laýv of 
the world and endures whether or not a Tathagata arises in tile world 478 
Either the cycle of pal iccu-sum uppada will tend towards the accumulation 
of 'this mass of dukkhu', or it will tend towards its cessation, it cannot be 
otherwise. The 'law of the eight-factored path' can be understood similarly. 
The eight factors embrace eight essential aspects of existence - eight 
aspects that cannot be avoided. As long as these eight aspects are samma 
or 'right' they continue to interact 'properly' and move in a skilful direction 
towards the cessation of dukkhct. When they are lnicclw or 'wrong, they 
interact wrongly and move away from the cessation of suffering. What 
ultimately issues fi-orn the skilful interaction or cycle is the 
at-iyo allhul)giko Inuggo itself 1,479 
This idea of the eightfold path describing an objectively-existing causal process has 
support elsewhere in the Nik5yas. In the Muhumulw1k), up"Ilu SIIII(j, tile Buddha 
tells Ananda that anybody \vho abandons the five lower fetters (becomes a noble 
disciple) will have done so through fulfili-nent of the path: 
476S N, 1-2 Gethin's translation. 777c 131ttl(Illisi I-lath 1(). 1 11-akelling. p. 221 
477 Gethin cites S ii I as an em]"Pic. 
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"There is a path, Ananda, a way to the abandoning of the five lower 
fetters; that anyone, without coming to that path, to that way, shall 
know or see or abandon the five lower fetters - this is not possible. 
Just as when there is a great tree standing possessed of heartwood, 
it is not possible that anyone shall cut out its heartwood v,; ithout 
cutting through its bark and sapwood, so too there is a path .. this 
is not possible. 11480 
To summarise, then, the eightfold path describes both a causal process and 
the fulfilment of this process. It describes a 'law of nature' or a 'law of the mind' 
which, like dependent origination, operates objectively and is part of the nature of 
things. 
All these factors serve to increase the impression that the Buddha's 
teaching, the Dhamma, presupposes a certain objective causal structuring of 
reality. The Buddha has attained insight of how this reality operates, and it Is tills 
that qualifies him to teach the path to liberation. The proximity to liberation of ally 
individual depends on how much they have set this causal process going Ill a 
'positive' direction. Although it is advantageous to have the Buddha's (guidance oil 
how to fulfil this process, it is possible to do so without hearing the teaching of the 
Buddha, as demonstrated in the concept of the 1)uccekcthudd17ci- Ali liberated 
beings will have fulfilled those aspects of discipline and conduct that are 
epitomised in the eightfold path. This can be illustrated with all analogy, anybody 
who is physically fit will have all efficient cardio-vascular system and strong 
muscles as a result of carrying out a certain Course of exercise. It is a la%ý of 
nature that this is so, and that all the different elements of fitness are closely inter- 
related. For example, one cannot increase the efficiency of one's heart without 
increasing the strength or efficiency of certain muscle groups, as It is by means of 
exercising these muscle roups that the heart gp-ows stronger. Similarly, a 90 1=) 
stronger, more efficient heart leads to more effective oxygen distribution, all the 
factors of fitness are inter-related, and it is a 'Im\, of nature' that tills is so. An 
analogous situation occurs with the spiritual development epitomised ill the 
eightfold path. It is in the nature of things that certain conduct %\ill lead to certain 
specific results, and that the development of one aspect leads to the 
development 
of another. The Buddha has complete understanding, of' tills causal processl to 
stretch the fitness analogy a little further, the Buddha has attained the ultimate 
level of fitness and is the best qualified teacher, \ýith the most effective course of 
training. 
480m 1435, Bliikkliu Bodhl 5,9. 
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Summary 
In this chapter the spiritual distinction between the 'ordinary person' and the 
'noble disciple' has been examined with reference to the noble eightfold path as the 
'distillation' of spiritual practice. It has been argued that the eightfold path represents 
part of a certain causal structure of reality, of which the Buddha had full and complete 
insight. 
In the next chapter, there will be a detailed analysis of the Buddha's teachings 
on one element of the path to liberation, that of view. This area has been chosen for 
particular analysis because of its relevance to 'inter-faith' issues. For it is often on the 
area of views that the Buddhist tradition differs frorn other teachings, and on which 
religions in general are at odds with each other. 
134 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Role of View in the Liberation Process 
In this chapter, we will look at right and wrong view as it is presented in the 
Nik5yas. This is important because understanding the Buddha's explanation of view 
and the role it plays in the mind helps to explain his encounters , ýlth recluses and 
brahmins of differing views. It also helps to elucidate the criteria that must be satisfied 
if one is to become an noble disciple and, ultimately, an arahant. In the Nikdyas there 
are three different kinds of view (dil! hi). wrong view, lower or ordinary (lokiyu) right 
view, and transcendent or allymi (lokunut-a) right view. The two different levels of 
right view correspond to the transcendent/ordi nary distinction that is found throughout 
the Nikdyas. In other words, ordinary right view is the province of the ordinary person 
and noble or ailyali right view is the province of the noble disciple. This chapter will 
be focused on three suttas that are devoted to the issue of view - the first two, tile 
Sammddillhi Sitita and the MulwcuiiUn-Suku Simu provide definitions of right and 
wrong view, with the Mulwcailffl-I-Saku Sulia focusing on the difference betýýeen 
ordinary and transcendent right view. These definitions will be supplemented kýlth 
references from other suttas. Tile section on wrong view will also involve a lengthy 
examination of the Fl-uhniujilu Sunu, where the Buddha analyses and dismisses 
various speculative views and the world. This sutta is very important on two levels - 
firstly because it demonstrates the Buddha's attitude to the views which are at odds 
with his teaching, but more importantly, because it clearly illustrates that it is the 
affective, psychological aspect of views that prompts the Buddha's judgernent, not just J 
their cognitive content. This is particularly important in tile context of this thesis 
because much of the focus of interfaith debate is on doctrinal difTerences or conflicting 
views about the way the universe operates. It is particularly pertinent, then, to 
consider the Buddha's attitude to such questions. 
Wrong View and 'Ordinary' Right View. 
In the Mahdcanui-isuku Simu wrong view is defined as the belief that. 
"'There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed, no fruit or 
result of good and bad actions, no this \, \orld, no other ýýorld, no mother, 
no father, no beings who are reborn spontaneously, no good and virtuous 
recluses in the world who have realised for themselves by direct 
kno%ýIediye 
and declare this world and the other world. ' This is wrong vie\ý - 
481 
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Right view of the 'lower sort', or "right view that is affected by taints (Usavas), 
partaking of merit, ripening on the side of attachment"482 is the opposite of wron(-, 
view, namely the belief that there are fruits and results of bad actions, theFe are [Yood 
and virtuous recluses in this world, and so on. 
Views wrong because of the Negative Causal Cycle they Promote. 
In chapter three we examined the notion of the factors of the eightfold path 
in both its ordinary and transcendent aspects - being inter-related, and to appreciate 
the role of both right and wrong view it is perhaps misleading to consider either 
completely on its own. For example, wrong view and 'lower' right view are put in 
context in the Sdleyyaku Sima where it is explained that wrong view is but one element 
of ten sorts of "conduct not in accordance with the dhaninia" (adhumlnucui-iý'11'0483. Of 
these ten, taking life, taking the not-given (or steafing), and se. \ual misconduct come 
under the category of "bodily conduct not ln'accordance with the dharni-na", speaking 
falsehood, malicious speech, harsh speech and idle gossip are characterised as "verbal 
conduct not in accordance with the dliami-na", and covetousness, hatred or ill-will, and 
wrong view are the three types of "mental conduct not in accordance with the 
dhamma. " It is conduct in relation to these ten categories that determines whether one 
gains a good or a bad rebirth-. 
"Householders, it is by reason of conduct not in accordance witil tile 
Dhamma, by reason of unrighteous conduct that some beings here, oil tile 
dissolution of the body, after death, reappear in states of deprivation, in an 
unhappy destination, in perdition, even in liell. It is by reason of conduct in 
accordance with the Mamma, by reason of righteous conduct that some 
beings here, on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappear in a happy 
destination, even in the heavenly world. "484 
It is clear from this sutta, then, that wrong view and 'lower' right view operate 
causally in the realm of sulPsUl4c existence, determining the quality of rebirth- Unlike 
ariyan right view, 'lower' 1-1011t view does not bring one directly to liberation, 
for it 
does not concern itself with those elements (such as the four noble truths) which, on 
being directly seen and understood, are the object of liberating insight. Instead, the 
treatment of right and wrong view in this sutta suggests that w-hat makes thern 'right' 
or 'wrong' is the conduct that they encourage. For example, somebody who 
defiles 
that actions have consequences has no motivation for acting, ethically or *skilfullý', in a 
way that will develop in a positive manner the elements that are suniniarised as 
the 
482M in 72. Blukkim Bodhi 934. 




eightfold path. One who does not believe that there are recluses who have attained 
spiritual liberation has no incentive either to listen to such individuals' teaching, or to 
develop their own practice. In the SeviiubLýseviiuhhu Simu, the Buddha defines 
wrong view simply as a view that causes "unwholesome states to increase and 
wholesome states to diminish", and lower right view as that which causes 
"unwholesome states to decrease, and wholesome states to increase. "495 It is on these 
grounds that right views are to be cultivated, and wrong views abandoned. 
This relationship between wrong view and wrong conduct is clearly 
demonstrated in the Apaýqiaka Slaw, where the Buddha explains regarding people ýý ho 
hold the wrong views listed above that 
cc ... 
it is to be expected that they will avoid these three wholesome states, 
namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental 
conduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three 
unwholesome states, namely bodily ... verbal ... and mental misconduct. 
Why is that? Because those good recluses and bral-ii-nins do not see In 
unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, nor do they 
see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of 
cleansing. "486 
Here, then, it can be seen that wrong views are 'ud(; ed primarily on praomatic -, rounds. j -n) - 
They are views which work against the 'causality of liberation' by promoting a 
negative causal cycle. Let us now consider if views are Judged wrongly on their j 
cognitive, as well as their pragmatic, content. 
Are views wroitg because they are cognitively false? 
The Apaýiýiuka Siala is very interesting insofar as it provides a relatively rare 
example of the Buddha describing views as wrong because they are cognitively false 
they do not correspond to reality. Elsewhere, and most prominently in the 
Brahmajd1a Siata, views are rejected as wrong mainly on the grounds of the 
psychological causal factors that bring them about. In the Apulpiuka Sunu, the 
fact 
that a view is cognitively wrong leads to a whole host of other wrong aspectsý 
"Since there actually is another world, one who holds the vie%ý 
'there is no other world' has wrong view. Since there actually is another 
world, one who intends 'there is no other world' has wrong intention. 
Since 
... one who makes 
the statement 'there is no other %ýorld, has wrong 
speech. Since ... one %\ho says 
'there is no other world' is opposed to 
those arahants who know the other world. Since ... one %\ho coiwinces 
485M iii 52-, Bilikkilti Bodhi 919. 




another 'there is no other world' convinces him to accept an untrue 
Dhamma; and because he convinces him to accept an untrue Dhamma, fie 
praises himself and disparages others. Thus any previous virtue that he 
formerly had is abandoned and corrupt conduct is substituted. And this 
wrong view, wrong intention, wrong speech, opposition to noble ones, 
convincing another to accept an untrue Dhamrna, and self-praise and 
disparagement of others - these several evil unwholesome states thus 
come into being with wrong view as their condition. "487 
Clearly, then, cognitive falsity is a defining element of 'wrong vieýý However, the 
Buddha's analysis goes deeper than this - why does it matter if a vie,, v is cognitively 
wrong? It is clear from the passage above that it matters because the ýýron(, view has 
certain negative causal effects. For example, it places one in opposition to 
ariyasdvakas who have right view, and thus becomes an obstacle to hearing the 
dharnma and progressing along the path. Similarly, this ignorance is spread if the 
adherent of the wrong view expounds it to others, which in turn leads to other 'evil, 
unwholesome states'. It is thus important to note that the fact that a vieýý is 
cognitively wrong is not the sole reason why the view is rejected - tile only reason 
why its cognitive falsity matters is that it has consequences detrimental to positi%e 
ethical and 'spiritual' development. 
'Incentives' for liolding lower right views. 
As the Sutta progresses, 'lower' right view is advocated in a manner that Is 
I five types of wrong vi very reminiscent of Pascal's Wa(yer88. The Buddha lists iew 
the nihilistic claim that there is no other world after death, the belief that actions do not 
have consequences- the view that defilement or purification of beings occurs 'without 
cause or condition', the belief that there are no immaterial realms, and the vleýý that 
there is no cessation of beings. For each view, there are recluses and brahmins who 
hold it to be definitely true, and others who definitely oppose it. Let us look at tile first 
example, the view that there is no other world. The Buddha explains how a mse man 
would behave when faced with the dilemi-na of choosing between those recluses and 
brahmins who expound the 'doctrine' that there is a ýN, orld after death, and those ýýIio 
deny it. I -) I- 
Ise man If there is a world after death, then ow nu to his oood conduct, the \\' 
would not be reborn in an 'unhappy destination'. If there ý, vas no other vv-orld, then at 
least in this life lie would have gained the support and approval ofwise tclchers. 
If, Oil 
487M i 402. Bliikkliu Bodlu 508. 
488BIaise Pascal argued that it was rational to bclicN-c in God becniso if onc NNcrc right. 
Own oiw 
Would gain God's approval and if one NNcrc wrong. onc N\ould not lost an) thim, 
b. \ bclic\ ing in 
11i'll. If 110%wver, onc chose not to belicvc in God N% hen God did in EICI c\ISI. 111c" 
thc 0111,: 0111c %\ould 
be less favourable. Pascal. Oevres Comphýle-s (Parls. Galhimird. 19.54). p4 5()A- 
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the other hand, the man were to assume that there was no other world, even if he were 
right he would gain the censure of the wise in this life, and engage in poor conduct, 
and if he were wrong: "this person has made an unlucky throw on both counts"119, 
because he would also have an unhappy rebirth after death. 
One of the interesting things about this sutta is that the 'wise rnan' who has to 
decide between different views does not know for himself what is true, but has to take 
it on trust, The theme of the entire sutta bears this out insofar as it is dedicated to 
providing a reason for choosing one view (for example, that there is another world) 
over another (that there is not). The man's lack of knowledge is explicitly mentioned 
with reference to the fourth and fifth views, (that there are no immaterial beings, and 
no cess ation of being) - regarding each doctrine and its antithesis, the wise man 
explains that "that has not been known by me' '490. Because he has not gained this 
knowledge personally, tile wise man recognises that to hold either view declaring 
"Only this is true, anything else is wrong"' would "not be fitting"491. Instead hejudges 
which opinion to hold in terms of its likely consequences, on the psychological and 
'ethical' effects that holding either view might have. In the case of the vie%ý that there 
is no cessation of being, the man recognises that if this were so, he would never cease 
to be, but may be reborn in one of the immaterial realms. in contrast, if it were true 
that there is the cessation of being, then it would be possible in theory for hini to attain 
nibb5na. The latter view provides a greater motivation for tile practice of dispassion, 
and it is on these (), rounds that the wise man follows it, 
"The view of those good recluses and brahinins who hold the doctrine and 
view 'there definitely is no cessation of being' is close to lust, close to 
bondage, close to delighting), close to holding, close to clinging, but the 
view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view 
'there definitely is cessation of being' is close to non-lust, close to non- 
bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-holding, close to non- 
ion towards clinging. After reflecting thus, lie practises the way to dispassi 
bein 
, to the fading away and cessation of 
being 11492 9 
ID 
Oit views is pragniatic In the Apaýiýiuka Siala, then, the motivation for adopting ri-il 
, ýhether one particular vieýý is true, since the ordinary person does not know directly 
he chooses between different doctrines by weighing up their respective advantages and 
j1cjpjjjjjjujýju Sunu, %vhere the Buddha explains disadvantages. This is echoed in the C1 
that an "untrue man" (asul)1no-isa) who holds the wrollo views listed above will 
I la% ea 
bad destiny- "... on the dissolution of the body, after death, 
[lie] reappears in the 
489M i 403. BlAkliti Bodhi 509. 
490m 1 410,411. Blukkliti Bodlil 516.7/ 
491 Ibid. 
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destination of untrue men. And what is the destination of untrue men9 It is the hell -or 
animal world. 
11493 
Thus in the absence of knowledge of the way things are (transcendent right 
view), the wise ordinary person will chose to act rightly on pragmatic grounds, by 
logically weighing up the potential consequences of his actions. 
Wrong View and Lower Right View - Summary 
So far, then, we have seen a number of grounds on which wrong view is 
discouraged and 'lower' right view advocated. 
Wrong views are cognitively wrong, and make a false statement about reality 
As we shall see presently, noble disciples know and see reality as it really is 
(yathibNaaly). Therefore one who holds a wrong view sets oneself in opposition to 
the wise. 
Holding wrong views leaves one in a position with more to lose than if one 
were holding right views. If one is wrong, then not only will one have been at odds 
with the wise in this life, but will also have an unfavourable rebirth, because wrono 
view leads to wrong action and a negative karninic cycle. If one holds right views, 
however, even if views about the next life do not turn out to be well-founded, then at 
least one will have acted well and gained the approbation of the wise in this life. 
View is inextricably linked with other factors such as speech, thought and 
action. Thus holding wrong view leads to development of all the other factors ill their 1. ) C-) 
negative aspec t, creating a 'downward spiral' effect, whereas right view has the 
opposite, positive effect. 
It is clear from the descriptions of 'lower' right view we have encountered that 
it is the province of those who do not know for themselves whether or not a particular 
view is a true reflection of reality. By the same token, one cannot know %ýhether the 
ultimate consequences of holding right and wrong views (in relation to a subsequent 
rebirth) are as the Buddha explains thern to be. Instead, this must be taken on trust. 
This aspect of right view is helpfully described by Collins as a 'pro-attltude'ý - ... the 
belief system of karmu and suqi. s-urti is ... recommended as a 
simple religious faith. 
Holy men can know that it is true, but the ordinary mail must take it on trust. 
The 
Buddhist term for the appropriate attitude here is suti(MU, (fai t 11 ). "494 Collins goes oil 
to explain that a more appropriate term than 'faith' \ýould be 'Confidence, -- Is %\e 
will discover presently, the Buddha taught that all tile truths lie teaches are ultimately 
493M In 22. Bliikkliu BodIn 893. 
494SIeven Collills. ýeýfless Per-solis. pp S'7-115 
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personally verifiable, thus suddhu refers to a kind of 'stop-gap' confidence that this is 
the case, and that the path of action the Buddha teaches will ultimately provide the 
liberating vision attained by the Buddha. 
The wrong views that we have considered so far are considered wrong largely 
because of the negative consequences of holding them. Bhikkhu Bodhi helpfully 
categorises the wrong views listed in the Nik5yas into three types. The views we have 
just considered fall into the first category, or "wrong views with fixed 
consequences" (niyuiumic-chudiiihi). The 'fixed consequences are the unwholesome 
types of kamma created by the denial of such factors as the efficacy of effort. Bhikkhu 
Bodhi explains that the views categorised as 'wrong views with fixed consequences'. 
"undermine the basic principles of morality by denying the framework which gives 
meaning and validity to external notions. "495 The second type are speculative views 
about metaphysical questions (dillhigula) such as whether the world or the self are 
eternal; and connected to these is the third type of wrong view, the personality view 
(sakkdyadillhi). Focusing primarily on the J? ruhmuj(-I1cJ S1111a, we will now consider 
the second kind of wrong view, speculative views about metaphysical questions. 
Brahmajd1a Sutta: Speculative wrong views. 
The Bi-ahmajiVu Siala is the first sutta of the first Nika)ýU, the Dighu Niku)ýa. 
In the introduction to his translation of the sutta, Bhikkhu Bodhi suggests that its 
position as the very first sutta is entirely deliberateý 
"It is, so to speak, the sentry at the gateway to the Doctrine, whose seal of 
approval must be obtained in order to cross the border that separates the 
Buddha's understandin(: ), of reality from all other attempts at a reflective 
interpretation of man's existential situati on. 
"491 
The Bi-ahinqjalu Simu contains a list of sixty-two wrong kinds of wrong speculative, 
metaphysical views. As we will shortly discover, the Buddha does not criticise the 
actual 'content' of these views, but simply describes the causal basis from which they 
arise to demonstrate that each view is ultimately the product of ignorance and craving. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the SUtta, lie speaks out against en(gaging in arguments and 
disputes over the content of difFerent vie%, \ýsý "Whereas some recluses and 
brahmins 
remain addicted to disputation such as, 
"You don't understand this doctrine and discipline -I do! 'Hoýý could 
you understand this doctrine and disciplineT 'Your way is all wrong 
' I' 'You said last ýý hat \, ou should mine is right! ' 'I am consistent -you aren t 
495BIiikkliu Bodiii. The Sitito on 1/1 . \'ej , 
/-I '/cw., 717c Braht"(01141 S'tIIa a1141 'I-% 
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have said first, and you said first what you should have said lastl' 'ýVhat 
you took so long to think up has been refuted! ' 'Your argument has been 
overthrown, you're defeated! ' 'Go on, save your doctrine - get out of 
that if you can! ', the ascetic Gotama refrains from such disputation. "19 -7 
The list of wrong views is preceded by three sections on morality, detailing 
how a monk should conduct himself and the sort of practices he should refrain from, 
such as fortune telling, gossip and sexual misconduct. We are told that Buddha refrains 
from all these wrong practices. Thus the first part of the sutta is dedicated to proving 
the Buddha's moral integrity and credibility - having established that the Buddha is 
freed from misconduct and moral taints, his superior knowledge is proclaimed-. 
"There are, monks, other matters, profound, hard to see. hard to 
understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond mere thought, subtle, to be 
experienced by the wise, which the Tath5gatha, having realised them by his 
own super-knowl edge, proclaims, and about which those who would 
truthfully praise the Tath5gatha would rightly speak. "498 
The sutta thus prepares the reader (or, as it would originally have been, the hearer) for 
the discourse on views by engendering faith or confidence in its teacher, the Buddha, 
by proclaiming his superior knowledge and conduct. 
The list of wrong views is divided into two categories. the first consists of 
eighteen speculative views about the past and the second of forty-four speculative 
views about the future. Of the first category, the initial four views are described as 
'eternalist doctrines' (sussaiuvadeý), for in each it is claimed that the world and the self 
are eternal. The first three of these views are based on meditative experiences - v,! hen 
a 'certain recluse or bralirnin' recalls (in varying degrees) his previous existences he 
concludes from this that his self and the world which it inhabits has always existed. 
The fourth eternalist view is based on 'logic', rather than meditative experience - the 
recluse comes to the view that world and self are eternal by "hammering it out by 
reason, following his own line of thought "499 This description of eternalist views is 
followed by a passage that appears each time a set of different wrong views has been 10 I-D 
expounded- 
"This, monks, the Tath5gatlia understands- These viewpoints thus grasped 
and adhered to will lead to such-and-such destinations in another world. 
This the Tath5gatha knows, and more, but lie is not attached to that 
knowledge. And being thus unattached lie has experienced for himself 
perfect peace, and havino truly understood the arisino and passing awav of n- ZN -- 
497 D 9, Walslic 7 1. 
498D 12, Walslic 73. 
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feelings, their attraction and peril and the deliverance from them, the 
Tatlidgatha is liberated without remainder. 11500 
it is interesting that here again the viewpoints are judged on the grounds of their 
consequences (for example, that they lead to further rebirth), rather than their content. 
Were the Buddha to dispute the claims put forward, then he would be engaging in the 
'disputation' to which some recluses and brahmins are addicted. Instead he remains 
6unattached' to the knowledge that he has gained. What this 'unattachment' means will 
become clearer presently when we consider the role of craving and the self-vieýý, 
(sakqyadiyhi) in relation to view. 
The second set of four wrong views belongs to recluses and brahmins who are 
tpartly Eternalists and partly Non-Eternalists' (ekaccusussatavuda). Just like the 
eternalist set of views, there are three views which are grounded in experience - in 
this case, the experience of beings who have existed in higher, deva realms and can 
recall these existences - and one view that is the product of reasoning and logic The 
first of the 'part fal-eternal I st' views is worth considering in sorne detail, not only as an 
example of how experience can be interpreted erroneously, but also because it provides 
an account of how theism arose. According to Buddhist cosmology, the universe and 
the world-systems within it are constantly "evolving and dissolving in patterns 
governed by impersonal law"511 I As a result of this the world where Brahm5s live 
contracts and when it expands again, a being is born there as a result of his previous 
kamma. He exists there alone for a very Iong time and, becoming lonely, wishes that 
other beings would arrive there. Coincidentally, just as lie thinks this, other beings are 
reborn there, having exhausted their lifespan in a previous realm. The first being, 
however, think s that the others have arisen as a result of his wishes, and believes that 
"I am the Brahmd, the Great Brahm5, the Conquerer, the Unconquered, the All- 
Seeing, the All-Powerful, the Lord, the Maker and Creator, Ruler, Appointer and 
Orderer, Father of All That Have Been and Shall Be. These beings were created by 
me... "502 Similarly, the other beings think that they have been created by the original 
being, because he was there before thern. Having explained this, the Buddha describes 
how one of the beings in this realm might subsequently be reborn in a human realm, 
and through his meditation may recall his existence in the Brahmd realm, but nothing 
preceding that, and so thinks. "'That Brahm5, ... 
he made us, and he is permanent, 
stable, eternal, not subject to change, the same for ever and ever. But ýýe ýýho ýýere 
created by that Brahrn5, we are Impermanent, unstable, short-lived, fated to 
fall away, 
and we have come to this world. "' '03 This 'theistic' belief Is thus partly eternalist, 
for 
-500D 1 16-17-, \Valslic 75 
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it maintains that there is an eternal deity, and partly non-eternalist for it recognises that 
'lesser' beings pass away. 
The next set of four views are described as views of finitiude and infinitude 
with recourse to meditative experience and reason, recluses and brahmins claim either 
that the world is infinite or finite (depending on how it has appeared in their 
experiences during meditation). Similarly, one of the two types of 'chance 
originationist' views (udlii'c(-ýusat? ilippaiiliai, ada) are based upon meditation 
experience. For example, in the first chance-originationist view listed, a deva in the 
Unconscious sphere attains a conscious perception and falls from that realm into the 
human realm, Because, owing to his unconsciousness in the previous existence, he is 
unable to recall past lives in his meditation experiences, and thus supposes- "'The self 
and the world have arisen by chance. How so? Before this I did not exist. Now from 
not-being I have been brought to being. "'504 The second type of chance-orioinationist 
view is based on reason. 
Thus ten of the first eighteen types of speculation oil the past are based on 
meditative experience, and four of them oil reason and logic. 
The Views of the 'Eel-Wi-igglei-s'. 
The four views not yet mentioned follow a different format and are of 
particular interest because in their content (or rather, lack of content) they are not 
dissimilar to the Buddha's own 'views'. These are the four vie%\ s of the 'Endless 
Equivocators' or 'Eel-wrigglers' (u1nu1-u--vikhej)pI'kU) so called because in order to 
avoid committing thernselves to a particular view they are constantly evasive, like 
wriggling eels. Their motivation for not committing themselves is that they fear the 
consequences of being mistaken. The first form of 'eel-wriggler' does not know 
whether something is good or bad, and fears that if lie were to make a claim either way 
he might be lying, and this would be a hindrance to him. * 
"Thus fearing to lie, abhorring to lie, lie does not declare a thin(,, to be 
good or bad, but when asked about this or that matter, he resorts to 
evasive statements and wriggles like an eel- 'I don't say that. I 
don't say it 
is otherwise. I don't say that it is not. I don't not say it is not. 
"' 5115 
The second sort of Eel-wriggler makes evasive statements because lie, too, 
does not 
know whether a thina is good or bad, but instead of fearing lies, 
lie fears experiencing 
ZI 
'lust, hatred or aversion', and the concomitant distress %\ould 
be a hindrance to him. 
Thus: "fearing attachment, abhorring attachment, lie resorts to evasl\ e statements 
II- 00 
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The third sort will not commit himself to a view because he is worried that he ma\ be 
humiliated and distressed when cross-examined by "ascetics and Brahmins who are 
wise, skilful, practised debaters, like archers who can split hairs, who go around 
destroying others' views with their wisdom .. 11507 The final characterisation of an eel- 
wriggler concerns a man who is simply stupid, and resorts to evasive answers when 
questioned "because of his dullness and stupidity"501 
What is particularly interesting about the eel-wrigglers, especially the first three 
types, is that their motivation for nol holding a view is on the grounds of the 
psychological and spiritual consequences of adhering to a wrong view We have 
already seen that it is the effects of holding certain views that determines their 
trightness' or 'wrongness' as much as their cognitive accuracy. Similarly, the 
questions that the fourth type of eel-wriggler refuses to answer and evades are the 
same questions that the Buddha refuses to answer in the 509 (albeit 
with a very different motivation). One might therefore expect that tile Buddha would 
treat the eel-wrigglers with more approval than the exponents of tile other false views 
so far listed, but this Is not tile case. This is because the views of the eel-wrigglers, 
even if they are cognItIvely accurate, are nevertheless 2rourided in ionorance and 
craving. For example, the individual who does not want to commit himself to a vieýý 
because he fears telling falsehoods is motivated by a certain level of attachment. He 
has certain consequences that lie wishes to avoid, and certain fears and expectations 
that underpin his views. His views are therefore not a pure perception of tile way 
things truly are, but the manifestation of certain forms of craving and clinging. This 
point will become clearer in the forthcoming discussion of ho\v the Buddha 
understands the arising of views. The remaining foi-ty-four views in the sutta are 
views about the future. The first set consists of sixteen different %\, ays of asserting the Z_ 
conscious post-mortern survival of the self (for example, as material, immaterial, both 
or neither; as finite, infinite, both or neither, of limited perception, of unlimited 
perception, and so on. ). The next eight views all claim a doctrine of unconscious post- 
mortem survival, and a further eight claim neither-conscious-nor-unconscious post- 
mortem survival. Having thus listed comprehensively the different forms in which 
POst-mortem survival of the self can be maintained, the Buddha moves on to a 
list of 
annihilationist claims, in which the self undergoes some form of destruction or 
annihilation after death. There are seven views in this cate(, Yoi-\, ranging 
from 
materialism, to the view that the self is only partially annihilated, \\1th another, 'diville' 
self that remains after deatll. 51(l The last five vie\ýs listed in the 
Bl-uhlnujula Sulfa 
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concern the claim that 'the self realises the highest nibbdna here and now'51 I The first 
view consists of the belief that when the self , "being furnished and endowed ýý ith the 
fivefold sense-pleasures, indulges in them. . . 
"5125 it realises nibb5na. The remaining 
four views maintain that the self attains nibbdna during the four stages of rneditative 
absorption (jhdna) respectively. 
The Arising of Views. 
Having listed all these views, the Buddha explains ho,, \, they are a 
comprehensive list of all the different speculations that can be madeý "These are the 
sixty-two ways in which those ascetics and Brahi-nins who are speculators about the 
past, the future, or both, put forward views about these. There is no other ýýaN,, "511 
He then repeats that lie knows all these views lead to destinations in another world, 
but that he is not attached to this knowledge. The crux of the sutta occurs when, 
having summarised each set of views, the Buddha explains that they are all 
manifestations of fundamental ignorance and craviii(y- 
"When those ascetics and brahmins who are speculators about the past, the 
future, or both, having fixed views, put forward views in sixty-two 
different ways, that is merely the feeling of those who do not kno\ý and 
see, the worry and vacillation of those immersed in craving, "I 
Each set of views is listed again, and regarding each view it is explained that "that is I: P ID 
conditioned by contact""', and this contact conditions all the feelings that prompt 
these views. This reference to contact and feeling leads to a demonstration of hoýý 
views arise out of the cycle of dependent origination - all tile speculators "experience 
these feelings by repeated contact through the six sense bases, feeling conditions 
craving- craving conditions clinging- clinging conditions becoming, becornim, -)I 
conditions birth, birth conditions ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, sadness and 
distress. 11516 Just as all these views are a product of dependent origination, so when a 
monk comprehends dependent origination, lie no longer adheres to such views- "When 
a monk understands as they really are the arising and passing away of the six bases of 
contact, their attraction and peril, and the deliverance from them, he knows that which 
goes beyond all these vleýý-s- ý 17 
Speculative views, then, are a further manifestation of the cycle of craving and 
51 ID i 36, Walslic 85. 
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ignorance that propagates suffering and saiiisdric existence, and it is oil this basis that 
they are criticised. In the introduction to his translation of' the PrulnnujUlu 
Bhikkhu Bodhi points out that the sutta- 
"does not actually provide specific criticisms of the doctrinal positions 
describes, nor does it even attempt to refute the Lyeneral principles 
governing each class of views ... the sutta rests content simply to explain 
each standpoint and to show the causal situation out of which it arises. -5 18 
He then suggests the reasoning behind this approach. 
"Since speculative views thus tie in with the net of phenomena embraced by 
the truth of suffering, the proper way to treat them is the same as that 
appropriate for the more general malady- to seek out their underlying 17, 
causes and apply the remedy suitable for eliminating these causes. -5 19 
Collins, too, finds one of the most significant points about the A-uhinuialu Sullu is that 
it judges views entirely on the grounds that they are conditioned. 
"the views of all others ... are conditioned products of their own experience, 
which is explained by the teaching of dependent origination. Each vie%\ Is 
merely something experienced by those recluses and brahmins 'who neither 
know nor see, and are subject to craving. ' All of these thinkers have their 
experience as a result of sense-conduct in (any or all of) the six senses. -520 
To sum up, then, speculative views are ultimately a product of' ignorance, of a 
fundamental misapprehension that characterises the perception of the ordinary person. 
The ordinary person erroneously perceives the world in terms of the self, let us now 
look at how this perception relates to speculative views. 
Speculative Views and the Self-View. 
The message that views are a product of a fundamental ignorance is strongly 
reinforced in many other suttas - we will now survey some of the accounts of 
how 
views arise. Of particular importance is the relation of the self-vie%ý 
(sakkiyadillhi) to the arising of view. The self-view describes the mind's tendencv 
to identify with one or all of the five elements that, according to the Buddha, constitute 
the human being. These are the five khaiidlia. y of body, feeling, perception, niental 
activities and consciousness. All five khandhas are impermanent, not-self and subject 
g, but the ordinary person fails to reco(; nise this fact and clim-'s to these to sufferin 
elements as thouoh they were a self 
5'8B1iikkliu Bodlii. Sitila on the of Vieivs, p. S. 
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"The clinging to being issues in a 'personality view' (s-ukkJj, Ud1'nhi) 
affirming the presence of an abiding self in the psychophysical organism In 
one of twenty ways as either identical with, possessing, contained ýýItllin, 
or containing one or other of the five aggregates that constitute the 
individual personality ... 
Arisen already at a pre-reflective level, this vie,. ý in 
turn becomes the basis for later reflective interpretations of existence, 
crystallising into the sixty-two views of the [Bi-ahmajula] Sutta. "52 I 
it is interesting to note that the self-view is not simply an opinion or belief, but is the 
'template' with which we order our existence The connection between the self-%, ie%\ 
and the Brahmajdlu Sulla is made explicitly by the Buddha in the Sul. n. i7mu Xikuyu. 
"... it is owing to the personal ity-view that they arise, and if the personalitv-view exists 
not, they do not exist . 
"522 This process is explained in detail in the KhalidhavaWCi 
the Buddha describes firstly how recluses and brahmins understand the selfas being in 
or identified with the five khandlias, resulting in the view "I am". As a result of this 
view I am", "there comes to pass a descent of the five feel 1 ng-facult 1 es of seeing 
hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. "523 This reinforces BhIkkhu Bodhi's above 
point that the self view exists at a 'pre-reflective' level, shaping how we receive and 
interpret our experience. As a result of the feeling faculties, mind and mind-states are 
the result, accompanied by the 'ignorance element' (dhannna avijjidhc-nu) Once 
feelings make contact with this base of ignorance, views arise at tile reflective, 
speculative level. 
"Touched by the feeling born of contact with Ignorance, there comes to tile C. 
untaught manyfolk (the view) 'I arn'; there comes (tile view) 'this same I 
am'; there comes (tile view) 'things will be' ... things will not 
be', 
- 
'things will have body' ... 'things will 
be bodyless' 'things will be 
-1 -524 IOUs 1101, Unconscious unconscious 'things will be neither consci 
The fact that views are a symptom of ignorance is reinforced when it is explained that 
the noble disciple is fi-ee of all views because lie is fi-eed fi-orn i3snoranceý "for tile well- 
taught ariyan disciple ignorance is put away and knowledge arises. Along with the 
fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge there comes to him no vieýý 
1'525 that 'I am' ... 'this sarne 
I am' 
The notion that a 'pre-reflective' self-view is a basis for all other views is 
demonstrated in the Alugudcli-ij)u1nu Simu where the Buddha explains that there are 
52 'Collins. Seffless Persons. p. 7. The Khali dh (S H, 1-240. \VoodN\zird 
1-1 i4) is dc\oted to 
describing sakkdyadilihi, and its anudole. analit-i (not selo, 
522S iv 286, adapted from Woodward 194. 





4six standpoints for views. The first five of these involve re arding, each of the five 9 
khandhas thus: "This is mine, this I am, this is my self"526 The sixth standpoint for 
views is the self-view itself which arises dependent on the identIficatIon ýýIth the five 
khandhas: "And this standpoint for views, namely, 'This is self this is self, this is the 
world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to changel I 
shall endure as long as eternity' - this too he regards as 'This is mine, this arn 1, this is 
my self"1527 Conversely, the noble disciple regards each of the six standpoints for 
views as "'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not rny self "', and is thus riot subject 
to the anxieties that these standpoints can bring. "Since he regards thern thus, lie is not 
agitated about what is non-existent. "521 As the Sutta progresses, the Buddha explains 
that any view of self is bound to bring suffering with it'. 
"'Bhikkhus, you may well cling to that doctrine of self that would not 
arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair in one who chiigs to it. 
But do you see any such doctrine of self, bhikkhus9' - 'No, venerable sir. ' 
- 'Good, bhikklius. I too do riot see any doctrine of self that Would iiot 
arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair iii oric ýýho clin(-js to 
it ) 11 529 
On several occasions in the A4ujjhhnu Niku-), a, the Buddha gives an account of 
the arising of view - although these references have less emphasis on tile self-',, Ie\ý ý 
they nevertheless concentrate on the causal psychological factors that result in views. 
The-process by which contact with the senses conditions views is elaborated in tile 
Madhqpiýi4ika Simu. The Buddha explains that when tile eye, for example, meets a 
form, 'eye-consciousness' arises - the meeting of all three is contact. Feeling arises as 
a result of conduct, 
"What one feels, that one perceives. What one percer,,,, es, that one thinks 
about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates With what 
one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged 
with mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and 
present forms cognizable through the eye. "5111 
Whether or not one attaches and grasps at these mental proliferations is tile 
determinant not only for views, but also for man), other iie(jati\, e factors that 
lead to 
suffering- 
"Bhikklius, as to the source through ývhich perceptioiis and notions tinged 
II -e to delight iný by mental proliferation beset a man. if noth*11o S t'OUnd thei 
526M i 13-5-, Bliikkliu Bodlu 229. 
5271bid. 
528M i 136, Blilkkhu Bodhi 2')0. 
529M 1 137-, Bliikkliu Bodlii 2') 1- 
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welcome and hold to, this is the end of the underlying tendency to lust, to 
aversion, to views, to doubt, to conceit, to the desire for being, to 
ignorance, this is the end of resorting to rods and weapons, of quarrels, 
brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, false speech-, here these evil 
unwholesome states cease without remainder. "531 
Here, then, it is the 'delighting in' and 'holding to' mental proliferations that is at tile 
root of views. Although there is no mention of the self-vi III ew in this sutta, it can be 
understood as a form of such 'delighting in' and 'holding to. ' What distinguishes the 
noble disciple from the ordinary person, then, is that he does not grasp after the five 
aggregates or mental proliferations, and does not therefore hold or attach to 
speculative views. The views of the "eel-wrigglers" in the Bt-uhmajUla S1111a can be 
understood in this way - what makes thern wrong views is not so much the content of 
the views themselves, but the fact that they arise out of craving and ignorance. 
So far, then, we have seen how the Buddha rejects speculative vie\ýs oil the 
grounds that they are symptoms of a fundamental ignorance that leads to suffering 
(dukkha). The Buddha claims that lie teaches the Dhanlrna in order to bring beings to 
the cessation of suffering- "Both formerly and now what I teach is sufFering and the 
cessation of suffering. ""' We have seen that all speculative views are rooted in the 
self-view and that all versions of the self-view cause suffering. Thus the Buddha's 
analysis and 'deconstruction' of speculative views in terms of their causal factors is all 
part of his diagnosis of and treatment for suffering, 
In the Pasudiku Sima, tile Buddha mentions various speculations about tile 
future, the past, and whether or not the world and the self are eternal, whether or not 
the world is created by chance and so oil. The Buddha explains that when lie meets 
ascetics and bralimins who hold such views, lie does not "admit their claims". He 
offers the following justification for this, 
"Because 
... 
different beings hold different opinions on such matters. Nor 
do I consider such theories equal to my owl', still less superior. I am their 
superior in regard to the higher exposition. As for those bases of 
,s which 
I have explaii ed to ou as speculation about tile beginning of till 
they should be explained, why should I now explain them to you as they 
should not be explained. ""' 
The message here seems to be that the Buddha is 'abo%e' speculating oil such 
questions which are ultimately grounded in ignorance. The 'bases of speculation' 
that 
/U The -hh-dier he has already explained is a reference to the Bailill'u-MIS"llu 
531M i 109-110. Blukkliu Bodhi 202. 
S32M 1 140. Bliikkliu Bodlu 234. 
533 D iii 140. Walshe 4338. 
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exposition' that the Buddha does engage in is of a different order to these speculations, 
and this is the grounds for his superiority. Indeed, the Buddha's teachings, his 'higher 
exposition', is designed to free his disciples from the ignorance of which speculative 
views are a speculation: "For the destruction of all such views about the past and tile 
future, for transcending them, I have taught and laid down the four foundations of 
mindfulness. 11534 
The Unanswered Questions: Why are certain speculative questions left 
without an answer? 
The Buddha's teaching of the 'unanswered questions', In which he refuses to 
offer his own views on certain speculative metaphysical issues, provides more clues as 
to the Buddha's attitude towards views. The questions are most clearly dernonstrated 
in the Cftjamjlitnkyusujleýý35. In this sutta, the monk M5]Liiikya wishes to know the 
Buddha's opinion on ten 'metaphysical' questions, narnely. Is the world eternal9 Is it 
not eternal? Is the world finite9 Is it infinite? Is the soul the same as the body" Is the 
soul one thing and the body anothei-9 Does the Tath5gatha exist after death9 Does the 
Tatlidgatha not exist after death9 Does the Tatli5gatha both exist and not exist after 
death? Does the Tath. -igatha neither exist not- not exist after death"536 
M51unkya knows that the Buddha has already 'set aside and rejected' these questions 
as speculative views (ditthigulu), but lie is unwilling to accept this and determines that 
"'If the Blessed One does not declare these to me, then I will abandon the training and 
return to the low life, 1 "537 The Buddha responds to M541nkya with an analogy in 
which a man is dangerously wounded with a poisoned arrow. When a surgeon arrives, 
the man refuses to let him remove the arrow until he knows who fired it, what he 
looked like and where lie came fi-orn, and what exactly every element of the arroýý was 
made of As a result, the man dies without ever findiný, out the answers to 
his 
questions. SO Md]Lliikya is like the man struck with the arrow - the questions 
he asks 
will still remain 'undeclared' by the Buddha and lie will die. 
The meaning of the unanswered questions teaching has 
been the subject of 
1. 
much scholarly debate, and it has been interpreted in various 
different ývays It Is 
534D in 141, Walshe 43)8. 
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worth briefly examining this debate, for not only does the teaching of the unanswered 
questions help to elucidate the Buddha's attitude towards certain views, but, as we 
have seen, Hick uses the notion of the unanswered questions to support his pluralist 
hypothesis. 
Was the Buddha an agnostic? 
In justifying his refusal to provide answers to the ten questions, the Buddha 
explains that such questions are irrelevant to the path to liberation: 
"Living the life of purity does not depend on the view that the world is 
eternal, nor does it depend on the view that the world is not eternal. 
Whether or not the world is eternal or not eternal, there definitely is birth, 
growing old, dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, larnentation and despair. Aild 
I have explained how to bring those things to an end here and now. "511 
Some scholars have taken this refusal to answer as a sign of the Buddha's 
agnosticism about metaphysical questions - they are unanswered because they are 
unanswerable and neither the Buddha nor anybody else could know the answer An 
example of such a view is provided by David Kalupahana, who argues that the Buddha 
remained silent on this issue because the questions are not answerable with reference 
to sense experience, and knowledge based on sense experience is the only possible 
knowledge- 
"Since no answer based on experience is possible, the Buddha remained 
silent when pressed for an answer and maintained that the questions as to 
whether the iathi-iguia exists (holi) or arises (u1)1)qJJa11), does not exist or 
does not arise, both or neither, do not fit the case (lict ill)ell)"ý39 
Hayes summarises Kalupahana's objections to 'metaphysical knowledge' as 
follows- 
"(1 )Metaphysical theories have no basis in our ordinary experience, and 
they cannot be verified by empirical investigation. (2) Metaphysicians 
attempt to determine in advance what must be true and ignore what their 
senses tell them. (33) Metaphysical propositions are strings of words that 
may appear meaningful because they conform to the rules of grammar, 
but 
turn out to be meaningless when examined more closely. "5411 
Another 'agnostic' argument that Hayes identifies is that put 
forward by 
TAN. Murti. Mum argues that the Buddha left the questions unanswered 
because 
5 
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they dealt with the realm of the absolute, and the absolute is not capable of being 
characterised by Reason: "the questions are about the Unconditioned. Buddha is alive 
... to the 
insuperable difficulties in conceiving the transcendent in terms of the empirical 
... 
The Tath5gata, as the totality of things, is beyond predication. "54, 
Murti's explanation is in some ways similar to Hick's interpretation of the 
unanswered questions, for Hick suggests that one reason why the questions are left 
unanswered is that the Buddha recognises that they are attempting to describe the 
indescribable, namely the Real ali sich. 542 Hayes, however, rejects both Kalupahana 
and Murti's explanations, arguing that both have "gratuitously offered an anachronistic 
interpretation of the Buddha's silence. "543 He sees these interpretations as 
cgratuitous' because the Buddha's own explanation is present in the Nik5ya texts and 
provide sufficient justification for his silence. 
Not conducive to the path to libei-ation. 
The main justification that Hayes points to in the Cit. -1U1nU1itn1o)asim, 11 is the Buddha's 
claim that worrying about the ten unanswered questions is not conducive to the 
fulfilment of the holy life that the Buddha sets forth. 
Just as the wounded man knowing the details of who fired the arroýý would not 
alter the fact that he is dangerously wounded by it, so irrespective of which speculative 
view one holds, there is suffering. Thus the answers to questions about speculative 
views are fundamentally irrelevant, impotent in dealing with the pressing and 
immediate problem of dilkkha. The Buddha has left each Of M511-Inkya's questions 
unanswered because- "it is unbeneficial, it does not belong to the fundamentals of the 
holy life, it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to 
direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to nibb5na. That is why I have left it undeclared. 
(abyRalain)"544 Instead the Buddha declares the four truths, because they do lead to 
liberation. 
The same message is found in the Poithupudu Simu, where the eponymous 
wanderer asks the Buddha the same ten questions, along with other questions about 
whether or not the self is identical with perception. The Buddha's response is exactlý' 
the same - such questions are not conducive to the 
holy life and instead one should 
consider the four noble truths. ' 
54 'T. R. V. Murti. The Centrol Philosoph 
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"'Why has the Lord not declared these thingsT 'Potthapdda, that is not 
conducive to the purpose, not conducive to Dhamma, not the ýý'ay to 
embark on the holy life; it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, 
to cessation, to calm, to higher knowledge, to enlightenment, to ilibbdila. 
That is why I have not declared it. ' 
'But, Lord, what has the Lord declared? ' 'Poqhap5da, I have declared- 
"This is suffering, this is the origin of suffering, this is the cessation of 
"1" 545 suffering, and this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering. 
In the Aggivacchagollasittla, when the same ten questions are asked of the 
Buddha by Vacchagotta, he replies that he does not hold such views because each view 
"is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a fetter of views. It is beset by suffering, 
by vexation, by despair, and by fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, to 
11546 dispassion ... 
Clearly, tben, the point of the questions' Irrelevance to liberation is one 
important factor in the Buddha's reasoning. But why are the questions irrelevant? An 
explanation for this is also found in the Nik5yas, and, indeed, Collins argues that this 
provides the 'most important reason' for not answeriný, the questions. 547 
The questions ai-e incohei-ent. 
The reason the Buddha gives for not answering the questions is that they make 
incoherent assumptions. That is to say, the questions themselves do not make sense 
on an ultimate level, for reality 'as it is' does not conform to the presuppositions in the 
questions. As Collins puts it, the questions are "linguistically 11-formed". We 
have 
already seen that the Buddha denied the existence of an enduring self, the problem with 
the unanswered questions, particularly the last six, is that they implicitly assume the 
existence of the self 
"for Buddhism there is no real referent for these terms, such as 
Tatlidgatlia, 
self, 'being' and so on. What appears as an individual, through 
the 
combination of a single body and the conceit 'I am', 
is the phenomenal 
person ý)uggala), the personality (sukka_, va or wIuhhuvu). * in 
fact all 
phenomena, both material and immaterial, 'form', and 
'name', are 
composites made out of impersonal elements. "' 
545D i 187ff, Walslic 164. 
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This point is illustrated in the Aggivacchagoliasiala. When Vacchagotta asks 
the Buddha "'When a bhikkhu's mind is liberated, where does he reappear [after 
death]? "' the Buddha rejects this question because the terms in which it Is couched do 
not make sense - it would not make sense to say the mind 'reappears' or 'does not 
reappear'; nor could one say that it neither reappears nor does not reappear, or both 
reappears and does not reappear. When Vacchagotta expresses his 'bewilderment' at 
this response, the Buddha elucidates the concept with an analogy. He explains that it 
is as if a fire were extinguished, and somebody were to ask whether the fire went to the 
east, west, north or south when it went out. Just as this question is not appropriate, 
and does not apply, so is Vacchagotta's original question is inappropriate. Again, this 
demonstrates that the unenlightened mind is fundamentally ignorant, and does not 
cognise the world in the same way as a being who is liberated. It is a mistaken belief in 
the self-view that lies at the root of such mistaken speculations. Sariputta explains 
that: " ... when 
Personality Belief exists, these views [on the Unanswered Questions 
and the views of the Bi-uhmujUlu Slitiu] exist, when it does not, these views do not. """ 
On one occasion in the SailiyLitta Nik5ya, the Buddha explains why it is that wanderers 
of other views make speculations about the ten unanswered. 
"Let me ask you what is tile reason why the wandering ascetics 
with other views try to answer these questions, whereas Gotama the 
recluse does not try to answer them. The reason is that other wanderino 
ascetics think of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind as belonging to 
him, nor does he think of thern 'These are my self' The Tath5gata, unlike 
other wandering ascetics, also does not regard feelings, perception, 
mentality or awareness as things that belong to him or as being himself or 
as being part of himself There is nothin(gy about which the Tatli5gata says I 
'This is mine. This is 1. This is rny Self 11'550 
Collins explains that the Nik5yas consistently present those who do ask such 
questions as conditioned by attachment to the self-view, to the conceit 'I am' 
An 
ariyasai, aka, however, is not attached to this sense of self, and thus 
does not 
participate in these mistaken speculations. , while the ordinary man 
does not 
understand the rise and fall of such views, as conditioned pl ienomena, the ýýise man 
does, and so 'is not perturbed, nor has any doubt' concerning the 
Unanswered 
Questions. "551 
/1 ch M, S1111" n which the Buddha r ute, Collins cites a passa(-),, e from the Malu-1 I" I 
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knows what there is to be known. This suggests that it is not through ignorance that 
the Buddha does not answer the unanswered questions. On the contrary, it is through 
his very knowledge and insight that he knows that the question does not make sense, 
and therefore cannot be answered in any ultimately meaningful sense: 
"whatever verbal designation or means of verbal designation there is, 
whatever expression or means thereof, whatever description or means 
thereof, whatever knowledge or realm of knowledge, whatever rebirth or 
experience of rebirth - by knowing these with superknowledge the monk 
is freed. But it is not fitting to have the view that 'the freed monk does not 
know or see. ""' 
Collins provides a further example of this point in which the monk Ananda is 
accused of not 'knowing and seeing'. Ananda replies that he does know and see, and 
knows that having an opinion on the unanswered questions is "a prejudice 
[dillhigalatn]; whatever prejudice there is, whatever fixing on a view, insisting on it, 
being obsessed by it, whatever the origin and cessation of view - all this I knoýý and 
see. 11553 It is precisely through knowledge, then, rather than ignorance, that the 
unanswered questions are not answered. 
Collins does acknowledge that another important reason why the Buddha 
rejects the ten questions is that they are irrelevant to the path to salvation. However, 
he sees this as a subsidiary reason, which must be seen in context. For example, in the 
CýIanwhtnkyusima, the Buddha is approached by the monk M511inkya whose 
meditation practice is hindered by his 'reasonings of rnind' about tile ten questions, 
indeed, he is even threatening to give up his life as a monk. The Buddha uses the 
analogy of the man pierced with an arrow to illustrate to M51unkya the foolishness of 
his stance. It is to this particular situation that the Buddha's use of the analogy is 
directed, a point that is stressed by Collins: 
"Within the narrative, this analogy, and the Buddha's insistence that the 
religious life does not depend on an answer to such questions, are clearly 
intended to provide - by contrast -a model 
for monks to evaluate the 
relative importance of practical religious training and sophisticated 
conceptual analysis. It does not mean that such an analysis is not possible, 
nor that Buddhism as a \. vhole rejects all speculation because it is 
harmful 
to the attempt to salvation. What is rejected is harmful speculation 
based 
on mistaken premises. "5 54 
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in it, t The Polthapdda Stinu is a similar case, ii lie Buddha tells Potthap5da that 
it will be difficult for him to follow the path as long as lie holds onto his desire to know 
about the fate of the self and the body after death, or the nature of perception and so 
on. it will be difficult because such presuppositions are "not conducive to the purpose, 
not conducive to Dhamma, not the way to embark upon the holy life"555 Here, the 
Buddha is applying his teaching to a particular individual and a certain set of vie%ý s- 
it would be unwise to infer from this that the Buddha has this attitude to all 
speculative views: "Again, this is not a universal recommendation to an 'empiricism' 
or practical, anti-metaphysical agnosticism, but a piece of advice given to all 
enthusiastic but easily misled admirer. "556 
Collins goes on to argue that in nearly every other case in which the Buddha 
refuses to answer such metaphysical questions for a practical reason, --it is possible to 
see an explicit connection with the facts of trainingy. ". Thus whilst it Is true that the 
irrelevance of speculative views to the practi . ce of the path is one of' tile reasons ýý hy 
they are rejected, "this is a subsidiary aspect, dependent oil the linguistic analysis which 
shows them to be ill-formed, and to contain presuppositions which do not allokk a 
11557 direct answer. 
In the light of these arguments, Collins argues that the status of tile unanswered 
questions is clear. Conceptually, they depend upon mistaken assumptions about the 
existence of referents which do not, in fact, exist. Psychologically, "the fact of making 
such an assumption, and therefore asking, the questions, is a conditioned result of 
"5 51 -elevance to tile path is also all important ignorance and craving. - Whilst their iri 
factor in their rejection, it is secondary to the main reasons above. Collins suggests 
that the questions have been so often misinterpreted because 'referrin(C terms such as 
Lself continue to be used in our language, indeed no lanLyuaoe exists which does not 1: ) Z-) 
use a subject-predicate structure. Similarly, the Buddha's teachings were designed to 
be accessible to pilihiyjatia, ý, who are still locked in ignorance and see understand the 
world through the distorting 'template' of the self-vie\\ ý "Buddhist teaching is intended 
to be of use to the 'ordinary' unenlightened man, who must by definition think in terms 
of'selves' and '11' , and 
by whom ordinary language is taken at face value 
So far, then, we have seen two reasons wll)' the Buddha 'sets aside' speculmi%e 
views. Firstly, they are a product of craving and igynorance, part ofthe causal c\, cle that 
propagates suffering. Secondly they are at best irrelevant, and at ýýorst a 
hindrance to 
the process of development fi-on-I ordinary person to noble discipleý as a symptom of 
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the cycle of dukkha that the Buddha's teaching purports to end, they are not helpful 
the process of liberation. 
Views Wrong Because They are a Source of Dispute. 
Now we will consider a further objection that the Buddha has with speculatiVe 
views, namely that they become the source for disputes and attachments. We have 
seen how, in the Mudhupin4iku Situa, the clinging after mental proliferations that 
precedes the formation of views leads to "the end of resorting to rods and weapons, of 
quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, false speech". "" This suggests that 
views are the one of the underlying causes of conflict and disputes. 
It is not simply the 'irrelevant' speculative views that the Buddha warris his 
disciples against - even the Dharnma can be attached to as a speculative vle%ý, and 
misappropriated in the cause of argurnents and conflict, rather thall as a 'tool' oil the 
path of spiritual liberation. In the Ko. yambly, a Swiu, the Buddha illeets a group of 
monks who "had taken to quarrelling and brawling" arid "could neither convirice each 
other nor be convinced by others, they could neither persuade each other flor be 
persuaded by each other. "56 1 The Buddha rebukes them because such coiiduct 
precludes the development of positive elements of the spiritual lit'e, such as the 
cultivation of lnemý (loving, kindness)- 
"'Bhikkhus, when you take to quarrelling and brawling and are deep in 
disputes, stabbing each other with verbal daggers, oil that occasion you do 
not maintain acts of loving kindness by body, speech and mind in public 
and in private towards your companions in the holy life. Misguided mell, 
what can you possibly know, what can you see, that you take to quarrelling 
and brawling ... 
Misguided men, that will lead to your harm and sufferillo -D In In 
for a long time. 1"562 
At the beginning of the Bi-uhmajilu Sullu, the Buddha describes recluses and 
brahmins who are 'addicted to disputation' and explains that he refrains 
from such 
conduct. 563This is echoed in the Khundhuvuggu, where the Buddha , ý, arns 
his disciples 
against being a 'wager of wordy warfare' . 
564 The Simile of the ý\ater-Snake in the 
Alagadditpamu Slaw provides perhaps the clearest warnino against attachim-, to 
the 
Dhamma for the wrong reasons, namely for rebukiii(gy and criticisim-, others rather 
thall 
realising the way to liberation: 
560M i 110, Blilkkhu Bodhi 202. 
561M 1321, - Bliikkliti Bodhi 419. 
562M 1 321-2. Bliikkliti Bodin 419. 
563D 18. Walslic 7 1. 
564S ii, 12 
. 
Woodxva rd I 
I m; , -, 
159 
"Some misguided men learn the Dhamma - discourses, stanzas, 
expositions, verses, exclamations, sayings, birth stories, marvels and 
answers to questions - but having learned the Dhamma, they do not 
examine the meaning of those teachings with wisdom. Not examinillL, the 
meaning of those teachings with wisdom, they do not gain a reflective 
acceptance of them. Instead they learn the Dharnma only for the sake of 
criticising others and winning in debates, and they do not experience the 
good for the sake of which they learned the Dhamma. Those teachings, 
being wrongly grasped by them, conduce to their harm and suffering for a 
long time. 11565 
Clinging to the Dhamma wrongly like this is likened to picking up a snake by the tall so 
that it swings round and gives a fatal bite - wronO grasp of the snake leads to liarill 
and suffering just as wrong grasp of the Dhamma does. Having thus explained the 
dangers of clinging at the Mamma, the Buddha explains how it Should be understood 
with the simile of the raft. He describes a mail in a dangerous place w, ho builds a rafi 
in order to get him across a river to tile safety of the further shore. Once lie arrives at 
the further shore he decides that, because the raft has been so helpful to him, lie %vIII 
carry it around with him. The Buddha explains that this is clearly a foolish thin(-, to do, 
for the raft will no longer be of use to him oil dry land. Instead lie should cast it adi-I I 
and go where lie chooses- "So I have shown you lio%,,,,, the Dharnilla is similar to a raft, 
being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of clinging "566 
All this suggests that what is important about the dharrinia is not its cognitive Z) 
content, but the factors from which it arises, and the way that it is heU "Tile Dhanirna 
according to this sutta is to be regarded as a plan of action and not as a theory to be 
clung to and pitted against other theories in debate either for tile purpose of defending 
it or criticising with its aid opposing theories. 11567 
It is through not understanding how views arise that one is ensnared in the 
'bond of view'- 
"Here someone does not understand as it really is the rise and fall Of vieýý, 
the satisfaction and danger in view, and the escape from view- not knoýý in(, 
(all this) he is obsessed by tile lust for view, the delight in it, the Io% e, the 
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In the Mahi5tanhasainkhiyu Simu, the Buddha asks some monks many questions 
about dependent origination, and is satisfied with their answers. Nevertheless, he gives 
them a warning: 
"'Bhikkhus, purified and bright as this view is, If you adhere to it, cherish 
it, treasure it, and treat it as a possession, would you then understand the 
Dhamma that has been taught as similar to a raft, being for the purpose of 
crossing over, not for the purpose of clinging? ' - 'No, venerable sir. "'569 
What is particularly significant here is that views can still be 'wrong' even if they echo 
in content the teachings of the Buddha: 
"What all this implies is that (false) view is as much a matter of tile 
psychology and emotional attitude of the person holding a view as it is of 
the formal content of a view. The Buddhist tradition recognises that what Z_ 
is formally Buddhist theory can be grasped and held in a manner such that 
it constitutes wrong view. 
11570 
We will now consider the many references that suggest that ultimately 'right' vieýý is 
in fact a state of being beyond all views- instead of a view, it is simply seeing the way 
things really are. 
Transcendent Right View 
Transcendent Right View is dealt with in some detail in the Sammi-idiuhl'Sullu, 
which contains the monk S511PLItta's explanation of right vie%ý to his disciples. As we 
have seen, there are two forms of 
riglit 
view, the ordinal-Nr (Iokiy(i) and the 
transcendent (lokullai-a). The Su1nmUdJqhi Simu deals with right view in its 
transcendent aspect. 
The sutta commences with some disciples asking Sdl'IPLltta: "In what way is a 
disciple of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the 
Dharnma and has arrived at this true Mamma? " 571 It is interesting that this question 
itself provides some information about allyan right view insofar as it describes it as 
4 perfect confidence in the Dhamma', and 'arriving' at the true dhami-na, as though the 
Dharnma is a 'state' in which one can become immersed. 
Sdriputta replies that one with right view understands what is umd-iolesonle or 
unskilful' (aku. yala), and what is wholesome or skilful (kusala), and 
he understands 
the root of the unskilful and the skilful. There follows a definition of unskilful, ýý 
hich 
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is explained in the terms of the 'negative precepts'. Unskilful conduct is killing, takini-, 
what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, malicious speech, harsh speech, 
gossip, covetousness, ill-will, and wrong view. 
The roots of the unskilful are greed, hatred and delUS1011,572 which are the 
defilements that lie at the very heart of sulys5t-ic existence, the roots of the skilful are 
simply the opposite of these qualities, namely non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion. 
Sdriputta explains that when a disciple gains such an understanding of the 
unskilful and skilful and their roots, he has a liberating knowledge: 
"When a noble disciple (ui-iyasUvaku) has understood the unwholesome 
he entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, lie abolishes tile 
underlying tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying tendency to 1= 
the view and conceit 'I am', and by abandoning ignorance and arousing 
true knowledge he here and now makes an end of suffering. "ý 73 
As the sutta progresses it is clear that this description of right view is but one 
tversion' or facet of right view. HavinOr heard the above reply, Sdriptitta's disciples go 
on to ask him if there might be 'another way' in which an arlyas5vaka has right view 
After explanation of further ways in which a disciple could have right \, ie%\, the 
disciples repeat their question, so that by tile end of the sutta there are thirteen ýýays in 
which right view is described. Each description is t1ollowed by the passage cited above 
in which it is explained that once such knowledge is attained, ignorance is abandoned 
and suffering is at an end. Twelve of tile characterisations of rigilit view concern each 
of the twelve links of dependent origination respectively. In each case, the ariyas5vaka 
understands the four noble truths in relation to the link in question. For example, in 
the case of birth, he understands birth, its arising (in this case, as a result of becoming), 
it cessation (with the ceasing of becoming), and the way to its cessation (the eightfold 
path). In addition to the twelve links of dependent origination, tile disciple also 
understands the four noble truths in relation to the four 'nutriments'. These are 
physical food, contact, mental volition and consciousness, and are four factors on 
which the continuity of life depends. Just like tile twelve 'links', then, the nutriments 
are part of the causal process that underpins sarnsaric existence. They have craving as 
their condition. 
It is apparent from these different descriptions of transcendent right vieýý that 
the causal inter-relation between the different factors and causes of existence is tile 
Prime focus of the noble disciple's understanding Once lie has seen 
Cor himself that all 
things are dependent oil other factors for their being, and are therefore contingent 
and 
impermanent, then there is nothing at \ý hich to grasp. As ý\ e shall see "I tile cOul"Ne 
Ot 
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this chapter, this relationship between insight and liberating knowledge is more 
explicitly explained in other suttas. 
Transcendent Right View as Knowing and Seeing the Way Things Truly Are. 
There are many passages in the Nikayas in which speculative ýie\ýs are 
contrasted to 'knowing and seeing' things that the Buddha has taught. With such 
knowledge and vision, one 'goes beyond' views. For example, in the 
Pahcattaya Sulfa, the Buddha lists various views about the whether the self is material 
or immaterial, percipient or inpercipient and so on. Instead of criticising these vieWs, 
the Buddha says of each of them- "'That is conditioned and gross, but there is 
cessation of formations. ' Having known 'There is this, ' seeing, tile escape from that, 
the Tatlidgata has gone beyond i t. " S74 Tile message here is elucidated by the 
paraphrase in the commentary. 
"All those types of perceptions together with the views are conditioned, 
and because they are conditioned, they are gross. But there is nibb5na, 
called the cessation of formations, that is, of the conditioned. Having 
known 'There is this', that there is ilibb5na, seeing the escape fi-oni tile 
conditioned, the Tath5gatha has gone beyond the conditioned. " S75 
It is thus the Buddha's insight into the causes and conditions of vje\ý s that enables hirn 
to transcend them. In the Aggiý, ýi(-ý(, -Iicigoila. yiiiici, it is explained that -Speculative 
view' is something that the Tatlic-igatlia has put away. For tile Tathiligatha has seen 
this: 'Such is material form, such is its origin, such its disappearance, such is feeling ... 
such is perception ... 
formations 
... consciousness, such is 
its origin, such its 
disappearance. 111576 Bhikkhu Bodhi explains that the Pali contains a word play 
"between ditthig5ta, 'speculative view', which the Tath5gatha has put away, and dill 
ha, what has been 'seen' by the Tatli5igatha with direct vision, namely the rise and fall 
of the five aggregates. "577 This demonstrates very clearly the contrast between vle%ýs 
as a distorted creation of all ignorant mind, and the seeing that accompanies the mind 
freed from ignorance. 
The 'seeing' does not simply involve accurately perceiving reality as it is, 
but 
brings liberation with it, for once one sees not-self, for example, one no 
longer clings 
to the impermanent as though it were permanent, and thus ceases to propagate the C) 
cycle of suffering within ones own perceptual activities, Thus, as 
Gethill emphasises. 
the cognitive and affective merge ill Views- 
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"What seems to be significant about ditthi, is not so much the cogniti -I ke 
content of a view, but the fact we cling to it as a dogurna, the fact that it 
becomes a fixed view, this alone is true, all else is foolishness. Thus even 
so-called 'right views' can be views (ditthi) in so far as they can become 
fixed and objects of attacliment. "578 
This is demonstrated in the Puficuituyu Suitu, where the Buddha explains that 
even cognitively correct views are still clinging if they are not the result of direct 
personal knowledge: "Since they have no clear, personal knowledge, even the mere 
fragmentary knowledge that those good recluses and brahmins clarify (about their 
view) is declared to be clinging on their part. "579 
The connection between 'seeing the way thinus really are' and liberation is also 
evident in the Khajidai,, agga, where it is explained how the noble disciple recognises 
the impermanence of body (and the other four khallcllios). When the disciple sec. s 
impermanence of body lie is no longer worried when it changes or agesý "Thus seeing 
as it really is, by perfect insight, he puts away from him all sorrow and gr ef o 
lamentation and despair- nor is lie troubled at their putting away, but untroubled, lives 
at ease ... 
"110 By the sarne token, one who sees things as th ey really are does not have 
views about the past or future, and "along, with the fading away of igynorance and the In 
arising of knowledge there comes to him no vie\ý that 'I am', that 'this same I am, 
that 'things will be, things will not be, things will have body, thinos . vill not have bodv, 
things will be conscious, things will not be conscious ... 
In the 
Mahdsal5 ianiku Sluta, the Buddha explains in detail how not seeing the six senses . Ya C) 
as they really are leads to suffering. When, for example, one views the eye, eye- 
contact, eye-consciousness and tile concomitant feeling in the wrong way (i. e. not as it 
actually is), then "one is inflamed by lust" for them- 
"When one abides inflarried by lust, fettered, infatuated, contemplating 
gratification, then the five aggreptes affected by clinging are built up for 
oneself in the future, and one's craving - which brings renewal of being, is 
accompanied by delight and lust, deligilits in this and that - increases. 
One's bodily and mental torments increase, one's bodily and mental 
fevers 
increase, and one experiences bodily and mental suffering "511 
Conversely, the reverse of this process occurs when one understands tile senses as 
they actually are (Jwihc7hhfiIa1. n), for one then abides "uninflarned 
bý, lust" and mental 
torments and suffering are abandoned. 
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In the Mdgandiyu Sima, the Buddha provides an analogy which Is very helpful 
in demonstrating how vision of the way things are lead to non-attachment. He 
describes a blind man who hears a rnan with good eyesight encouraging him to buv a 
clean, spotless white cloth. When the blind man agrees to buy it he is cheated, for he is 
actually given a 'dirty soiled garment'. Shortly after this, the mail is treated for his 
blindness, and having taken medicines, he gains his sight. Oil doing so, he is repulsed 
by the sight of the dirty cloth, and becomes furious with the man who tricked him into 
buying it. In the explanation of this analogy, the Buddha likens himself to the doctor 
who enables the man's vision to arise, once a disciple sees the Dhamma Ills vision 
arises and, seeing the khandhas as they really are, he is no longer attached to thenv 
"If I were to teach you the Dhamma thus- 'This is that health, this is 
that nIbb5na', you might know health and see nlbb5iia. Together with the 
arising of your vision, your desire and lust for the five amyreoates affected 
by clinging might be abandoned. Then perhaps you might thli& 'Indeed, I 
have long been tricked, cheated, defrauded by this mind. For when 





... consciousness. With my clinging as condition, being comes 
to be- with being as condition, birth-, with birth as condition, ageing, and 
death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come to be Such is the 
origin of this whole mass of suffering. 11583 
This analogy is very helpful for understanding the Buddha's teaching of noble 
right view, because it suggests that it is simply seeing what is already the case. Rather 
than being something 'extra', some speciallsed cognitive viewpoint that has to be 
attained, it inste ad is how the world appears to one who has gol I-ld qfcertain blinding 
and obscuring emotions or perceptions. The analogy dernonstrates that the reality of 
the ordinary person is profoundly deceptive - one is attracted to or repulsed from 
things in the world in a manner that leads to suffering, unaware that the way this world 
appears is in fact fundamentally Illusory. Owing to the defiling factors ofthe mind, the 
fundamental ignorance that underpins tile ordinary person's perception of reality, this 
perception of tile world Yeeln. ý entirely real and genuine. Indeed, as lon- as one ý7 
perceives reality through the perceptual apparatus of the self-view, then It is true that 
certain events in the world (such as the death of a loved one, for example), %ý ill 
lead to 
suffering. It is not the suffiering itself that is illusory, then, but it is the understandino 
of the world that leads to such sufferiiwy that is deceptive In a sense, then, clukOw is 
ultimately a product of the unenlightened, Ignorant mind - the ordin, -iry person is 
'tricked, cheated and defrauded by this mind. "" In contr, 'Ist. one %0o percel%es 
the 
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world with right view, 'as it really is', is freed from dukkha, no longer under the spell 
of an illusory perception of reality. 
This may be elucidated by a brief look at the understanding of right and wronu 
view found in the Therav5din A bhidhalPma. Gethin explains that in tile Abhidhan7niel, 
"treatment of dillhi ... 
is considered to be exclusively a concomitant of clua rooted 
in greed (Wha-m0a)- dillhi can only be present in the mind when greed or 
attachment occurs: it is confined to four types of consciousness rooted in greed (Dhs 
75) 80-82). 11585 The stream-winner reaches a state where he his mind is freed from 
greed and delusion to a sufficient degree to be freed from all kinds of wrong vleýý 
(micchd-diýýhi) this is a sign that he has attained transcendent right view (sununU5 
dillhi), although his insight is not yet perfect and lie has more to perfect, 
distinguishing him from the other three types of ariyas5vaka. Thus the strearn-%ý inner 
cannot hold speculative views, or any wrong views, because his mind is no lon(, Jer 
rooted in the greiý, d that prompts them- "once the four truths have been directly seen, 
the mind has no inclination to either eternalism or annihilationism, the mind has no 
tendency to misinterpret Buddhist theory in terms of either anni III] at ioni sm or 
eternalism. 11586 
It is also significant that in the Therav5din AMOIR-1177IM-1, transcendent right 
view (sannnadiuhi) and [wrongy] vle\v (diiihi) are a diffierent 'species' alto, -, ether 
- the former is a manifestation of wisdom, and the latter "a particular 
psychological manifestation crystallisation of delusion and greed _ sannnUdi. i. 1hi shares 
none of the characteristics of diiihi. ". S87 
Ultimately, then, 'right view' is 'no view' insofar as views, (diql1l), are 
understood in the Nik5yas as the manifestations of the subjective bias of the 
unenlightened mind. Transcendent right view consists of simply seeing the way things 
are (yathdRi-ilaip). Jayatilleke explains that "what is taught by the Buddha is claimed 
to be objectively valid"-"'. In other words, what the Buddha points out to be true is 
always the case it is not sorriethiq) of his invention that is contingent upon him 
for 
its truth. This point is made by the Buddha in the HI-cil, 177clli'177tilil(ililk(I 
S1111a 
"Whether the Tath5gatha teaches the Dhamrna to his disciples or does not preach it, 
the Dhamma rernains the sarne. "19 
The four noble truths are a natural law, a fact about how the world really isý 
"The fact of suffering; is true, not false, not changeable. The fact of the arising ot 
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suffering ... the ceasing of suffering ... the way to the ceasing of suffering is true, not 
false, not changeable. 11590 Dependent origination, too, is portrayed as an objectiVe 
fact: "Whether there is arising of Tatlidgatlias or whether there is no such arising, this 
nature of things ... stands, this causal status, this causal orderliness, the relatedness of 
this to that. 11591 
it is because these elements of the Buddha's teaching are in fact merely his 
description of the way the world is that they are something to be weji, and not merek 
an opinion or a hypothesis. The Buddha emphasises this when he describes how he 
knows dependent origination- "Apart from belief, apart from hearsay, apart from 
argument as to method, apart from reflection on and approval of opinion, I know this, 
I see this: decay and death is conditioned by birth. '1592 In the Mgmuot-a Niku_ya, the 
Buddha rejects ten ways of attaining knowledge (Includino tradition, looic, hearsa%, 
and reflection on and approval of op1n1onS)593, contrasting them with knowing and 
seeing for oneself 
"Be not misled by report or tradition, or hearsay. Be not misled by 
proficiency in the collections, nor by mere logic or inference, nor afier 
considering reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of sorne theor-v, 
nor because it fits becoming, nor by the thoughtý The recluse is revered by 
us. But ... when you 
know for yourselves- These things are unprofitable 
blameworthy 
... conduce to 
loss and sorrow, - then indeed do you reject 
them. "594 
For the Buddha, truth must be seen through personal knowledgeý 
am one of those recluses and bralimins who, having directly known the 
Dhamma for themselves arnong things not heard before, clairn [to teach] 
the fundamentals of the holy life after having reached the consummation 
and perfection of direct knowledge. "595 
The notion that transcendent right view consists of seeing what is already the 
case is supported by the Buddha's description of himself He uses ternis such as 
C4 awakened"596 "one who knows and seeS"591, -comprehending-, 
"t 11 oroug Illy 
knowing"598, and "not liable to delusion"59", all indicating that 
lie is able to cleai-ly see 
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reality as it really is. This insight of the way things are is described in the 
Afiguttara Nikdya as the ultimate knowledge- "Knowing things as theý- are, ýý herever 
they are, is the highest knowledge"600 
The Buddha, then, could perhaps be described as a pioneer - he has attained a 
certain liberating knowledge through his personal Insight, and Is desCrIbIn i _g to others 
the way in which they, too, could gain the sarne insight- "There is a path, there is a 
course of training, whereby one who has followed it will know and see for himself 
'The ascetic Gotama speaks at the proper time, what is true, to the point - tile 
Dhamma and the Discipline'. ". 601 In the light of all this, Jayatilleke suo , gests that early 
Buddhism "should be regarded not as a system of metaphysics but as a ý'erifiable 
hypothesis discovered by the Buddha in the course of his 'trial and error' 
experimentation with different ways of life. "602 
Two levels of truth 
In the above discussion of the different forms of right and wrong vieýý, we have 
established that, on an ultimate level, all loklyci right views are 'wrongo' in the sense 
that they are, on the final analysis, products of ignorance and cravin, _, Transcendent 
right view, however, is ultimately true, insight into reality as It really is, undistorted bv 
the deluding factors of ignorance and cravino. Hoýýever, one caimot have 
transcendent right view 'ust by willino it* as we have seeii, it is the culnifflation of a 
certain complex causal process that the Buddha expresses in his description of the path 
to liberation. Ordinary views are right insofar as they fit iii vith this causal process, 
causing development of path-factors in their positive aspect. Wrong views, hoýve%er, 
work in the opposite direction. 
One of the implications of this state of affairs is that a view that is 'right' or 
'true' on the ordinary level, may actually be 'false' on the ultimate, transcendent level 
For example, the idea that it is right to refrain from murdering one's neighbour, and the 
concept that refraining, from evil deeds will bring positive results both presuppose the Y 
distinction between self and other which, on the ultimate level, is seen to be false 
Indeed, the five precepts presuppose the notion of the phenomenal self a notion that is 
ultimately illusory and a product of ignorance. Collins argues that in practice, most 
Buddhists operate on the ordinary level- and the personality view provides the 
basis t'or 
their ethical conduct- 
"Most Buddhists, therefore, have had a simpler \ iew of personalitý and 
continuity than that which I have so far discussed .. 
Rouohk, one 11,101t 
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say that this simpler view is the native westerner's vie", of reincarnation, in 
which a series of lifetimes, each containing a unitary 'individual', is 
somehow connected together as the successive lives of one 'person' It is 
such an idea ... on which the religious practice of most Buddhists has 
depended, and which has been the main conceptual tool with which their 
view of psychology and ethics has operated. "603 
He goes on to explain that the "affective and cognitive selfishness" of ordinary ri(, jht 
view is "socially and psychologically necessary" in that it provides the material that Is 
ultimately deconstructed by uiiuu, 5, the insight into not-self that accompanies 
transcendent right view. Thus lower right view is a step along the path, as the raft 
analogy implies, such views have their uses as vehicles on the path to liberation. 
"For Buddhist thought, the existence of, (for example) enthusiasticaliv 
self-interested merit-making is socially, psychologically and Indeed logically 
necessary. as the raw material which is to be shaped by cilicalu ... 
For 
Therav5da doctrine, unreflective religious practice, and the perception of 
self and other which it Involves - whether as a reactilon pattern or an 
explicitly formulated Personality Belief - involves one or other of these 
two types of 'selfishness'. They are both fetters oil the Path - bw irlihow 
fellei-, v thel-e irould be no libel-wion. "604 
Lower right view, then, is 'true' in tile sense that it accords mtli realit\ as it is 
perceived and understood by tile ordinary person. Insight into reality as it really is, 
however, is true oil an ultimate level, but this does not ne(yate the provisional truth of 
lower right view: 
"Both types of discourse are seen as containing truths, for two main 
reasons. In the first place, since the phenomenological reality of the 
'ordinary mail' and of tile 'learner' on the Path is necessarily patterned 
according to the conceit A am', for them the discourse containing talk of 
unitary individuals will be - Iwo 1ej71j)()1'e 'true", secondly, 
tor the 
most refined type of virtuoso Buddhism, doctrines which can be given 
verbal expression are in the last analysis simply instruments, tools 
for a 
spiritual culture which culminates by abandoning them in tile 'silent 
wisdom' of the sagye. 11605 
Summary 
603COI lins. Seýfle. vs Persons, p. 150. 
604COI lins, Seýfless Persons. pp. 152-', litalics Oriý, 'iMdl 
605 Collins, Selfless Persons. p. I 5o. 
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In this chapter a number of factors about the Buddha's attitude toýý ards % it%% s 
have been established. There are two sorts of view, the ordinary and the transcelidelit. 
Ordinary views are ultimately a product of ignorance, the view of the unenlightened 
mind. This is demonstrated in the A-uhniujila Sima where vie%ý s are described as the 
"worry and vacillation of those immersed in craving. "606 Similarly, in the teaching of 
the unanswered questions ordinary views are portrayed as the product of a 
fundamental 'misreading' of the world in terms of illusory concepts such as a notion of 
self However, some ordinary views are more conducive to the development of the 
path in its positive aspect than others. These views are ordinary right vieýý s Ordinary 
wrong views work against the causal process that culminates in liberation. 
Transcendent right view describes the insight attained by a mind that is free of 
deluding factors of greed, hatred and delusion. Rather thaii being) a '%, . ie%\', it is rather 
a 'seeing of the way things really are'. When one sees the way things truly are, one is 
freed from suffering, for suffering is a product of an ignorant perceptiori of reallt\ 
This chapter has focused very much on theoretical aspects of the Buddha's 
teachings. Building on this foundation, the next chapter will look at those occasions in 
practice where the Buddha encounters other teachings and groups, and ho%ý lie reacts 
to them. 
606D i 40-, Walslic 87/ 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Buddha's Attitude to Other Teachinas 
In this chapter we will look at the occasions in the Nikdyas ýý lien the Buddha 
encounters followers of other practices or deities, and the times when lie expresses all 
opinion about their different forms of 'holy life'. The first part of this chapter will be 
devoted to the Buddha's more 'general' judgements about different ways of holy life, 
collected from various different suttas. These suttas will be examined Ili an attempt to 
discover if there is a general philosophy that informs the Buddha's encounters ýýlth 
other groups and a generalised criteria with which lie judges thern. The second part of 
this chapter will consist of suttas which describe the Buddha's encounters mth specific 
groups. For convenience tills is ordered into sections relatino to wanderers 
(paribbdjakas); Nigai. -ithas (specific wanderers and the forefathers of the conternporary 
Jain religion) and Brahmins. 
There is a large arnount of material Ili the Nik5yas that relates to the Buddha's 
encounters with other groups. There are some suttas that directly relate the Buddha's 
reaction to others ill such encounters, and others Ili \vh1ch such encounters are 
incidental to the message of the sutta. There is, for exaniple, all entire section Ili the 
Majjliinia Nik5ya, the Pui-ibb5jukuvuggu that is dedicated to relating tile Buddlia's 
encounters with specific other wanderers. However, the suttas ill this section do not 
, 
ht of the wanderers or their necessarily provide an account of what the Buddha thoug 
teachings; rather, the questions put by the wanderers provide tile Buddha with all 
opportunity to explain his own teaching. However, sonie of the suttas in the 
Paribbijakavaggu are directly relevant to the project of this thesis, and where tills is 
so, have been explained in some detail. 
The same is true of the Bi-(-1h1nu11u1'aggc1 of tile Ma. i. iiiiiiia-Nik5ya ýýhich, like 
the Paribbijukavagga, is a collection of suttas linked by a conlilloll characteristic - ill 
this case, the Buddha's encounters with various Brahrnins- This chapter does not 
contain a comprehensive list of all the suttas Ili which the Buddha encounters other 
Ion or repetition in the suttas Asa groups since there is much irrelevant informati 
i lie result, I have chosen to consider 'representative' suttas 
Miich denionstrate ti 
Buddha's attitude to other groups. it will be noted that, Ili all 
his encounters mth 
other groups, the Buddha approves of other teachinuls In so 
far as theý, ý\Oi, k 
accordance with tile 'causality of liberation Ili othei \ýords, 
lie appro\es ot' thOsc 
teachings or practices \vhich lead to the developilielit Ot, tile path 
to liberation, and 
disapproves of those which do not. The Buddha presents 
ills 0ý\ll teachinL, and 
followers as the most accomplished In this regard. 
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As we saw in the introduction, in the Buddha's time there was a strong 
tradition of asceticism - there would have been many wanderers who, either bý 
themselves or in groups, practised a world-renouncing asceticism in the hope of 
gaining freedom from continued suffering and rebirths. The Buddha's teaching came 
firmly within this tradition, and it is clear from the Nikdyas that tile Buddha had many 
encounters with wandering ascetics or teachers with many dIfferent vlews and 
practices. The prevalence of other teachers and wanderers is testified by the Buddha's 
own life story - before he became enlightened he practised various difFerent ascetic 
rituals and hardships with different groups before eventually discovering the way to 
liberation through his own conduct and meditative insight. 
Views at odds with the Holy Life. 
The Satidaka Situa deals with Ananda's (one of the Buddha's chief disciples) 
meeting with one such wanderer ý)ctl-ibbqjaka), Sandaka. Ananda goes to visit 
Sandaka and his large assernbly of ill-disciplined wanderers, and at Sandaka's request, 
proceeds to teach them about four ways of nol living the holy life (cibl-ahlnucui-Oa) 
that is declared by the Buddha. The first type of 'doctrine and vieýý' that 'negates the 
holy life'607 is the belief that "There is nothing (nven, nothing offiered, nothillo 
sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions, no this world, no other worlds . 
. 
"608 This list of beliefs continues, and echoes the Buddha's description of wrong, 
view. The views culminate in an annihilationist claiiw "Fools and the wise are alike 
cut off and annihilated with the dissolution of the body, after death they do not 
exist. 11609 In response to this view, then, a 'wise man' considers that, accordin(,, to this 
teaching, even if he does not engage in an ascetic, disciplined way of life, lie would still 
have 'lived the holy life' that is lived by the teacher of this doctrine, because there are 
no actions that he has. to perform to fulfil this teaching. This means that the ýýise man 
and the teacher "are exactly equal here"610, and that in ascetic practices is 
pointless- 
"It is superfluous for this good teacher to go about naked, to be shaven, to 
exert himself in the squatting posture, and to pull out his hair and beard, 
since 1, who live in a house crowded with children, Mio use 
Benares 
sandalwood, ... accept gold and silver, 
shall reap exactly the same 
destination, the same future course, as this good teacher. "I'l I 
607 M 1515. BlukkIm Bodhi 619. 
608 Ibid. 




The very fact that the wise man is on an 'equal footino, ' ýýith the teacher, and, 
having followed the teaching, is no 6 wiser' than he ", as Previously provides the 
decisive reason for rejecting the 'holy way of life' "'What do I kno%ý and see that I 
should lead the holy life under this teacher? '. So when lie finds that this \ýýay negates 
the living of the holy life, he turns away from it and leaves It. "612 Exactk, the same 
format is followed for the remaining three ways of not-living the holy life. The second 
way involves the belief that actions do not have consequences - even if one were to 
go along the banks of the Ganges killing, torturing and mutilating others, and illaking, 
others do the same, no evil action would have been done, and there would be 'llo 
outcome of evil'. 613 Similarly, if one were to act in a kind and giving way, there would n 
be no merit in this. The third way is the belief that there is no 'cause or condition' for 
the purification or the defilement of beings. The fourth way consists of all e. \tellsl\e 
list of theories and hypotheses about how the universe is divided up and how it 
operates (through a theory of 'seven bodies'), culminatingy In the view that everybody 
has a certain amount of rebirths to go through, and sooner or later, regardless of their 
actions, beings will attain liberation. 
It is significant that none of these 'ways of holy lite' are criticised directly oil 
the grounds of the content of their views, but once again it is the consequences, tile 
'fruits' of these beliefs that Is the focus. We have seen that acceptance of causal 
relations between actions and results is one of the elements of ordinary right view, 
which in turn is required for positive development of the spiritual path taught by the 
Buddha. Since the four teachinos listed here are in total opposition to this riglit view, 
it follows that a teacher of them will not be particularly wise, and certainly not 
liberated. Similarly, the way of life itself will not bring with it many advantages Thus 
the wise man who judges these 'holy ways of life' follows pragmatic criteria, rationally j 1--ý 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of living a particular %\av of lite whell 
he considers whether there is any purpose for undertaking ascetic practices, and 
whether he would know and see more as a consequence. We have seen ill a previous 
section that the idea of causation is of fundamental importance to the teaching of the 
1 1011 Buddha. The path to liberation is seen as a causal process, with knoMedge and vis 
of the way things really are a product of this progression fi-oll, oralice to 
liberat 
n 1: P 
insight. In the examples of tile practices that negate the holy life in the 
ýcinclaka Sulia, 
the causality that is so fundamental to the Buddha's teaching is 
denied ill % arlous 
different ways, with the result that adherents of these %, ie\\s 
do not attain knoýýleduc 
and vision, and do not have anything to show for their ascetic practice', 
Atter each 
description of the four ditTerent ways, Ailanda explainsý 
61 21bid. 
613M i 516. Blilkkiiii Bodhi 620. 
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"This is the ... way that negates the living of the holy life that has been 
declared by the Blessed One who knows and sees, accomplished and fulk 
enlightened, wherein a wise man certainly would not live the holy life 
(brahniac5riya), or if he should live it, would not attain the true "a\,, the 
Dhamma that is wholesome. 11614 
In this context, bi-ahmacariya is not just a generic term for different 'religious' ways of 
life, but is in fact a reference to the holy life, namely the course of causal developrilent 
that culminates in liberation frorn suipsura, and which is seen by the Buddha frorn his 
position of pure knowledge and insight. The four other modes of practice are not 
criticised on any grounds other than that they are not conducive to development along 
the course to liberation. They do not achieve what they set out to gain, because they 
deny the natural law of causation, and work in opposition to it. 
'Comfortless' Views Rejected Because of Their Means of Knowledge. 
The first part of the Scindciko Sulict, then, deals with the practices and vie%ýs 
that are completely at odds with the Buddha's bl-uhmaccii-l' - iv. 
These vleý\s ýýork in 
direct opposition to the teaching that tile Buddha sets out. The second half, llo%ýe'v'er, 
deals with bi-ahmacul-qu which, although not in total opposition to the Buddha's 
brahniacai-iya, still do not result in tile fruits of tile true holy life set forth bv the 
Buddha. Whilst these teachings are not completely disapproved of by the Buddha they 
have only a very limited potential for development along the path to liberation. Tile 
four types of bi-ahmacut-i))u listed here are described as cuicissusika, meaning 'giving no 
comfort or security'. Unlike the four ways of 'negating' tile holy life, they "do not 
totally undermine the principles of the holy life, but they also fail to offer tile prospect 
Is of attaining the ultimate fruits of spiritual discipline. "61' The first example under thi 
category is of a teacher who claims to be omniscient, but clearly is not, realising this, a 
wise man no longer follows his teachings. Here, then, the criticism is against false 
teachers - although what they are teaching may ultimately be true, they are not in a 
position to know this for themselves or guide others to that knowledge, thus their 
'holy life' is 'without comfort. ' The second example attacks the means of knowledoe 
by which a particular teaching is known- 
"here some teacher is a traditionalist, one \\ho regards oral tradition as 
truth- he teaches a Dharnrna by oral tradition, by legends handed 
doýý11, by 
what has come down in scriptures. But ý\hen a teacher is a traditionalist, 
614 C-9-. M1 515-6. Bilikkiiii BodIn 620. 
60BIiikkim Bodhi. n749. p 1279. 
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one who regards oral tradition as truth, some is well remembered and some 
is wrongly remembered, some is true and some is otherwise. "616 
Here, once again, no criticism is made of the contew of the teaching, but it is rejected 
by the wise man for the unreliability of its method of transmission. There is no 
4security' in this holy life for the teaching might be poorly represented or badiv 
understood. 
The third type of holy life in this category is a teaching that is based on reason 
and enquiry. Just like the tradition-based teaching, however, this method of 
knowledge is rejected as unreliable, for the teacher may be inconsistent in his thlnkirigý 
"He teaches a Dhamma hammered out by reasoning, following a line of inquiry as it 
occurs to him. But when a teacher is a reasoner, an inquirer, some is well reasoned 
and some is wrongly reasoned, some is true and some is otherwise. "617 
The fourth type of holy life that lacks comfort or security does so because the 
teacher of it is "dull and confused" - lie is one of the 'eel-wrigglers' mentioned in the 
Brahniajdlu Siala. A wise man will reject this holy life because- "This good teacher is 
dull and confused ... lie engages in verbal wriggling, in eel-wriggling- 'I don't say it is 
like this. And I don'. t say it is like that. And I don't say It is otherwise. And I don't 
say it is not so. And I don't say it IS not not So. 
"'618 
In the second half of the Soliclcik(i Suna, then, it is the teachers of particular 
doctrines and the methods that they Lise to attain knowledge, that Is the focus of 
criticism. It is interesting that there is no mention of itka they teach, but simply their 
means of knowledge. This seems to suggest that if one has a poor teacher who uses 
unreliable methods or who is 'dull and confused', it is immaterial what he is teaching, 
because one could not be sure which of his teachings were cgenuine', and which were 
not. 
The eight 'holy ways of life' that are treated ill this sutta are disapproved of for 
one of two reasons - the first four are seen as totally at odds with the true 
bi-ahmacai-iya advocated by the Buddha, and the second four are rejected as 
unsatisfactory because of their means of knowledge. 
The 'True' brahmacariya: Personal Insight as a Valid Means of 
Knowledge. 
616M 1 520. Blukkhu Bodhi 024. 
617 Ibid. 
618m 152 1. BlilkkliLi Bodlil 62 5- 
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Having listed these eight types of holy life that are somehoýý deficient or 
unreliable, Ananda contrasts them with the bi-uhmucul-iyu set fbrýýard b%- the Buddha, 
which is the yardstick against which the other traditions are judged, -ýý herein a wise 
man certainly would live the holy life, and while living it would attain tile true way, the 
Dhamma that is wholesome. "619 Ananda's explanation of this true' bt-uhmucui-iva 
follows the set formula that appears in many of the other suttaS620 in which a 
householder goes forth, perfects skilful ethical practices, abandons the five hindrances 
and progresses through the fourjhiýnus, and is able to attain liberating krimviedge of 
the way things really are. Once again in this description, the operation of a causal 
process is strongly emphasised - tile formula describes a process of gradual 
development that progresses causally. The various events are presented as simple 
causal fact, as though what is being described is a law of nature, something, that v"Ill 
inevitably be the case were the right conditions to be put in place. Indeed, throughout 
the entire sutta, apart from the terms ubi-uhinucul-ijýu and unussUsiku, there are no 
value judgement' terms in relation to the eight teachings. Instead the vle%\s and the 
fruitlessness of following them are plainly listed in the manner of simple facts. Sandaka 
makes reference to this approach at the end of the Sutlýv "It is %\olldel-ful, Master 
Ananda, it is marvellous! There is no lauding of one's own Mamma and no 
disparaging of the Dhamrna of others, there is the teaching of the Dharnrna in is full I -D 
range, and so many emancipated ones appear. "621 
We have already considered the idea of 'salvific causation', namely the idea 
that in teaching the Dharnma, the Buddha pointed out a natural law, or process that 
occurs in reality, regardless of whether anybody teaches it or believes in it. Ananda's 
treatment of other teachings in tile Scilickika Suiici Supports tills interpretation, for his 
criteria for judgement is whether or not a particular teaching works in accordance with 
this natural law. In his book, Aal-l)., Huddhi-yl Jheol-j- (? f Kiwirledge, Jayatilleke 
analyses the epistemology that the Buddha appears to espouse in tile Nikayas. His 
findings lend further support to the view that in his teachings, the Buddha is simply 
describing a natural law, a causality that operates in objective reality. Jayatilieke 
explains that around the time of the Buddha, 'religious' thinkers could be 
divided LIP 
into three categories, according, to their emphasis oil particular means of 
knoýý111L,, 622 
The first of these, the Traditionalists, included those \dio del-i,,,, ed their 
kiloýý led e 
entirely from a scriptural tradition. The Brahmins of tile Three 
Vedas proýldc one 
'I\ Of example of this type of thinkei. As \ve have seen 11, tile ýcwdukci 
Sutici, tills %ýc 
619 Ibid. 
dhi 448171' 
irst emniple of tills in MN *s *11 the Kindmika 
SLIML ý11 1 ')44 IT, Billk-killi Bo I 620TIie fi 
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attaining knowledge was rejected by Ananda as unreliable, because the scriptures could 
be wrongly remembered. 
The second category that Jayatilleke uses is that of The Rationallsts 
thinkers who claimed to attain knowledge entirely through the process of reasoning 
and speculation. This class includes Sceptics, Aj-ivikas, metaphysicialls of the Earlv 
Upaniýads, and Materialists and is the third sort of holy life that is criticlsed as 
anassdsika in the Sandaka Sulfa. 
Finally, Jayatilleke introduces the third category as 'Experientiallsts', thinkers 
44who depended on direct personal knowledge and experience, includin- extra sellsory 
perception on the basis of which their theories were founded. "611 Groups ill tills 
category include many thinkers of the Middle and Late Upani, 5ads, some Jains, and 
some Aj-ivikas. 
Jayatilleke then cites a passage in the Sulýgulvvu Simu in %k hich tile Buddha 
explains where he would place himself in tills categorisation. This is a very interesting, 
passage, worth quoting at length, for in it the Buddha is directly comparing himself to 
other teachers. He is approached by a Brahmin woman vdio is confused bv tile 
presence of so many recluses and bral-in-lins, all of whorn claims to have true 
knowledge- 
"'Master Gotama, there are sorne recluses who claim [to teach] the 
fundamentals of the holy life after having reached the consurnmation and 
perfection of direct knowledge here and now. Where among these recluses 
and bral-irnins does Master Gotarna stand9 ... 624 
The Buddha responds that there is a 'diversity' arnong those who claim to lla\, e 
this knowledge- 
"There are some recluses and brahn-lins who are traditionalists, who oil tile 
basis or oral tradition claim [to teach] the fundamentals of tile holy life afier 
having reached the consummation and perfection of direct knowledoe here 
and now, such are the brahi-nins of the Three Vedas. There are some 
recluses and brahmins who, entirely on the basis of mere faith, claim [to 
teach] the fundamentals of the holy life after having, reached the 
consummation and perfection ofdirect kno%ýIed,,, c. SLICII are tile reasoners 
and invest i gators. There are some recluses and brahmins %Oio, 
having 
II lot heard befol C. directly known the Dhan-inia for themselves among th ill-Is I 
claim [to teach] the fundamentals of the holy life after having reached tile 
consummation and perfection of direct kno\ý ledge... 1, Bli5radv, 
-ija, arn one 
of those recluses and brahmins who, having direct]\, 
kno\vn tile Dhamma 
(123 Ibid. 
1,24 Nl 11 211: Bi . 
11 Witi Bodlil 820. 
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for themselves among things not heard before, claim to teach the 
fundamentals of the holy life after having reached the consummation and 
perfection of direct knowledge. "625 
According to the Buddha, then, personal knowledge is the criteria for gaining; 
liberating insight. It is not unreliable like the other means of knowledge, which all rely 
on some form of authority that might be flawed. In the Agiatai-a Nikuyu, there are 
passages where the Buddha addresses a follower and urges him against being misled by 
various different forms of authority: 
"'Come now, Bhaddiya, be not misled by report626 or tradition 
(paranipai-d) or hearsay (ilikh-u). Be not misled by proficiency In the 
Collections (pilakusuinpud5), nor by mere logic or inference, nor after 
considering reasons, nor after reflection of and approval of some theory, 
nor because it fits becorning, nor by the thought: The recluse is revered bv 
us. 111627 
Instead, the Buddha advocates personal knowledge- 
"When you know for yourselves: These things are unprofitable, these 
things are blarneworthy, these things are censured by the intelligent, these 
things, when performed cand undertaken, conduce to loss and sorro" 
then, indeed, Bhaddiya, do ye reject them. "628 
This attitude to various different forms of knowledge echoes tile 
Brahmajila Sulia in some ways. For example, the RruhlnujUlu Slatu deals with some 
views held by 'logicians' and 'reasoners' who arrive at their views through 'hammering 
it out by reason'629. In the BI-ahmaji-ilu Siwu, however, the content of these views, 
and the consequences of holding them, are more the object of criticism than the means 
by which they are attained. In the passages above, it is the unrehability ofthe methods 
of knowledge that are the subject of the Buddha's criticism. 
In the Cui)ki-Slaw, the Buddha elaborates further on his attitude towards 
iff (Y is stress on attaining personal knowled'-. D d erent means of attaining knowledge. Hi (Ye is 
evident when he is asked by a brahmin student about the traditional and scripture- 
based practices of the Brahrnins of the Three Vedas- 
62 5Ibid. 
'lickc (p. 1'180) identifics "2"Horner's translation of amissal, 0 is 'report' IS 110t pirIlCllljrIN 
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three senses in which the Nvord is used ill the Nik5vas. Firstlý. 
. Is it is used 
i 
Ill the Vedic tradition. it 
handed domi 
could Ilican 'divine revelation'. all ol-'9*11,11 "Isi it revealed from adv 11 
I\ Ill", IS 
througil generations-, secondly it could refer to in 'atithoritativc tradition'. and 
thirdl) it could mcall a 
., t reporl, conle from inotith to, inotith. " All these are rejected Lindcr the same : 
htcrm 
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"'Master Gotama, in regard to the ancient brahmanic hymns that ha\ e 
come down through oral transmission and in the scriptural collections, the 
brahmins come to the definite conclusion- "Only this is true, anything else 
is wrong". What does Master Gotama say about this)"'630 
The Buddha answers by pointing out that there is not one teacher amongst the present 
brahmins, nor among the generations of brahmins before them, nor even amongst the 
ancient brahmin seers who could say- "'I know this, I see this. only this is true, 
anything else is wrong. "' In other words, there is nobody within the entire tradition 
who has definite personal knowledge of what they teach. The Buddha judges this state 
of affairs with an analogy: 
"Suppose there were a file of blind men each in touch with the nextý the 
first one does not see, the middle one does not see, and the last one does 
not see. So, too, Bh5radvdja, in regard to their statement the brahi-nins 
seem to be like a file of blind mený the first oiie does not see, tile middle 
one does not see, and the last one does not see. \Vhat do you think ... that 
being so, does not the faith of the brahmins turn out to be -groui-idless" 
`631 
Blidradv5ja responds that the brahmins do not just depend on faith, but also oil 
oral tradition. The Buddha's response provides another surnmary of his attitude 
towards different forms of knowledgyeý 
"Blidi-advdja, first you took your stand on faith, now you speak of oral 
tradition. There are five things, Bli5radv5ja, that may turii out in týýo 
different ways here and now. What five" Faith (wdclh(7), approval (rilc/), 
oral tradition (unu. s,, s, ui-u), reasoned cogitation (u-Mil-ulmriviiukku), and 
reflective acceptance of a view (dq1hi1, ijjhunukkhu1m). These five thin0s n 
may turn out in two different ways I iere and now. Now something may be 
fully accepted out of faith, yet it may be empty, hollow, and false, but 
something else may not be fully accepted out of falth, yet it may be factual, 
true and unrnistaken. Again, sornething may be fully approved of ... may 
be 
well cogitated, ... may 
be well reflected upon, yet it may be empty, holl()ý\ 
and false, but something else may well not be reflected upon, yet it may 
be 
factual, true and unmistaken. [Under these conditions] it is 'lot proper 
tor 
a wise man who preserves truth to come to the deftite conclusiolY 
Onl\ 
this is true, anything else is wrong, 11'632 
Coming to such a conclusion is 'not proper' because the individual 
does not 
have personal knowledge of a doctrine's truth or falsity, and, as we 
ha\ e see,,. this is 
630M il. 169. Blukkiiii Bodhi 779. 
631M 11 170-1. Blilkkiiii Bodlit 780. 
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the only criteria the Buddha accepts as a valid means of knowledge. For each of the 
five categories, a claim could be either true or false, but the point is that there is no 
way of knowing whether this is the case - none of these five ways could lead to 
personal knowledge, they are "not capable of yielding certainty. "633 
Blidradvdja then asks the Buddha how there is 'the preservation of truth' 
(saccdnurukkhanu). The Buddha replies that when one is faced with clairns derived 
from unreliable means of knowledge, the appropriate response is to kýithhold 
judgement: 
"If a person has faith, Blidi-advdja, he preserves truth when lie says- 'My 
faith is thus'; but he does not yet come to the definite conclusion- 'Only 
this is true, anything else is wrong. ' In this way, Blidi-adv5ja, there is the 
preservation of truth-, in this way, he preserves truth-, in this way we 
describe the presentation of truth. But as yet there is no discovery of truth 
(saccanuh. odha) 1 11634 
It is Interesting here that the Buddha does not autoniatically disipprove of all 
views which are grounded in the unreliable means of knowledge - indeed, he 
acknowledges that sorne of then-I could be 'factual, true and uni-nistaken'. The Cact is, 
however, that one can only know this for certain through personal experience , and 
until one has attained this, then one should not clairn that one knows the exclusive and 
definitive truth. Thus in the Cui)ki-Simu, the Buddha does not object to individuals 
holding certain beliefs, but simply insists that if the 'truth' Is to be 'preserved, then 
such beliefs should be held provisionally, until personal verification is found 
The Correct Attitude for an Ordinary Person. 
As the Cal)ki-Stwu progresses, the Buddha explains ]low truth /s discovered by 
describing the right attitude to be adopted in relation to teachers of the Dharnma. A 
householder who comes across a Bhikkhu should investigate whether the monk is 
freed from states based in greed, hatred and delusion, and whether or not he says 
I 
know" when he does not know, or I see" when he does not see. He decides as a 
result of this investigation that the bodily and verbal conduct of the 
bliikkliu is 
consistent with one who is fi-eed fi-oni greed, hatred and delusion, and that the 
Dharnma he teaches is so profound that lie must be a very ývise nian. 
Ha\lno, been 
satisfied in these respects, the householder places his faith ill tile teacher. 
As ý\e can 
see from the account below, tile householder verifies the teachings 
for himself' 
"filled with faith lie visits him and pays respect to 
him-, having paid respect 
to him he gives ear- when lie gives ear, he hears the 
Dhaninia, having heard 
I- 
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the Dhamma, he memorises it and examines the meaning of the teachinus 
he has memorised, when he examines their meaning, lie gains a reflective 
acceptance or those teachings; when he has gained a reflective acceptance 
of those teachings, zeal springs up, when zeal has sprung up, he appli Is ies hi 
will; having applied his will, he scrutinises (151en), having scrutinised, he 
strives; resolutely striving, he realises with the body the ultimate truth and 
sees it by penetrating it with wisdom. In this way, Blidi-advdja, there is the 
discovery of truth-, in this way one discovers truth-, in this way we describe 
the discovery of truth. 11635 
In the commentary it is explained that the stage of 'scrutinisino" represents insight 
meditation, when one sees the four noble truths and impermanence. 'Discovering 
truth' represents the stage of becoming, a strearnwinner. We have already seen that a 
streamwinner is able to see things as they really are- this is reinforced here by the idea 
that the stream-winner has discovered 'the truth. This rnessa(ge reflects the teaching 
found in the Viniulhsuku Suilu, where the Buddha encourages his disciples to -rnake an 
investigation of the Tathagatha in order to find out \\hether or not lie is fullý' 
enlightened. "636 Having been satisfied by the Tath5gatha's conduct and words, the 
disciple should listen to his teachings, until -through direct knowledge (abIlififilu) of a 
certain teaching here in that Dhaninia, the blukkhu comes to a conclusion about the 
teachings. 11637 As a result of this investigation, the disciple places confidence in the 
Tatlidgatlia, the Dharnma and the Safigha. This process of personal verification leads 
to an unshakeable confidence. - 
"Bhikklius, when anyone's faith has been planted, rooted, and established 
in the Tatlidgatha through these reasons, ternis, and phrases, his faith is 
said to be supported by reasons, rooted in vision, firm, it is invincible by 
any recluse or brahmin or god or M5ra or Braliiii5 or by anyone in the 
world. " 
All this information helps to build up a picture of how the Buddha viewed his 
role and how this differed frorn other religious adherents. We have already seen ho%ý 
he rejects all means of depending oil authority because it is unreliable, be it the 
authority of revelation, tradition, scripture or reason, Hoýý ever, the Buddha hiniself is 
in an authoritative role as a teacher, but as the above passages dernonstrate, 
Ills 
authority is grounded in personal experience. It is 0111\ý \\ hen a disciple has scrutinised 
the Buddha's characteristics and his teachings, and found him to be pure and \ý ise, that 
they can firmly establish confidence in him, Thus what distinguishes the authorlt\ý of 
635M 11 173. Bliikkliti Bodhi 782. 
636M i 317ý Bliikkiiii Bodlu 4 15. 
637M i 319-20, Blilkkiiii Bodin 4 17, 
ISO 
181 
the Buddha from the other forms of authority that he rejects is the fact that anybodý, 
who scrutinises his conduct will see for themselves that his behaviour is consistent ýý ith 
his claim to be fully enlightened, and that when one follows the course of conduct that 
he advocates, then one can experience for oneself the truth of his teachings. With tile 
other forms of authority that the Buddha criticises, one never gets to personal 
experience, but merely an infinite regress of appeals to authority. Thus the faith or 
confidence in the Buddha that is 'invincible' is of a different order to the faith that the 
Buddha rejects as one of five unreliable forms of authority in the Canki S1111U. This can 
be summed up as the difference between faith as a form of confidence born out of 
experience, and 'blind' faith, which involves adherence to a proposition regardless of 
the evidence for or against is truth. 
Once again, it is important to remember that the Dharnrna is not presented as a 
phenomenon of the Buddha's invention - it is simply the ýýay tile world really Is 
when perceived by an undeluded mind. The Buddha's authority comes from tile fact 
that he is in a position of superior knowledge. The Buddha is able to see realitv as it 
really is, and is able to teach others how to attain this insiolit. He is a (, ulde, sornebody 
who shows others the path to enlightenment having travelled it himself The Buddha 
himself does not directly 'endow' his disciples with the insights of tile noble disciple 
(ariydsavku), but shows thern the way to reallse these attainments t1or themselves 
The Superiority of the Buddha's teachings: the Mahusi-hanUda SuPra 
The MuhiýsThanjdu Suna provides one of the clearest examples of the 
Buddha's approach to other groups and teachings, and his clairn to superiority over 
them. The Buddha explains how, out of the many different teaching's that are around, 
there are some which in part agree with his teachings, and some which disagreeý 
"There are some ascetics and Brahmins who are wise, skilled, practised in 
disputation, splitters of hairs, acute, who walk cleverly along the path of 
views. Sometimes their views accord with mine, sometimes they do not. 
What they sometimes applaud, we sometimes applaud- what thely 
11638 
sometimes applaud, we sometimes do not applaud ... 
He then goes on to explain his approach to such ijroupsý 
"On approaching them I say: 'In these things there is no agreement, 
let us 
leave thern aside. In these thimys there is aorecmentý there let the ýýise take 
up, cross-question and criticise these matters \\ ith the teachers or with thell- 
followers, saying: 'of those things that are UnsklItUl and reckoned as such, 
censurable, to be refi-ained fi-orn, unbefittin, -, a Noble 
One, black, luid 
reckoned as such - who is there who has completely abandoned 
such 
638D 1 162. Walslic 152. 
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things, and is free from them- the ascetic Gotarna, or some other venerable 
teachers? 111639 
The same question is considered in relation to the cultivation of " those things that are 
skilled and reckoned as such, blameless, to be practised, fitting for a oble One, bri- 
and reckoned as such ... 11640 Here, then, the emphasis on scrutiny and investigation is 
clearly evident - the Buddha invites a wise man to consider whether the Buddha 
cpractises what he preaches, and decide whether his conduct is in accordance ýwh his 
teachings. Since the Buddha considers himself to be supreme in terms of his wisdom 
and conduct, he explains that this will be evident when he is compared to other 
teachers - whereas the Buddha can be seen to have 'completely freed himself' from 
the unskilled factors, and 'completely mastered' the skilled ones, the other reverend 
teachers have done so "only in part"64 1. Once again, the Buddha is not completely 
dismissive of other teachers - lie does recognise that they have partial success in 
developing positlye, skilful states and causing negative ones to diminish. He does not 
directly disparage other teachers, but simply points to tile evidence as though it speaks 
for itself, by comparing his conduct and wisdom with that of other teachers tile 
Buddha's superiority in this regard will be self-evident. He does not directly disparage 
other teachers, but simply points to the evidence as though it speaks for itself, by 
comparing his conduct and wisdom with that of other teachers the Buddha's 
superiority in this regard will be self-evident. 
In the next part of the sutta, exactly the same format is repeated, but this time 
substituting 'the order of the ascetic Gotama's disciples' and 'that of the other 
reverend teachers' for 'the ascetic Gotania' and 'other reverend teachers'. The fact 
that the wisdom and skilful conduct of the Buddha's disciples is superior to other 
groups is a testament to the fact that the teaching, and example that they folioýý is 
superior to any other. As the sutta progresses, the Buddha advocates his doctrine 
through a simple statement of fact, explaining, his knowledge that there is a path to 
liberation, and that anybody who follows it will know for themselves that 
he is 
speaking the truth on this matter, 
"There is a path, there is a course of trainino, whereby one ýýho 
has 
followed it will know and see for himself, 'The ascetic Gotania speaks at 
the proper time, what is true, to the poInt - the 
Mamma and the 
Discipline. ' What is this path, this course of training' it is the 
\oble 
-1,42 Eightfold Path ... 
639D 
1 163-, Walslic 152 
640 Ibid. 
, 14 1 Ibid. 
642D 
1 164. Walshe 152 
12 
1831 
Kassapa then lists some of the various ascetic practices carried out by other 
ascetic teachers, including asceticism regarding clothirig, food, sleepillu and %ýashin(y 
The Buddha's response to this list is to point out their irrelevance in defiriiiig oi-ie as an 
cascetic or Brahmin'- 
"Kassapa, a practiser of self-mortification may do all these things, but it' ills 
morality, his heart and wisdom are not developed and brought to 
realisation, then indeed his is still far from being an ascetic or a Brahmin, 
But, Kassapa, when a monk develops non-enmIty, non III-wIll and a heart 
full of loving-kindness and, abandoning the taints, realises and dwells in the 
uncorrupted. deliverance of mind, the deliverance through wisdom, having 
realised it in this very life by his own insight, then, Kassapa, that monk is 
termed an ascetic and a Brahmin. "643 
He then goes on to explain that this kind of asceticism is harder to achieve than 
the sort listed by Kassapa - if becoming a Brahmin or an ascetic ý\ere a question ot, 
only eating certain foods, then 'any householder or householders son - C% en tile 
slave-girl who draws water - could do thl S1644 The Buddha offers "a very different 
kind of asceticism and Brahmanism" which Is much harder to achieve, because it 
depends on the development of 'morality, of the heart, and of wisdom', not JUSt the 
performance of certain ritual practices. Tile Buddha defines the cle\elopnient of 
morality, the heart and wisdom in terms of the standard description of tile gradual 
progress towards enholitennient. The perfection of nioralitN, comes at the sta,, e when 
one has developed the five precepts in their positive aspects, the perfection of the heart 
is attained when one has reached the four flianas, and the perfection of wisdorn comes 
when a monk sees reality as it really is, and destroys the taints (usuvus). This is 
described as the ultimate achievement- "And Kassapa, there is nothing further or more 
perfect than this perfection of morality, of the heart, and of wisdorn. "' 
This sutta pronounces the ultimate efficacy of the Buddha's teaching, which is 
unsurpassed by any other. This claim is made explicitly as the sutta dra%ýs to a close 
regarding morality, 'self-mortification and scrupulous austerity', 'ýýisdorn' and 
'liberation', the Buddha acknowledges that there are other ascetics and Brahmins xýho 
teach all of these things. However, regarding each one (for example, morality), 
lie 
makes the following claim, "But as regards the highest Ariyan morality, 
I do not see 
any who have surpassed me in this. I am supreme in this regard, in super-nioral It \. 
"6-4(, 
MUS, He then anticipates any criticism that his disciples are not content with 
his te, "chi 
such criticisms would be unfounded and should be responded to is 1'0110xýs 
643D 16T. Walshe 153-4. 
644D 168- Walshe 154. 




" 'The ascetic Gotama roars his lion's roar, in company and confidentl\, 
they question him and he answers, he wins them oý'er kýith his ans', ý; ers, 
they find it pleasing and are satisfied with what theý haý-e heard, theý 
behave as if they were satisfied, they are on the path of truth, and the\ are 
satisfied with the practice. 111647 
The simple justification for following the guidance and the teaching of tile 
Buddha as opposed to that of any other teacher is that he is more accomplished in 
wisdom and morality than any other teacher: 
"For the perfection of the moral code (concentration, Insight, etc. ), I 
should live under another recluse and brahi-nin, paying hirn honour and 
respect. But I see not anywhere in the world of gods - M5ras, Bralinlas 
- not among recluses and brahmins, not arnong the whole race, huniall or 
divine, any other recluse, or any brahmin more accomplished in moral 
conduct than myself, and under whom I might ll\, e, payino hini lionour and 
respect. "648 
The motivation for following the Buddha and joining) the Sai igha, then, is that both are 
the best qualified to brino one to the goal of the cessation of'sufferino Dn Z_ 
"Among all the teachers now existing in the world, I see none Mio has 
attained to such a position of farne and fblloýý in(; as I haý, e. Of' all tile 
orders and groups of the world, I see none as farnous and well-followed as 
my sangha of monks. If anyone were to refer to any holy life as being fully 
successful and perfect, with nothing lacking and nothing superfluous, well- 
proclaimed in the perfection of its purity, it is this holy life they ýý, ould be 
describing. "649 
The message of prioritising development of the 'niorality, the heart and 
wisdom' over other ascetic practices is a theme that arises cons, stelltlY III other suttas 
In the Saipj4ala Nikaj; u, for example, the Buddha explains the futility of such practices 
as "Wearing rough hides and matted hair and filth, Chantings, and empty rites and 
periances", describing them as "vain" and "empty as a treasure gotten 
in a dream-650 
Instead, one must cultivate the heartý "A heart ýýell-tanied, made pure and undefiled, 
or every living thing - That is the way the 
highest to attain. "I'l In tile Considerate fn-- 
I'atthupaina Sitilu, the Buddha asks the bral-ii-nin SUndarkt 1310tradv5.1a 
Miat good it is 
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to worship fires or to bathe in 'holy' waters, because "They cannot purify an evil-doer, 
A man who has done cruel and brutal deeds". Instead he advocates the development 
of morality: 
"It is here, brahmin, that you should bathe, 
To make yourself a refuge for all beings, 
And if you speak no falsehood 
Nor work harm for living beings 
Nor take what is offered not 
With faith and free from avarice, 
What need for you to go to Gayd? 
For any well will be your Gayd. 11652 
The efficacy or futility of certain practices is demonstrated by explaining tile 
kind of rebirth that they lead to- in tile Bhq ahe'lcn., cimilla, tile Buddha explains that all% IY 
beings "who were possessed of good conduct in speech ... thought, who 
did not scoff 
at the Ariyans, holding a right view, incurring deeds consequent oil a right viieýý - 
these, at the breaking up of the body after dying, have arisen in a glood bourn, a heavell 
world. 11653 Those with wrong conduct, however, are reboni Ma bad bourn, Niraý, a 
hell. Significantly, the criteria here does not include 'folloý\Hig, ' the Ari\, aiis, but 
merely not disrespecting them or actively disparaging them- this ýýould be a form of 
wrong view, wrong speech or wrong thought, and \ýould work a(lainst the positiVe 
process of causality that enables one to progress along tile path. This seems to imply 
that, at a preliminary (i. e. ordinary) level at least, one's allegiance to different teachers 
is secondary to the conduct one exercises. It does not matter who one follows - as 
long as they act skilfully then they will have a good rebirth. This point is made 
explicitly in the followino passa0e fi-on-i the Agiwuru Ni*ký-o, a. 
"Monks, if a i-nonk ... ascetic ... 
Jain 
... slla\, el, lil, (, 
him with braided hair 
... the wanderer ... the 
follower of Maganda ... of the sect of 
the triple staff 
... of the unobstructed ... of the sect of 
Gotama ... of 
deva rites .. 
follow the 
course of five things, lie will be cast into hell. What fi\, e9 He destro\, s 
life, 
takes the not given ... 
1'654 
What is particularly slopilficant is that here, folio\\ ei-s of the 
Buddha, the 'sect 
iberation is of Gotama are included In tills list - no matter what oil 
's alleoiance, I 
not automatic, but depends upon skilful conduct. This is as true 
for t`6110\ýel-ý, Ot tile 
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Buddha as it is for any adherents to any other teachings. The focus is verv much upon 
personal effort in the realm of moral conduct-. 
"To bring about (life in) the heaven-worlds, it is of no use for an Arlyan 
disciple, yearning for heaven, either to pray for it or to think much of it, the 
steps that lead to heaven must be stepped by the Arlyan disciple, and when 
those steps are stepped by him, they lead to the winning of heaven, and he 
is a winner of the heaven world. 11655 
One does not have to be a follower of the Buddha to avoid being. reborn into an 
unpleasant realm; even if one does not have faith in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, 
but still has energy, effort, mindfulness, skilful conduct, and moderately approves of 
the Buddha's teaching, then one is not destined for an unpleasant rebirli. If, however, 
the ultimate goal is not simply a pleasant rebirth, but the cessation of suffering, then 
the perfection of moral conduct is not enough. In the S1111a656, Ananda 
highlights the supremacy of the Buddha's achievement and the consequent superiority 
of his teachings. He explains that no other school of wanderers have attained the 
perfection of morality, and even if they had, since they have not attained full insight, 
then they would think that they had reached the goal of their asceticism, when in fact 
there is still concentration and wisdom to perfect. 
The supremacy of the Buddha's attainment, and the fact that the 'holy life' is 
'fully successful and perfect' in the way that he teaches it, does not rilean that there is 
no value or efficacy in other teachingys: sorne passages in the Nik5yas put a strong 
emphasis on acceptance and tolerance of other schools. In the Alýgillluru N1"k5)'CI, the 
Buddha describes different levels of insight to be found arriongst other teachers: "Sorne 
wanderers are fools without understanding-, but some will know of one who has 
attachment - he has sorne attached remainder and sorne will 
kno%ý of one ýýho has no 
attachment - he has none. "657 Similarly, some will 
find happiness in this life and tile 
next as a result of their good conduct' 
"Any recluses and brahmins whatever in whorn has arisen irre, -, ular actions 
and who quickly casts them out, represses them, ends thern, 
brings thern to 
nothing, both fares happily here without trouble, despair and yearning, and 
at the separation of the body, after death, has to expect a 
happy destiny "(, 58 
This message is consistent with the idea of fiberative causation - since 
the process of 
cause and effect that the Buddha points out is a natural la%\, 
it t'ollo%\s that it operates 
for everybody. The stage of moral perfection, lio\\ever, is a preliminary 
one - 
055 A in 47, Hare 39-40. 
656D i 204-2 10: \Valslic 171-74. 
657 A iv 381. Hare 254. 
658 S ii 15 1, Rhys Davids 107. 
I 
187 
according to the Buddha, other teachers do not know how to progress further than 
that because they have not discovered this way for themSel%es. A follower of their 
teachings, then, is at a disadvantage because their teacher is ill-qualified to guide them. 
Although there may well be parts of their teaching that accord with the path towards 
liberation, it is ultimately incomplete. When a wanderer, Susima, converts to followinu, 
the Buddha he explains in strong terms the difference between his present teacher and 
his former one- "When compared with the attainment of an Ariyan disciple ýýho has 
won vision, of the person who has understanding, the attainment of recluses and 
brahmins who are Wanderers, heretical teachers, does not make up the hundredth, the 
thousandth, the hundredth thousandth part. 11659 In the Sutta Nip5ta, there is a passage 
where the Buddha uses an analogy of three fields, he likens an excellent, fertile field to 
his ordained disciples, a moderate field to his lay-disciples, and a pool- field to 
wanderers of other sects. The Buddha sows seed (representing the Dhamma) oil all of 
the fields, but is harder for the seeds to flourish on the ground of poorer quality 
"Then just like that field that is poor, hard, saltish, of bad soil, are 
wandering recluses and brahmins that hold other views than illille. I teach 
them the dhamrna that is lovely ... 
I make known to thern the righteous life 
that is wholly and utterly pure. Why so9 Because if it so be the\, can 
understand a single sentence, that will be for their profit and happiness for 
many a long day. "660 
Living under another discipline or following another teacher, then, places olle at a 
disadvantage, as the Buddha explains to the wanderer Bliaggava. 
_, gava, 
holding different views, being, of different "It is hard for you, Bhao 
inclinations and having a different teacher, to attain and remain in the 
deliverance called 'the Beautiful'. You must strive hard, putting your trust 
in me, the Buddha. 11661 
The passages we have seen so far, then, are not totally dismissive of other 
teachings, insofar as the Buddha recognises that other modes of practice call produce 
positive, skilful effects, and enable the practitioner to progress at least some kýay aloriu, 
the path to liberation. However, there is also a clear message that it Is only tile 
Buddha 
who knows the way to liberation in all its completeness, having, 
discovered It f0i 
himself He is thus the only truly reliable guide, and anybodý \ýJio 
fblloýýs a difl`erent 
'des are not sufficiently qUallficd 
,, ed 
because their teachers or gui teaching is disadvantaG n 
, it to the n(jht w-ay with the correct knowledge and experience to po In 
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Udumbarika-Sihandda Sulia: Acceptance of Other Teachings. 
I now wish to consider a passage in the Dighu Nikdya that sits rather uneasll\, 
with this message of the Buddha's superiority. It seems fair to assume (since the 
Buddha alone knows the way to complete liberation, and that wanderers of other sects 
will not attain this goal if they follow their inferior teachers) that the Buddha would 
urge members of other sects to follow his teaching and abandon their own. Indeed, in 
the last passage cited, the Buddha urges Bhaggava to switch his trust to the Buddha. 
We will now consider a certain passage from the Udumbat-iku-Sihallidu S1JttU662 
where this message is apparently contradicted with a thoroughgoing tolerance of other 
practices. This sutta gives an account of the Buddha's meeting with a group of 
wanderers called the Udumbarikas, under the leadership of an individual called 
Nigrodha. Nigrodha invites the Buddha to one of his assemblies of ýýanderers, 
believing that he will be able to outwit the Buddha, to "baffle him with a single 
question, ... 
knock hirn over like an empty' pot. "663 When the Buddha (who has 
telepathically understood Nigrodha's intention) arrives, Nigrodha asks him to explain 
"'What is this doctrine in which the Blessed Lord trains his disciples, and which those 
disciples whom lie has so trainýd as to benefit fi-oni it recognise as their principal 
support, and the perfection of the holy l1fe9 ... 664 The Buddha does not reply directly, 
but makes the statement that we have already seen elsewhere, that is hard for 
Nigrodha, who is subject to different influences, teachings and inclinations, to 
understand the Buddha's doctrine. Then, instead of explaining the Dharnnia, the 
Buddha asks Nigyrodha about his teaching: "'how are the conditions of austerity and 
self-mortification fulfilled, and how are they not fulfilled" "'665 This response in itself 
fills the Udumbarikans with respect for the Buddha who make a great commotion and 
exclaim- "'It is wonderful, it is marvellous how great are the powers of the ascetic 
Gotama in holding back with his own theories and inviting others to discuss theirsý `666 0 
Nigrodha quickly silences his followers, and only partially answers the 
Buddha's question. He admits that his group teach and adhere to "higher austerities", 
but asks the Buddha what would constitute their fulfilment or non-fulfilment. The 
Buddha replies at lenG i ina many different ascetic practices, such as ýýearlng , th, describi . 
and sleeping on thorns, refusing to drink water, and ritually bathing three times a 
day 
Having heard this list, Nigrodha maintains that, by these practices, the 'higher 
austerity' is fulfilled. The Buddha, how, ever, disagrees, maintaining instead that "this 
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higher austerity can be faulted in many ways. "667 He then provides an e\tensi\ e list of 
such f aults. For example, a self-mortifier who succeeds in his practice might become 
pleased with himself and disparage others, becomino -intoxicated with n concei 
alternatively he might practice for financial gain and status in the eyes of' kings and 
ministers. The Buddha goes on to list a series of such faults, including N, Hwy and 
jealousy, that can follow from the wrong attitude towards ascetic attainments. it is 
significant that one of the faults listed is withholding assent when "the Tathagatha or a 
disciple of the Tatlidgatha presents the Dhamma in a way that should command Ills 
11668 assent. Nigrodha agrees that all of these factors represent faults in the self 
mortifier. The Buddha then repeats tile list of attainments, but tills tinle ý\ ithout tile 
negative response to them, so that the self-mortifier is indeed 'purified' by Ills actions. 
Having heard this list, Nigrodha expresses the view that the higher austerity "attains its -D ID 
peak there, penetrating to the pith. 
"669 The Buddha's response at thi s stage follo\ý s 
the same pattern that we have seen in the other suttas, for lie maintains that what, 
according to Nigrodha, is the pinnacle of achievement, is only a preliminary stage in 
the Buddha's scheme- "No, Nigrodha, it does not attain its peak there, penetrating to 
the pith. It has only reached tile outer bark. 1116711 He then explains hoýý the pith is 
attained with a description of the gradual path to nibb, -ina, beoinning, with the lburfold 
restraint' of not harming living beings, not taking the not gi\, en, not lying, and not 
craving *for sense pleasures, and proi; ressingg thrOUgh tile four JI-i5nas until the four 
freedoms of mind are attained. At the end of this exposition, the Buddha explains that 
he has answered Ni rodha's original question about what doctrine the Buddha teaches 9 
his disciples- "It is by something, more far-reaching and excellent that I train them, 
through which they ... recognise as their principal SLIPPOI-t, and 
the perfection of the 
holy life. "671 Nigrodlia is clearly convinced and repents his former arrogance, asking 
the Buddha to accept him as one of his followers. Tile Udumbankalls are thrown into 
confusion when they recognise the inferiority of their own tradltlollý "'We and our 
teacher are ruined! We know of nothing higher or more far-reaching than our 
teaching. "1672 
So far, then, tills sutta follows the line of the others ýýe have 
looked at 
whilst Nigrodlia's teaching and practices call be beneficial, theý, do not go 
far enough 
and could not lead one to liberation. in this respect, thev are inferior to the 
teachill(Is 
of the Buddha. At this point in the Sutta, ho\ý, ever, there is an appareiitlý 
-tolerant' 
667 D iii 42, Walshe 387. 
668D iii 45, Walshe 389. 
()(")D ill 48. Walshe 390. 
670 Ibid. 
67 ID ill 52. WaIslic '92. 672 Ibid. 
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passage where, despite all the arguments pointing to the superiority of the Buddha's 
discipline, he appears to urge the other wanderers to stay within their own discipline. 
"You may think ' The ascetic Gotama says this in order to Let disciples. ' 
But you should not regard it like that. Let him who is your teacher renialn 
your teacher. Or you may think- 'He wants us to abandon our rules. ' But 
you should not regard it like that. Let your rules remain as tile% are. Or 
you may think, 'He wants us to abandon our way of fife. ' But you should 
not regard it like that. Let your way of life remain as it is. Or you rnay 
think: 'He wants to establish us in the doing of things that according to our 
teaching are wrong and are considered wrong among us. ' But you should 
not regard it like that. Let those things that you consider wrong continue 
to be so considered. Or you may think: 'He wants to draw us away frorn 
things that according to our teaching are good and are so considered 
among us. ' But you should not regard it like that. Let those thinus that 
you consider ood continue to be so considered. Nigrodlia, I do not speak 9 
for any of these reasons 
There are unwholesome things that ha\, e not been abandoned, 
tainted, conducive to rebirth, fearful, productive of painful results in the 
future, associated with birth, decay and death. it is for the abandonment 
of these things that I teach Dharni-na. if you practise accord i these 
ill develop and (, i-o%\, and you tainted things that make for purification w 
will attain to and dwell, in this very life, by your o\ý11 insight and 
realisation, in the fullness of perfected wisdom 
11673 
At first sight, this passage appears to portray a message of extrerne tolerance. The 
Buddha explicitly states that these other wanderers should let their w'ay of life remain 
4 as it is'. Since their way of life is not the sarne as that espoused by tile Buddha - and 
therefore is not tile holy life in all its fullness and perfection - it follows that tile 
Buddha would not a ree with some of their teachings and practices. it rna\, even 
be 
9 
gs that are (Yood' accordino to these other the case that, according to the Buddha, thin 0 
wanderers are in fact 'bad' (i. e. unskilful or irrelevant to the path) according to 
the 
Buddha. It is something of a surprise, then, that lie should apparentl\ condone 
the 
continuation of 'inferior' practices. 
lien understood as This apparently anornalous extract is best made sense of %ý 









to avoid having his reasons for teaching misunderstood. 
He (-, I\cs a list ot t3l', clV 
attributed motives for whv lie is teaching, and rejects thern all 
by insist", -' that tile 
I illslstelwc that the wandeieis should wanderers "should not regyard it like that. - His 
(, 7 1D 111 57-, Walslic 394. 
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carry on as they are is perhaps best understood as a form of deiwiiiLy these false 
motives. If the Buddha was really motivated by wanting to gain disciples from another 
teacher, he would never urge these disciples to remain with their teacher The fact that 
the Buddha does say this means that it cannot possibly be tile case that his motivation 
is to take disciples away from somebody else. It is as though the Buddha expresses 
these tolerant attitudes in order to demonstrate his argument. 
The first paragraph, then, is devoted to explaining what the Buddha's 
motivation is nol; the second, in contrast, describes what does motivate the Buddha to 
teach. It begins with a description of some of the various manifestations of suffering, 
and is followed by the Buddha's statement that he teaches Dhamma for "tile 
abandonment of these things. " If one follows the Mamma, then one reaches tile state 
of perfected wisdom where suffering ceases - it Is this goal that drives the Buddha's 
teaching. We have already seen fi-oni the evidence of other suttas, lio%ýever, that 
following the Dhamma is sometimes hindered or obstructed by tile practices of other 
groups - the best way to the follow the Dhamma is to follow the teachings of tile 
Buddha. This inevitably means that for a group like, for example, the materialist Aji 
vikas, who deny the operation of kaninia, this indeed means abandoning, at least some ID 
of their practices and values in order to follow tile Dhaninia. For some wanderers, at 
least, following tile Dharnnia foi- the abandonment of sufferinu \\ould meaii abaiidoning Z. 7 
their way of life, and abandoning their teacher. It IS thLIS hard to see ho\ý tile Buddha's 
claim that there is a specific way of practising in order to gain liberatioll call rest ýýith 
his insistence that lie does not want to change the practices of other groups This 
apparent inconsistency only appears to make sense when the meaning is restricted to 
the Buddha's motivation. If this is tile case, then the Buddha is arguing is that, Mille 
he is teaching things that may contradict and conflict with other teachim-, s and 
philosophies, he is not doing it just for the sake of gaining extra disciples, or 
undermining a certain teaching. He is simply teaching the path to the cessation of 
suffering, and this is his sole concern. Although his teaching may have tile effect of 
making a follower of a particular group redefine their sense of good and 
bad, or 
transform their way of life, this is a corollary of, and not the sole purpose of, the 
Buddha's teaching of the Dlianinia. 
This philosophy is elucidated in other passages In the 
N'ikayas ýOiere tile 
Buddha encourages his disciples not to *ud(ye other oroups, 
but silliplN, tO tcýlch 
Dj 
Dhamma. Oil one such occasion lie Instructs ills follo, \ers 
ho, \ to behave Mien theY 
meet wanderers with other views, lie tells them Ilelthel- to appl, ove or 
disapprove of' 
their teachings, but just to teach to them. If a teachill-1-1 is not condLICi\e 
to positiVe 
hat thev development of the path, a disciple should lot tell the other -', I'OLIP 
t 
s of holdinu false or entered upon the xý, -rong but simply state the consequence, 
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unhelpful doctrines or practices- "'The pursuit is a state beset by suff *, ering, vexation, 
despair, and fever, and it is the wrong way', then one teaches only the Dhamma' . , 
67, 
The Buddha himself demonstrates this approach when he is asked to evaluate 
the teachings of different wanderers- 
"'Master Gotama, there are these recluses and brahmins, each the head of 
an order, the head of a group, the teacher of a group, a well-known and 
famous founder of a sect regarded by many as a saint - that is, 
Paraiýa Kassapa, Makkliali Gos5la, 
... the Nigai * itlia 
Ndtaputta. Have they 
all had direct knowledge as they claim, or have none of them had direct 
knowledge, or have some of them had direct knowledge and some 
not? "1675 
The Buddha refuses to be drawn into such a Judgement, presurnably because it is not j 
beneficial to the development of the path: "'Enough, let this be. I shall teach you the 
111676 Dharnma. 
These passages thus seem more concerned with approach in dealing with other 
groups, rather than judging the value of their teachings. The fact that tile Buddha does 
not advocate direct criticism of other schools by his followers, or attempts to take 
others away from their original teachings and practices should not be read as a form of 
acceptance of their teachings as equal in value or efficacy. I 
Specific Groups 
Having considered some of the general philosophy that rifornis the Buddha's 
judgement of other schools, we will now look at those occasions in the Nikdyas where 
the Buddha or his followers explicitly mention or encounter wanderers of other sects. 
To begin with we will look at the S, ýInufifiuphula Sulla, in which the Buddha 
mentions six other wanderers by name, and points out their type of homeless life as 
fruitless. We will then consider the sections in the A4qJJh1177a Nikaya where the suttas 
dealing with the Buddha's encounters with wanderers and brahmins are grouped 
together into iwggas, or sections. 
Wanderers and Ascetics (Puribbojukus und Sumuýius)- 
SdEqLaj2Aýý 
- The SdinafifialAdu Simu directly follows the Frullmul'(1lu S"Itu in the J)igha Nikuya. 
.., peace In it, King Aj5tasattu resolves to visit a recluse or brahmill who is able to 
-brin(y 
"'M iii 232, BlukkIm Bodhi 108' 
675%1 1 198. Blukkim Bodlu 29 1. 
676 [bid. 
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to our heart5l His ministers suggest six different wandering ascetics that may be able 
to bring him peace, but the King is silent because on previous visits to each of these 
teachers, he was unsatisfied with their answers to his question about the rewards that 
are the fruit of the homeless life. When the King goes to consult the Buddha, he 
explains what happened in his encounters with these other teachers, and recounts how 
unsatisfactory he found them. He is then satisfied with the Buddha's ans%ýers to his 
questions, and becomes a follower of the Buddha. 
In this sutta. other wanderers are used for the polemical purpose of throwing 
into relief the fruitfulness of the Buddha's way of life. Bhikkhu Bodhi suggests that 
the Sdniafifizaphalu Sulfa is deliberately placed after the bwhmajalu Sittla to offer a 
positive statement about the right way of practising after explaining hoýý iioi to 
practise: 
"the Sumai'li'laphala Sllnu takes over preclselN, where the 
BruhniujUja Sitliu leaves off ... whereas the 
1))1-u1nnujU-1u Simu has tile 
negative task of pointing out the dangers and futility inherent in wrong 
views, the Silnui-ifial)hulu Siwu sounds a triumphant and lyrical 
proclamation of the ftuitfulness of a course of spiritual training founded 
upon right view. "677 
Each of the six teachers that the king finds unsatisfactory are representative of 
views outside orthodox Brahmanism - as we shall see presently, tile Buddha deals 
with the brahmins at length elsewhere in the Majjhijim Nikc-qu. The vie%ýs attributed 
to these teachers cover a spectrum of wrong views, ran(yino froni views that can be 
placed in the 'at odds with the holy life' category of the Scwdcik, -i Sull(i (p 160ff) to 
those which are in the 'without comfort or security' category. Tile first teacher that the 
king describes to the Buddha is Ntrapa Kassapa, who is a naked wanderer. When the 
King asks him "Can you point to ... a reward visible 
here and now as a fruit of. the 
homeless life? ", Nirai. ia Kassapa does not answer the question, but simply 
begins 
teaching his beliefs about tile inefficacy of action in which he denies that either good or 
bad actions bears fruit. His teachings, as a complete denial of tile causality so central 
to the Buddha's teachings, correspond to the first way that negates tile 
holý life 
described in the Salidaka Sillici. Interestingly, however, the views in thernselves are 
not directly criticised - instead, tile King is 
displeased at P[irai. la Kassapa Is failure to 
answer the question- "Just as if oil being asked about a nian('Yo tree 
lie ýýere to describe 
n Z. ) 
a bread-fruit tree, or oil being asked about a breadftuit tree 
lie %ýei, e to describe a 
mango, so Pflirai 
, 
ia Kassapa, oil being asked about the tI rults of 
tile hornelelIoS life, 
6 78 the King's reason tor not explained non-action to- me. Even then, 
677 Bliikkliu Bodlu. The Discow'scsOll ihe I, ruils 'If pp. 1-2. 
678D 153, Walshe 94. 
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employing Parapa Kassapa in his court is not presented in the form of a direct criticism 
of Pfiraiia Kassapa - instead, the king explains how he did not want to ll%, e %ý ith a 
constant feeling of displeasure towards somebody in his kingdom: 
I thought, 'How should one like me think despitefully of any ascetic or 
Brahmin dwelling in my territory? "', so I neither applauded nor rejected 
Paratia Kassapa's words but, though displeased, not expressing niý, 
displeasure, saying nothing, rejecting and scorning speech, I got up and 
5)679 left 
. 
For each of the six teachers, whatever the view expressed, King AidtasattLi has the 
same response - when each teacher in turn fails to answer his question, he does not 
express his displeasure, but simply leaves, regardless of the view that has just been 
expressed. 
The second teacher to see the king is Makkhall Gos5la, who is the leader of 
the Aj-lvlkas, a group of wanderers with fatalistic doctrines. Bilikkilu Bodhi explains 
that Makkhali Gos5la was an early associate with the Jain teacher, Nigai. itha NdtaPLIWI 
before they were driven apart by a split. The Ajiwikas maintained that the entire 
cosmos was controlled by destiny or fate and therefore denied the efficacN, of 
human effort or action, thus directly opposing the view set forth by the Buddha. As a 
spokesman for this philosophy, Makkhali Gos5la tells King Aj5sattu that there is "no 
cause or condition for the purification of beill(yS"690 but that all bemos go through six 
pre-determined spells of rebirth before automatically reaching an end of sufferim-) when 
this time is completed. 
The third teacher, Ajita Kesakambah is a materialist who is a mouthpiece for 
the sort of views that we have seen the Buddha explicitly reject as wrong, ý'iews in 
other suttas- for example, the belief that "there is no fruit or result of good and bad 
deeds 
... 
fools and wise, at the breaking-up of the body, are destroyed and perish, they 
do not exist after death. " 
The fourth teacher, Pakudha Kacc5yana, similarly denies the basis for moral 
action, but for the very different reason that he believes that the individual soul is 
indestructible, and that the seven items of earth, %vater, fire, air, pleasure, pain and the 
life-principle are all uncreated and stable, not subject to impermanence 
As a result, 
la ing his Pakudha believes that one cannot be ouilty of killing another being, thus Pct 
teaching morally and philosophically at odds with the Buddha's 
The next teacher mentioned is tile leader of tile 
Jains, Niumi. i! ha VIMPLitta 
Walshe argues that the characterisation of the Nigai. ilha N5taputta's 'Ie,, s 1" 
this sutta 
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enclosed by all curbs, cleared by all curbs, and claimed by all curbs. "681) do "not 
represent genuine Jain teaching. " The 'genuine' fourfold restraint taw-yht by the Jains 
is largely concerned with the avoidance of evil. Bhikkhu Bodhi suggests that, since the 
Jains agree with the fruitfulness of the holy life and ultimately claim to bring all end to 
suffering, "to have introduced these views here would have required diveri-, ence from 
the forward movement of the sutta. 11681 Elsewhere, however, there are some detailed 
and more accurate presentations of Jain beliefs, and the Buddha's opinion of theM683. 
The last teacher to be mentioned is Safijaya BelattliallUtta who is a sceptic. His 
views directly correspond to those of the eel-wrigglers in the A-uhmajula S1111u, for he 
answers all questions with evasion, and, like all the other teachers, does not even be(-'III 
to address the question put to hirn by the King. 
Each of these six teachers and the viewpoints they express are found on other 
occasions in the Nik5yas. Although the teachers are not mentioned, the materialist, 
antinomian, fatalist and atomist views expressed by A. 1ita Kesakambah, 
ParaiIa Kassapa, Makkhali Gos5ila and Padukha respectively fornn the four types of 
abrahmacariyamsa in the SalOcikci Si/l/Cl. 684 Bashani explains that there are some 
passages in the Nik5yas where the deterministic views expressed bý, 
Makkliali Gos5la in the SU1nufifiuj)hu1u Simu are attributed to P[irai. ia Kassapa. 6115 He 
explains that the views expressed by both at different tirnes are "those most 
characteristic of the later Apivikas. "686 
When King Aj5tasattu has finished describing these encounters, tile Buddha 
makes no comment about the different teachers. Instead lie answers the k1mg's 
explamino these initialk, as question about the fruits of the homeless life thoroughly, 
'material' advantages, insofar as a nionk is treated with more reverence and respect 
than those in many other roles. He then gives the description of the gradual path to 
liberation, beginning with the arising of faith in the Tatlidgatlia and the perfection of 
morality, and explains the fruits of each stage, such as contentment, 
health, calm and 
so on. Ultimately a disciple knows that lie has attained tile cessation of suffering, and 
thus attains the most perfect of the fruits of the homeless life. 
687 
There are a number of sionificant things about this sutta 
Firstly, ýýe have 
already seen the Buddha's emphasis on the importance of 
knowino and seeing" for 
oneself. In the Canki SIVIU688, we sa%ý how the Buddha advocates the 
'preservation ot 
681D 157, Walslic 97. 
682BIiikkliu Bodlil. Yhe Discoul-se ofihe Fruils of Recluseship, P 
7; 
683 See below P. 2022 13. 
684M i 514-5- BlukkIlLi Bodlu 619-620. 
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Am 38. 685 See for x uple S 11,69. Woodward 6 1. Sv 126, \VoodNurcl 
10- 3 Kirc 27, 
686A. L. Basliam. Histoýv and Docii-ine (? f'lhe. 
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truth' by investigating a teacher and seeing if he lives up to his teachl I Is and h* 
reputation. This is what King Ajdtasattu does in the Siýlnufiýiuphulu sutia - he goes 
to see various different teachers and 'investigates' them by asking them a question. 
The reader or hearer of the sutta is presented with the evidence that the King finds as a 
result of this investigation, and the Buddha himself does not speak against these vieký s 
- the fact that the other six teachers fail to answer the King's question is allowed to 
speak for itself This relates to the Buddha's insistence that the Dhamma is tile way 
things really are - since it is the Truth, it speaks for itself Similarly, unlike tile other 
six teachers, the Buddha does not immediately surni-narise his doctrinal beliefs %ý hell 
faced with the King's question. Instead, lie describes a process of conduct whereby 
one can discover the Dhamma for oneself 
We can infer frorn what we are told in other suttas, particularly the Salidaka 
SUIld89, and the J? i-uhjnajct1uSjjjjU690 , that all the views attributed to the six teachers 
are in fact wrong views, because they fail to provide philosophical justification for 
those factors, such as restraint from killing, that provide tile foundations for posItIVC 
development towards the cessation of suffering. However, no such direct Judgment is 
given in the S, (ýmufifiuphulu Sititu. The views are not *udoed in themselves, but it Is j --, I 
their advocates who undermine them by being unable to ans\\er tile King's question, 
demonstrating a blindness to his needs and an attachment to expressing their o%ý11 
views that casts doubt upon their wisdorn and sensitivity as teachers. III contrast, tile 
Buddha is able to answer the question fully and in such a way that the King develops 
significantly along the path that the Buddha describes III this way, the msdom and 
superior knowledge and Insight of the Buddha is highlighted in comparison to the 
ignorance of the six teachers. 
Paribbdiukavaggy 
. 
The Pui-ibbiýjukuvaggu of the Middle Fifty Suttas of the 
Majhima Nik5ya (A4qjjhimupuýiýOsupuji) consists of reports of tile Buddha's dealings 
with other wanderers whorn he meets, or who come to seek him out. In the seventh 
sutta of this section, the A4u1u-1sA1i1u); i Sullu, the six teachers of the 
ayin meets the Sdmafifiaphulu Sima are mentioned again. A \vanderer called Sakuluda i 
Buddha, and explains that lie has heard of the six teachers, but 
has also heard that tlieý, 
are not universally venerated. For example, in the case of 
Hirapa Kassapa, lie has 
heard that "This PL-irapa Kassapa is the head of an order ... regarded 
bý many as i 
saint, yet he is not honoured, respected, revered, and venerated 
bv his disciples. nor do 
689M 1 513-524- B lik I Ii klm Bodhi 618-628. 




his disciples live in dependence on him, honouring and respecting him. "691 He then 
explains why Kassapa is not venerated - when he was teaching Dhamma to 'several 
hundred of his followers', some of his followers urged others not to ask him certain 
questions, because he would be unable to answer them. Instead, only they, Kassapa's 
followers, were able to answer. Kassapa objected, 'waved his arms and wailed' and 
demanded the right to answer the question. We then learn that many of his disciples 
left having refuted Kassapa's doctrine- "'Your doctrine is refuted. You are proved 
wrong. Go and learn better, disentangle yourself if you can! "692 
The same formula is repeated for each of the remaining five teachers - they 
are tcscorned by the scorn shown to their Dhamma". 693 Sakuluddyin then explains that, 
in contrast, he has heard that the Buddha's followers are united in their reverence for 
him, and that when he teaches they listen in rapt silence and concentration. Even those 
who fall out with their companions and return to lay life still speak well of the Buddha, 
Dhamma and Sangha, blaming themselves and not others. The Buddha then asks 
Sakuluddyin whether he can identify any of the qualities for which he is so revered. 
Importantly, this question moves the emphasis away from hearsay, and on to 
Sakuluddyin's personal experience. 
Sakuluddyin then goes through a series of qualities for which the Buddha is 
revered, beginning with his exemplary way of living, and moving on to his perfect 
morality and wisdom. We are told that the Buddha possesses the supreme aggregates 
of virtue and wisdom. In contrast to the other teachers who know things only through 
tradition, revelation and hearsay, the Buddha has direct personal knowledge of what he 
teaches, and this is why his teaching is 'convincing' "The recluse Gotama teaches the 
Dhamma through direct knowledge, not without direct knowledge, he teaches the 
Dhamma with a sound basis, not without a sound basis, he teaches the Dhamma in a 
convincing manner, not in an unconvincing manner. "694The Buddha then explains that, 
since he is possessed of the supreme aggregate of wisdom fie is able to refute arw 
doctrines taught by others- "It is impossible that lie should not foresee the 
future 
courses of doctrine695 or that lie should not be able to confute with reasons the current 
doctrines of others. "696 
691M ii 3-, Bliikkiiu Bodiii 630. 
6921bid. 
693 Ibid. 
694M ii 9, Bliikkliu Bodlii 6-35. 
-tile BLIddli'l ulicici-stailds, 111 of 111C 695BIiikkliu Bodiii understands this statc, "ClIt to 111c, "I till', 
unexpressed illlpllcýjtioiis of Ills own doctrine as well as of 
ills opponcilts' doctrines (p. 12 
1 
"', 1.1101C 
761. ) He also suggests that. as ill tile R/ vh117aj-01a Stma. tile 
Buddha "IMs laid doNN 11 1 critique 
I 
applicable to any doctrine that might arise ill tile future course of 
rcilgio-PhilOSOPIlical though 
(Ibid. ) 
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Here, then, wanderers of other sects are criticised on two broad grounds - 
firstly, their followers are ill-disciplined and argumentative, and do not revere their 
teacher. Instead, the teacher has to compete with them, for some followers believe theN, 
know more than he does. Secondly, the teachers themselves are not respected simply 
because they are not worthy of the respect - they are not able to answer all the 
questions put to them. In contrast, the worthiness of the Buddha's Dhamma is 
testified by the respectful behaviour of his followers, by the Buddha's conduct, and by 
the depth and extent of his knowledge. 
The theme that other wanderers are lacking in direct knowledge and make 
empty or hollow claims is one that informs many of the suttas in this section. In the 
Mdgandiya Sima, the Buddha speaks to a wanderer, M5gandiya, who maintains that 
"The greatest of all gains is health, n1bb5iia is the greatest bliss. "691 He understands 
'health' to refer to physical health, and nibb5na to be the state of enjoying physical 
health and happiness. The Buddha replies that Wgandiya is ensilared and blinded by 
the sense pleasures, and not knowing anything of any worlds beyond tile sense-sphere, 
believes that sense pleasures are the highest bliss. He is like a blind niall who accepts a 
dirty, soiled rag having been told it is a beautiful, spotless cloth, by an unscrupulous 
salesman. The blind mail's mistake is to accept tile cloth simply out of faith in tile illan 
with eyesight, without 'knowing and seeing' for himself Tile Buddha explains llo%k it 
is just the same with wanderers fi-oni other sects who do not kno%ý, and see for 
themselves, "... the wanderers of other sects are blind and visionless. They do not 
know health, they do not see nibbana, yet they utter this stanza thusý 'The greatest of 
all gains is health, nibb5na is the highest bliss. "'698 
The Buddha explains that the clairn about health and iubbdna has been 
misappropriated by ordinary people who have incompletely remembered a stanza 
taught by previous Buddhas, which explains that tile eightfold path is tile %kay to the 
Deathless. Ordinary people, however, have not remembered this part - they, 
including M5gaiidiya, do not have "that noble vision" (uojýu c-ukk1m) by "Ilicli t1ley 
can know and see health and nibb5na, and instead blindly identify the greatest 
health as 
referring to the physical body, which is in fact "a disease, a tuniour, a 
dart, a calainitý, 
and an affliction. "699 Continuing tile analogy of the blind man, tile 
Buddha explains his 
role as a physician, %.,,, Iio recommends to the blind man a course of treatment 
which 
restores his sight and enables him to see for himself that tile cloth 
lie once belieýýed was 
spotless and pure is in fact filthy and ragged. So bN, 
following the teaciiing, of the 
-Nn 
697M i 509ý Bliikk-Iiii Bodlii 6 l'). 
698m i 510ý Blilkk-liti Bodlii 614. 
699M i5 10-, Blilkk-liti Bodlii 615. 
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Buddha, Mdgaiidiya can know health and see nibb5na for himself , and therefore free 
himself of the clinging to the five aggregates (khaiidhas) which causes suffering. 
On hearing the Buddha speak thus, Mdgandiya gains confidence in the Buddha, 
and believes that "'Master Gotama is capable of teaching me the Dhamma in such a 
way that I might rise up from this seat and be cured of my blindness. `700 The Buddha 
then suggests the course of action that Mdgandiya must now take. - 
"Mdgandiya, associate with true men. When you associate with true men, 
you will hear the true Dharnma. When you hear the true Dhamma, you will 
practise in accordance with the true Dhamma. When you practise in 
accordance with the true Dhamma, you will know and see for yourself 
thus: 'These are diseases, tumours, and darts, but here these diseases, 
turnours and darts cease without remainder. With the cessation of my 
clinging comes the cessation of being, with the cessation of being, the 
cessation of birth, with the cessation of birth, ageing and death, sorrow, 
lamentation, pain, grief, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this 
whole mass of suffering, "'701 
This passage highlights the difference between the 'blind faith' possessed by 
wanderers of other sects in this passage, and the faith or confidence possessed by a 
disciple of the Buddha. For the Buddha's disciple, faith is a preliminary step, that 
which enables one to progress along the course of action that the Buddha 
recommends, allowing the process of 'salvific causation' to operate. It is ultimately 
superseded by direct knowledge and vision. However, in the case of the 'blind 
wanderers' all they have is a faith that is unfounded in knowledge or vision. 
The theme of inferior or unfounded knowledge is repeated in the 
Cfi! asaku1ud5yiSjjjjU702 . Here, the wanderer 
SakUlUd5y1n again speaks to the Buddha 
about his encounter with Nigai * itlia 
NatapUtta, the Jain. He explains that Nigaptlia Nd 
taputta claimed to have 'complete knowledge and vision', consistently omniscient and 
all-seeing. However, when Sakultid5yin asked him a question concerning the past, 
Nigai. itha N5taptitta was apparently thrown- "he prevaricated, led the talk aside, and 
showed angler, hate and bitterness. """. Here, then, just as in the 
Mali5sakulud5yi Sutta, Nigantha N5taptitta's clainis to have the qualities of a great 
teacher are shown to be empty, to fail to stand up to investigation. 
The Buddha, however, when asked the sarne questions about the past 
bý, 
Sakuluddyin also declines to ansý\, er, not, lie explains, because 
lie is unable to, but 
700M 15 12. Blukkhu Bodlu 616. 
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simply because it would not be conducive to SakUlLid5yiii's development or welfare 
"But let be the past, Uddyin, let be the future. I shall teach you tile Dhamma. '1 70-4 
The Buddha then questions Uddyin about his own teachers' doctrine. t'd5 
yin's reply is vague and tautologous - he explains that his teachers say- "'This is the 
perfect splendour"1705When the Buddha asks what they are referring to when they 
speak of the perfect splendour, Uddyin can only reply by restating the definition in 
different terms- "'That splendour is the perfect splendour which is unsurpassed by any 
other splendour higher or more sublime. "'. The Buddha responds that this process of 
circular definition could go on for a long time. He likens Ud5yin and his teachers to a 
man who claims to be in love with the most beautiful woman in the country %ýithout 
knowing her or seeing her, without even knowing what she looks like. Just as such a 
man's talk 'turns out to be nonsense', so is with the claim that 'this is the perfect 
splendour' without even knowing what that splendour is. 
When the Buddha continues the critique of Ud5yiii's position, fie points out 
that furthermore, Ud5yin has no experience of the many different types of splendour, 
so he is in no position to judge which is the highest. The Buddha talks Ud5yin through 
examples of increasing splendour and brightness, beginnino with the splendour of the I Z_ 
light of a glow-worm, and ultimately progressing to the light of the sun at midday, and 
uses this to demonstrate Ud5iyin's foolishness- 
"Beyond this, Ud5yin, I know of very many gods [whose splendour] the 
radiance of the sun and moon does not match, yet I do not say that there is 
no other splendour higher or more sublime than that splendour. But you, 
Uddyin, say of that splendour which is lower and meaner than a (flow- 
worms- 'This is the perfect splendour, yet you do not indicate what that 
splendour I S. " 1116 
There are two counts here oil which the Buddha criticises the teaching 
advocated by Ud5yin. Firstly, the fiact that Ud5yin is unable to fully explain his claims 
when questioned demonstrates that they are not grounded in personal knowledge and 
experience, which, as we have seen, are key criteria for truth in the Buddha's teaching 
Uddyin is thus making a claim which does not stand up to investigation. Secondly, the 
Buddha is able to see what Uffiiyin and his teachers cannot. The implication in tile 
Buddha's rebuke that Ud5yin praises as tile perfect splendour that which is -lo\ýer and 
rneaner than a glow-worm's' su(, (-, Yests that the Buddha is able to see 
Miat their claims 
refer to even though they themselves are unclear about it. Not only thl,, 
but haviM-1 
of splendour, tile many oreater forills seen with his superior knowledoe and insight 
704M 11 '32, Bliikkliti BodIn 655 
705M ii 33, Blilkkliu Bodlu 650 
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Buddha can see that the object of Uddyin's praise is not worthy of being kýorshipped. 
Uddyin's ignorance, then, is shown on two levels - firstly, because he cannot justifý- 
or support his claims, and secondly because he is making claims that he is not qualified 
to make, for he is coming from a position of blindness. There is a certain arrogance - 
audacity even - implied in making claims that even the Buddha does not make, whilst 
having only a fraction of the Buddha's knowledge. Uddyin is duly chastened, 
however, by the Buddha's criticisms and concedes that 'The Buddha has terminated 
the discussion" because "on being pressed and questioned and cross-questioned about 
our own teacher's doctrine by the Blessed One, we are found empty, hollow and 
mistaken. " 707 
The remaining passages of the Cfilusukulud5yi Suna are also Interesting, 
because they turn to some common ground between the beliefs and values held by 
Uddyin's teachers and the Buddha. Ud5yin explains that his teachers claim that 'There 
is an entirely pleqsant world, there is practical way to realise an entirely pleasant 
world. 1708 This is a clairn that is also made by the Buddha later in the Sutta709. 
However, there is a fundamental difference between Ud5yffl's view and the Buddha's 
teaching about what this entirely pleasant world consists of, and tile 'practical k\ýiy to 
attain it'. Uddyin and his teachers believe that an entirely pleasant world is attained by 
skilful conduct - Interestingly, this is explained in terms of the five precepts, 
demonstrating definite common ground with the Buddha over what constitutes ethical 
action. An alternative to practising this method of keepin(y, the five precepts is to 
undertake and practise "some kind of ascet ICI SM. "7 10 
The Buddha's criticism of this path is basically that it does not go far enough, 
and does not lead one to the cessation of suffering He elicits from Ud5yin a 
recognition that, even if one were to keep the five precepts or practise a form of 
asceticism, then one would still feel "both pleasure and pain", and not exclusivek, 
pleasure. Uddyin admits that one cannot realise an "entirely pleasant world" by 
"following a way of mixed pleasure and pain", and once again concedes that his 
teachers' doctrine has been shown to be "empty, hollow and mistaken" in the face of 
the Buddha's questioning,. The Buddha then gives his account of an "entirely pleasant 
world", and the path to realise it. This description begins %\here Ud5yin's 
. 
left off, 
when a monk is "secluded fi-oni" sensual pleasures and unwholesome states, it Is then 
that he can progress through tile first threefliunus', which the Buddha identifies as the 
way to realise the entirely pleasant world. The -entirely pleasant ý\orld- Is Identitled as 
the attainment of the fourtliflia-liu, 
707M n 36, BliikkliLi Bodhi 659 
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"With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous 
disappearance of joy and grief, a bhikkhu enters and abides I in the fourth 
jhdiia, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity of mindfulness due to 
equanimity. He dwells with those deities who have arisen in an entirely 
pleasant world and he talks with them and enters into conversation ýýith 
them. It is at this point that an entirely pleasant world has been 
realised. 11711 
The division here between the first three jhdnas as "only the way" to tile realisation of 
an entirely pleasant world, and the fourth jhdiia as its attainment is significant, 
Uddyin's teachers are thrown into confusion at the point when the Buddha describes 
the way as the first three jhdnas- "When this was said, the wanderer SakulLiddyin's 
assembly made an uproar, saying very loudly and noisily- 'We are lost along with our 
own teachers' doctrines! We are lost along with our own teachers' doctrinesl We 
know nothing higher than that! "'712 As Bhikkhu Bodhi explains, the meaning of this is In 
elucidated in the commentary, originaily, meditators were able to attain the third Jildna, 
but as time went on, lost the ability to do so. Thus the current wanderers only know of 
this world second-hand, and have no experience of anything beyond that-, "The 
wanderers only learned that 'an entirely pleasant world' exists and that tile five 
qualities mentioned ... were the 'practical way' to 
it. They knew of no entirely pleasant 
world higher than the third jh5na, and of no practical way higher than the five 
qualities. "113 
Once again, then, the Buddha's teaching is shown to be far more efficacious III 
reaching states of attainment than others. Just like the previous wanderers of other 
sects that the Buddha encountered, Uddyin's teachers have incomplete knowledge, are 
acting on hearsay and authority without knowing the way to 'an entirely pleasant 
world' through their own direct experience. Even what their predecessors did know, 
however, is incomplete compared to the knowledge of the Buddha, for they never 
attained a state beyond the third Jh5na. Furthermore, tile Buddha goes on to distance 
himself from the teachers of Sakti] tid5yin on the grounds of motivation too For them, 
a reallsation of an 'entirely pleasant world' is the ultimate attainment of the holy 
life. 
The Buddha, however, describes this as a mere stage in the process, for "'there are 
other states, ... 
higher and rnoi I is for the sake of realising -e sublime [than that] and it =1 
them that bhikklius lead the holy life under me. 111714 He then goes on to 
describe these 
states using the formula of the gradual path, beginning wth the 
description of tile 
arrival of a Tath5gatha in the world through to the attainment of the 
four Jh5nas . -\fter 
7"M li 37ý Blukkliti Bodlil 000- 
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this, with a mind "purified, bright, unblemished, rid of imperfection, malleable, ýkieldy, 
steady, and attained to imperturbability"715, the disciple recollects past lives. and ýýith 
"the divine eye", sees the passing away and the arising of beings according to their 
kamma. Finally, he knows that the taints (isul-us) are destroyed, and attains 
knowledge of the destruction of suffering, thus liberating his mind. Each attainment 
after the fourth jhdna is described by the Buddha as one of the 'higher and more 
sublime states' for which the holy life is lived under his instruction. 
Sakuluddyin and his teachers, then, are portrayed as inferior to the Buddha on 
many counts; their claims are not grounded in personal experience, such that tile%, 
cannot explain or justify their beliefs with any degree of certainty, they have very 
limited insight, which is far exceeded by the Buddha, yet they continue to make claims 
about the way to liberation, even were one to attain tile pinnacle of achievement 
according to their systern, one would not have attained the cessation of sutTering, but 
would simply have reached a certain stage in the path thereto. Compared to the 
Buddha's teaching, then, their systern is incomplete. 
This message is reinforced by certain sections of tile VjuhUvuggu of the 
Sam s mth other .. )4ilta 
Nikuya where the Buddha's disciples report their meeting, 
wanderers. The first such account involves some disciples of the Buddha deciding, to 
visit a group of wanderers who hold other views. These wanderers claim to teach tile 
same teachings as the Buddha- "We also thus teach doctrine to our disciples, saying 
'Come ye, friends! Abandoning the five hindrances, the taints of the heart ývhlcll cause 
weakening of insight, do ye cultivate the seven limbs of wisdorn. "'11 They then 
approach the Buddha's disciples with a question- "What is the distinction, what the 
peculiarity of, what is the difference between Gotanna the recluse's teaching of doctrine 
and our teaching, between his instruction and our instructi 011.1'717 The Buddha's 
disciples do not respond, but go and seek the Buddha to ask ho%ý, they should answer 
the question. The Buddha tells them that they should ask the other wanderers how the 
five hindrances becorne ten, and how the seven limbs of wisdom are fourteen. The 
answer to this question is that three hindrances, sense-desire, aversion, and doubt, can 
be both within the self and outside it, whilst the single hindrance of laziness and 
sleepiness can be seen as two hindrances, as can excitement and depression 
When 
considered in this way, the five hindrances are ten. The se%en limbs of %ýisdom are 
mindfulness, discrimination of dhaninia, equipoise, *oy, concentration, tralIqUillity and J .1 
strength. Mindfulness, discrimination and equipoise can be reterred to 
both internal 
and external objects, thus each one becomes a pair. Joy and consciousness 
beý: onie 
715M 11 38. Bliikkliu Bodlu 60 1. 
716S ý, 108, WoodNurd 9 1. 
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pairs when it is understood that they can be both associated with and dissociated from 
initial and sustained thinking. Tranquillity and strength can both be applied to the bod\' 
and the mind. In this way, the seven limbs become fourteen. The Buddha explains that 
other wanderers will not be able to answer this question, because they do not have 
sufficient insight. His words are worth quoting in sorne length, for they provide a clear 
example of a claim to supremacy over other groups- 
"When questioned as to this, monks, the Wanderers of other views will be 
unable to explain themselves, and further will come to an ill pass. Why so? 
Because, monks, it is beyond their scope. For I behold not, monks, anyone 
in the world, with its devas and its Mdras, its Brahiii5s, with its host of 
recluses and brahmins, with its devas and mankind, who could satisfy the 
mind with an answer to these questions, save only a Tath5gatha or a Tath5 
gatlia's disciples, or at any rate after hearing it of them. "718 
This is fQllowed by two more instances where the Buddha's teaching is 
compared favourably with apparently similar ones espoused by other wanderers. Tile 
second occurrence is a further way of supporting tile Buddlia's. superior knowledge 
about the seven limbs of wisdorn. He explains that other teachers would not be able to 
explain which limbs of wisdom should be cultivated Mien the mind is sluggish, and 
which should be cultivated when the mind is excited. 719 Tile Buddha and his disciples 
are the only ones who know tile answer to this question. In the third instance, other 
wanderers claim to teach the abandoning of the hindrances and tile development of tile 
four freedoms of mind, namely loving kindness (Inellj), sympathetic joy (inuditu), 
compassion (kul-iqid) and equanimity (upekkhu). These things are also taught by the 
Buddha. However, the Buddha explains that no other teachers would be able to 
explain how these factors are developed, what their outcome is, their perfection, their 
gnificant thimys about ConCIUSion. 72 -71 fruit, and their 0. Gethin remarks that one of the si- - 
these passages is that they demonstrate the Buddha's apparent acceptance that there 
are some teachings that resemble his own - lie does not flatly deny their teachinos 
"It is surely striking that in none of the three cases is tile Buddha 
represented as categorically denying the wanderers' claim to a teaching that 
bears sorne similarity to his own ... 
in other %\ords, tile Nik5yas seem to 
accept some form of basic common ground betýýeen the Buddha and tile 
wanderers. "121 
a complete denial of tile The superiority of the Buddha's teaching is not maintained by 
teachings of others, rather, it is seen as the teaching in its uniqUel\ 
f1ill de\ clopille"t 
'18S N' 109. Woodward 92. 
719S N, 112-5-, Woodward 95-8. 
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"The wanderers of other schools may abandon the nivarapas and develop the seven 
bojhangas, but the full potential inherent in this practice is not understood or fulfilled 
by them. In short, they do not really understand what they are doing. " 72 2 
We have already seen that the path put forward by the Buddha can be 
understood as a 'natural law' that operates in reality independent of any teaching about 
it. it is important to notice that, in the suttas we have looked at, the ilidnas, the 
hindrances, the seven factors of awakening, and the four freedoms of mind are 
mentioned in the context of other schools, and teachings. This reinforces the fact that 
the law of 'salvific causality' operates universally - it is not the exclusive property of 
the Buddha's 'school', but the same 'spiritual landmarks' operate for everybody, given 
the right causes and conditions. The implication of the C51usuku1ud5. ), -iSu11u, though, 
is that Sakuluddyin and his group of wanderers are locked into a state of ignorance, 
and will not be able to progress to tile cessation of suffering as long as theý, stay ý\ ithin 
that teaching. A clear message of the superiority and greater efficacy of the Buddha's 
teaching runs through this sutta. The same message runs through the extracts from 
the Mah5vaggu. This raises some Important questionsý even though the causality of 
salvation is in principle open to everybody, because it is 'objectively' tile case, is It only 
followers of the Buddha who have the right 'directions' or instructions to realise V 
MAdvaggy 
In the T ekhalia. y. ýýi 
S11/1C1723, the wanderer called Kacc5na Vekhanassa has 
similar views to Uddyin about the 'perfect splendour', and is unable to explain his 
beliefs in much the sarne way. Tile Buddha again points this out, and then explains the 
five cords of sensual pleasure (corresponding to the senses) to Vekhanassa and 
explains how there are fbi-ther pleasures that transcend these. When Vekhanassa 
marvels at the Buddha's teachings about the 'higher pleasures', the Buddha e\plalns 
how the wanderer is very disadvantaged by following a different teaching, 
"Kacc5na, for you who are of another view, who accept another teaching, 
who approve of another teaching, who pursue a different training. who 
follow a different teacher, it is hard to know what sensuality is. or 
Miat 
sensual pleasure is, or what tile pleasure higher than the sensual is 
But 
those bhikkhus who are arahants with taints destro\ed, who 
have lived tile 
holy life, done what had to be done, laid do%\ n the 
burden, reached the true 
goal, destroyed the fetters of being, and are completely 
liberated thi-01.1ý1111 
2. 7 "Ibid. 
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final knowledge - it is they who would know what sensuality is -what the pleasure higher than the sensual IS. "724 
This passage is very significant, for it suggests that other teaching's obscure 
truth from a disciple, and prevent them from seeing clearly with insq; ht. I "msh to 
suggest that there are two ways of interpreting the Buddha's claim that is hard for 
those from other teachings to know what sensuality is. Firstly, it could be understood 
that they do know what these things are in that they do not understand it in terms of 
the Buddhist rubric. This would correspond to Collins's interpretation of right view as 
tacquaintance with Buddhist doctrine'725 . 
Secondly, the passage can be taken at face 
value to mean that it is simply difficult for others to see the way things reallý, are when 
their insight is obscured by wrong views and practices. In the first interpretation, truth 
is inextricably linked with - in a sense, a product of - 'Buddhist rubric', the 
Buddha's vision of the world. In the second, the truth is there irrespective of the 
Buddha's teaching, but this teaching simply facilitates its realisation. 
Followei-s of Nigai * itha 
Ndtaputta. 
In the following section I will consider sorne of the suttas in %\ hich the Buddha 
encounters Nigaptlia. Mitaputta or his followers. Nigai. iýha N5taptitta is identified with 
Mah5vilra. ('Great Hero'), who founded Jainism. Harvey suninlarlses tile teachings of 
the Jains as follows: 
"All things, even stories, are alive, each containing a jivu or 'life 
principle'... The airn of Jainism is to liberate the fivu fi-orn the round of 
rebirths by freeing it frorn its encrustation of karma, seen as a kind of subtle 
matter. The methods of doins,; so are primarily wearing out the results of 
previous karrna by austerities such as fastin(;, going unwashed, and pullill() ý7 
out the hair, and also, to avoid the generation of neýý karrna, self-restraint, 
total non-violence ... to any 
form of life, and vegetarianism "726 
The Buddha has many encounters with the Nigai. ithas, and reserves some of 
his 
harshest criticism for them. One of the most detailed accounts of such all encounter is 
found in the Devadaha S1111C1727 In it, the Buddha visits a town called Devadaha and 
tells his followers about the teachings of Nigaijýha N5taputta. He characterises these 
teachings as follows. 
lther pain-nor- "'Whatever this Person feels, w-hether pleasure or pall' or ne 
pleasure, all that is caused bv ý\ hat was done ill tile Past 
So by annihilating 
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with asceticism past actions and by doing no fresh actions, there be no 
consequences in the future. With no consequences in the future, there is 
the destruction of action. With the destruction of action, there is the 
destruction of suffering. With the destruction of suffering, there is the 
destruction of feeling. With the destruction of feeling, all sufferIng will be 
exhausted. ' So speak the Nigaiýthas, bhikkhus. `728 
The Buddha explains that in response to this teaching, he asks the 
Niganthas whether they k7ioiv that they existed in the past. They reply that they do not 
know. They also admit that they do not know how much suffering has been exhausted 
and how much more that there is to work off, nor do they know "what the abandoning 
of unwholesome states is and what the cultivation of wholesome states is here and 
now. 11729 This being the case, the Buddha argues that it is "not fitting" for the 
Nigai)thas to make the claims that they do. If they knew about their past existences, or 
about the amount of suffering they had to work off, then their claims would be 
plausible; as it is, they are grounded in Ignorance and this is what makes them 'not 
fitting'. 
The Nigai. ithas response is that their teacher, Nigai. itlia Mtaputta, "is 
omniscient and all-seeing and claims to have complete knowledge and vision. ' /30 It IS 
as a result of his omniscience that he teaches about past lives and how to cease 
suffering through asceticism. The Buddha's response refers once more to the 
unreliability of Nigai. itha Ndtaptitta's knowledge. He mentions the 'five things that 
may turn out in two different ways here and now', namely, "faith, approval, oral 
tradition, reasoned cogitation, and reflective acceptance of a view. "711 The Buddha 
asks the Nigai 
, ithas what 
kind of faith, approval etc they have "in a teacher ýýho 
speaks about the past. 7, and explains that "I did not see any legitimate defence of their 
position by the Nigaijtlias. 11732 As we have seen, the Buddha's criticism of 
Nigakitha Ndtaptitta is that he makes claims about things in the past that he does not 
actually know about. The above question and the response from the Nigapýhas 
reinforces this criticism - the Niganthas are unable to 
find any 'legitimate defence' for 
Nigai. itha NdtapUtta's position through any means of knowledge, simply because 
fie has 
of Ignorance n or his knowledge. His position is grounded in iý 
As the sutta progresses, the Buddha embarks upon a fresh 
line of criticism Fie 
s intense exertion 1, gets the Nigapthas to admit that the causal result of undergo ri-o " 
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ctpainful, racking, piercing feelings", feelings which are absent when the exertion stops. 
This example proves that suffering can be a direct result of one's own actions in the 
present, rather than a consequence of actions in past lives: 
"You are therefore feeling only the painful, racking, piercing feelings of 
your self-imposed exertion, and it is through ignorance, unknowing and 
delusion that you mistakenly hold- 'Whatever this person feels ... all 
suffering will be exhausted'. 11733 
The Buddha then gets Nigai)tlia Ndtaputta to acknowledge various other fla%ý s 
in his beliefs; for example, he admits that the painful fruits of an action cannot be 
transformed into a pleasant fruit, however hard one exerts oneself and strives to 
change it. The basic admission that the Buddha elicits from Nigai. ithas Ndtaputta is that 
the causal connection between an action and its result cannot be altered, however 
much one strives. The Buddha points out that this admission Undermines 
Nigantha NdtapLitta's teaching and the practices of his followersý "That being, so, the 
venerable Nigaijthas' exertion is fi-ultless, their striving is fruitless. "734 
So far, then, we have seen a number of grounds on which the Buddha criticises 
the Nigaiýthas. Firstly, they are unable to verify their own claims about ho\ý much 
suffering there is to work off, and how much more they have to do. Secondly, thev 
claim authority for their beliefs by referring to Nigapýha N5taptitta's omniscience, 
which is disproved by the Buddha. Thirdly, their beliefs are falsified by realit\, -- 
contrary to the claims of the Nigai. -ithas, painful feelings can be the result of ones own 
present actions, rather than those of past lives, and the consequences of actions cannot 
be changed, however much one wills it. 
Having criticised the Nigapthas in this way, the Buddha changes his approach. 
He explains that there are 'ten legitimate deductions' to be made from tile 
Niganthas' 
assertions. It is not necessary to list all these in detail, but will to suffice to 
look at 
some examples. In his first 'legitimate deduction', the Buddha explains that if pleasure 
and pain were caused by actions in the past, then the Nigapýhas must 
have behaved 
very badly - "the Nigai * iýhas 
surely must have done bad deeds in the past, since 
theý, 
now feel such painful, racking, piercing feelings. " The 
Bu ddha's next deduction 
contains an implicit critique of theism- 
"If the pleasure and pain that beings feel are caused 
by the creati%-e act of a 
supreme God (issui-aniniffliahem), then the Nigaptha-, surely 
must ha%c 
733M n 219-20. Bliikkliu Bodlil 83)0-3 1 
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been created by an evil Supreme God, since they now feel such painful, 
racking feelings. " 735 
Similarly, if pleasure and pain are caused by chance, the Nigaijtlias must have verý, bad 
luck, and if class of birth is a cause of pleasure and pain, then "the Nigapt. has surely 
must belong to a bad class". If pleasure and pain are caused by 'exertion here and 
now', then the Nigantlias must be 'striving very badly' because they experience such 
painful, unpleasant feelings. 
The Buddha claims that the Nigatithas 'are to be censured' if any of these 
theories are true, and censured if they are not. For example, if the theory about 
pleasure and pain being caused by a creative act of God is true, then the Nigai 
, ithas are 
to be censured for they must have behaved very badly to warrant such pain. If this is 
not the case, then the Nigaiýtlias are still to be censured for all the reasons the Buddha 
has already highlighted. The same is true for all the other proposed causes of pleasure 
and pain - the fact that the Nigai * itlias experience unpleasant, painful 
feelings (in their 
ascetic practices) suggests that, on these accounts, they have acted badly to 'deserve' 
such painful feelings. Even if none of these theories about the origin of pleasure and 
pain is true, according to the Buddha the Nigaijýhas still follow futile practices ýý hich 
are grounded in ignorance, and are to censured for this. 
The point of this last line of criticism through the 'ten legitimate deductions' is 
that, even were some model admitted that supported the Nigapthas' vleý\ about the 
past origin of present feelings, there would still be many reasons for criticisim-, them 
Not only are their theories wrong, but their conduct is reprehensible. Their e\ertloll 
and striving is 'fruitless'. 
Following this thoroughgoing criticism of the Nigapthas, tile Buddha forwards 
his idea of how exertion and striving are 'fruitful'. A bhikkhu, he explains, should not 
be overwhelmed by suffering, and should not "give up the pleasure that accords with 
736 1 Dhamma", although lie should not become infatuated' with this pleasure. Unlike 
the Nigaijthas, the bhikkhu understands the causal relation between his actions and the 
diminishing of suffering- 
"He knows thus- 'When I strive with determination, this particular source 
of suffering fades away in me because of that determined striý, in(-,, and 
Ti in fa d es, when I look on with equanimity, this particular source of sut er 
1 -737 away in me while I develop equanimity. 
'I 'sut ering i IIIT, i is exhausted Realising this, the bhikkhu keeps striving with equan mitý', ul't 
in him'. 
735M ii 222, Blilkkliu Bodlii 833). 
736M ii 223. BhikkllU Bodlil S"13-4 




Interestingly, in the next stage of his explanation, the Buddha describes hoxý- it 
is sometimes necessary to engage in practice which is painful and unpleasurable 
However, such practices are to serve a certain purpose, and once this is achieved, then 
the monk can finish the practice. The Buddha explains how a monk might think to 
himself. "'While I live according to my pleasure, unwholesome states increase in me 
and wholesome states diminish, but when I exert myself in what is painful, 
unwholesome states diminish in me and wholesome states increase. 111731 Thinking this, 
the monk carries out the painful practice, but only until he has achieved the purpose of 
diminishing unwholesome states. Later, the Buddha explains, the monk stops the 
practice. of what is painful. In this description, then, the Buddha demonstrates that he 
does not disapprove of all painful ascetic practices pei- se, for they can have a useful 
purpose. What he objects to in the case of the Nigapthas is that there is no apparent 
reason for their painful practices - they are grounded in ignorance and their striving is 
futile. In contrast, the monk who follows the' Buddha's teaching has tile wisdom to 
identify when such practices are useful, and when they are not. As a result, "tile 
exertion is fruitful, the striving is fruitful. 11739 
The Buddha completes his description of the right way to practise by the stock 
explanation of the gradual path, beginning with the perfection of the precepts and 
going on through the attainment of the hindrances to the attainment of liberating 
insight. We saw earlier in the sutta how the Buddha found tell grounds oil wliich tile 
Nigaiýtlias could be censured. Whatever the theory of the provenance of painful 
actions, the fact that the Nigai * ithas experienced 
them suggested they acted poorly, 
is OW11 either in the past or the present. The Buddha applies the same ten points to hi 
practice. Consider, for example, the first point- "'If the pleasure and pain that beings 
feel are caused by what was done in the past, the Tatlidgatha surely must have done 
good deeds in the past, since he now feels such taintless pleasant feelings. 1 "740 
Oil the 
issue of a 'creator God' causing pleasure and pain, it is said that 'the Tath5gatha must 
surely have been created by a good Supreme God'. The list continues, substituti 
I iýlias Whether such positive points where there were negative points for the Nigai. 
accounts of the causes of suffering are true or not true, tile Buddha explains 
that the 
Tatlidgatha "is to be praised". If any of the accounts are true, 
lie is to be praised 
because they indicate that he is accomplished in good conduct, and irrespecti\ C of 
this 
fact, he is to be praised because, unlike the Nigapýýllas, 
his actions are grounded ill 
knowledge and are consequently 'fruitful'. 
738M ii 225. Blllkkilu Bodhi 83) 5 
,, 39M 11226, Blilkkliu Bodlii 836. 
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To sum up, this sutta has many purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the 
importance of grounding practice in genuine knowledge, and shows the futility of 
practices which are grounded in ignorance. The Nigaiittlias provide a \-ehicle throu(, h 
which the Buddha can convey this point. Secondly, the sutta demonstrates the success 
of the Buddha's teaching, because it is grounded in knowledge and is thus fruitful. 
The Uj2jli Sutta 
The Up5li Sutta provides another lengthy account of the Buddha's encounters 
with the Nigaiýtlias teachings, although it focuses on an entirely different aspect of their 
beliefs. The Sutta relates how a follower of Nigaptlia Ndtaputta, D-igha Tapass-1 ('Tall 
Ascetic') comes across the Buddha, and is questioned by the Buddha about his -. "iews, 
namely the different kinds of action that can perpetrate evil. Digha Tapass-i replies 
that, rather than using the word 'action', the Nigapthas use the word 'rod' (dai , ida). 
The three 'rods' for the 'performance' and 'perpetration' of evil action are the bodily 
rod, the verbal rod, and the mental rod. In the footnote to this translation, Bhikkhu 
Bodhi explains that the term daýi4a has the implication of 'rod' as an instrument of 
punishment, and argues that this is a reflection of the Nigai * ithas' vlews- 
"the idea 
seems to be suggested that the Jains regarded bodily, verbal, and mental activity as 
instruments by which the individual torments himself by prolongim-, his bondage in 
saijisdra and torments others by causing them harm. "741 
Of these three 'rods', we are told that Nigaptha Ndtaptitta considers the bodily 
rod as "the most reprehensible for the performance of evil action "742 
The Buddha then explains how he teaches that there are three kinds of action, 
the bodily, physical and mental, and that of these the mental is the most 'reprehensible 
for the performance of evil action. ' D-igha Tapass-i goes back to Nigapý 
lia Ndtaputta and his followers and relates this encounter with the Buddha. 
Nigatitha Ndtaputta strongly disagrees with the Buddha's teaching "'What does the 
trivial mental rod count for in comparison with the gross bodily rod"' "743 This point is 
taken up by Updli, a lay follower of Nigaptha N5taptitta, who boasts that 
he xill go to 
see the Buddha and easily refute his teachings- "'Just as a strong man might seize a 
long-haired ram by the hair and drag him to and drag him fro and 
drag him round 
about, so in debate I will drag the recluse Gotama to and drag 
him fro and drag hirn 
round about. "'744 
Up5li duly goes to the Buddha to argue his case and 
demonstrate the 
superiority of Nigai. itlia N5taptitta's teachings. Howevei, 
b\, asking, Up5li a sei es ot 
74 'Bliikkliu Bodhi. fii. 579, p. 1255 
74'-M 1 373, Bliikkliu Bodlil 478. 
743M 1374, Bliikkliu Bodhi 4.79. 
744M 1374, Bliikkliti Bodhi 480. 
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questions, the Buddha quickly leads Updli to make a series of self-refuting and self- 
contradictory statements that expose the weakness of his position, and the superiorltv 
of the Buddha's own. For example, the Buddha raises the hypothetical case of a man 
whose actions are thoroughly restrained, but who, in the process of moving around, 
inadvertently "brings about the destruction of many small living beings. " Up5li reports 
that, according to Nigaýitha Ndtaputta's teaching, this destruction is not 
"reprehensible" because it is "not willed". However, if it is willed, it is -greatlý' 
reprehensible". The Buddha points out that, since 'willing' is part of the 'mental' rod, 
and that willing makes the difference between a great -reprehen sibl e and non- 
reprehensible action, Updli's claims about the relative insignificance of the mental rod 
is refuted: "'Householder, householder, pay attention to how you reply! What you 
said before does not agree with what you said afterwards, nor does what you said 
afterwards agree with what you said before. ' "74 5 As the Buddha continues to ask 
questions of Updli, more and more inconsistencies in his position are uncovered, until 
Updli admits that he is satisfied with the Buddha's arguments, and asks to go for 
refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. In response, the Buddha tells 
Updli that he must 'investigate thoroughly' the Dhamma. Up5li's response to this is 
very favourable: "'I am even more satisfied and pleased with the Blessed One for 
telling me that. For the other sectarians, on acquiring me as their disciple, would carry 
a banner announcing: 'The householder Up5li has come to discipleship under us. I" 746 
The Buddha's next staternent serves to underline his lack of sectarianism, for 
he counsels Up5li to show some loyalty to the Nigapthas whorn he has supported for 
so long- "'Householder, your family has long supported the Nigapthas and you should 
consider that alms should be given to them when they come'. " Once again, Updll is 
impressed with the Buddha, and goes for refuge for a third time, upon which the 
Buddha gives Updli 'progressive instruction' through the gradual path to liberation. 
In Chapter Four we saw the Buddha's emphasis on knowing for oneself that the four 
noble truths, for example, are true. This is supported in this sutta, by the Buddha's 
insistence that Up5li 'investigate thoroughly' rather than just accepting the Buddha's 
teachings without testing them. This approach is reinforced in the description of 
Up5 
h's liberation. When Up5li has transcended the five hindrances we are told that --the 
spotless immaculate vision of the Dhamma arose in him- 'All that is subject to arising is 
subject to cessation. 111747 it is significant that Upd], is expressly said to 
be independent 
of any others in this knowledge - he knows it and sees it 
for himself 
1. 
745M 1 376. Bliikkliu Bodlu 4182. 
746M 1379, Bliikkliu Bodhi 484. 
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"the householder Up5li saw the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, 
understood the Dhamma, fathomed the Dhamma; he crossed beyond doubt, 
did away with perplexity, gained intrepidity, and became independent of 
others in the Teacher's Dispensation. "748 
The rest of the Updli Sutta is dedicated to describing Up5li's return to 
Nigaýitha Ndtaputta to tell him about his 'conversion' to the Buddha's teaching. 
Nigaiýtha Ndtaputta reacts angrily, abusing Up5li and telling him he has "come back all 
caught up in a vast net of doctrine", and that he has been subject to the Buddha's 
"converting magi C11749. Updli is quite unashamed in his response, describing the 
Buddha's 'converting magic' as "auspicious" and "good". "If the world with its gods, 
Mdras, and its Brahmds, this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its princes and 
its people, were to be converted by this conversion, it would lead to the ", elfare and 
happiness of the world for a long, time. "750 
Using various similes, tJpdli describes the difference between Nigaptha N5 
taputta's teaching and the Buddha's- 
"the doctrine of the foolish Nigai. ithas will give delight to fools but not to 
the wise, and it will not withstand testing or being smoothened out ... The 
doctrine of that Blessed One, accomplished and fully enlightened, ý, vill give 
delight to the wise but not to fools, and it will withstand testing and being 
smoothened out. " 
When Up5li continues to praise the Buddha and his teaching, we are told in 
graphic terms that Nigai. itlia Nataputta is so sickened that he vomits blood: "since 
Nigat-itha Ndtaputta was unable to bear this honour done to the Blessed One, hot blood 
then and there gushed frorn his rnouth. "75 I The commentary explains that this is the 
beginning of an illness from which Nigai. iýha N5taptitta never recovers, which is further 
symbolic of the superiority of the Buddha's teaching over Nigantha Ndtaputta's. 
Yet again, this sutta serves to reinforce the knowledge and wisdom of the 
Buddha, and contrasts it with the ignorance and foolishness of other teachers. It 
demonstrates how beliefs that are not grounded in knowledge and insight are shoýýn up 
not only on the grounds of the conduct that accompanies them, but also because they 
do not make sense and are impossible to defend. 
748 Ibid. 
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In the Dt-ghu Nik5yu, the Pdsddika Sima contains an account of the behaviour 
of the Nigatithas after the death of Ndtaputta752 - We learn that they are in conflict ýý ith 
each other, having split into two factions, and are "quarrelling and disputing, fighting 
and attacking each other with wordy warfare"753 When the Buddha learns of this 
conduct he blames it on the fact that Nigantlia Ndtaptitta was not fulb. " enlightened, and 
thus his teachings were unhelpful and grounded in ignorance: 
"here is a doctrine and discipli I unedifyinolv ine that is ill-proclaimed, 
displayed and ineffectual in calming the passions because its proclaimer was 
not fully enlightened. Such being the case, ... a 
disciple cannot live 
according to that doctrine and maintain proper conduct, nor live by it, but 
deviates fromit. "754 
This is contrasted to the Buddha's own teachings, which are effectual in calming the 
passions, because the Buddha is fully enlightened. The Buddha argues that there is 
&much demerit' in practising the teachings of an unenlightened teacher, because they 
are so ineffectual. Conversely, there is much merit in following the teachings of the 
Buddha. Another way in which the Buddha's teachings are contrasted with 
Nigaiýtlia NdtapUtta's is over what would happen to disciples of each group after the 
death of the teacher. In the case of Nigai. itha Mitaptitta we already know that, on his 
death, his disciples split into factions and quarrelled and disputed with each other, 
throwing the order into disarray. In contrast, the Buddha describes the ideal state of 
affairs which he has put into practice-. 
"Suppose a Teacher has arisen in the world, an Arahant, fully-enfightened 
Buddha, and his doctrine is well-proclaimed ... effectual in calming 
the 
passions, and his disciples have fully mastered the true Dhamma, the full 
purity of the holy life has become clear and evident to them in the logic of 
its unfolding, and has been sufficiently grounded amono them while being 
thus well -procl ai med among humans by the time of the 
Teacher's passing 
from thern. That way, the Teacher's death would not be a sad thing for his 
disciples. Why9 They would think- 'Our Teacher arose in the world 
for us 
... and we 
have fully mastered the true Dhaninia ... while it was proclaimed 
among humans, and now our Teacher has passed away from among us. 
' 
That way, the Teacher's death would not be a sad thing 
for his 
disciples. "75 5 
752 Nigandia ýý,, ',, 'PuMl Is Maurice WaIS11C POIIltS 01.11 IhH tills pl-csents a 'chronologicill probIcIll s, Cý -- 
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Thus the teaching of the Nigai. ithas is portrayed as inferior to the Buddha s, it is not 
founded in knowledge of the way things are, and proponents are unable to defend the 
teachings in comparison to the greater coherence of the Buddha's teachings. The 
flawed nature of the Nigai. ithas' teaching is demonstrated in the lack of harmonv and 
discipline amongst the followers, which is in complete contrast to the conduct of the 
Buddha's followers. 
Brahmins 
So far, then, we have examined various references to wandering ascetics that 
the Buddha encountered. As we saw in chapter two (pp. 81-4), another major 
4religious' group in the Buddha's tirne was the brahmins, and this section will be 
devoted to considering some of the Buddha's encounters with them, Historically, the 
term 'brahmin' referred to followers of a religious group that arrived in India with the 
Aryans. Harvey ýurnmarises their spiritual goal as "attaining, the heaven of the creator 
god Bralu-nd by means of truthfulness, study of the Vedic teachings, and either sacrifice 
"756As we shall see, the Buddha is more accepting of the brahmins than or austerities. In 
of the wandering ascetics, and does not censure them quite so vigorousl\,. 
One of the main sources of suttas detailing the Buddha's encounters with 
brahmins is the J? 1-uh1nuýiuvuggu of the Majhilnu Nikc-i)v. We have already seen ho'. k 
the Buddha reacts in some encounters with BrahmIns - for example, In the 
CankiSiata we saw the Buddha rejecting the young brahmin's dependence on the 
scriptures and oral tradition oil the grounds that it is not grounded in personal 
experience. With very few exceptions, both in the Btwlnnuýiuvaggu and elsewhere in 
the Nikdyas, the Buddha's treatment of brahmins is characterised by a rejection of their 
ritual practices as futile, and all emphasis oil the importance of ethical conduct over 
rituals. In the first of these suttccis, the Fl-uhmupi Suilu, a brahmin asks the Buddha 
how one is a brahmin, and the Buddha replies with a definition of an arahat-. 
"Who knows about his former lives, Sees heavens and states of 
deprivation, And has arrived at birth's destruction, A sage who knows 
by 
direct knowledge, Who knows his mind is purified, Entire]y freed from 
every lust, Who has abandoned birth and death, Who is complete in the 
holy life, Who has transcended everythino, One such as tills is called a 
"757 Brahmin. 
It is particularly interesting here that the Buddha uses tile term 'bral-irnin' in application 
to the fulfilment of his own teaching, as though 'brahmin' is a generally accepted 
term 
for a 'Spiritual teacher'. rather than a sectarian labellim; 
for one particular type of 
756 Peter Harvey. An liitro(iiiciio" lo P. 11 - 757M 1-1 144-, Bliikkliu Bodlii 744-5. 
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religious adherent. The Buddha redefines, rather than replaces the term. This is 
illustrated in the Mah5-Assupiti-a Sulta, where in reply to the question, "'Ho'. v is a 
bhikkhu a brahmin? "', the Buddha replies: "He has expelled evil unwholesome states 
that defile, bring renewal of being, give trouble, ripen in suffering, and lead to future 
birth, ageing and death. 11758 
A far more detailed account of the ideal qualities of a brahmin is found in the 
Vasettha Sutta of the Sutta-Nipdta - having comprehensively listed the types of 
ethical qualities that distinguish a brahmin, the Buddha rejects the original, 
contemporary understanding of a brahmin as one who is boi-n into such status. Such 
titles 'care mere wordly conventions. They have come into being by common 
. 
11759 but they are not true- "No one is boi-li a brahmin- no-one is born a non- consent 
brahmin. A brahmin is a brahmin because of what he cloes-, a man who is not a brahmin 
is not a brahmin because of what lie does. ". The Buddha then describes the "essence 
of Brahmin" "A bralimin is a result of self-restraint, wholesome living and self- 
control. 11760 Returning to the FrUhmuýiuvaggu, the same message against the caste 
system (into which people are believed to be born as. brahmins) is found in the 
Assaldyana Sutta. The Buddha points out that like other castes, brahmins are born of 
women, not Brali-ni5, that the quality of their rebirths is conditional on their conduct, 
and that it is not only brahmins who call cultivate positive qualities such as Inellu. He 
thus points out that the theory of the 'uniqueness' of brahmins does not stand up to 
questioning, that they have no evidence to support their position. Tills message is 
reinforced in the Esuk5r_i Stitta, where the Buddha maintains that a person from any 
caste, however lowly, is able to follow the five precepts, and accomplish 'the true wav, 
the Dhamma that is wholesorne', and that true wealth is a persons ability to accomplish 
the Dhamma- 1, brahmin, declare the noble supramundane Dhamma as a person's own 
wealth. "761 
The Buddha's criticism of existing brahmins is that sonle of their beliefs are 
groundless, and irrelevant as far as the attainment of the Dhamrna is concerned. 
We 
I in have already discussed that following the- Dhamrna is portrayed as 
behaving 
accordance with 'reality', the way things really are. it is unsurprisingy then, 
that the 
points on which brahmins diverge from the teachings of the Buddha are 
described as 
false or grounded in ignorance. In all earlier section we already touched upon 
tile 
Subha Sima762 inwhich the Buddha likens brahmins to a string of 
b lind men trying 
i 
in 
ý%, th \ý. Il'ch to (Yulde 1-1) vain to lead each other, because they have no 'direct 
kno\\ ledge' I 
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themselves. They claim that five factors which provide merit are truth, asceticism, 
celibacy, study, and generosity, but none of them have direct knowledge that this is the 
case. The same criticism is made of the 'brahmins of the three vedas' in the Jej, qja 
Sulla763 - they are making unfounded claims, based in ignorance. However, in the 
Soýadaýz4a SIIIIU764, the Buddha's rejection of the brahmins of the three vedas is not 
complete, for he does condone some of the qualities that they value. These brahmins 
hold that one must possess five qualities in order to be a brahmin: one must be well- 
born, be well-versed in the mantras, be handsome and pleasing in appearance, be 
virtuous, and be learned and wise. The Buddha maintains that one could still be a 
brahmin without the first three qualities, but without wisdom or moralltv, one could 
never be called a brahmin- "Wisdom is purified by morality and morality is purified by 
wisdom. 11765 Morality and wisdom are defined by the standard description of gradual 
development, beginning with the perfection of the five precepts before developing 
insight through meditation. Tile reason given for the irrelevance of the first three 
factors propounded by tile bralimins is that they carry with them no 'ethical' demands. 
Having been convinced by the Buddha, Soi. iandai)(Ja the brahmin explains the position 
to his fellow brahmins by using the example of his nephew, Angyaka, who Is ýýell 
trained in all the five qualities. 
"But if Angaka were to take life, take what is not given, commit adultery, 
tell lies and drink strong drink - what would good looks, or mantras, or 
birth profit him? But it is because a Brahmin is virtuous, ... wise, on 
account of these two points can he truthfully declare, 'I am a Brahmin "" 
In tile Agunaiw NWi), u, mention is made of tile 'three-fold lore of Brahmins, 
namely that they be well-born, given to study, and 'learned in idiorns and grammar', 
and it is contrasted with the 'three-fold lore of the al-i), aay ', which is described as 
being aloof frorn evil states and in a state of jh5na, having insight of former births and 
other beings; attaining the destruction of the dsavas and release from them. There 
follows a rare example of a direct comparison between the brahmins and the noble 
disciples (at-i))usuvakas)- "He who has the three-fold lore of the brahmins is not worth 
one sixteenth part of him who hath it in the discipline of tile Arlyan. 11767 
Elsewhere 
there is a reference to the rituals of Brahmins who believe in the purifying po%\ ers of 
, ]I still not gain purity so Ion',, water. No matter how many rituals they perform, the), w 
as they have not got rid of the defilernents of body (i. e taking 
life etc ), speech (false 
speech ... 
) and mind (wrong view, etc. ). 
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"One characterised by these ten ways of action may rise up early and at 
eventide touch the earth ... worship 
fire or not ... 
bow to the sun or not 
... 
descend in the evening into water for the third time or not, vet he is still 
impure. Why? Those ten ways of wrong action are impure and cause 
impurity. 11768 
Thus we have seen how the Brahmins are criticised for following practices %ýhlch, 
through their ignorance, they fail to recognise as futile or irrelevant to the process of 
attaining liberation or purity. It is interesting, however, that the Buddha does not denv 
the goal to which they are aspiring - namely, union with Bralund. Here it is useful to 
clarify what the concept of Brahmd would have meant in the Buddha's time, and a 
helpful clarification is provided by Bhikkhu Bodhi in his introduction to the 
Majjhinia Nik5yu. In contemporary Hindu traditions, the term Brahman can have the 
meaning of "an impersonal absolute reality hidden behind and manifesting through tile 
changing phenomena of the world. "769 Bhikkhu Bodhi emphasises that this concept of 
brahnia never appears in tile Pall Canon. Instead, the brahmins in tile Pali canon 
understood Brahn-I5 to be an eternal, personal creator (, jod %vho regulates the processes 71 1-7ý 
of the world. Buddhists had their own conception of what Brahma stood for. 
"The Buddhists themselves asserted that Brahii-I5 was not a single creator 
God but a collective name for several classes of high deities whose chiefs, 
forgetting that they are still transient beings in the grip of kamma, were 
prone to imagine themselves to be tile orrimpotent everiastino creator. "770 
We have already seen that the Buddha admits the existence of Brahn-I5, - indeed, it was 
Bralund who exhorted the Buddha to teach the Mamma after lie had attained 
Enlightenment. It is not that tile Brahmins' aspirations are vain, but that they are not 
behaving in a way that gives them any hope of fulfilling these expectations. 
In the Tevijja Sutta, two brahmins approach the Buddha, confused at the 
multifarious practices advocated by different Brahmins- "There are so many kinds of 
Brahmins who teach different paths ... 
do all these ways lead to union with Bralinid"" 
The Buddha replies that none of these paths do, because none of the teachers 
have 
ever had direct knowledoe of Brahin5i, and are therefore not in a position to (juide 
others. He then reiterates the criticism of the 'Threefold Lore' of the 
Brahnlins, 
arguing that those who follow this teaching are often "full of hate, impure, 
undisciplined, encumbered with \ý, Ives and wealt 11"771 , and thus 
have nothing Miate,,, er 
in common with Brahn-I5, who is the antithesis of these qualities. 
It is Impossible for 
such individuals who -persistently neglect what a brahmin Should 
do" to attain union 
768A N, 266-, WoodNurd I SO. 
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with Brahma; to expect them to do so is like expecting a man who is bound and 
chained to the shore to cross a strong-flowing river. In the same way, a brahmin who 
does not conduct himself skilfully is bound by the five strands of the sense desires, and 
unable to attain liberation in that state: " ... those Brahmins learned in the Three Vedas 
are enslaved, infatuated by these five strands of sense desire, which they enjoy guiltily, 
unaware of danger, knowing no wayoUt. 11772 Similarly, a brahmin who is beset by the 
five hindrances is likened to a man who wishes to cross the river, but lies down on the 
bank and falls asleep under a blanket - he, too, will never get across in this way. 
However, the Buddha clearly understands that union with Bralmid is possible, 
for he claims to have direct knowledge of how to attain it. The problem for the 
brahmins is not only their practices and their neglect of skilful conduct, but, connected 
with this, they are unable to see what is wrong with their actions and how they should 
behave, because they do not have direct personal knowledge. The Buddha, in contrast, 
does have direct knowledge of the path to union with Bralini5-. "For I know 
Brahma and the world of Bralmid, and the way to the world of Brahn15, and the path 
of practice whereby the world of Brahma may be gained. "771 The description of this 
path follows the first part of the 'standard' formula, in which a disciple goes forth and 
practices the moralities. When this disciple gains the first ilidna, he suffuses the world 
with loving kindness (meilu), then with compassion, sympathetic joy, and finally with 
equanimity. Such a monk is 'unencumbered' and is without hate and ill-will and is 
pure and disciplined, and thus has much in common with Bralini5- 
"Then that an unencumbered monk, after death, at the breaking up of the 
body, should attain to union with unencumbered Bralinid that is 
possible. Likewise a monk without hate ... without ill-will pure 
disciplined 
... 
Then that a disciplined monk, after death, at the breaking up 
of the body, should attain to union with Bralini5 - that is possible. "774 
This is reminiscent of the Ci-ilasakuluddyi Sittla 775, where the Buddha explains that one 
can attain the lesser goal of a realisation of an 'entirely pleasant world' whilst on the 
way to the reallsation of the cessation of suffering. The implication here is that 
followers of other teachers can be on the same path as followers of the Buddha, 
subject to the same factors of causation, but do not have the right guidance to go any 
further than a partial realisation. When addressing the teachings of Ud5yin's group, 
the Buddha described the first three flidnas as merely the wa. l' to the reallsation of an 
entirely pleasant world'. Ud5yin's group did not even have the ability to reach 
this 
Terincy What stage of attainment, let alone progress beyond it to the cessation of sut Zý 
772D 1245: Walslic 191 
773D 1249, Walslic 193. 
774D i 252, Walshe 195. 
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they view as the ultimate goal is, according to the Buddha's teaching, merely a stage 
along the way to ultimate liberation. Similarly, the ultimate goal for the brahmins is 
identified with the first jhdna, which, according to the Buddha, is simply a preliminary 
stage along the path to liberation. Not only, then, do both groups have an inferior goal 
to the one described by the Buddha, but they do not even know how to attain that 
goal, and are caught up in unhelpful and irrelevant practices. The reason for this is that 
they do not have a guide who knows and sees the way things really are, but are blindly 
casting around in a state of ignorance. The Buddha, however, knows, sees and teaches 
the cessation of suffering, and the way to the cessation of suffering - in this respect 
he is unique and is unsurpassed in this knowledge. 
At this point the Tevijja Sulfa ends, begging the question why the Buddha did 
not teach the brahmins about the rest of the path to nibb5na, but stopped at the stage 
of the first jhdna. This question is addressed in the Dhunaýijuni Stitia in the 
Majjhinia Nikdya, where the monk S5riputta teaches Dhanai-ijani the bralimin hmý to 
arrive in the Brah-nid-world. Knowing about this, the Buddha asks hlmý "Sdriputta, 
having established the brahmin ... in the inferior 
Brahma-world, why did you rise from 
your seat and leave while there was still more to be done? ' -776 Mriptitta's answer 
provides something of a weak justification- "I thought thus: 'These brahmins are 
devoted to the Brahma-world. Suppose I show the brahmin Dhdnafij5iii the path to 
the company of Brahmd. 111777 The Buddha replies that Dli5iiafij5n1 has indeed 
reappeared in the Brahma-world. In his footnote to this section, Bhikkhu Bodhi 
suggests that the Buddha's questions to Sdriputta on this issue are intended as a gentle 
rebuke, because Dlidnafijdni had the potential to progress further than the stage of the 
realisation of the Brahma-world, and go on to become a noble disciple. Bhikkhu 
Bodhi suggests that the Buddha himself only teaches brahmins the way to Brah]115778 
when they do not have the potential to go any further than that. 
The fact that the Buddha sees union with Bral"I'd as an inferior attainment is 
supported in the Ai)gutlai-a Nilcdya, where he addresses the beliefs that the best sight is 
Brah-nid, the best of sounds comes from devas, and the best becoming is in the 
deva 
realms-, he describes these beliefs as the province of the ordinary person, "the way of 
the manyfolk"779. Instead he maintains that the best of sights, sounds and becoming's 
are those associated with the destruction of the taints, which marks the point at which 
one becomes an at-iyasavuka. That the course he prescribes provides the ultimate 
fulfilment is reinforced by the Buddha's claim that having carried out the course 
of 
776M ii 196. Blukkliti Bodlii 797. 
777 Ibid. 
778For another example see the Sublia Sulla. NI 11 207-209.816-,, 
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training and destroyed the dsui, us, "beyond this there is no further development of 
knowledge and conduct that is higher or more perfect. "780 
In the Ahgutlaru Nikdya, the Buddha presents his version of four "brahmin 
truths" which "have been set forth by myself after fully comprehending and realising 
them for myself " He lists the four as follows- 
"I. 'All living things are not to be harmed. ' So saying a brahillin speaks 
truth, not falsehood. Therein he has no conceit of 'recluse' or 'brahmin'. 
He has no conceit of 'better am Y, 'equal am F, 'Inferior am 1'. Moreover 
by fully comprehending the truth contained in that saying he is bent on the 
practice of mercy and cornpassion for all living things. 
2, 'All sense delights are impermanent, painful, of a nature to change. '. So 
saying a brahmin speaks truth ... 'inferior arn 1'. Moreover by fully 
comprehending the truth contained in that saying he is bent on the practice 
of distaste for sense-defights, for passionlessness, for making, all end 
thereof 
3. 'All becomings are impermanent, painful, of nature to change ' So 
saying ... lie is. bent on distaste for becomings ... 
4. '1 have no part in anything anywhere, and herein for me there is no 
attachment to anything. So saying ... he is bent on the practice of 
having 
nothing at all. ""' 
This passage is consistent with the Buddha's treatment of brahmin teachings in other 
suttas, it demonstrates an emphasis on ethics and insiglit as a sign ofbeing a 'genuinel 
brahmin. When insight into the way things really are is gained, then one no longer 
compares oneself to others or seeks sense pleasures, having seen that such pursuits 
only lead to suffering. According to the Buddha, these 'brahmin truths' supersede 
brahmin ritual practices such as sacrifices or reciting of the vedas, practices which are 
ultimately futile and do not bring liberation. 
Summary 
To surnmarlse this chapter, we have seen how the Buddha re2, ards tile practices 
and teachin s of wandering ascetics and brahnnins as inferior to his own 
for various 9D 
differing, but inter-connected reasons. He rejects some practices and rituals 
because 
they are irrelevant to the path to liberation, and thus futile. The teachin, --, that inspire 
such practices are grounded in ignorance, and this provides a 
fur-ther reason Miv the 
780D i loo, ý\'; lIslic I 19. 
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Buddha sees these teachings as inferior. Ultimately, all teachings that are not 
supported by personal experience are grounded in ignorance; the Buddha alone kno%\ s 
and sees for himself how one attains the cessation of suffering in all its completeness, 
and it is for this reason that he is superior. Other teachings might have positive, skilful 
elements to them, but they are limited in their scope to effect liberation, it is tile 
7,1%' 2 Buddha's teaching alone that is "fully successful and perfect, with nothing lacking. 
Even those groups that appear to teach the same thing as the Buddha are ultimatelv 
shown up to be ignorant, because they are not able to elaborate on their teachings in 
the same way that the Buddha or his followers are. 
The message that is consistently portrayed, then, is that the Buddha's teaching is 
unique and ultimate in bringing about the cessation of suffering - any other teaching 
or practice is flawed in comparison. This does not mean to say that other teachings 
should be immediately dismissed - as we have seen, the Buddha advocates a *gentle' 
approach towards other teachings in some places. However, it is still the case that 
ultimately, the Buddha's teaching is superior to any other. The reason for this is 
because, unlike any other teacher, the Buddha has seen reality as it really is, and 
through this insight has learnt how to attain the cessation of suffering. It seerns 
legitimate to suppose, however, that the Buddha would not deny the possibility that 
other individuals could gain liberation hipri . ncil)le. This follows logically from tile idea 
of the 'causality of liberation. As we have seen, this causal process is described as 
existing objectively, it is the 'nature of things', the way that the world really is. An 
objective causal process does not work 'exclusively' to one particular group, it is a law 
of nature that applies to everybody. This is a point that Jayatilleke makes in his 
pamphlet on "The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions" "The concept of the Buddha 
as one who discovers the truth is clearly a source of tolerance. It leaves open the 
possibility for others to discover aspects of the truth or even the ýý, hole truth for 
themselves. The Buddhist acceptance of Pacceka-Buddhas, who discover the truth 
for 
themselves, is a clear admission of this fact. ""' 
In praclice, however, in the Nikdyas it is only the followers of the Buddha who 
understand and work in accordance with this causal law to its full realisation. 
It just 
so happens that all the attempts to gain liberation through other teachings that 
he has 
come across have had some fundamental flaws, because they are grounded in 
ignorance. The Buddha makes it clear that anybody who Is to gain 
liberation ýý III have 
essed perfected the qualities of the eightfold path that he has perfected, and pro, 
r 
through the stacyes that he has been through. This is because there is a 
certain caLISýIl 
7 'ý-D in 126, Walshe 431 
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structure to reality. The Buddha knows and understands this causality, and it is this 
that marks him out as a 'fully enlightened Buddha'. Other teachers that he has 
encountered do not have this insight, therefore it is a case of the 'blind leadin, -, the blind". 
Let us briefly sum up the Buddha's account of the relation of other vieýýs and 
practices to liberation as this has emerged in the course of this thesis. It then be 
explained that this account is free from the incoherencies that undermine Hick's post- 
Copernican hypothesis. The Buddha described a certain causal laxý, that operates in 
reality, independent of any descriptions or perceptions of it. This causal laýý Is 
summarised in the law of dependent origination, but it is more generally understood as 
the law of cause and effect that is presupposed by all of the Buddha's teachings. I 
have called this the law of salvific causation, the idea that when certain skilful acts are 
undertaken, they will necessarily lead to liberation. The Buddha had reached a state of 
perfect knowledge and insight, in which he has seen reality as it really 'is, including tile 
operation of this causal law. For this reason, he knows which actions relate to which 
effects, which beliefs lead to which actions, and so on. Thus some key presuppositions 
of the Buddha's teaching are that there is a certain objective structure of reality, that it 
is possible to see this as it really is, and that the Buddha is one of those who has 
attained such insight. In the Nik5yas, the Buddha describes himself as unique in this 
respect; no other teachers have attained this liberating insight. 
The Buddha . udges other teachings according to how closely they accord J 1: 1 
positively with the causal process towards liberation. He rejects as "in opposition to 
the holy life" those which do not work in accordance with salvific causation, and has 
approbation for those that do. However, he sees his own teachings and path of 
practice as the best, for it has "nothing superfluous and nothing lacking", and is "fully 
successful and perfect". Some other teachings may help to develop the eightfold path 
in its positive aspect, but since they are not grounded in the ultimate wisdom of the 
Buddha's insight, they are not "fully successful and perfect". The Buddha's teaching is 
presented as the fulfilment of such other teachings. 
In the next chapter there will be a critical analysis of Hick's hypothesis 
frorn tile 
standpoint of the Buddhist tradition. Hick's use of certain 'Buddhist' concepts %ý ill 
be 
compared with the concepts as they are presented in the Nik5yas, 
This %Al be used to 
II ily ývitll argue that Hick 'excludes' Buddhist self-understanding, and that this sits uneasi 




religions as demonstrated in the Nik5yas is more coherent than 
Hick's account -11 
there will be a consideration of how the Buddha might have viexýed 
Hick ,s 11N, potheslS 
in the light of his teachings about other groups and Vie%vs. I 
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CHAPTER SIX: Critical Evaluation of Hick's Post-r-opernican 
Hvpothesis. 
In the first chapter of this thesis there was a presentation of the pluralistic 
hypothesis espoused by John Hick which included Hick's idea of how Buddhism Is best 
understood as relating to other world faiths. It also demonstrated how Hick used 
'Buddhist' concepts such as the 'Unanswered Questions' and 'Skilful Means' to 
develop and support his hypothesis. 
The main body of the thesis (chapters two to five) has been concerned with the 
path to liberation as it is presented in the Pali Nikdyas. This has included a particular 
emphasis on the role of views and belief in attaining liberation, and has focused on the 
idea of the 'law of the eight-factored path' as a universal causal law that culminates In 
the result of liberation from suffering, ditkkha. In the light of this, there has been all 
analysis of the Buddha's attitude towards other teachings and views as lie encounters 
them (as presented in the Nikdyas). 
This chapter will contain a critical analysis of Hick's teaching in the light of the 
Buddha's teachings that have been examined in previous chapters. Firstly, it will be 
argued that Hick is not, in fact, a pluralist, because his hypothesis actually excludes key 
-elements of Buddhist self-understanding. Perhaps the most fundamental area of 
disagreement is epistemological - Hick's hypothesis rests upon what has been 
described as a "transcendental agnostici SM11784. The term 'agnosticism' is used here to 
denote the view that we cannot know what reality is like in itself The term 
'transcendental' refers to the fact that this Reality ('the Real' as Hick calls it) Is 
beyond human comprehension, transcendino, our understanding of it. Hick's thesis 
depends upon this view that the Real as it is in itself is unknown and unknowable to 
every religious tradition. It will be argued that to apply Hick's denial of unmediated 
experience to the Buddha's teaching is to deny the very foundation of the Buddha's 
message, namely his knowledge of reality "as it is". This poses problems of internal 
coherence for Hick's hypothesis, accepting Hick's argument would mean rejecting one 
of the fundamental tenets of Buddhism in favour of Hick's foundational presupposition 
of the inaccessibility of the Real ali sich. This is problematic for Hick in that 
his 
hypothesis is intended to show that all religions are, in fact, true. it is 
hard to see hoýý 
he can make this claim about Buddhism when he has, in effect, denied a 
foundational 
tenet of the Buddha's teaching. In this respect, Hick's hypothesis 
demonstrates 
"exclusiv, st" as opposed to "pluralist" tendencies. For in accept 
H ck s aLynost kAsIll 
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one is not simply rejecting a 'cosmetic' element of Buddhist teaching, but one of its 
fundamental tenets; thus in effect Buddhism is essentially "excluded" from the 
pluralistic hypothesis. These differences will be explained in some detail in this 
chapter with various examples from Buddhist thought to demonstrate the extent of 
Hick's departure from Buddhist self-understanding. 
Secondly, it will be argued that Hick's own so-called 'pluralist' position is 'lot, 
as he presents it, a "second order hypothesiS11785, but a rival set of first-order truth 
claims, arising from a particular tradition and history. This is the tradition of Western 
liberal modernity, and Hick only includes those aspects of other religions that accord 
with this tradition, excluding those that do not. This provides further evidence that his 
hypothesis is not 'genuine' pluralism, but is actually a form of exclusivism. 
Thirdly it will be acknowledged that Hick recognises and freely admits that lie 
cannot accept all religions on their own self-understanding. He sees such 
reinterpretation aý inevitable, and nevertheless presents his hypothesis as the most 
coherent treatment of the data provided by the different apparently conflicting world 
religions. This claim of greater coherence will be contested oil the grounds that Hick's 
transcendental agnosticism leaves him with no ontological support for the sense of 
goodness and value on which his hypothesis relies. Hick sees the existence of ethical 
'fruits' as a sign of the soteriological effectiveness of a religious teachin, (: ', but is 
unable to support this claim ontologically. The Buddhist tradition, however, does have 
such ontological support and is therefore more coherent than Hick's hypothesis It 
will be argued that, whilst there are similarities between Hick and the Buddha on the 
pragmatic treatment of views and doctrines, the coherence of Hick's hypothesis is 
called in to question at the point at which he departs frorn the Buddhist tradition, 
namely on his denial of certain knowledge of the foundations of moral conduct. Thus it 
will be claimed that the Buddhist tradition is more coherent and effective in 
accommodating other religious traditions than Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. Thus on 
Hick's own criteria that the most coherent hypothesis is the one that should be 
employed786, he 'loses out' to the Buddhist tradition. 
It is perhaps pertinent to point out at this stage that all of the above criticisms 
of Hick's thesis could be made in principle from the standpoint of other religious 
traditions, and not just the Buddhist one. It is not just Buddhist self-underst arid in, _ 
for 
example, that Hick denies. However, since this thesis is written from a standpoint 
within the Buddhist tradition, the shortcomings of Hick's hypothesis are dernoristrated 
with 'Buddhist' examples. On the third line of criticism, the po 
i 
int that Hick's 
hypothesis is not the most coherent treatment of the data, there is roorn 
for an 
785See p. 225, below. 
786 See Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, p. 5 1. 
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argument that the Buddhist tradition in fact provides a more coherent account of other 
religions that any other tradition, including Hick's. This is a line of argument I do not 
wish to pursue, partly because it would involve a much more lengthy discussion thall 
the time and space-limits of this present thesis allows, and partly also for fear of 
engaging in just the sort of 'wordy warfare' and verbal disputing that the Buddha 
warned his followers against. 
To close this thesis and critique of Hick's hypothesis on a distinctly 'Buddhist' 
note I will end this chapter with a brief attempt to imagine how the Buddha might have 
viewed Hick's hypothesis. Such a critique implicitly runs throughout this chapter, but 
will be summarised and made more explicit in the final section. 
Hick's Hypothesis Excludes Buddhist Self-Understanding. 
Hick maintains that his pluralistic hypothesis for relating to the different world 
religious traditions is preferable to the alternatives of naturalism and one-tradition 
absolutism* 
"The options are either to affirm the absolute truth of one's own tradition, or go for 
some form of pluralistic view - or of course have no view and simply regai-d the 
whole matter as a mystery. "797 
I now wish to argue that, of these alternatives, Hick actually tends towards the 
position of one-tradition absolutism, because he judges other traditions by particular 
criteria that disqualify their truth claims in favour of his own. I will explain this point 
with regard to the Buddhist tradition, concentrating on the Buddhist notion of the 
possibility of unmediated experience of the Real as this is demonstrated in the teaching 
of the unanswered questions and of skilful means. I will compare Hick's account of 
these teachings with the way that they are presented in the Nikdyas to demonstrate the 
extent to which Hick diverges from Buddhist self-understanding. This is significant 
because this divergence disqualifies and truncates fiindamental Buddhist tenets upon 
which the teaching rests. If it is only after being divested of its most central claims 
that the Buddhist tradition can be included in Hick's post-Copernican pluralistic 
hypothesis, this calls into question how genuinely 'pluralistic' the hypothesis is. 
The Unanswered Questions. 
We have seen that Hick's Post-Copernican hypothesis enables the co-existence 
of different truth claims by promoting, a doctrine of 'religious ignorance'(p. 
5-3)). We 
have also seen that Hick posits the pluralistic hypothesis as a niore acceptable 
understanding of the co-existence of different faith traditions than the alternatl\, 
cs ot 
787Hick, The Rainhoir of Faiths. pp. 4, -, -9. 
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claiming all religious beliefs are illusory, or that only one tradition is true, and all others 
are mistaken. His approach to the problem is to claim that all religions have an 
incomplete picture of the Real, because it is ultimately inaccessible in its pure state. 
We have seen that Hick uses the Buddha's teaching of the unanswered 
questions to support the religious ignorance element of his thesis. I now wish to arv-ue 
that, in contrast to Hick's interpretation of it, the Buddha's teaching of the unanswered 
questions is entirely dependent upon the idea of the Buddha's complete religious 
knowledge for its coherence. The teaching of dhan? n? a comes about in the context of 
the Buddha's knowledge of the way things truly are in ultimate reality-, furthermore, it 
is a doctrine that is designed to help others see reality in itself by helping them to avoid 
getting side-tracked into preoccupations that are irrelevant to the path to liberation. 
As we saw in chapter one (pp. 57-8), Hick uses the unanswered questions in 
two ways. Firstly he makes the point that there is no purpose in dwelling on the 
differences between religious metaphysical claims when there is insufficient information 
to settle the question. If the questions are not answerable, it is a waste of energy to 
focus one's attention on these issues as soteriologically helpful. The second point for 
which Hick enlists the support of the unanswered questions is in connection with the 
inaccessibility of the Real -just as the Buddha explained that some questions cannot 
be answered because the conceptual terms in which they are couched do not apply to 
the subject, so ultimate reality "cannot be expressed in human term S"788. In fact, Hick 
does not merely want to say that the Real cannot be spoken of in human concepts, but 
rather that is 'unexperienceable 1789 and "not directly known ali vich' '790. Having 
identified these two sorts of unanswered question, Hick uses them to argue for the 
soteriological irrelevance of myths and doctrines (when they are understood as 
describing the actual truth)- "In response to the first group we develop theories, which 
can all too easily become sanctified as dogmas. In response to the second we develop 
myths. But neither theories nor the myths are necessary for salvation/liberation. "791 
Hick's first point about the futility of arguing over issues that cannot be 
resolved, is in accordance with the message of the Cl-i. lUnO111111(YU Sima, where the 
Buddha points out that such issues are not conducive to salvation. Hick himself 
acknowledges, however, that it is possible that the Buddha did indeed know the 
S792 answer to some of these question , 
but that lie saw their irrelevance to the proces, 
of liberation. As we have seen 793, there is some scholarly debate about this issue, 
but 
788Hick, An Inferpretali . on ofReligion. p_3347. 
789Hick-An Interpretali . on ofReligion. p. 246 
790Hick,. in Interpretation of Religion. p. 24 5 
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even if one were to accept Hick's interpretation here, it surely poses problems for his 
thesis. On this understanding, the Buddha, even though he is merely human, does 
know the answers to questions that are unknown to other groups. He recognises that 
knowledge of such metaphysical facts is not conducive to liberation. Here, then, there 
is an implicit judgement of those groups or individuals who do hold that questions 
about the nature of the universe and the self after death are soteriologically significant. 
This is a point that Hick seems to miss in his reporting of the unanswered questions. 
The Buddha does not merely say that some questions are unhelpful - instead he 
describes such preoccupations as actual hindrances on the path to liberation. He 
explains to Mdlunkya that the holy life does not depend upon the answers to the ten 
questionS794, suggesting that such views are not only irrelevant, but actively stand in 
the way of spiritual development. This is a point on which the text is clear, even if it is 
not clear that the Buddha knows the answer to metaphysical questions such as ývhether 
or not the world is eternal. Either way, the presupposition of the Pali text is that tile 
Buddha has complete knowledge of the way to liberation, and it is this knowledge that 
enables him to differentiate between useful and unhelpful views and doctrines. It 
seems that the Buddha's criticism here is aimed at teachings or individuals that ask 
such metaphysical questions in the first place. The Buddha's alternative is not just to 
refrain from asking such questions, but to follow his teaching which, through his 
ultimate* insight, he knows is effective in bringing about liberation. It is ironic that 
Hick uses the unanswered questions to support his theory of religious ignorance when 
it is precisely the Buddha's knowledge that leads him to teach tile unanswered 
questions in the 
_first 
place. 
It is important to recognise that in his teaching of the unanswered questions, 
the Buddha deals with specýfic questions that cannot be answered and are not 
conducive to the path. He does not judge all views in this way. In the previous 
chapter about the Buddha's encounters with other teachings, one of the suttas focused 
795. ges four different types of 'doctrine on was the Satidaka Sulla In it, the Buddha jud, j 
and view' that are at odds with the way of holy life that he teaches (ubt-uhnluc, ul'i. 
These include this-worldly claims, such as denial that actions have consequences, and 
that there is no cause for the purification of beings. They also include ýýhat 
Hick 
would describe as metaphysical beliefs - the fourth way that the 
Buddha rejects 
consists of various claims about the universe, including the 
fact that e%erybody has a 
finite number of rebirths to (Yo through, regardless of their actions. 
These vieý\s are 
rejected by the Buddha - this time, not on tile (, rounds that 
the\, deal %ýith subjects 
1=ý - 
that are beyond knowledge, but that they encourage conduct that 
does not conJuce to 
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positive development of the eightfold path. They are wrong views (micchu-di. 11hi) of 
the lower sort. This suggests that there are some metaphysical views that, whether 
they can be verified or not, are wrong because anyone following them -%ýould not 
attain the true way, the Dhamma that is wholesome. "796 As we have seen, however, 
Hick detaches the teaching of the unanswered questions from their original context, 
and uses the idea to support a general deprioritising of metaphysical questions. He 
uses this modified version, divorced of its connection with the Buddha's insight into 
transcendent reality, to allow the co-existence of conflicting religious doctrines and to 
avoid dismissing a particular teaching because its metaphysical claims contradict those 
put forward by other groups. His point is that any metaphysical teaching is acceptable 
as long as it encourages a transformation from self-cent redness to others-centredness, 
and that no particular metaphysic that is broadly followed within the major world 
religions is universally more successful at effecting this transformation than any other. 
The Buddha claims, however, that there are some metaphysical beliefs that are far 
more conducive to promoting skilful behaviour than others. Conversely, it is the 
nature of some beliefs that they bar the way to wholesome practice by undermining the 
very principles of the 'holy life' that the Buddha teaches. 
There is further evidence to suggest that it is only certain types of question 
not all questions - that the Buddha rejects as unhelpful Indeed, as we have seen, the 
ability to answer some questions is seen by the Buddha as a sign that an individual is 
on the path to liberation, and has true insight. One such example is in the 
Saýij4tfta Nik5ya where other wanderers are unable to explain how the five hindrances 
are ten because they have inferior insight to the followers of the Buddha 197 In this 
case, the inability to answer certain questions is a sian of ignorance and as such is nn 
soteriologically significant'. The implication of the Buddha's words is that wanderers 4 
of other-groups who leave these particular questions unanswered are further 
from 
liberation than those who can answer the questions. 
In Hick's eyes, however, such questions are presumably to be understood as 
an area of "metaphysical difference" between Buddhism and other teachings, 
differences that ultimately "Will not affect the all-important matter of 
Ir nal differences" are merel% salvation/liberation. 11798 As we have seen, for Hick, "doct , 
matters of interest, rather than "matters of ultimate concern in ývhlch our relh6ous 
existence is held to be at stake. 11799 For the Buddha, the message seems 
to be different. 
With reference to the above question about tile hindrances, the 
Buddha does not "Cern 
to be saying that one must answer such questions in order to gain 
liberation. Instead, 
796 M1 516. Bliikkilu Bodhi 620 
797 S ý, I 09ff. -c. pp. 200ff. , 
Woodward 92. See aboN 
798 Hick. Disputed Questions. p. 108. see above. pp. 58-9- 




his message seems to be that one with liberating insight will understand reality to such 
an extent as to be able to describe it fully. Being able to answer such questions is a 
sign that an individual has gained liberating insight, or has been taught by one who has. 
Even if one has not seen the way reality truly is for oneself, one is being taught in a 
tradition which is informed by those who ai, e genuinely liberated. As we have seen, 
one of the Buddha's criticisms of other groups and teachings is that theY are led by 
individuals who are not themselves liberated, but stuck in a state of ignorance. Thus it 
is a case of the blind leading the blind. In the Nikayas, the Buddha maintains that his 
teaching is unique in being grounded in liberating insight: 
"I behold not, monks,, anyone in the world, with its host of recluses and 
brahmins, with its devas and mankind, who could satisfy the mind with an 
answer to these questions, save only a Tath5gata or a Tatli5gata's disciples, 
or at any rate after hearing it of them. "800 
The inability to answer these 'doctrinal' questions therefore tv soteriologically 
significant, for it demonstrates the salvific competency - and, in the case of the 
Nikdya-world, superiority - of the Buddha's teaching. This serves to underline the 
point that the Buddha's teaching of the unanswered questions is concerned with certain 
specific questions, rather than all metaphysical, doctrinal issues pel. se. As we have 
seen, this treatment of the unanswered questions differs radically from the kkay that 
Hick interprets the teaching. Whereas the unanswered questions as they are used by 
the Buddha are applied in a particular scenario to a specific set of questions, Hick uses 
the teaching as a general illustration of a the relative unirnportance of metaphysical 
questions. Whereas the Buddha's teaching of the unanswered questions is grounded in 
his knowledge of what liberation is and the way to attain it, this is a knowledge that 
Hick denies. Instead he reinterprets the 'resource' of the unanswered questions to 
support his transcendental agnosticism. 
The unanswered questions thus provide one example of the way in which Hick 
de-contextualises a particular reli0ious teaching and in doing so changes Its meaning 
and significance. Why is this problematic for the coherence of Hick's hypothesis" 
It 
is problematic because, in this case, Hick's reinterpretation of the unanswered 
questions denies the knowledge in which the Buddha's teaching is grounded, namely 
his knowledge of reality as it really is. Hick therefore explicitly excludes a 
key part of 
Buddhist teaching from his pluralistic hypothesis. Let us nmý, consider another 
example of this process, the teaching of skilful means. I=) 
Skilful Means: the Presupposition of Complete Knowledge. 
800 S N. 109, Woodward 92. 
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The teaching of the unanswered questions is the first of the Buddhist concepts 
that Hick uses in support of his pluralistic hypothesis. The second major idea he uses 
is the teaching of skilful means. Let us briefly explain the significance of skilful means 
in relation to Buddhism in the Nikdyas. In his examination of skilftil means, Hick does 
not limit himself to Theravdda Buddhism, but puts a greater emphasis on Mali5yana 
traditions, where the doctrine of skilful means is most developed. Indeed, as Michael 
Pye points out, "there is no evidence whatever that the Buddha himself ever used the 
terminology of skilful means. "801 However, as he goes on to argue, the terms -say 
something about the nature of [the Buddha's] teaching which it would be very difficult 
to dissociate from the initiator of the Buddhist tradition. "802 Indeed, the aspects of 
skilful means that Hick focuses on are found - in spirit at least - in the Pal, Canon, 
so it is perhaps useful to briefly survey some examples in order to understand better 
Hick's approach. Pye cites certain specific suttas as containing examples of the 
Buddha's 'skilful means' approach in the Pali Canon. The first is the 
AriyapafiyesanUS111lU803, which gives the story of the Buddha's decision to teach the 
Dhamma. When the Buddha first becornes enlightened he is reluctant to teach what 
he has learnt, because the Dhamma is 'deep and subtle' and other people ývill be too 
ignorant to understand it. From his position of knowledge the Buddha survqs the 
minds of people and compares them to a pond of lotuses, some remain in the mud, or 
under the water, but some can rise through the water and bloom above it. This is a 
recognition of various different levels of understanding in individuals - not all ofthern 
will be able to understand the Dhamrna, but the Buddha will adapt his teaching's to be 
accessible for those who have the potential to comprehend it. The Buddha then 
proceeds to teach his companions about the four noble truths and thus embarks upon 
his teaching. Pye sees this acknowledgement of different levels of understanding and 
different means of exposition as an early example of 'skilful means'- "In general it Is 
fair to say that the idea of a differentiated yet consistent teaching was the basic style of 
pre-Malidydiia Buddhism anyway, presumed to stem from the Buddha himself. Skilfill 
means is the Mah5y5na name for this style. "804 A further important aspect of the 
Ariyapariyesunasittla is the Buddha's claim that the Dharnrna is "profound, hard to see 
and hard to understand ... unattainable 
by mere reasoning"805. The Buddha cannot 
teach the Dhami-na in its pure form because the ordinary person , ý-ould not understand 
it. Therefore he has to adapt his teachings to the needs of his followersý 
801 Michael Fý, c. Sblful. ýIeans: A Coj7cept j/7 11ahjy5na Bm h/h iSIll - 
(London. 19 P. 
802 [bid. 
803M 1 160-175. Blilkkliu Bodlil 253-268. 
804 Fý'e, Skilful, Ueans. p. 126. 
805M 
1 168-, Blukkhu Bodhi 260. 
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"The real meaning of the Buddha's teaching can only be recognised in so 
far as one appreciates that it is at first formulated in manner appropriate to 
the entanglement of the hearers in passion and ignorance. The 
formulations that make possible the escape from passions and ignorance 
are themselves only necessary in so far as they lead to the 
disentanglement. 11806 
This is the philosophy behind the raft simile - the Buddha's teaching is a means to an 
end, for 'crossing over' and not for 'holding on to'. It is a teaching suited to the 
unenlightened mind, dominated by greed, hatred and delusion. Once the mind has 
become enlightened, these teachings can become impediments, like the raft ý, vhich is 
carried around once one has attained the further shore. This tailoring of his teaching 
by the Buddha to suit the pragmatic purpose of bringing unenlightened beinos to 
liberating insight is an early example of the philosophy that later crystallised into the 
doctrine of skilful. means in the Malidydna tradition. 
Pye argues that there must be some kind of "conceptual restraint" to prevent 
Buddhism from disappearing into other teachings, and to enable it to "maintain its grip 
on its own central meaning"101. Pye identifies this restraint as coming from the 
soteriological goal of the Buddha's teaching; whatever produces the desired effect of 
progress in the right direction towards nibbdna is useful. The parable of the water- 
snake'01 demonstrates this point that 'true' doctrines are not necessarily useful ones, 
for "the same item of doctrine may be both a barrier and a door depending on hoýý it Is 
used. 11809 Pye sums up his understanding of skilful means in pre-Malidyana Buddhism 
as follows- 
"Buddhist teaching is offered after some hesitation. It seeks forms which 
are appropriate to the recipients who are rooted in diverse cultural 
contexts. In spite of its rich variation of form, the teaching is not uselessly 
speculative but pragmatically related to its goal. Its meaning must be 
correctly grasped. Although the teaching is indispensable it is eventually 
disposable. It is in these ways that all knowledgeable Buddhists understand 
the workings of their tradition. "110 
Having briefly looked at the idea of skilful means as it appears in the 
Pal' 
Canon, let us now recall Hick's use of the doctrine in his pluralistic hypothesis. 
As 
have seen, Hick interprets a narrower and a broader meaning of skilful means, 
the 
narrower being that a teacher knows a truth which lie %vill communicate to others in 
806N, C, sk. jol/. ý lea,? S. p. 124., 
807 Pye. Skiýful. ý Ieans. p. 130. 
808,41agaddlipaina Sulla. M1 134. Blilkkliti Bodili 227, ISce pgCS 154-5. above 
809Fý7e, Skiýful, llealU, p. 134. 
81 OFýle, SkiýfulAleons. p. l')-/. 
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such a way that they come to understand it for themselves. The broader meaninQ. to 
which Hick devotes most of his attention, is the kind of attitude expressed iii the 
parable of the raft, where the teachings are portrayed as pragmatic and non-dogymatic, 
a means to a certain end which are not to be attached to for their own sake. 
To avoid falling into an abyss of self-reflexivity, Hick argues that Buddhism 
must limit the doctrine of skilful means at some point. For example, if nibbana and the 
four noble truths are just means to an end and not inherently true, then they become 
44means which are not means to anything, and the whole system collapses into 
incoherence. ""' To avoid this difficulty, Hick introduces his idea of degrees of 
cupayity'. In his Kantian epistemology, with its insistence that one cannot experience 
reality as it is in itself, Hick concedes that everything has to be interpreted to a certain 
degree, so everything has a level of 'upayity' insofar as it is interpreted by the mind to 
serve certain individual or cultural purposes. Applying this to Buddhism, Hick argues 
that the Buddha could never teach reality 'pure', as it is inaccessible in tills state. Thus 
the moment the Buddha taught dhamma he was employing skilful means. A certain 
level of 'upaylty' is therefore inevitable for all statements and teachings in any religious 
or secular context. However, the four noble truths have a lower degree of upayitý, 
than, for example, the teaching of dependent origination. Hick makes this distinction 
on the grounds that the claims of, for example, the first noble truth, are founded in 
experience and more difficult to deny than, for example, the twelve links of dependent 
origination. The existence of suffering is an "experiencable fact" that "no honest or 
reflective person" could deny; it is not a theory but all "experienced reality" (although 
like all experiences in this life, it is not 'pure experience' but is subject to perceptual 
interpretation. ). 812 Thus one of the determinants for the degree of upaylty for any 
given theory is how self-evident and undeniable it seems in terms of our experience. 
Therefore, Hick judges that dependent origination has a higher level of upaylty because 
it makes use of "optional concepts and assumptions"113, It is not clearly apparent to 
any observer, unlike the existence of suffering. His argument is that, owing to the 
epistemic distance between the Real an sich and the different descriptions of it, 
dependent origination is no more true or false than any other religious interpretation of 
reality which places individuals in "soteriological alignment" with the 
Real As ýýe 
have seen, he argues that both Buddhism and Christianity, for example, are 
"both 
I IS skilful means to a radically new or transformed state of bei 
n gy , 14 
How does Hick's understanding of skilful means compare "ith the 
the 
Buddha describes his own teaching in the Nik5N! as9 Firstly, there are certain 
81 'Hick, Disputed Ouestions. p. 12 1. 
812Hick, Disputed Questions. p. 122. 
813Hick, Disputed Queslions. p. 124. 
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similarities insofar as both Hick and the Buddha argue for an epistemic distance 
between the Real ati sich and one's interpretation of it. As we have seen, however, 
one of the fundamental differences between Buddhism and Hick's hypothesis Is that the 
Buddha claims to have bridged the epistemic gap by becoming enlightened, and not 
only states that it is possible to experience reality as it is, but claims to knmý how to 
lead others to this state. For the Buddha, the issue of skilful means arises in the 
context of trying to explain the path to this ultimate reality in terms comprehensible to 
the unenlightened mind. Ultimately, the problem for the Buddha is commimicalloll, 
rather than epistemology. In other words, the story of the Buddha portrays knowledge 
of reality 'as it is' as attainable by the human mind. However, it is attainable by a mind 
that is freed from greed, hatred and delusion. The deluded mind of the 'ordinary' 
person, however, is unable to perceive this reality, the ordinary person's perception is 
distorted by greed, hatred and delusion. The problem for the Buddha is how to 
describe this reality in terms that the unenlightened mind will understand, as such a 
description inevitably involves a distortion. This is why, as we saw in chapter two 
(pp. 94-5), nibbdna tends to be described in terms of negative attributes - qualities that 
are absent from it - rather than in terms of positive attributes. Any attempt to describe 
the consciousness of the enlightened mind in terms of 'ordinary' discourse is doomed 
to failure, because the 'ordinary' consciousness perceives the world in categories such 
as 'self and 'other' that do not apply on the transcendent level. Thus whilst the 
Buddha claims to have breached the epistemic, gap between hurnan knowledge and 
reality an sich, there is always a gap between language, and the reality that it describes. 
In this sense, all descriptions are uj)a'Y'1*c, in that they involve a level of interpretation. 
Thus, as Pye pointed out, it is the goal of the path itself, the liberation actually 
experienced by the Buddha, that provides the purpose and rationale for the Buddha's 
skilful means. 
For Hick, however, the gap between the Real an sich and human consciousness 
is unbridgeable. It is not Just a problem of linguistic difference, but of epistemological i Z) 
and ontological difference. Whereas the Buddha's teaching of skilful means is 
informed by his knowledge of the reality as it truly is, Hick thinks this knowledge is 
impossible. Once again, Hick's denial of the 'transcendent' level of insight is apparent. 




the presupposition of the transcendent level of truth, and this level is required 
for tile 
coherence of his teachings. It is the clearly defined ultimate goal of tile 
Buddha's 
teaching that enables him to distinguish between skilful and unskilful 111call. " 
and 
practices. The fact that all religious language (on the ordinary 
le\el) shares the 
t- 
sanic 
status of being ultimately provisional and non-dogniatic does not preclude 
some orills 
of language from being more conducive to liberation than others 
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This approach presupposes a certain structure of reality. Some of this thesis 
has been concerned with an idea of 'salvific causation' which is epltomlsed In the 
eightfold path. This is the theory that when certain conditions are in place, 
development of all the factors of the eightfold path, (which sums up spiritual practice 
in general), is bound to occur, whether or not it is consciously willed. An indiý-idual 
who behaves ethically and cultivates meditative practice cannot help but develop the 
path factors positively - it is a law of nature that this is so. This law of nature Is 
reality that terms such as "dependent origination" attempt to describe, it is true that 
there could be different descriptions of this, but the reality is what is presupposed by 
the Buddha's teaching. It is this 'natural' causation that provides the connection 
between the two different forms of right view; one cannot gain transcendent right view 
simply by wishing it or by holding dependent origination, for example, as a cognltl\*e 
view on the lower, ordinary level. However, given the right conditions of practice, 
then transcendent right view, insight into things as they really are, ", III follmý 
automatically. Without this premise, the Buddha's teaching would not make sense - 1: ý 
the four noble truths would not be truths at all, but merely useful fictions. All of the 
Buddha's teachings presuppose a certain causality which applies not only to his 
followers, but which is universal. Hick agrees that this is presupposed by the Buddhist 
tradition, arguing that the possibility of nibb5na is grounded in the fact that the 
universe has "a certain objective character"815. However, Hick argues that the true 
character of the universe cannot be known because of the subjective activity of human 
interpretation. The Buddha of the Nikdyas, however, appears to argue that it is only 
on the unenlightened, 'ordinary' level that the universe's character cannot be known, it 
is, however, possible to free oneself from this ignorance, and see the universe as it 
really is. This insight is accompanied by liberation from suffering. 
This analysis of the unanswered questions and skilful means has demonstrated 
that Hick interprets and uses the Buddha's teachings in way that differs radically from 
their presentation in the Nikdyas. The fact that Hick has used the teachings in a way 
that differs from the Buddhist self-understanding, however, does not neces-s-cirill, 
undermine the coherence of his hypothesis. Hick never claims to be using the 
teachings in the same way as the Buddha, but instead sees thern as "an important 
resource"816What Hick takes from this resource is the idea that "it is not necessary 
for 
liberation to know the true answers"117 to certain metaphysical and cosmolo-Ical 
questions. He finds "resources" from other traditions to make the same point. 
For 
example, as a representative of the Christian tradition, lie cites 
Julian of Norxýlcli`,, 
815Hick, Dispute(I ()Ijestions. p. 124. 
916ffick--In 1/7 ferpre tali on Qf Religion. p. 343. 
817Hick,. 
-In Interprefoli . on ofReligion. p. ')44. 
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teaching that truth is "hidden and closed" from us; for the Jewish tradition he explains 
that "the stress has always been upon right practice, both ritual and ethical, rather than 
right theory. 11818 
My objection here, then, is not that Hick has reinterpreted the Buddha's 
teachings, as he never claims to have used them in the same way as the Buddhist 
tradition. Instead, my objection is with the ivay that he has reinterpreted tile 
teachings. For he has done so in such a way as to disqualify fundamental Buddhist 
claims. As we have seen, in his reinterpretation of both skilful means and the 
unanswered questions, Hick denies the Buddha's knowledge of reality as it truly is, and 
denies the 'salvific causality' that is presupposed by the Buddha's teaching of the 
gradual path to enlightenment. For a Buddhist to accept Hick's pluralistic hypothesis 
it would be necessary for him or her to relinquish the possibility that the Buddha 
attained liberating insight into ultimate reality. This would be to reject tile fundamental 
tenet on which the Buddha's teaching is based. It would ultimately mean that a 
follower would have to concede that the Buddha's teachings are not ii-iie. In effect, 
Hick's 'pluralistic' hypothesis in fact 'excludes' Buddhism when it demands the 
relinquishing of a foundational tenet of Buddhist teaching. 
This objection that Hick reinterprets a tradition's truth claims In way that 
challenges its truth and self-understanding is also made from within tile Christian 
tradition. Griffiths and Lewis exemplify this objection when they arpe that, contrary 
to Hick's hypothesis, Christians do believe that they are making fundamental claims 
about the nature of reality. Hick's hypothesis amounts to a denial that this is what they 
are really doing, and thereby empties the beliefs of their cognitive conteric 
"Such an approach does not even do the tradition with which it is 
concerned the favour of taking it seriously oil its own terms, it is almost 
certain to lead to such a serious distortion of the tradition that it can no 
longer be taken seriously as a representative of that tradition. "811 
This general point is also made by D'Costa, also writing from within the 
Christian 
tradition- 
"It is curious that those wishing better relationships between religions and who 
are anxious to dispose of exclusivist clairns, end up inadvertently not respecting the 
integrity of the different traditions and the seriousness and absoluteness of their claims 
11820 and thereby erect a new exclusivism . 
818ffick. An Interpretah . on ofReligion. p. 345- to People 8 19Paul Griffitlis and Delinas Lewis. "On Grading Rcligiolls. 
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This charge of 'exclusivism' is an important one. So far we have considered 
reasons why Hick is not genuinely 'pluralistic' because he departs from Buddhist self- 
understanding in such a way as to undermine the truth claims, and ultimately the 
coherence, of the Buddhist tradition. Let us now therefore consider the notion that 
Hick's 'pluralist' hypothesis is actually a form of exclusivism. 
Is Hick an exclusivist? 
Hick is aware of the charge that he does not accept religious traditions on their 
own self-understanding"'. However, he argues that the alternative to this process of 
reinterpretation is "simply to turn one's back on the whole project of a religious 
interpretation of religion in its wide variety of formS"822, I or else to maintain a one- 
tradition absolutism. I will now consider the objection that Hick's hypothesis logically 
falls into the latter category of a one-tradition absolutism. This is a charge made by 
D'Costa who argues that a pluralist view of religions is a logical impossibility, because 
any pluralist account entails the use of some criteria as a truth condition. Thus any 
tradition that does not meet these criteria is excluded- "There is no such thing as 
pluralism because all pluralists are committed to holding sorne form of truth criteria 
and by virtue of this, anything that falls foul of such criteria is excluded from Counting 
as truth. "823 In the case of the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha's claim to have 
unmediated experience of reality as it is is disallowed by Hick's hypothesis. This claim 
is thus "excluded from counting as truth", yet it is a clairn on which the Buddha's 
teaching fundamentally rests. 
How does Hick defend himself against this argument? Hick is keen to stress 
that his pluralistic thesis is simply a hypothesis, an attempt at explaining available data 
in a coherent manner, rather than a final truth claim about the way the world is. He 
argues that his hypothesis is a "proffered explanation" and not a "proof824, in that it 
is always open to being superseded by a better explanation. It is an explanation that 
he 
finds preferable to one-tradition absolutism, because the absolutist position falls to take 
into account the apparent soteriological effectiveness of all the other traditions. 1=) 
Furthermore, if each tradition argues that it provides the only ýý ay to 
salvation/] iberat I on then one has to make an arbitrary choice between manv absolutist 
positions, for Hick argues that there is no evidence to point to the soteriologicai 
I- III III I at his superiority of any tradition. In his defence to D'Costa's criticis , 
Hick argues tl 
hypothesis is of a different order to the absolutist claims of a religglous adherent I 
82 'See for example. Hick. The J? Ojl7hOW of Faiths, p. 45. 
82'-'Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, pp. 48-9. 
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"religious exclusivism and religious pluralism are of different logical kinds, 
the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith, and the other a 
philosophical hypothesis. The hypothesis is offered as the best available 
explanation, from a religious as distinguished from a naturalistic point of 
view, of the data of the history of religions. Pluralism is thus not another 
historical religion making an exclusive religious claim, but a meta-theory 
about the relation between the historical religions. Its logical status as a 
second-order philosophical theory or hypothesis is different in kind from 
that of a first-order religious creed or gospel. And so the religious pluralist 
does not, like the traditional religious exclusivist, consign non-believers to 
perdition, but invites them to try to produce a better explanation of the 
data. 11825 
This defence is rejected by critics such as D'Costa, Milbank and Surin, who argue that, 
on the contrary, pluralism is "another historical religion makinc.; an exclusive clairn". 
D'Costa argues, for example, that "whatever criteria are specified they are always and 
necessarily tradition specIfiC. "826 IIII , and that 
in the case of the pluralistic hypothesis, the 
ethical criteria that Hick applies are the product of modern Western llberalisrný "If it is 
not from a secularist modern liberal outlook, as Hick sometimes suEyoests, what is it 
that makes the values of 'acceptance, compassion, love for all humankind, or even for 
all life "normative"1? 11827 
Milbank makes a detailed critique of Hick from this perspective. He argues 
that the entire enterprise of cornparing different religious traditions itself has its roots 
in the Western intellectual tradition. He maintains that when non-Western traditions 
have engaged in polemical debates with Western religious traditions, "this has usually 
been occasioned by immediate exigencies of coliabitatioll"828. in other words, these 
debates as discussions between 'rival entities' only occurred after the non-Western 
traditions had been categorised as "religions" with conflicting truth claims- "the other 
religions were taken by Christian thinkers to be species of the genus 'religion', because 
these thinkers systematically subsumed alien cultural phenomena under categories 
which comprise Western notions of what constitutes religious thought and 
practice. "829 Here it is useful to recall Gombrich's discussion of 
'Protestant 
Buddhism' in the introduction (p. 15-16) to this thesis, where the point is made 
thit 
only after the influence of Western Christian missionaries did Buddhist teachers en, -, a(-, e 
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in debates and apologetics with Christians. In fact, Milbank illustrates his point %ý ith a 
reference to the Buddhist tradition: "John Hick can speak of 'many roads to salvation', 
yet it is clear that Eastern religions do not on the whole seek deliverance by divine 
grace from a sinful or merely natural condition. "83" The point here, then, is that the 
very 16problem' that religious pluralists try to address, namely the existence of 
apparently conflicting religious truth claims, can be attributed to a particular wa\' of 
categorising and understanding 'religious' phenomena that is grounded in a Western, 
Judeo-Christian intellectual tradition. The very framework in which Hick works, then, 
demonstrates that he operates from a particular historical tradition. 
Milbank's arguments similarly question Hick's choice of those religions that 
qualify as being equally soteriologically effective. For the criteria on which they are 
judged as 'equal' is also tradition specific- 
"One can only regard dialogue partners as equal, independently of one's 
valuation of what they say, if one is already treating them, and tile culture 
they represent, as valuable mainly in terms of their abstract possession of 
an autonomous freedom of spiritual outlook and an open commitment to 
the truth. In other words, if one takes them as liberal, Western subjects, 
images of oneself. 11831 
Continuing with the issue of criteria, Milbank goes on to argue that the pluralist's 
tendency to look at practice as a criteria of soteriological efficacy is rooted in Western 
liberalism which itself has roots in its "Helienic-Roniaii-Cliristian-Jewish 
inheritance. 11832 This idea that puts criteria in the arena of practice, "a politico-legal 
discourse about justice and liberation that the religious traditions can now all share in 
common" distorts and denies aspects of other traditions. For different religious 
traditions have often had fundamental differences over practice. "The uncritical 
embrace of modern norms of politics and legality leads the contributors to gloss over, 
and even try to deny, the obvious fact that religions have dIffered over political and 
social practice quite as much as anything else. "933 Milbank concludes that practice 
"turns out to be no neutral meeting ground, but rather the place where the other 
religions and even Christianity itself to some degree, have been most engulfed 
by the 
dominance of secular norms. "834 
The argument here, then, is that the framework and criteria 
for Hick's 
pluralistic hypothesis are not -second-order" and somehow "neutral" tools, 
but part of 
a tradition and history that is of the sarne logical order and status as the other 
8301bid. 
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creligious' traditions that it judges. Logically, it is a cfirst-order' and not, as Hick 
maintains, a 'second order' claim. Surin makes the point that even the logic of the 
pluralistic hypothesis belongs to the Western liberal tradition, it is not universal- 
"Traditional liberal intellectuals pride themselves on acknowlediinu, 
heterogeneity and plurality, but this acknowledgement Is always fatally 
compromised by a deployment of homogenous logic -a logic which irons 
out the heterogeneous precisely by subsuming it under the categories of 
comprehensive and totalizing global and world theologies. "835 
A further interesting point is made by Donovan, who draws a distinction between 
epistemic and ideological liberalism. He describes epistemic liberalism as "liberty of 
opinion as an epistemological principle"836, namely the notion that a plurality of 
opinion should always be heard, "not so as to absorb them all into rational uniformity, 
but so as to guarantee that any belief of opinion presently held as the truth remains 
constantly open to challenge and correction. 11831 Epistemic liberalism, then, describes a 
certain attitude towards learningy and knowledge. 
Donovan characterises ideological liberalism, however, as a "total belief- 
system and political policy" which does, indeed, try to absorb other opinions into a 
rational, trans-global uniformity. He makes an implicit criticism of Hick on these lines, 
arguing that pluralists' claims to be making only 'second order' are all part IJ 
of their ideological commitment to liberalism- "Despite describim) their efforts as 
'hypotheses' only, pluralist theologians ... 
have laid themselves open to the charge of 
seeking to promote some new, all-embracing, global ideology, a universal faith or 
world theology. "838 
As we have seen, Hick clearly tries to use the "just a hypothesis" defence in 
arguing that his model is a "second order philosophical theory", not a "first order 
religious creed". In the light of the preceding discussion, this claim seems highly 
questionable. Hick's hypothesis clearly employs certain criteria, criteria chosen and 
determined by the Western liberal tradition that Hick writes from. The logic and 
framework of tile hypothesis, too, is a product of a particular Western intellectual 
tradition. As we have seen, Hick's hypothesis excludes certain key elements of 
Buddhist teaching. It excludes them because Hick has chosen to prioritise 
his oýý11 
criteria and set of value Judgements (namely, those of Western liberal modern1tv) over 
the Buddhist ones. For, as we have seen, the Buddha did have ways of accountill-, -, 
for 
IIIII 
McDonald's 835Kenneth Surin. "A 'politics of Speech'. Religious pluralism ill tile Age of the 
Hamburger". in Christiol? Uniqueness Reconsidered, pp. 192-21 12. p. 2 10. 
836 Peter Donovan. "Tile Intolcrancc of RcligIOLIS Pluralism". 
Religious Studies, 29.1993. pp 2 1-, - 
229, p. 220. 
837Donovan. "Tile Intolcranec of Rchmous Pluralisin". p. 222- 
838DOnovan. "Tile Intolerance of Rell, "10LIS Pluralism". pp. 22 1-2 
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the existence of other groups and teachings, and these judgements are implicitly 
rejected by Hick when he disallows the Buddha's claim to ultimate knowledge. It is 
ironic that one of the reasons why Hick rejects Buddhist (or any religion's) self- 
understanding is because he mistrusts one-tradition absolutism, for Hick himself is a 
one-tradition absolutist in prioritising the values of Western liberal modernitv over 
others. 
This brief survey of an important area of criticism of Hick suggests that he is, in 
fact, logically an exclusivist in so far as his hypothesis operates with certain tradition- 
specific criteria that exclude other traditions. 
Suppose, however, that Hick were to concede the point (although he does not) 
that his hypothesis is in fact a 'first order claim', of the same logical status as the 
different religious traditions that he describes. Hick would presumably want to argue 
that his hypothesis makes better sense of the data than other accounts-, it is more 
coherent. As we saw earlier in this chapter, Hick does in fact concede that other 
religious adherents may not recognise their own self-understanding in his 
characterisation of their traditions. * 
"A global interpretation which starts from the rough salvific, parity of the 
great traditions will not be identical with the belief-systern of any one of 
them. This is why we have either to seek a more comprehensive view, or 
else each return to the absolutism of our own tradition, with Christians, 
Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and so on each affirming the unique 17) 
superiority of their own path. "119 
It has so far been argued that Hick's 'more comprehensive view' operates as another 
form of 'absolutism', despite his denials of this. If, for the sake of ar(pment, we 
suppose that Hick concedes this point, on what grounds does Hick think that his 
account is 'superior' to others? Hick sees the advantage of his account as its greater 
coherence, its better explanation of the data- "The hypothesis is offered as 'the 
best 
explanation', i. e. the most comprehensive and economical explanation, 
from a religious 
point of view, of the facts of the history of religions. 11840 He argues that 
the 
C superiority' of this explanation can only be challenged by the existence of a more 
coherent explanation- "the right response of someone who does not 
like my proposed 
explanation is not to complain that it is not proved 
but to work out a viable 
alternative. 11841 
Hick therefore supports the 'superiority' of his account on the grounds 
that it is 
the most coherent treatment of the data available. I now wish to challenge 
this claim 
839Hick, The Rainhow of Faiths. p. 48. 




on two grounds. Firstly, I wish to argue that Hick's account is not, in fact, coherent 
because his transcendental agnosticism severs the ontological backing for his use of 
ethical criteria. Secondly, I wish to argue that the Buddhist tradition is not prone to 
this incoherence, and that it is thus a more coherent account than Hick's post- 
Copernican pluralistic hypothesis. On Hick's own criteria, then, the Buddhist account 
is superior to Hick's hypothesis. 
Hick's Account is Undermined by Incoherence. 
I now wish to argue that Hick's hypothesis is internally incoherent. As we 
have seen, Hick postulates that the Real an sich is unknowable, transcending human 
understanding. For Hick, since we cannot know ultimate reality in order to veFIfy the 
cognitive truth of any metaphysical claims, the only way of finding out whether theý' 
are 'appropriate' myths, in 'soteriological alignment' with the Real, is to examine the 
ethical conduct that they encourage842. Any tradition that fulfils this 'ethical criterion' 
can be understood as an 'authentic' response to the Real. As we saw in chapter one, 
Hick's criteria for judging soteriological effectiveness is pragmatic, it is dernonstrated 
in the presence of 'saints' within religious traditions. 'Saints' he defines as individuals 
in whom the qualities of selflessness and self-giving love are developed to a significant 
843 Similarly, the existence of the ethical 'golden rule' that it is wrong to harm degree. II It) 
others is a sign, for Hick, that a religious tradition is in 'soteriological alignment with 
the Real. ' 
The problem for Hick with this element of his hypothesis is that he is unable to 
explain why or io i-Mai event the existence of ethical fruits is a sign of 
salvation/liberation, for on his own admission he does not know what the Real is like 
or what exactly salvation/liberation consists of Hick's clairn is not simply that he does 
not, in practice, know what the Real is like, but that in principle, the Real cannot 
be 
known an sich. This is demonstrated in his Kantian epistemology, 
"In this strand of Kant's thought ... which 
I am seeking to press into 
service ... the noumenal world exists 
independently of our perception of it 
and the phenomena] world as that sarne world as it appears to our 
human 
Is consciousness. Analogously I want to say that the noumenal 
Real i 
II ming and experienced and thought by different hurnan mentalities, 
for 
- 
formed by different religious traditions, as the range of gods and absolutes 
which the phenomenology of religion reports. " 844 1 1=) 
'72. CSP- PP- 842Hick-AnIl7terprelation ofReligion. Pp. 299-) 
843See Hick, An Interprelatiom ofReligion pp. 300-309. 
844 Hick-4/i Interpreiati . on of Religion, p. 242. 
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Hick is thus making an ontological claim about the Real, narneIN, that it is not 
knowable. Hick's hypothesis is thus founded in an ontological agnosticism, and this is 
problematic because it leaves Hick with no ontological backing for his ,,, aiue 
judgements about what is ethically 'good' and 'true'. If Hick knows nothing about the 
Real, what justification can he have for saying that certain kinds of conduct are in 
tsoteriological alignment' with it? Hick is criticised on these grounds by D'Costa, 
who argues that praxis always has some relation to theory; it requires some notion of 
what is 'good' practice and what is 'bad'. Hick's agnosticism severs such a 
connection: 
"In defining ... more precisely the terms soleila, Kingdom, love, and so on, 
we are inevitably driven back to the theory and the particularities of each 
tradition. Theory, of course, retains a dialogical relation to praxis. If Hick 
follows the route of transcendental agnosticism lie cannot answer this 
question. "945 
Citing other critics, Hick himself characterises this objection- "You start with the 
assumption that these various traditions are authentic responses to tile Real, and then 
you use their moral teachings as the criterion by which to judge that they al-e authentic j 
responses to the Real! Isn't this clearly a vicious circle9" 
846 
Hick's response to this objection is that such a circular argument is inevitable 
because ultimately, any argument deals with foundationalist assumptions that cannot be 
proved: "It's the kind of circle which ciny comprehensive view inevitably involves. - 
There are no non-circular ways of establishing fundamental positions. ""' He thus 
maintains that there is no alternative to this circular argument. Surely, however, this is 
not the case. The Buddha, for example, would claim that there J .. v a non-circular way of 
justifying a position, namely knowledge and insight into reality as it really is. It is this 
seeing things as they are that underpins all of the Buddha's teachings, and 'Justifies' all 
his claims. Hick's claim that there are no non-circular means of justification 
presupposes his Kantlan epistemological model. His transcendental agnosticism in 
relation to the Real pl-ecludes 1he po. ymbilily, of the foundational grounding of a 
position in reality, because this reality is unknown and unknowable. Indeed, the 
fact 
that Hick presupposes a Kantian epistemology here serves to confirm the above 
I e\cludes objection that he is operating frorn a certain intellectual heritage which 
alternative accounts, such as the Buddhist one. 
845 Gavin D'Costa. "John Hick and Religious Pluralism* Yet Anolher Revolution 
" in ed. He\\ ill. 
Problemsin the llhilosophýv of Religion (London. Macill I Ik, ". 1991). p. 
I 5ý 
846 Hick, The Rainhow o Itesis Iii example 
Tiinoili\ R. Stinnett. "Jol"I HIJ'S 
.f 
Faiihs. p. 78. Hick ci 
Pluralistic Thcory of Rcligion". The Journal qfReligion, 70.1990. p-79. 
847 Hick, The Rainhow of Taiths. p. 78. 
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Effectively, Hick is saying that, since there are no non-circular means of 
justifying his pragmatic criteria, this does not undermine the coherence of his 
hypothesis, for there is no alternative. However, it is only by presupposing the truth of 
his transcendental agnosticism that the possibility of an alternative Is denied. One could 
respond simply by rejecting Hick's premise of transcendental agnosticism. The 
difficulty with this for Hick is that it leads to the position of 'one-tradition absolutism' 
where each different tradition claims that it is unique in knowing Reality all sich. It 
has already been suggested that Hick's hypothesis itself is a form of one-tradition 
absolutism. However, even if we accept Hick's argument on this point, his hypothesis 
still runs into incoherence. Hick finds the 'one-tradition absolutist' position a less 
coherent treatment of the data of religious phenomena than his own, because it appears 
that all the main religious traditions, and not just one, are soteriologically effective He 
believes this on the grounds of the pragmatic ethical 'fruits' that are found . vithin each 
tradition. But here we have returned to the initial difficulty- if Hick does not know 
what the Real aii sich is like, then how can he know which 'fruits' are a sign of 
'alignment' with it? The very transcendental agnosticism that Hick maintains with the 
aim of allowing religions to exist as equals in fact undermines his hypothesis, because 
Hick's criteria for perceiving this 'equality' is without basis or foundation 
In contrast, the Buddhist position can provide justification for the 'frults' 
approach, because the notion of skilful and unskilful behaviour has ontological support 
in the Buddha's insight into the objective structure of reality. The greater coherence of 
the Buddhist position on this account will now be illustrated. 
The Greater Coherence of the Buddha's Approach. 
Hick's argument in defence of his pluralistic hypothesis is that it is more 
coherent than other alternatives, he challenges those who reject his hypothesis to offer 
a more coherent alternative. In the previous section it has been argued that Hick's 
hypothesis is Internally incoherent because of his failure to provide ontological 
justification for the ethical values lie prornotes: I now wish to rise to Hick's challenge 
and suggest that the Buddha's treatment of other 'religions' is more coherent than 
Hick's hypothesis. 
The first point to make is that, unlike Hick, the Buddha 
does have ontological 
support for the ethical values lie promotes, As we saw in the 
discussion of the 
eightfold path and views, Buddhist teaching contains two levels of truth 
S4 This can 
be described as 'ordinary', 'conventional', or *ý\orldly' 
(Iokl-va) truth, and 
'transcendent' or 'ultiniate'(1okiwal-a) truth. The ordinary 
level of truth is used to 
describe the world as it is understood by the unenlightened mind. 
Tile perception and 
848 See above. p. 156. 
246 
understanding of the 'ordinary person' is clouded and distorted by factors rooted in 
greed, hatred and delusion. Having completed the course of training crvstallIsed in tile 
Buddha's teaching of the eightfold path, a disciple's mind becomes freed of these 
obscuring factors. Such an individual is described as a 'noble disciple' (ailyusivaka), 
and he or she is said to see reality as it really is. This knowledge Is described as 
'transcendent' (lokullara) right view- it is the way reality appears once the distorting 
factors of greed, hatred and delusion have been transcended. According to the 
Buddha, this 'transcendent' view is insight into the ultimate truth about tile way the 
world is; it is seeing things as they truly are. 
As a result of this insight into reality, the Buddha knows that it is the nature of 
certain views and beliefs that they affect the mind and conduct in certain ways. It is 
clear, for example, from the SaWaka Sulla that certain specific views will not and 
cannot promote conduct that encourages development towards liberation (pp. 168- 
172). For the Buddha, then, there is a definite *and specific connection between certain 
views and conduct. The Buddha is able to specify a 'hierarchy' of views because his 
knowledge of liberation and the path to its attainment furnishes him with specific 
criteria. For example, he is able to clairn that denial of the efficacy of action is a 
definite hindrance to the development of the holy life. Hick, on the other hand, does 
not have recourse to any such criteria, because he denies that there Is a standpoint of 
objective knowledge from which different beliefs can be judged. Thus, his criteria for 
evaluating beliefs comes a povel-lol-l, and is deduced frorn the 'evidence', whereas the 
Buddha's assessment comes ci 1)1-1'ol-I from his insight into the causal nature of reality. 
The Buddha, then, does have clear criteria for judgement (i. e. his knowledge of the j 
path to the cessation of suffering) and evaluates different teachings accordingly. 
Unlike Hick, he sees a direct causal relationship between views and conduct which 
enables him to be specific in his judgements of views. As we saw earlier in the 
Apannaka Sitlia849, it is "to be expected" that certain views will produce wholesome 
results and certain ones will encourage unwholesome conduct. The Buddha's 
judgement on views is a claim about the nature of objective reality seen as it really is by 
the enlightened mind, frorn a viewpoint that Hick maintains is impossible. By the 
postulation of this foundational knowledge in which the Buddha's ethical judgernents 1=> 
j" 
are grounded, the Buddhist tradition avoids the undermining vagueness that plagues 
Hick's use of ethical criteria. This difference between the Buddha's teaching and 
of the Buddha's criteria for Hick's hypothesis is demonstrated in the higher speci I 
liberation. As we have seen, the Buddha's criteria goes beyond just ethical conduct 
In 
v lighly de\eloped the Tevýja Siala, for example, we saw that brahniins who ha eI 
ethical conduct attain their goal of union with Brahni5 (p. 205ff) 
On Hick's ýiccount, 
849M 1402, Bliikkliu Bodhi 507. 
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these individuals would have attained salvation/liberation. The Buddha, howe%-er, 
describes how these individuals still have more to perfect in terms of morality, ýý isdom 
and concentration; because the Buddha has a clear idea of what liberation consists of 
(unlike Hick), he is able to be highly specific in his criteria. 
Another area in which the coherence of Hick's hypothesis has been questioned 
is in its claim to be genuinely 'pluralistic' when in fact it logically operates as a form of 
exclusivism. Hick seems wary of making claims that 'exclude' other traditions, but 
nevertheless he implicitly does so, and does so by using certain tradition-specific 
criteria. The Buddha is more consistent on this account; his insight into the objectiý,, e 
nature of reality gives him an objective justification for his judgements of other 
traditions. Hick, however, implicitly makes judgements without having objectl%, e 
justification for them. 
Let us briefly summarise the argument of this chapter. Firstly, it has been 
argued that Hick. radically undermines Buddhist self-understanding. In doing so he 
effectively 'excludes' the Buddhist tradition from inclusion in his hypothesis, rilakiffill 1_7 
his claims that his hypothesis is 'pluralist' seem highly questionable. 
Secondly, it has been argued that Hick's hypothesis is a form of exclusivism in 
so far as it arises from, and expresses the values of a particular historical and 
intellectual tradition. Other religions are Judged' by the standpoint of this tradition J I-) 
This leads to the internal contradiction that Hick is being exclusivist when he claims to 
be a pluralist. 
Thirdly, another internal incoherence has been dernonstrated in Hick's use of 
the 'ethical fruits' criteria. It has been argued that Hick's transcendental agnosticism 
severs the ontological justification for these criteria, rendering them meaningless. 
Fourthly, it has been argued that the Buddha's approach to other teachings as 
presented in the Nik5yas does not contain the incoherencies of Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis. It thus represents a more coherent alternative to Hick's account. 
How Might the Buddha have Viewed Hick's Hypothesis? 
Finally, I would like to briefly offer an account of how the Buddha might have 
viewed Hick's hypothesis. This is a large and complex subject and space is limited, 
however, a brief sketch of this analysis, apart frorn being of interest in itself, ýý 
ill serve 
to highlight the differences between Hick's hypothesis and Nik5N, a Buddhism. This 
will bring into relief those aspects of Buddhist self-understandin, ' that 
Hick's 
hypothesis denies. 
Although most of this chapter has been dedicated to shomrig, 
hoýý Hick 
misrepresents the Buddhist tradition, in man),, ways I think the Buddha would 
have 
approved of Hick's hypothesis in that in significant respects it is conducl%e 
to tile 
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development of positive wholesome states. Although, ultimately It is an 'ordinarv' 
view, and thus made from a position of fundamental ignorance, it neý, erlheless 
demonstrates many facets of 'ordinary' right view. 
Hick's hypothesis as Ordinary Right View. 
In Chapter Four there was an analysis of 'ordinary right view' as described in 
the Sdleyyaka Slata (p. 126. ). Using this definition of ordinary right vieý,, ý, I want to 
suggest that Hick's hypothesis is an example of such a view in that it commends the 
practise of conduct "in accordance with the Dhamma". For example, in his approval of 
"love, compassion, generosity, mercy"850, and his disapproval of conduct that is 
"selfish, cruel, deceitful, exploitative and maliCiOUS"151, Hick clearly promotes the 
abstention from 'unwholesome' factors such as taking life, taking the not-, (,: Y)Iven, sexual 
misconduct, malicious or false speech, covetousness and hatred. In the 
Sevitabbisevitabba Siata, ordinary right view is described as that which causes a 
decrease in unwholesome states, and an increase in wholesorne stateS852 Hick's 
hypothesis works in alignment with this analysis, for lie approves of those religious (or 
even secular) traditions that "teach tile moral ideal of enerous (loodwill, love, 9 
compassion". 853 
From the viewpoint of the Buddhist tradition, this is rigyht viev, because such 
conducts leads to positive development of the factors epitomised in the eightfold path, 
it is a sign that the law of 'saivific causation' is operating in the right direction, towards 
fruition. As we saw in the Bha., abel-cwttvaici any beings who "were possessed of' ood 
conduct in speech and thought" and who "did not scoff at the Ariyans 11 will have a 
pleasant rebirth. 854 
Hick would therefore be approved of for his ethical code and his recognition of 
ordinary right view. There are other respects in which I suggest that the Buddha 
would have approved of Hick's views. In the Apaýqiuku Sulfa, we saw the Buddha's 
approval of certain pragmatic attitudes towards views held by the ordinary person who 
acknowledges his position of ignorance855. When faced with various teachings about 
life after death a "wise [ordinary] man" , explains the 
Buddha, would recognise that he 
has not "known or seen" for himself which, if any, teaching is true. Instead, lie judges 
which teaching to follow on the grounds of the probable ethical and spiritual 
consequences of following it. In the absence of personal knowledge, 
lie recogiiises 
850 Hick-An Interpreiation ofReligion. P. -326. 851 Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths. p. 7 7. 
852M Iii 45-61, BlAklm Bodhi pp. 913-924. 
853 Hick-4n Inierprefolion (? f Religion. p. 116. 
854See above, p. 1733. 
855See above, p. 127 ff. 
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that it "would not be fitting" to declare that only one view is right, and that all the 
others are wrong. 856 He therefore chooses to approve of those views that are likel% to 
tend towards freedom from clinging and lust. Thus he recognises that a viek". that 
denies that actions have consequences, for example, leaves one with less motivation for 
acting ethically. If he were to follow this view and behave unskilhilly, then If he were 
wrong he would suffer bad consequences; if he were right, then he would not have lost 
or gained anything. If he were to behave as if actions do have consequences, then if he 
were right he would gain much by acting skilfully; if he were wrong he would have lost 
nothing. Therefore it makes sense for him to act skilfully as though actions do have 
consequences. There are certain similarities between Hick and the 'ordinary man' in 
the Apaýqzaka Siata. Like the wise man, Hick knows that he is in a position of not 
knowing and seeing whether a particular doctrine is true, as a result he does not 
commit himself to the truth claims of any one particular tradition, preferring instead to 
opt for 'transcendental agnosticism'. It is important to note, however, that this 
argument only works if Hick's agnosticism is understood in its weak form, namely as 
an admission that he in fact does not know what the Real IS like. From a Buddhist 
perspective, this is an honest recognition of the limited viewpoint of the ordinar-ý' 
person. Although, unlike the wise man, Hick understands the value of ethical conduct 
as a foundational truth, he is like the wise man in that he Judges a particular vie%ý on its 
psychological and ethical effects. However, if Hick's agnosticism is interpreted in its 
stronger form, as an in-principled denial of the possibility of knowledge of reality as it 
is, then Hick is in fact making a rival truth clairn, - lie is saying, that lie knoirs that he 
cannot know. His claim then becomes a knowledge-claim, rather than an admission of 
ignorance. 
There is a further interesting point of divergence, here. The Buddha points out 
that, without knowing and seeing for oneself (i. e. transcendent right view), an 
individual cannot know if there is any point in acting ethically. Hick, however, clearly 
accepts as a 'given' the value of ethical conduct- "one cannot prove such a 
fundamental principle. It is too basic to be derived from prior premises. 
"8ý1 One must 
question the coherence of this clairn with Hick's position of agnosticism. 
What sort of 
'knowledge' does Hick have of the fundamental principle that it is wrong to cause 
suffering to others9 Hick claims that one cannot know reality as it really is, 
how is his 
foundational belief in the principle that it is wrong to cause suffering, 
to others, 
consistent with this claim? Surely, if lie is really in a position of ispiorance, it 
would be 
more consistent for him to be agnostic about morality too, just 
like the 'ý\ Ise mail' in 
the Apaýqiuku Suna who elects to act ethically as a rational, pragmatic 
decision. rather 
856Scc above. p. 129 ff. 
857Hick.. 4n lnlerpretotioi7 of Religion. p., 12. 
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than from a fundamental conviction. Indeed, this is one of the problem's with Hick's 
use of ethical criteria; since they are not grounded in foundational knowledge Hick is 
vague and non-specific about them. 
From the perspective of the Nikdyas, it seems plausible to suggest that Hick's 
ethical convictions are a form of saddlO, 'confidence' or 'faith'. It is a position of 
cconfidence' as opposed to knowledge insofar as the ordinary person has not seen for 
himself the ultimate consequences of ethical action and how it relates to liberation. On 
his own admission, Hick does not laioi, v (i. e. he does not have 'transcendent right 
view') the ultimate structure of reality-, however, his conviction that right ethical 
conduct leads to positive soteriological benefits is a right view, and a form of saddha. 
So far, then, we have seen that the Buddha might approve of Hick's hypothesis 
in so far as it advocates skilful conduct, and as such is a form of right vie%\ It might 
also be approved of in so far as Hick recognises his firnited knowledge, recognises that 
he does not 'know and see' reality as it really is. However, there are other accounts on 
which it might not be approved, let us now consider some possible objections to 
Hick's hypothesis in the light of the Buddha's teaching on views in tile 
Brahniajdla Sulla. 
The BrahmajUla Sulla. 
In Chapter Four there was a section on the Bi-ahinuiula Sullu, the discourse in 
which the Buddha categorises and analyses sixty-four different kinds of metaphysical 
views and beliefs. How would Hick fit into this analysis9 Once again, I wish to argue 
that there are some respects in which the Buddha would view Hick's approach 
favourably. In other respects, however, it would be open to criticism. As we have 
seen, the Bi-ahinaj, 51a Sima begins with the Buddha speakiniz out against engaging in 
disputes over matters of doctrine. It seems that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is partly 
motivated by a desire to avoid such disputation. In his explanation of the need for a 
pluralistic hypothesis in Ali 11aelyn, elcili . on (? f Religion, one of Hick's justifications is 
that the pluralistic hypothesis is more satisfactory than the two alternative positions 
These he characterises as, on the one ]land, "the sceptical view that religious 
experience is iii iolo delusory", and on the other the "dogmatic vleýý tliat it is all 
delusory except that of one's own tradition. "151. Regardless of whether or not 
he is 
i is to sLiguest judged successful, one of Hick's motivations in the pluralistic 
hypothesis i 
a model of understanding that does not place religious 
beliefs and adherents in 
opposition to each other, but which accommodates their claims. 
The fact that lie puts 
858Hick,. 4/7 Inferprelotion qfReli, 0017. p. 235- 
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forward his point as a "hypothesis", rather than a "proof'859 or final truth claim 
suggests that he is keen to avoid the kind of dogmatism that the Buddha characatures 
in the Brahnzajdla Suna- "'Your way is all wrong - mine is right! 'I am consistent - 
you aren't'. 11860 In this respect, then, I wish to argue that the Buddha would have 
some approval of the motivation behind Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, from the Buddha's perspective of transcendent right view, Hick's 
hypothesis is an "ordinary view" and thus "merely the feeling of those who do not 
know and see, the worry and vacillation of those immersed in craving. "861. In terms of 
the sixty-four types of view listed, Hick's hypothesis in some ways resembles the 
group of views which, in various ways, postulate post-mortem survival. As we have 
seen, Hick postulates eschatological verification, the idea that his hypothesis can be 
verified or falsified after death. "I believe that there is a final state, a fulfilment of the 
project of human existence, beyond this life, perhaps beyond many lives. "162 He admits 
not knowing what such an existence will be like, whether it will be conscious, 
unconscious or neither conscious nor unconscious, but the Buddha rejects all of these 
views as "the worry and vacillation of those immersed in crav n(I. "863 Similarly, the 
transcendental agnosticism element of Hick's thesis bears some resemblance to the 
views of the eel-wrigglers, who realise their position of ignorance, and are non- 
committal about metaphysical claims. "'I don't say that. I don't say it is otherýý,. Ise. I 
don't say that it is not. I don't not say it is not. "'804 As we saw in chapter four, 
(p. 135-7) the problem with all these views is that they are claims made from a position 
of ignorance, they are all dependently arisen and ultimately the product of ignorance 
and craving. A disciple who has clear insight into this causal progress, namely one 
who sees reality as it is, is freed from such views- "When a monk understands as they 
really are the arising and passing away of the six bases of contact ... 
he knows that 
which goes beyond all these views. "965 
From the Buddhist perspective, then, although Hick's hypothesis may have 
factors that qualify it as an 'ordinary right view', it is ultimately a 'view' rather than 
insight into the way things really are. The Buddha, however, has knowledge of the 
way things really are, and this is grounds for the salvific superiority of his teachings 
In 
the Pdsddika Situa we saw that the Buddha rejected various metaphysical views 
like 
those listed in the Fj-uhmqj51u Sulla on the grounds, "I do not consider such theories 
, her equal to my own, still less superior. I arn their superior in regard to the 
hig 
859See Hick, The Rainbow of Faiihs, p. 5 1. 
860D 1 9. Walshe 7 1. (See p. 13 1. abo\ c 
86 'D 140, Walslic 87. 
862Hick, The Rainbow of Paiths, p. 72. 
863D i 40-41. Walshe 88. 
864D 1 26, Walshc 80. 
865D i 45, Walslic '189. 
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exposition. 11866 The Buddha's "higher exposition" is superior on the grounds that it Is 
founded in insight and not in ignorance and craving. 
On his own admission, Hick does not have transcendent right vieýý Indeed, he 
denies the very possibility of insight into reality as it truly is when it is this insight that, 
according to the Buddha, constitutes transcendent right view. We have already seen 
(p. 148ff. ) that, according to the Nikdyas, it is the insight into the causal nature of 
reality as it is that provides liberation from suffering. It is this personal knoýý ledge and 
insight that characterises transcendent right view. Although Hick's views may be right 
in some respects on the 'ordinary' level, they are not transcendent right views because 
they are not founded in knowledge of reality as it is- "Since they have no clear, 
personal knowledge, even the mere fragmentary knowledge that those good recluses 
clarify (about their view) is declared to be clinging on their part. "967 
Hick's hypothesis, then, is the view of an 'ordinary person' ý)wlntl . aiia), and 
as such it is ultimately not to be trusted. This is dernonstrated in the analogy in which 
an ordinary man is likened to a blind mail, when lie finally attains transcendent 
knowledge and vision lie reallses that lie has been "tricked, cheated, defrauded by tills 
mind. "868 
As we saw in chapter four, however, one cannot gain transcendent ri(_YIlt vlew 
simply by willing it. One has to start with ordinary right view, and in so far as it 
promotes ethical conduct Hick's hypothesis is an ordinary right view that causes the 
development of the path-factors in their positive aspect. 
In a way, Hick's transcendental agnosticism is highly appropriate, for in it Hick 
recognises the limitations of his current knowledge. Consider tile example of Prince 
Jayasena, who did not believe his friend's description of the view frorn the top of the 
mountain because he himself was only halfway up and the view was obscured by him. 
He questions his friend's description of the view: "'It is impossible, friend, it cannot 
happen that while standing oil top of the mountain you should see lovely parks ... 
lovely ponds. "'. Only when lie has been led up the mountain and sees the view for 
himself does he believe that it exists. The Buddha argues that this story is analogous 
to the difference between the knowledge of the ordinary person and the noble dlsclpleý 
"So too ... 
Prince Jayasena is obstructed, hindered, blocked, and enveloped 
by a still greater mass than this - tile mass of Ignorance. 
Thus it is 
impossible that Prince Jayasena, living in the midst of sensual pleasures, . 
could know, see, or realise that which must 
be known through 
866M i 140, Bliikkliu Bodhi 234 (sccjbovc p. 140) 
867M I1 235, Bliikkhu Bodhi 844 (see aboN c P. 152) 
868M 1 511-2. Blukkiiii Bodlu 616 (see abovc p. 186) 
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renunciation, seen through renunciation, attained through renunciation, 
realised through renunciation. 11869 
In its denial of knowledge of reality an sich, Hick's hypothesis provides all accurate 
description of the perspective of the ordinary person. Hick is being truthful in 
explaining that the ordinary person does not know Reality an sich, because he or she is 
not yet in a position to know it. However, from the Buddhist perspective, Hick is 
wrong in his denial of the possibility of transcendent knowledge in this life. Although 
Hick's belief in eschatological verification admits the possibility of eventual 
transcendent knowledge in a future existence, the Buddha is clear in expressing that 
this transcendent knowledge is attainable now. Thus whilst the Buddha would 
perhaps approve of Hick's accurate description of the limited knowledge of the 
ordinary person, he would surely see Hick as mistaken in his denial of the possibility of 
transcendent knowledge in this life. 
So far, then, it has been suggested that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis 
demonstrates many of the characteristics of ordinary right view It encourages skilful 
ethical conduct and is partly motivated by a desire to avoid disputes and conflict over 
dogmatically held beliefs. Like ý11 ordinary right views, however, it is fundamentally 
rooted in ignorance and craving. This manifests itself most clearly in Hick's denial of 
the possibility of knowledge of the Real aii sich. 
Hick shows the i-ight attitude for an ordinai-y person. 
In that it is not grounded in transcendent knowledge of the way things truly 
are, and in that it denies the present possibility of such knowledge, Hick's hypothesis 
might qualify as one "without consolation". However, there are other respects in 
which, on the 'ordinary' level at least, Hick's approach might qualify for the Buddha's 
approval. 
On his own admission, Hick has not had personal knowledge of the Real an 
sich; in Buddhist terms, he has not seen reality as it is and attained transcendent right 
view. Instead, he is faced with varying soteriological traditions and teachings. 
In such 
a situation, the Buddha's recommendation is that one 'preserves the truth' 
by 
withholding judgement: "If a person has faith ... 
he preserves the truth when he says, 
'My faith is thus', but lie does not yet come to the definite conclusion. 
'Only this is 
true, anything else is wrongl. "8711 Thus there is the "preservation of 
truth" in a state 
prior to the "discovery of truth". As we saý, v in the Cunki S, I I, U'-, 
7 1, the correct attitude 
869M Iii 13 1. Blukkliu Bodlu 991 
870M 11 17 1, Bliikkliu Bodhi 780 (sccabovc. P. 167) 
871 See above. pp. 166-7. 
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for an ordinary person is one of scrutiny. For example, when the Tath5gata claims that 
he "knows and sees", his conduct should be scrutinised to see if it is in accordance 
with one who is freed from greed, hatred and delusion. If one is satisfied with the 
teacher's conduct, then one should provisionally accept his teachings, scrutillise them 
and strive in accordance with them until "he realises with the body tile ultimate truth 
and sees it by penetrating it with wisdom. 11872. In this way, there is "disco,, -, er-N, of 
truth' 
In some ways, Hick's hypothesis recommends an approach in accordance with 
this teaching. For example, Hick does not claim that the hypothesis Is exclusively true 
and he does not completely dismiss other teachings. Indeed, one of the intended 
purposes of his hypothesis is to enable to co-existence of apparently 'rival' teachings. 
Similarly, with its ethical criteria of soteriological effectiveness, Hick's hypothesis 
recommends a form of 'investigation' into conduct that resembles the Buddha's 
teaching that one. should scrutinise the behaviour of teachers. From one perspective, 
Hick's transcendental agnosticism can be seen as an admission that in his present state, 
he does not knou, which teaching is true and that his agnosticism is a way of not 
committing to any particular teaching and ruling out others before he has tile grounds 
to do so. However, from another perspective, Hick's agnosticism could be seen as a 
rival truth claim that actually does rule out other teachings, and therefore does not 
cpreserve the truth'. For example, we have seen that the Buddha grounds his teaching 
in personal experience of the way things truly are. In denying tile possibility of this 
knowledge, Hick denies the teachin2of the Buddha. From the Buddhist perspective, 
this denial is premature, for Hick is not yet in a position to make such judgements 
(here it is useful to recall the Prince Jayasena mountain analogy). This point rests on 
the kind of agnosticism that Hick promotes. If Hick is claiming that he does not know 
the nature of the Real all mch, then he is 'preserving the truth'. If, however, he is 
making the claim that it is not possible In pl-mcil)le to know the Real atimch, then he is 
excluding other beliefs and is not 'preserving the truth'. The difference between these 
two kinds of claim is that the former is a report of Hick's phenomena] experience 
The 
latter, however, is a claim about the nature of reality. From the Buddha's perspective, 
the 'ordinary person' is only qualified to make a clairn of the former category, 
for this 
I howe,,,, er goes beyond is grounded in his or her own experience. The latter claim, 
experience and is made on the (,, rounds of logic and inference, 
it Is thus an 'unreliable' 
claim. 
Returning to the idea of scrutinising a teacher's conduct as a means of 
establishing his authority, Hick might argue that his pim-alistic 
1wpothesis does take this 
approach in its use of ethical conduct as a criteria 
for soteriological effecti\eness 
872M 11 173. Bliikkliu Bodin 782. 
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When the 'saintly' individuals and the levels of good ethical conduct ýý ithin different 
traditions are compared, no particular teacher and tradition appears to be ýý'Iser or 
more accomplished in moral conduct than any other. I want to suý,, (; est that the 
Buddha's response would be that Hick's investigation does not go far enough. The 
Buddha does recognise that other teachers are accomplished in moral conduct. For 
example, in the Mah5sihandda Slaw, a wise man is said to recognise that other 
teachers have mastered skilful conduct and freed themselves from unskliful conduct "in 
part", but the Buddha has "completely" attained these things"'. We have already seen 
in chapter five how the Buddha claimed to be unsurpassed in moral conducv "I do not 
see anywhere ... any other recluse, or any 
brahmin more accomplished in moral 
conduct than myself 1874. As it has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the Buddha 
recognises other criteria, beyond moral conduct, as a sign of soteriological 
effectiveness. As we saw in the Culiki-Suna, when one is satisfied with a teacher's 
moral conduct, then this provides justification for provisional faith in their teachings. 
These teachings must then be 'scrutinised' and tested against one's own experience. In 
this context, this means practising the teachings, particularly meditation, until one gains 
the insight to verify or falsify a teaching with personal experience. The stage of good 
moral conduct, then, is a preliminary step in the process of the 'discovery of truth' 
This is demonstrated in the Miýgandiy, a Siala where it is explained that, with 
investigation of the Buddha's teaching, accompanied by skilful ethical conduct, faith 
becomes superseded by (transcendent) knowledge and Vi Sion. 975 From the Buddhist 
perspective, then, Hick's hypothesis does not take investigation far enough, there is 
more than just ethical conduct that is a criteria for salvific effectiveness. Any 
individual that were to follow the course of training that the Buddha describes would Z: > 
set in motion the law of salvific causation, and would eventually come to know the 
reality as it really is for hirn or herself The Buddha is unambiguous about describing 
the path he sets forth as the best way to attain this knowled(; e: it "fully successful 
and perfect, with nothing lacking and nothing superfluous. " 876 In the previous section 
we acknowledged that Hick's denial of criteria beyond the ethical in judging salvific 
effectiveness was a point at which his hypothesis is at odds with the 
Buddhist tradition. 
Here we can see that, from the Buddhist perspective, it is on this issue that 
Hick is 
of the knowled(ye and vision that the mistaken. Hick denies the very possi iI 
Buddha explains as the culmination of the path of practice that 
lie sets out it is a a% 
of nature, part of the objective structure of reality, that if the ri(, 
ht conditions of 
isciple %ýith a such as practice are in place, this goal will be attained. To a 
d' 
873See above, p. 170. 
874S , 138. sec abou. p. 172. 
875See above. p. 152ff. 
876D iii 126, Walslie 411 
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Hick's, the Buddha might suggest that he suspend judgement on the possibility of 
attaining such knowledge until he or she had practised the path to the extent of gaining 
personal verification. 
Before concluding this section it would be appropriate to consider once again 
the Cfijusakuluddyi Siala, for in some ways it provides a useful summary of the way in 
which the Buddha might have judged Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. U, ffityiii is a 
wanderer who believes that liberation consists of attaining "the perfect splendour". 
However, on being questioned by the Buddha, he is unable to describe what this 
splendour is like, for neither he nor his teachers have experienced it. As we have 
seen877, the Buddha criticises Uddyin on two counts; firstly, he is unable to Justify his 
claims because they are not grounded in personal experience. Secondly, because his 
claims are not grounded in personal insight, he is not qualified to make them. I wish to 
suggest that the Buddha might have made a similar critique of Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis. The reason why Hick is unable to say anything about reality all sh-. 17 Is 
because he has not had personal, transcendent insight of it. This in itself is not a 
criticism; however, from the Buddhist perspective, one who has not had personal 
direct knowledge of reality cm mch is not in a position to make claims about it. Hick 
is right in so far as he claims that the 'ordinary person' does not know the Real all sich 
and so cannot make clairns about it. He is wrong however, in saying that the Real 711 
cannot be known ali sich, for he is simply not in a position to make such a claim. 
There is a further interesting point of comparison in the Ca. lusukuludiyi Sulla, 
Uddyin and his followers argue that the goal of their teaching, "all entirely pleasant 
world", can be attained by practising skilful conduct. As we have seen, the Buddha 
describes this as a preliminary stage, through his knowledge of reality and the process 
of salvific causation he knows that there are other things to be perfected, such as 
progression through the four stages of meditation. Hick's hypothesis therefore 
resembles Udayin's in that it sees skilful moral conduct as a sufficient criteria for 
soteriological effectiveness, and therefore denies the stages beyond this that are 
explained by the Buddha. 
Summary 
Let us now summarise this critique of Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis ,n the II ght 
of the Buddha's attitude towards other teachings and views in the 
Nikayas. 
I- Hick's hypothesis, in its advocation of ethical conduct, and its attempt to avold 
dogmatic disputes, is a form of ordinary right view 
2. In so far as it recognises the limited knowledy of the ordirlarv person, 
and, 
knowing of this limitation, is reluctant to finally praise or condernii aiw of 
the -, reat 
877 See above p. 187ff. 
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world traditions, Hick's hypothesis 'preserves the truth'. The hypothesis is right in its 
recognition that the ordinary person is not in a position to make claims about the 
ultimate nature of reality. 
3. Hick's hypothesis is mistaken in its denial of the possibility of direct personal 
knowledge of reality 'as it is I in this life. It impli I icitly suggests that all 'holy ýýavs of 
life' are (without consolation; this is not the case. Although the individual on the 
&ordinary level' is not in a position to make claims about the nature of reality as it is, 
there are individuals who have gained transcendent knowledge and have seen reallt\, all 
sich. There is a path set forth by the Buddha that, if followed, enables the attainment of 
this transcendent knowledge. 
4. If Hick's agnosticism is interpreted simply as an admission of ignorance, it could be 
seen as a facet of ordinary right view, in as much as it contains an accurate recognition 
of the limited knowledge of the ordinary person. However, as an ontological claim 
about the nature of reality, Hick's agnosticism is a wrong view, because it denies the 
possibility of liberation as taught by the Buddha, and thus undermines the Buddha's 
teachings. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis has been criticised oil the following 
grounds from a primarily Buddhist perspective. 
1. It is not genuinely pluralistic because it denies vital elements of Buddhist self- 
understanding which, if denied, would change the rileaning, and even the coherence of 
the Buddha's teachincys. In this respect it is internally incoherent because it is not, in 
fact, a 'pluralistic hypothesis', even though it claims to be. 
2. Related to the first criticism is the point that Hick's hypothesis is logically a form of 
exclusivism, for it operates by certain specific criteria that implicitly exclude other 
criteria and values. 
3. Hick's hypothesis is also internally incoherent on tile grounds of the 'ethical 
fruits' 
criteria. The ethical criteria that Hick employs are incoherent if not supported 
by a 
notion of 'right view', for they become vague and unspecific. 
Furthermore, it has been 
argued that Hick's focus oil praxis represents the privileging of one particular 
philosophical and value-tradition (narnely that of Western-liberalism) over others. 
4. The Buddhist account provides a more coherent alternative than 
Hick's hypothesis, 
because it does provide ontological support (with the notion of 
'transcendent right 
view') for the criteria of liberation. On Hick's own criteria 
that tile most coherent 
hypothesis is the most acceptable one, tile Buddhist account is 





5. Finally, it has been suggested that from the Buddhist point of view, Hick is in error 
in his hypothesis, for he makes claims that he is not qualified to make. He is right in 
his admission of his own fundamental ignorance, but profoundly mistaken in his claim 
that the Real an sich is unknowable. 
There are many questions worthy of future research that have arisen during the 
course of this thesis. For example, the notion of a Buddhist approach to religious 
pluralism could be expanded in great detail, to provide a critique of specific religious 
traditions. As we have seen, Hick's broad criteria of 'ethical fruits' leads him to 
suppose that all religious traditions are equally effective. It would be interesting to 
compare different religious traditions in the light of the highly specific criteria 
presented by the Buddha to discover if there were a hierarchy of 'salvific effectiveness' 
amongst non-Buddhist and indeed Buddhist traditions. Another area of interest would 
be to compare the attitude towards other groups in the Nik5yas with that found in 
other Buddhist sources, for example in early Mah5y5na texts. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to consider the attitudes towards other religions espoused by contemporary 
Buddhist teachers to see how much they are informed by the early texts of their 
respective traditions. 878 
It would also be interesting to consider how Hick might respond to the critique 
in this thesis. Perhaps he would argue that he does not in fact propound an 
contological' agnosticism, or that there is insufficient evidence (in terms of ethical 
fruits) to support the Buddha's claim that his holy life is 'fully successful and perfect, 
with nothing lacking. ' 
At the start of this thesis, I expressed that the subject was being approached 
from a standpoint sympathetic to the Buddhist tradition. However, a doctoral thesis 
perhaps epitomises many of the values of western, post-enlightenment academia. One 
of the conventions adhered to in this tradition is the methodology of debating between 
often conflicting positions as means of reaching truth or consensus. This process 
has its 
roots in the Hegelian method of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This thesis is no 
exception to this process-, for not only has it dealt primarily with two 
cconflicting' 
accounts presented frorn within the Buddhist tradition and from 
Hick's hypothesis, but 
throughout it, the thought of various different thinkers has 
been marshalled ill support 
of one view or another. I wish to close this thesis with the suggestion 
that, were I 
truly to embrace the Buddha's teaching as I have understood it in the 
Nik(-iyas, then I 
8781 have touched upon this issue in a paper in which I consider ilic 
Dalai Lama's Ricle to%Nards 
other religions. See -Tlic Dalai Lania and the %Vorld 
Religions: A False Fricild"" iii Religmio 
30,1996, p. 271-279. 
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might turn my back on this form of scholarly discipline. The following extract from the 
Dighanakha Siam illustrates the grounds for this suggestion- 
"A wise man among those recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and 
view 'Something is acceptable to me, something is not acceptable to me' 
considers thus. 'If I obstinately adhere to my view 'Something is acceptable 
to me, something is not acceptable to me', and declare 'Only this is true, 
anything else is wrong', then I may clash with the two otllersý with a 
recluse or brahmin that holds the doctrine and view 'Everything is 
acceptable to me' and with a recluse or brahmin that holds the view 
'Nothing is acceptable to me'. I may clash with these two, and -v,,, hen there 
is a clash, there are disputes, there are quarrels-, when there are quarrels, 
there is vexation. ' Foreseeing for himself clashes, disputes, quarrels and 
iew. vexation, he abandons that view and does not take up some other vi 
This is how there cornes to be tile abandoning of these views, this is how 
there comes to be the relinquishing of these views. ""' 
The alternative to nol clinging obstinately to a view is to equivocate through not 
knowing what is true or false- "'I don't say this, I don't say that. I don't say it is 
otherwise. I don't say it is not. I don't not say it is not. ""'(' 
As we have seen, however, this is one of the wrong, views of the 
Brahmajula Sulfa, the view of an 'Eel-wrimyler'. Here, then, I am raising tile question 
of whether the acadernic debate that characterises this thesis is "merely tile worry and 
vacillation of those immersed in craving. "111 if I were truly to embrace tile values of 
the Buddhist tradition as presented in the Nik5yas, perhaps tile most appropriate 
response to the interfaith debate would be silence. 
879M i 499. Blukkim Bodlii 605. 
880D i 26, Walshc 80. 
881D i 40-, WIlslic 87. 
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